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Chapter Sevens IST WING FILM AGENCIES 1933 - 1939 (II 
i 
1, The Workers' Film and Photo League 
The activities of the Workers' Film and Photo League spanned 
roughly four years from November 1934 until the end of 1938, although 
it did not close down until July 1935. During this period it produced 
at least. 27 films, all silent, and shot footage for many more. After 
1935 it provided its own distribution service, hiring its films prin- 
cipally-to local Labour and campaign organisations. It reportedly 
attracted as affiliated members thinly such groups; and assisted in 
the work of several local production units in various parts of the 
country. As an organisation it was. badly run, its finances chaotic, 
and its membership riven with divided loyalties and differing political 
perspectives. Its organisational reach was fat more restricted than 
Kinos, and its political status vis-a-vis the Labour movement as a 
whole was more tenuous. Nevertheless, the. League was the most prolific 
of production agencies operating within the constellation of Labour 
organisations in the 1930's, and appears to have been the most dynamic. 
in attempting to make workers 'film conscious'. This Chapter will 
follow the pattern of the previous one, discussing firstly the League's 
approach to film as a means of contributing to the 'class struggle'; 
secondly its, distribuzion and exhibition work; and lastly its productions. 
A representative sample of the League's films will be described; and. 
details of the specific context of production are provided for some 
of these. 
(i) 'Cine is the machine-gun of ideological warfare. ' (1) 
} 
As with Kino the League throughout its existence conceptual- 
ised film in terms of its utility in promoting the class struggle. 
More specifically, its members, several of whom were also involved. in 
Kin's work at"various times, considered that the medium was a valuable 
1. H. Marshall, HMO, FPL Publicity Leaflet, 'Left Film Front', n. d. 
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weapon in combatting; the propaganda of the 'ruling class', and in 
raising and guiding the class consciousness of the working class. As 
the League explained in its Manifesto, issued shortly after formin: 
up to now the making of films in this country has been almost 
entirely monopolised by the capitalist class. What have they' 
done with this monopoly? They have used it to give us a 
capitalist view of life: to show us life from a distorted 
angle. They have used it to glorify and justify their own 
parasite existence. Above all, they have used it to make us 
forget our own lives. 
Obviously, most people go to films to be entertained or to 
learn something. But there is nothing entertaining or 
instructive in the empty, hysterical love affairs of decadent 
Society women and their gangster or gigolo lovers - the 
subject of most commercial films. 
We have only to compare ay of the great Russian films like 
P to emkin or General Line with any English or American comm- 
ercial film to prove that there is more real heroism and 
real drama in the daily lives of our class - in the class 
which is making history - than in anything the capitalist 
class can show us. 
Workerst Film and Photo League thinks the time has come for 
workers to produce films and photos of their own. * Films and 
photos showing their own efforts, their own problems, their 
own organised efforts to solve these problems. 
For this purpose there must be joint coordinated activity 
bg all working class film and camera club organisations, all 
individual workers, students, artists, writers and technicians 
interested in films and photography. 
Workers' Film and Photo League exists to provide this co- 
ordination. (2) 
The most immediate task was to make films and provide classes on film am 
the most direct way of cultivating a general awareness within the 
Labour movement and the working class of the medium's value in political 
and educational work. To this end various production units operating 
under League auspices produced fifteen films between November 1934 and 
January 1936, that is, an average of one. film every month; and an arrange- 
ment was negotiated with Kino for their distribution and exhibition. 
2. British Film Insitute, FPL (2), Manifesto of the Workers' Film and 
Photo League, n. d., ? December 1934. 
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Thereafter production was more internittent, with seventeen films 
being made within three years, almost all in 1937. As Kino no longer 
automatically took FPL films greater efforts were made by members 
towards building a League network for distribution. 
While primary emphasis was given to production, the League' 
never lost sight of the importance of class work, and over the years 
organised a considerable number of lectures, classes, demonstrations, 
weekend schools and exhibitions specifically to cultivate interest in 
the use of films and photographs by the Labour mmvement and organisations 
of the working class, and to; provide technical instruction and general 
education in the possibilities of these media. A one-day school on 
'film-making', for example, was given on 7 July 1935 at the Studio 
Theatre in Finchley, at which Ivor Montagu gave a lecture on 'Films 
and Modern Society' and Paul Botha talked on 'Making films without 
money'. A series of lectures in mid-1937 included 'Making a Film' 
by Arthur Elton, 'Left Books and the League' by John Lewis of the LBC, 
and 'Modern Russian Technique' by Herbert Marshall. The programme for 
a four-day FPL school in January 1938 indicates the comprehensive 
approach of the League to film education. Talks on the theme of 'Film 
Consciousness'' included 'The critical approach to the commercial cinema', 
and 'The Socialist Alternative'; and on the theme of 'Techniques of 
Propaganda', talks such as 'Mass Observation with the Camera' and 
'The Psychological Angle'. Other themes focussed on practical work - 
script-writing, filming, editing, exhibition, sound recording and the 
use of film slides. (3) Most of these classes, and most of the exhibitions 
which the League itself arranged, were in London; but some were given 
where affiliated provincial groups existed. Manchester Film and Photo 
League gave regular, fortnightly shows for purposes of 'technical 
discussion'. (4) Photographic exhibitions occasionally toured the 
country, as did a library of League films in 1935-6; and attempts 
were made to establish a photographic library for use by the left press, 
both as a focus for generating interest in 'worker photography-' and to 
supply suitable papers and journals with appropriate material. (5) 
3. From various FPL publicity leaflets in the Eerbert Marshall Collection 
and the Cuthbertson Pavers. 
4. She Camera Forward, n. d., (no. 1, January 1936), p. 5. The journal was 
the monthly bulletin of the League, but only one issue was produced. 
5. Ibid., p. 4. 
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Throughout, the League's central coordinating body attempted 
to publicise the importance of film and photography for Labour orgqnisa- 
tions, and draw groups into its activities. Its self-appointed task 
was to 'endeavour to make all Left progressive political groups tine 
conscious'. (6) But the League's role extended beyond this: Labour and 
working class groups were to be encouraged to use films and photos for 
distinctly political purposes. They were to be used 'to forge a weapon 
to unite the working class movement', to contribute to 'exposing and 
combatting the evils of war, reaction and taboos' and to the opposition 
to'all forms of react4. on to the furtherance of World. Peace'. (7) While 
gradually eschewing the sloganised formulae characteristic of the 
communist section of the Labour movement, the League undoubtedly con- 
ceived of its activities in terms of making a small but valuable 
contiibution to the class struggle. The League saw itself assisting 
left and socialist agitation and propaganda work by putting forward 
an interpretation of events alternative to that dispensed by the con- 
ventional media, and in so doing combatting, in ideological terms, the 
more sinister aspects of media 'manipulation'- - the everyday, unseen 
effects of exposure to what the League called 'false social values". (8) 
As the League's Constitution revealed, its first object was 
To produce and popularise films and photos of working class 
interest, giving a true picture of the workers today and of 
their organised struggle to improve these conditions. (9) 
No less than Kino, the League was committed to a political use of film. 
Unlike Kino however, the League avoided any direct association with a 
specific political party, and although at various points during its 
existence the League aligned itself vaguely-with socialist and communist 
elements in Britain, its abiding political commitment was a more general 
one, to the Labour movement and the working class, and to 'grog 
forces. While political differences between the two groups led there- 
fore to a certain degree of overlapping of function and competition, 
6. Home Movies and Home Talkies, January 1938, P-3- 
7- BFI, (4), Typescript, 'FPL', (speaker's notes), n. d., 1938; 
FPL (2 ,, Publicity Circular, ' he Film and Photo League', 1936. 
8. Ibid., FPL (2), Publicity Circular, 1936. 
9. Ibid., FPL (2), Draft Constitution for the Workers' Film and Photo 
League', 1935" This was accepted by the League's committee in 1936. 
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the League's posture, under the circumstances of 'united front' and 
'popular front'- politics, which dominated the left of the Labour 
movement from 1935 onwards, complemented that of Kino, giving thereby-the 
impression that these two groups comprised the core of a united or 
homogeneous 'workers'_film movement'. 
(ii) Organisation, Exhibition and Distribution 
Propaganda apart, coordination was the League's major function. 
Given the widespread. interest in amateur-cinematography, (10) there was 
considerable potential for developing a 'left political cinema', but 
little by way of practical activity in that direction in 1934. The 
League not only devoted its energies to publicising the idea of such 
a cinema amongst cine enthusiasts, but assumed responsibility for 
assisting groups which wished to use film in this way, arranging for 
the production of material, providing guidance and advice, and generally 
providing a core of activists around which a left cinema could grow, 
bringing together people of diverse talents and interests. Consequently, 
during the year 1935-6, of the fifteen films in the production of which 
the League was involved, only one was specifically produced at the 
request of the League's central committee: the others were made at 
the request of other bodies, and different production units were formed 
on virtually every occasion, embracing members of the League and individ- 
uals from the commissioning bodies. Significantly, 'All productions 
were run by and from London, and no local-groups were activiseä'. (11) 
At its most basic League coordination served to bring to the attention 
of'groups the feasibility of film production and the existence of other 
interested groups throughout the country; and to provide equipment to 
enable local units to shoot material, and technical assistance in editing. 
Rhondda, a documentary containing remarkable scenes of unemployed miners 
scrambling across slag heaps in search of coal, predating by two years 
almost identical images in Paul Rothals celebrated Today We Live, (12) 
was made by a group in South Wales after the League had made a camera 
available. Constatction. shot by-builders on a site in London, was edited 
10. See, for example, Editorial, Amateur Cine World, April 1934, P"5. 
It was estimated in Sight and Sound, Spring 1935, p. 7, that there 
were over 400,000 amateur film-makers in Britain, and 200 amateur 
film clubs. 
11. BEI, FPL (unnumbered. file), 'Production During 1935-6', n. d., 
? March 1936. 
12. Both sequences were shot by Donald Alexander, who worked as a" 
documentary director and producer with Strand Films from 1936-1941. 
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and partly financed by-the League. The FPL arranged for Kino to 
distribute both films. 
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In mid-1935 the League was-'a small and staffleas society'(13) 
and only two provincial groups had affiliated to it by the end of the. 
year, Manchester FPL and Hull Workers' Film Society. The League's 
strength resided in its twenty or so committee members and a further 
sixty , fully paid up individual members, most of whom were based in 
London. (14) The League's coordinating role never really materialised 
beyond London until after mid-1937. As Kino discovered, having made 
a concerted effort to build up local cine units in 1936, though there,: 
may have been a body of interest, too few people were prepared to 
organise meetings and production work. It was only with the`dramatic 
rise in the Left Book. Club and popular frontist politics in 1937 that 
the League began to establish more widespread contacts and organise 
and coordinate film work among local provincial groups. By mid-1937 
the League had affiliated groups in Manchester, Doncaster, Hull, 
Glasgow, Sheffield, Liverpool, Dundee, Norwich, North Shields, Lincoln, 
Durham, Oxford, Cambridge and Cardiff. (15) In 1938 the League had 
an individual fully-paid-up membership of 92, a mailing list of roughly 
500, and 30 affiliated groups. (16) Typical of the organisations which 
affiliated were Aberdeen Independent Labour Party, Urmston and District 
Labour Party, Nottingham Cooperative Society Education Department, 
Walton-on-Thames Left Book. Club and Croydon League of Youth. 
The League had held a conference in conjunction with the 
Left Book Club in June 1937 "to discuss the coordination of sub-stand- 
ard film work for Left propaganda'. A. scheme was adopted intended, to' 
provide LBC groups regularly with visual propaganda, establish the 
League as the central coordinating body for all LBC groups which wished 
to show films or engage in film production, and provide a pool of resources 
for cooperation on film projects, particularly of national scope. (1T) 
13.. BFI", FPL (2), Circular to Members, n. d., June 1935. 
14. Ibid., FPL (2), Circuläx to Members, 28 February 1936. 
15. Leftfilmfront, no. 1, July 19379 P"3. This journal was the bulletin 
of the League. Further issues were produced but none have been 
discovered. 
16. BPI, FPL (2), H. Cuthbertson to J. Reeves, 5 July 1939. 
17. Leftfilmfront. no. 1, July 1937, p. 2. 
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The two main results of this development were firstly that the League. 
experienced an upturn in its fortunes; its activities were given far 
wider publicity-, its films subject to greater demand, and its status 
was dramatically improved. Secondly, a number of production units 
were formed, all under the auspices of the LBC groups, which, by mid- 
1938, were engaged in various projects under the League's supervision. 
Production units in Manchester, Reading, Sutton, Wembley and Pontypridd 
were 'simultaneously working on the first films to be made under the 
new production scheme'. (18) 
The League was committed to a'grand drive' 'to make all Left 
progressive political groups cine conscious. In this it had the help 
and support of the Left Book Club. '(19) It had also agreed with Kino 
in early 1938 to co-produce a film of May Day 1938 'in a first step 
towards the unification of all Left Cinema work', and planned a series 
of co-productions, including a full-length sound film. (20) The May Day- 
joint production never materialised, but cooperation continued, culmin- 
ating in the formation of a joint production group, the British Film 
Unit, which made at least two, possibly four, films. 
League attempts at the coordination of sub-standard left cinema 
work under its own auspices may have jeopardised the project from its 
inception. While there appears to have been little by way of fertile 
ground upon which to cultivate a 'left cinema', at least until 1937, 
the League was probably handicapped by its image - of being little 
more than a London-based largely working class cine club, almost 
indistinghishable from home movie societies which were to be found in 
most towns and cities in England, some of which made films of 'concerns 
for the poor, the unemployed, etc. (21) This image can only have been 
confirmed by the League's poor organisation and extremely limited 
resources. 
The WFPL started with no money (indeed, with a debt of ¬12 
to Kino) and no premises. Throughout its existence it operated on a 
hand-to-mouth basis. All committee members were volunteers and mater 
18. BPI, FPL (2), Publicity Circular, 'Film and Photo League', n. d., 
May-1938. See Left News, July 1938, p. 906. 
19. Home Movies and Home Talkies. January 1938, p. 3. 
20. BFI, FPL (2), Publicity Circular, 'Film and Photo League', n. d., 
May 1938. 
3 
ýý.. ý 
3t 
contributed to the Leaguers funds or eased cash-flow problems with 
donations and loans. An indication of the pitifully meagre funds 
available in the early years is given in one of the League's Minute 
Books. A total of E8 3s was raised in loans from 19 members in mid- 
1935 to enable work to continue, the largest individual loans being 
¬l 7s 6d from B. Wood, and ¬1 is from Frank Jackson (both Kino membera). (22) 
Annual deficits in the League's accounts were frequent, and by 1939 
debts totalled approximately ¬100. (23) The League functioned on such 
a tight budget that its distribution work was seriously hampered'by 
lack of sufficient copies of FPL films, as Cuthbertson revealed in 
reply-to complaints from a League customer: 
As we are only financed by small film-rentals and members' 
subscriptions, we, generally have to send out our 'cutting- 
copies'. (24) 
Members of the League were aware of the precarious . tyre of 
the group's existence and regularly made appeals for support and drives 
to secure new members and affiliations (fees in 1937 were 2s 6d per 
member of an LBC affiliated group, 2s 6d per other affiliated group, 
and the same for individual members). Hugh Cuthbertson tried to enlist 
the support of leading Labour figures such as G. D. H. Cole and John 
Strachey, and persuaded Victor Gollancz to loan ¬50 for the purchase 
of a Bolex camera. (25) 
One of the League's most difficult and damaging problems 
was lack of suitable premises. On formation the League used a small 
room in gin's offices at 86 Gray's Inn Road, WC1, and moved next door 
to 84 with Kino when it moved there after fire had destroyed Kin's 
offices (but not its films) in early 1935. In late 1935 relations between 
Kino and the League became rather strained after moves to secure the 
21. Bolton Amateur Cine Association, for example, produced a 12 miaute 
16mm silent film on-sly life in 1934, Gehenna in Britain. 
Kensington Sousing- Trust had its own film unit, under Mathew 
Nathan, and produced several documentaries on housing, maternity 
welfare and nurseries.. 
22. BPr, FPL (7), List at financial members - September 1935. Amount 
Loaned., in Minute Book 1934-5- 
23. Ibid., FPL (2), Cuthbertson to Reeves, 5 July 1939. 
24. Ibid.., Film and Photo League to Mrs. Sinker, 14 May 1938- 
25. Ibid., FPL (7), FPL Committee Minutes, 14 June 1937, Minute Book 
May 1935 - January 1936 (sic). 
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League's reunj. on with the distributor, and shortly after the League's 
annual general meeting in February 1936 it moved to one room at 4 Parton 
Street WC1, adjacent to the offices of Left Review. In May the same 
year the League moved to 5 Great Ormond Street WC1, sharing offices 
with Ivan Seruya's International Sound Films, the rooms being sub-let 
by-the Friends of the. Soviet Union. These offices were not suitable 
for the activities which the FPL wished to pursue, and on taking respon- 
sibility for the Secretaryship of the League in February 1937 Cuthbert- 
son volunteered his flat at 3 Somerset Terrace WC1 as the League's 
headquarters. From this date until its demise the League functioned 
without satisfactory premises, and relied on the continuing goodwill 
of Cuthbertson and Leonard Peto who allowed their homes to be used. 
for meetings and production work. Hopes had been high that rooms could 
be properly equipped and tenure made secure with a donation of 8173 
by-Jean Ross (the League's former-Secretary) in February 1936. But 
curiously few members of the League's Committee knew of this windfall 
until it was too late: in September 1936 ¬130 of this donation was 
unofficially transferred to Ivan Seruya to capitalise his own venture 
International Sound Films. (26) The money was never repaid during the 
League "s lifetime, and Cuthbertson, relating the problems of the League 
in 1939 to Joseph Reeves, Manager of the Workers' Film Association, 
was convinced that the 'Seruya loan' played a large part in hindering 
the League*s progress. (27) 
Without suitable premises the League could never fully develop 
its coordinating and productive roles. Cuthbertson drew up plans to 
raise funds and approached a number of left-wing personalities for 
assistance. As he explained in an appeal to Victor Gollancz: 
it is hopeless to expect any results in this work without 
a whole-time organiser or assistant, ýsome tangible funds 
for film stock and publicity, and studio, club and proj- 
ection premises where members can get together and work be 
done. Such a foundation outlay would in the (? )longer run 
be of far greater value to the movement that ¬500 or more 
invested in one professionally produced film. 
If you, with your-extensive contacts with progressive 
visionaries, and with your experience of finance, could 
sponsor a meeting to discuss such a project, this organisa- 
tion would be veri pleased to put a plan before you. 
Failing such a development, it must continue to be a some- 
what ailing and ineffective ehild of the movement. (28) 
26. BFI, FPL (2), Moscow Narodny Bank to Film and Photo League, 25 June 
1936; 4FPL Committee Minutes, 20 January 1937. 
27'. Ibid., Cuthbertson to Reeves, 5 July 1939. 
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The League's often chaotic and casual management further 
contributed to its ineffectivity. According to Cuthbertson the League 
suffered set backs because, the Seruya loan and his poor health apart, 
we seem to have collected and entrusted a very unreliable 
crowd of workers, with intentions much greater than 
[? ] realisations. (29) 
Equally significantly, Prank Cox, a League Committee member who resigned 
in. mid. -1937 on becoming Film Publicity Officer for the London Cooperative 
Society, complained to Cuthbertson that 
it is unfortunately one of the failings of this organisation 
that their meetings are never conducted in a businesslike 
manner. (30) 
This was perhaps an under-statement, as the FPL's minutes for January 
193T reveal that no-committee meetings had been officially held since 
the previous spring; (31) and the League almost disintegrated. on 
closing down the operation at 4 Parton Street the same month, with 
administrative records, equipment and films being dispersed for 
safekeeping with individual committee members until new premises 
could be found. 
Nor was the League's active core of members unswervingly loyal 
or dedicated to promoting the organisation. Sirre Seruya, who was given 
charge of the League's films in January 1937, engaged in doubtful 
dealings with the group's film stock; and Frank Cox, hitherto a regu]ar 
contributor to League productions, not merely refused to participate 
in the shooting of the May Day-1937'film, but took footage of the event 
for a rival organisation, Fleet Films (which survived only a few weeks). 
Many committee members lost their positions through consistent non- 
attendance at meetings (including Herbert Marshall), and several 
stalwarts simply resigned in 1938 and early 1939, perhaps disillusioned 
with left wing politics or the inability of the League to achieve any- 
thing, or possibly abandoning the work as futile in view of the 
approaching war. (32) 
28. BFI9 k (unnumbered file), Cuthbertson to P. Gollancz, 22 July 1938. 
29. Ibid., FPL (2), Cuthbertson to Reeves, 5 July 1939. 
30. x, F. Cox to Cuthbertson, 27 December 1936. 
31. 
, FPL Committee Minutes, 20 January 1937. 
32. FlL 7), FPL Committee Minutes, 22 February 1937; List of 
ZFMO ttee Members, 1938; D. Brotmacher to Cuthbertson, 20 March 
1938; 
. bid., 
(2), P. Davies to Cuthbertson, n. d., ? July 1938. 
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After 1936 the League relied heavily for its survival on the 
energy and enthusiasm of Hugh Cuthbertson. His own periodic illness 
ensured that the organisation never functioned smoothly and efficiently 
and was only intermittently operational. Moreover, despite the res- 
pectability of popular frontist politics amongst a small section of 
the Labour movement, it is probable that without the organisational 
reach and political status of the Left Book Club, the League would have 
folded far sooner than it did. 
On several occasions facing imminent collapse, and at its 
best workingxell within its limits, the League never recovered from 
Kinots moves in late 1935 to re-absorb the production group. As men- 
tioned earlier, Kino had attempted to exert greater control over the 
League's production work by proposing that the League should dissolve 
and its members re-join Kino. Albert Pizer's resolution, put to the 
FPL Committee, asserted that the League 
had not made enough progress in this first year, and that 
we had not been successful in activising groups in the 
provinces or getting other societies to affiliate. Also, 
that our production side could only develop through the 
influence and work of Kino as a distributor. (33) 1 
A further determining factor in this move had apparently been, as Kino 
explained in publicising its own Production Committee, that 'Kino has 
practically no films which deal with conditions in this country'-C34) 
Yet up to January 1936 the League had produced an average of one film 
every month. It was therefore certainly not a dearth of films which 
motivate& Kino. More likely, it would seem that political consider- 
ations were involved. In November the previous year two key League 
members Jean Ross and Sims Seruya had proposed that 
To. emphasiee the non-sectarian nature of the organisation 
and encourage membership from other film societies the 
name of this organisation be changed..... (35) 
33. BFI, k (7), FPL Committee Minutes, ? 17 January 1936, Minute Book 
May 1935 - January 1936. My emphasis. 
34. 'Kino Pio duction Committee, Left Review. May 1936, p"415. 
35. The wording of the Resolution is included in a letter from the 
League's Treasurer to a Cooperative Wholesale Society Bank in 
RL (2), n. d., June 1936. 
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The word 'Workers"" was subsequently-dropped from the League's title, 
the move being unanimously agreed at the annual general meeting of the 
League the following- February. While such a move was broadly consistent 
with popular frontist politics it made the League vulnerable to influence 
from people interested more in film (and photography) per se rather 
than in film's political utility for the left of the Labour movement. 
Indeed, according to the evidence of Sime Seruya, the League had already 
shifted its perspectives considerably within the first 12 months of its 
separate existences 
I 
we are essentially a broad-based. non-party organisation - 
our aims should and do appeal to wide sections of the 
public..... 
Kino is known as a courageous Distributor of Soviet films 
..... But by just that courage makes it difficult to appear 
non-party and they have failed to obtain the collabor- 
ation of many sections most essential for their own 
and our work. 
.... . 
Politically, if war or difficult relations occur with the 
USSR Kino may be rapidly closed down. (36) 
Seriiya urged that members vote in favour of developing the League 'as 
an independent, non-party, self-governing body', and stressed that a 
broad composition for the League was essentials 
Cooperation is the keynote of progress. Several members 
join us because they want to do -practical work, others 
because they are interested in the educational and cultural 
sides - one is as necessary as the other. (37) 
In view of Kino's commitment to the Communist Party it would seem that 
Pfizer's move to re-unite the League with Kino was grounded in political 
considerations: the League was drifting slowly beyond the influence of 
either the Party or Kino. gin's attempt at a it accompli by estab- 
lishing its own production unit failed, as a core of nine League members 
36. BFI, M (2), Written notes, (a statement opposing A. Pizer's res- 
olution at, the 1936 A((), n. d., no signature (Sime Serum, 1936). 
37. Ibid. Nay emphasis. 
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rejected the move and re-activated the League on a new basis, appealing 
to those 'whose interest in films is mainly general', (38) and in so 
doing taking a further step towards-transforming the League into a 
film society. A further consequence was that relations between the 
two groups became less amicable, particularly in view of the disaffection 
of several League members, presumably offended by the political intrigue 
and manoeuvring of both groups. 
Thereafter, the League and Kino developed uneasily along 
similar paths, their Activities often overlapping, and as the FPL 
became increasingly unable to pay its debts Kino became less tolerant 
of its poor-relation, resolving in November 1938 that all future film 
hire by the League would have to be pre-paid.. (39) Moreover, Sin's original 
fear that the League's political perspectives would become increasingly 
obscure would seem to have been well-founded. The League appears to 
have developed a two-sided character, populated by both cine. enthusiasts 
and politically-motivated film-makers, becoming more pronounced as the 
decade wore on. Indeed, David Brotmacher, the League. 's Treasurer, 
recalled that by 1938 most of the League's members, while vaguely 
left wing, were interested mainly in making films rather than producing 
material for political work; (40) and for some time the League acted 
indiscriminately as a distributor for local cine clubs, as part of its 
coordination work. (41) 
Of the numerous projects planned only one League film appears 
to have been completed and released after January 1938. Such was the 
degree of general deterioration that in March 1938 the Kino Committee 
decided that several members still involved in the FPL should 'go into 
P+PL and get hold of its to'get the F+PL moving', and-proposals were 
drawn up for joint production as a first step in this direotion. (42) 
While there is indufficient evidence to draw firm conclusions it is 
38. BPI9 FPL (2), Circular, 'To All Members of the Workers' Film and 
Photo League', April 1936. 
39. Ibid., FPL (3), B. Bower (for Kino) to D. Brotmacher (FPL Treasurer), 
29 November 1938. 
40. D. Brotmacher, in an interview with the author, 16 November 197T. 
41. FPL (2), M. Chaplin to Cuthbertson, 20 May 1938- 
42. H. Marshall, HNC, Kino Committee, Minutes, 23 March 1938. 
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probable that this move by Kino was more than an attempt to"revivify 
the ailing League. The outcome was the splintering of the League still 
further and the formation of the British Film Unit; - consisting of 
members of both groups, to produce a series of propaganda films for 
the Kino group, which had by now decided yet again to devote all its 
resources to distribution. (43) 
Up to February 1936 the FPL's productions were more or less 
automatically taken by Kino for distribution, on a financial basis, 
the League confining itself to production. Exhibitions were given, 
of course, as part of its educational activities, but most exhibitions 
of League films were organised by or through Kino. An indication of 
the scope of the exhibition of FPL films in the early years is given 
by information contained in a League document detailing its production 
work for the 1935-6 year. According to this üAB (Workers'- Newsreel No. 3) 
was shown on 15 occasions, Transport 20 times, Workers' Newsreel No. 4 
27, Jubilee 32, Holiday from Unemployment 329 Construction 14, and 
Defence of Britain 12. (44) These seven films were shown a total of 
152 times within a few months - Construction and Defence of Britain, 
for example, were only released in December 1935. It is unlikely that 
they were in great demand compared with Sin 's Soviet material,. although 
there is not enough evidence to draw firm conclusions. From 1936 this 
exhibition probably expanded, with the assistance of the LBC nationwide 
network, but here again there is a paucity of documentation. In the 
first few months of that year the entire collection of League material 
was being shown around the country in an extended tour to publicise the 
League and build contacts. (45) The League's balance sheet for the 1937- 
8 year reveals that film rentals raised ¬20 16s in revenue. (46) By 
far the majority-of films in its library could be hired for 2s, some 
for 4s and two two-reelers for 10s each. As League films were shown as 
a supplement to the exhibition of larger productions obtained from Kino, 
or more usually before small audiences to illustrate talks, the average 
43. PRO EQ, HO 45 21109/695383/67;. 'Memorandum of Evidence', op. cit, 
44. BFI, FPTx (unnumbered file), 'Production During 1935-6', n. d., 
? March 1936. 
45. Ibid.., ZRIL Circular to Members, 28 February 1936. 
46. Ibid., Film and Photo League. Balance Sheet, January 1936. 
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film hire was probably one or two films, costing no more than 6s. A 
mimimum average film hire would reveal the maximum possible mzmber of 
occasions on which FPL films were shown. If we-take this minimum to 
be one film, with a hire charge of 2s, then the maximum number of shows 
for the 1937-8 year would have been 208, considerably less than gin 's 
exhibition for the same period. 
The total audience size is indeterminate, but average audiences 
for individual shows were probably far smaller than gin 's. This vaa 
due less to the greater attractiveness of gin's material and more to 
the League's organisational structure and policy. As Cuthbertson 
explained in mid-1938: 'As far as has. been possible our policy has been 
to leave the field of distribution to Kino Films-'(47) The League 
had arrived at 
a mgtual understanding with Kino and..... will be chiefly 
catering for shows in rooms and small halls and encouraging 
production of films by amateurs. (48) 
Such an accommodation was as much recognition of the League's inferior 
organisational network as a compromise between two groups implicitly 
in competition, as Cuthbertson revealed in reply to a request for 
films : 1, 
We had, Z think, better refer you to Messrs. Kino.... 
as we are a production society and not organised or 
equipped for projection outside London, except where 
we have members in the locality, or others willing to 
lend their projectors. (49 
Correspondence in the Cuthbertson Papers suggests that the 
demand for League films was far greater than the actual number of shows 
given or for which films were provided. Poor administration accounts 
47.. BPI, M(unuumbered file), Cuthbertson to S. Freedman, (Secretary 
of the joint production unit), 19 July 1938- 
48. Left News, August 1937, P"479" See also Leftfilmfront, no lt 
July 1937, P"3. 
49. FI (6), `Cuthbertson to Shildon Left Book Club, 17 February 1938. 
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in some part for this discrepancy. The League simply failed to reply 
to many inquiries. (50) But it could not always meet demand through 
lack of films, as Cuthbertson implied in reply to an inquiry from 
Bristols 
glad to hear always from people who want to PRODUCE (over- 
flooded with letters wanting to hire - but so few films - 
we want amateurs to get busy and rectify this. ) (51) 
Since the League possessed only one copy of most of its films its 
distribution/exhibition work was at the mercy of its customers. Some 
failed to return films immediately after use or pay hire charges, (52) 
and films were frequently returned in a damaged state. Subsequently, 
in December 1937 the League's Committee resolved to restrict its hire 
service to affiliated bodies and members, and only on occasions where 
suitable projection apparatus was known to be available. (53) As there 
were no more than 30 affiliated groups at the peak of its activities 
League distribution/exhibition work was consequently far more circum- 
scribed than gin's. 
Parallel with Kino however the League developed international 
contacts, and provided material for several organisations in North 
America (Toronto Workers" Educational Association, Ontario Left Book 
Group, New York Film and Photo League), Australia (Sydney LBC) and 
South Africa (Johannesburg Left Wing Social Club), and arranged at the 
request of Herbert Marshall an exchange of material with film organisa- 
tions in Moscow-(54) In Britain the League attempted to broaden its 
support through close collaboration with the Left Book Club, (55) and 
50. BPI9 JU (2), see for example letters from the National Clarion 
Cycling Club, 10 and 25 November 1938, and from the Combined. 
Apprentice Chapel, Watford Branch, 20 and 29 March 1938. 
51. Ibid., Cuthbertson to G. Thomas, 17 February 1938. 
52. Ibid., see for example the League's correspondence with A. S. Willis, 
May - August 1938. 
53. Ibid., FPL (7), FPL Committee Minutes, 15 December 1937. 
54. Ibid., FPL (2), see correspondence in this file; FPL (7), FPL Comm- 
ittee Minutes, 27 May 1935,3 June 1935. The League also acquired 
a number of silent newsreel from Castle Films in New York, in 1937-8. 
55. See Left News, June 1937, P"392; August 1937, PP"479-80; July 1938, 
P"906- 
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appealed to marry national trade union organisations to arrange shows 
and commission productions, such as the Associated Society of Loco- 
motive Engineers and Firemen, the National Union of Tailors and Garment 
Workers and the Transport and General Workers' Union. (56) 
A reliable indication of the range of organisations hiring 
FPL material in the post-1936 period is given in the correspondence 
to be found in the Cuthbertson Papers, and the following list is a 
representative sample: 
Urmston and District Labour Party 
Romford and District LBC 
Birmingham LBC 
Aldershot LBC 
Hackney Labour Party 
Barrow LBC 
National Clarion Cycling Club 
Bristol Branch of the National Union of Shop Assistants, 
Warehousemen and Clerks 
Aberdeen ILP 
Bromley Labour Party 
Nottingham Cooperative Society Education Department 
Plymouth LBC Film Group 
Willesden Theatre Group 
Walton-on-Thames LBC 
Arun Film Society 
Rugby LBC 
Lancashire and Cheshire Film Service (Kino Regional Agent) 
Holborn Labour Party League of Youth 
Croydon League of Youth 
Dover Labour Party 
ILP London and Southern Counties Division 
Croydon Labour Party 
Manchester Film and Photo League 
Hackney Film and Photo League 
Individual films proved popular with particular organisations. Co nstrict- 
ion. for example, was of agitational value mainly for building workers' 
unions, and was apparently shown almost exclusively to thirty of their 
branches within six months of its completion. (57) The various reels 
56. BFI. Z'L, (7), FPL Committee Minutes, 8 March 1937,12 April 1937; 
H. Marshall, XC, various items of correspondence. 
57. World Film News, June 1936, p. 21. 
i 
r covering national hunger marches not surprisingly were popular with 
branches of the N1WM. FPL films were screened, paradoxically, before 
less varied audiences than those attending exhibitions of films from 
Kino's library. This was no doubt due to the League's organisational 
problems, but also to the League's far lower national profile. It did 
not, moreover, enjoy a close relationship with the Communist Party or 
any of its orbital groups - other than Kino itself; and the League 
lacked the widespread contacts which Kino developed in the Labour 
movement and the film industry. 
I 
One area where the League did surpass the work of Kino 
however was the amateur cane movement. Many local groups showed 
League productions, and some participated in the League's educational 
and production work, such as the North London Film Society. Hugh 
Cuthbertson's extensive contacts in this respect were particularly- 
important, drawing into 'left political cinema' leading cine enthusiasts 
such as George Sewell (Vice-President of the Institute of Amateur 
Cinematography), who produced Gaiety of Nations, an anti-war film, 
which was shown widely through the League, and Mathew Nathan, who 
produced Pomp and Circumstance, Housing Progress and Nursery School. 
League exhibition was on a much smaller scale than that of 
Kino. Correspondingly the exhibition services which it provided were 
more limited. All the FPL's material was on silent 16mm stock, and 
som*ilms were available on 9.5mm. Sound disc commentaries were available 
from 1937 onwards, and some films were specially produced for such 
accompaniment. Spanish Travail, for example, shot by League members 
in Spain, was 'cut to the sound of the mass recitation'of "On Guard 
for Spain"'-(58) Commentary scripts and recorded music were also available. 
League projectors could be hired for use with the FPL's Kodachrome films 
such as Coronation May Da<v, but before 1937 the League had to hire the 
projectors from Kino for its own shows. Also from 1937 onwards the 
League offered speakers from within its own ranks to accompany film 
exhibitions at meetings in the London area. (59) Charges for film hire 
58. Left News. December 1937, P. 624. 
59. Leftfilmfront, no. 1, July 1937, P"3. 
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for full-length exhibitions given by League members with a talk to 
introduce the films were usually £l. (60) League films were intended 
for low-key exhibitions before small audiences which did not usually 
charge an entrance fee (unlike Kino); and the services which the League 
provided corresponded' to this: a typical show could be given for far 
less than £1 in 1937, whereas a Kino show, intended for audiences upwards 
of 100, could be had for £3 - £5. 
(iii) Production 
I 
Of the 27 films which the League produced between November 
1934 and December 1938 two-thirds were of a documentary or agitational 
type; the rest were newsfilms or newsreels. Description will be confined 
to about a quarter of these. The accounts which follow are based on 
the viewing of all extant League-Films, in the Cuthbertson Collection, 
now in the National Film Archive, and elsewhere. (61) Firstly, however, 
some account is necessary of the development of the League as a production 
organisation. 
The League's principal role throughout its existence was-the 
coordination of production work, and in all its publicity proclaimed 
itself as the only working class organisation in Britain specifically, 
concerned with the production of films. With desperately poor resources 
it was reliant on other organisations or. individuals commissioning 
the League or requesting its assistance. Consequently only one of its 
productions in the 1935-6 year, Winter. had been planned by the League. 
The rest were financed by private loans or the commissioning bodies, 
and either co-produced or completed with League assistance. FPL prod- 
uction units therefore were formed on an ad hoc basis, and usually 
dissolved on completion of the film in question. They were consequently 
fluidic, constantly changing in composition according to who was 
available and who was willing to assume responsibility for a film. 
Holiday from Unemployment, a documentary film on the work of a camp 
in Oxford for-unemployed Welsh miners, and commissioned by the Camp 
60. Leftfilmfront, no. 1, July 1937, P"3. 
61. Of considerable value in this respect has been an unpublished 
descriptive catalogue compiled by Victoria Wegg-Prosser, dated 1977. 
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Committee, was finished with League assistance. The production 
unit consisted of E. Stich, J. Turner, Sam Handel, Herbert Green, Albert 
Pizer, Philip Leacock and P. Rhodes. Defence of Britain, financed by 
private loans, was produced by Frank Jackson, John Maltby, Jean Ross, 
and P. Bradshaw; and Winter was produced by Ralph Bond, Irene Nicholson, 
J. Goldmann, Peter Davies, Albert Pizsr, Sam Handel, Frank Jackson 
and (? )R. McNaughton. (62) 
A variety of organisations approached the League to produce 
material, including the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Daily Worker, 
the %ung Communist League, North Kensington Labour Party, the British 
, 
Seperanto Association, the Left Book Club and the National Clarion 
Cycling Club. (63) Through lack of funds most of the productions 
requested never materialised. Similarly, a number of production 
'groups' were formed within the League's central organisation in 
London - feature, newsreel, and still photography - but non appears 
to have really- succeeded in establishing any sense of identity and 
continuity. The newsreel group, for example, consisted of people only 
free to shoot at weekends, which made it difficult for the group to 
function adequately; and no funds were available to support a reasonable 
coverage of working class 'newsI beyond events in London. The group 
was consequently compelled to provide what it called a monthly 'Kino-Egge' 
bulletin, which would be less topical and of more lasting value. (64) 
Four films were produced, known collectively as Workers' Newsreel No. 4, 
and the group folded in late 1935. Lack of funds as much as lack of 
cohesion was the source of the Leaguers paralysis as an. indpendent 
production organisation. Although in 1937 and. early 1938 it succeeded 
in producing material without sponsorship or commissions, this was 
probably due more talpersonal donations by Hugh Cuthbertson and one or 
two others to League coffers than the financial strength of the group. 
Ivan Seraya shot a good deal of footage in Spain for the League's 
Spanish Travail and Spain 1936-7. Cuthbertson financed and, supervised 
62. BPI, PL (unnumbered file), Production During 1935-6, n. d., ? March 
1936. 
63. Ibid., FPL (4), Suggestions for Film Scenarios, n. d. 
64. Ibid., FPL (2), List of League Groups and Projects, n. d., ? Nay 1935. 
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the paoduction of a series of films on Maly' Day 1937, Coronation May- 
D (a shorter version of which was released as The Merry Month of Max), 
The Spirit of May Day, and-May the First 193T. Other purely League 
productions included A Penny to Spend, Generous. Soil and People's Front 
Newsreel (the first and only reel of 'A series of films intended to 
run progressively in the style of "March of Tima"). (65) By early, 
1938 the League's production work had. ground to a halt: no more films- 
were being completed and released, even though much footage was being 
shot. The People's Front Newsreel scheme had envisaged a sequence of 
seven monthly- 'bulletinar" but. only one was released. A film on events 
in China never materialised despite help from the China Campaign 
Committee; and a two- or three-reel compilation of footage dealing with 
British and European events during 1937 and early 1938 failed to appear 
even though the footage had already been acquired from Castle Pilms in 
New Fork. The League was clearly close to collapse. Under such 
circumstances some League members were receptive to Kinots proposals 
for joint production, but differences in perspective and financial 
hardship again precluded any effective cooperation. - As Ciithbertson 
explained to Sol Freedman, of Kino, in reply to suggestions that the 
project needed more money to see it through to completion: 
it--is doubtful if we would be able to anywhere near meet 
the cost of the film by our rentals. It is therefore verr, 
äoubtful if the League could consider any further expend- 
iture on the May Day film.... (66) 
gin's assistance and Cuthbertson's enthusiasm apart, prob- 
abl, r . the only reason for the League's continuation in 1938 was the 
involvement of the Left Book Club. The Club had gone to considerable. 
lengths to publicise League films, encourage Groups to use its 
material, and generally assist in the FPL's project of making people 
'eine conscious'. One of the main thrusts of League work in this 
direction was the formation of production units and, apart from spawning 
two in London (Hackney FPL and Islington FPL), had only succeeded in 
building affiliated units in Manchester and Hull, of which at least 
the former had, by 1937, produced and. shown its own materials Lancashire 
Peace Demonstration. Manchester at Work and A Trip to 8ussia. (67) In 
65. BPI, 'P (2), Film and Photo League 'Film List', n. d., ? August 1937. 
66. Ibid., FPL (unnimabered file), Cuthbertson to Freedman, 19 July 1938, 
and 27 , Tu17 1938. 
67. Unfortunately little is ]mown of either group or these films. 
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mid-1937 the LBC convened a conference with the League 'to discuss the 
coordination of substandard film work for Left propaganda'; (68) and 
at the Club's simmer school at Digswell Park in July/August 1937 the 
League gave instruction on film production and produced Red. Right and 
Bloo (a 'story-comedy documentary') with the help of students at the 
school. (69) The scheme of coordination involved the League providing 
instruction, guidance, equipment, editing facilities, scenarios, and 
an organisational focal point. It was anticipated that the types of 
film to be made would cover 'local conditions, working class life, 
cultural problems. Story and documentary films, also subjects suitable 
for children'. (70) Various LBC/FPL production units subsequently came 
into operation, but there is nothing in League files to suggest that 
aryl films were completed. Paradoxically, at that point in its history 
when the League made its most significant political and organisational 
breakthrough, the central organisation was on the verge of disintegration. 
League productive work consequently came to an end, and the more politic- 
ally motivated of its members joined with associates from Kino to 
form the British Film Unit. 
Sharing the general belief widely held within left circles 
of the power of the film medium to convey 'reality' and of its value 
in influencing opinion, members of the league, judging by the character 
of their produntions, attached immense importance to the newsfilm, the 
newsreel and the documentary as the cinematic forms most appropriate 
for the League's educational and propagandist roles. Only one feature, 
Fight, was produced by the League, compared with 11 newafilms or news- 
reels and 15 documentary propaganda films. Undoubtedly there was an 
awareness that 
films capable of appreciation only by the converted are 
already-far in excess of, for example, thirty-minute 
'entertainment' features explainer the important aspects 
of the struggle to the politically unenlightened. Thus, one 
object is to correct this trend in the League's early 
development. (71) 
68. Leftfilmfront, no. 1, July 1937, P-1- 
69. This film was selected for exhibition by the Royal Photographic 
Society. 
70. Leftfilmfront, no-l# Jury 1937, P-1- 
71. BPI9 FP, M I (2), Publicity Circular, 'Film and Photo League', n. d., 
? May 1938. 
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But the Leagna's Central London Branch, the main unit of the FPL, had 
already decided in view of the current political situation 
to postpone the production of any long 'feature' and to 
concentrate on the production of as many 'shorts' of 
topical and Socialist interest as possible. (72) 
All the League's surviving productions tend to use a 'camera as witness' 
approach, but few if any are confined to this mode of filming, employ- 
ing agitational techniques in newsfilms as much as in documentaries. 
Examples of the League's newsfilm and newsreel production are = 
(Workers' Newreel No. 3), Workers' Newsreel No. 4, News Review 19379 
Challenge of Youth and People's Front Newsreel, UAB was made as a 
record of the national demonstration of 24 February 1935 against the 
Unemployment Assistance Board and the new procedures for assessing and 
dispensing 'unemployment assistance' which had come into force in 
January- that year. The crucial aspect of the UAB was that its scales of 
relief effectively reduced payments for many people. Large-scale 
protests and demonstrations took place throughout the country in January 
and February 1935 and the Government issued instructions to the Board 
to maintain existing scales of relief until the furore had subsided. 
The demonstration on 24 February was a national day-of demonstration 
organised by the National ünmeployed Workers' Movement, calling for the 
complete repeal of the Unemployment Act of 1934, Part II of which had_ 
introduced the UAE. Still attached to the communist section of the 
movement the WFPL. appealed via the pages of the Daily Worker for people 
to shoot 16mm footage (roughly-25 feet) of their local demonstrations. 
The League itself had four people filming marches in Hyde Park and 
Shoreditch, and the deputation to the Ministry of Labour. (73) 
The twelve minute film opens with a close-up of a report in 
the Daily Worker of a meeting in Wood Green. 'Bury the UAB' is followed 
by scenes of a mass demonstration on 'February 24' 'Against the Slave Act'. 
Various banners belonging to a number of contingents are seen in the 
gathering. In Hyde Park we see speakers on a platform, including Tom 
Mann and James Matton. Newspaper reports follow detailing those local 
councils which supported the action of workers in opposition to the 
UAB's proposed cuts in relief. The film appears to end with 'Smash the 
72. BPI, F=L (7), FPL Production Committee Minutes, 31 March 1938. 
73. Daily worker, 19 Febi ry 1935, P"4; 26 February 1935, P"4" 
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Starvation Act', 'Down with the National Government', but an 'Epilogue' 
follows. 'Hyde Park. Arrests: Men in Court - Only Police Give Evidence 
for Prosecution'; and the film finally ends with a jibe at the Daily 
Herald's claimed failure to report these events in detail. 
This was the first production of the League since the group 
had split from Kino, and while lacking the agitational qualities of 
earlier material is considerably more accomplished. As the WFPI. 
Newsreel Group reported after the film's completion, UAB 'was technic- 
ally and in every other way -a hundred per cent improvement on all past 
newsreel work'. (74) 
Workers' Newsreel No. 4 was composed of individual films prod- 
uced by the League at the request of other bodies, and re-edited by., 
Kino into a 'workerst newsreel' in the late simmer of 1935. The individ- 
ual. items were 'Mag Day in Hyde Park', 'Soviet Folk Dancers in London 
for the International Festival', 'The ILP Summer School in Letchworth' and 
the 'Visit of Tom Mann to a Pioneers Camp'. All but the item on Soviet 
Dancers has survived. May Day 1935: Labour Marches to Celebrate May Day 
is incomplete, footage having been taken out, lasts barely one and a 
half minutes, and has no titles other than the opening one. The opening 
shots show a flurry of banners moving in front of a hoarding above 
the entrance to an undeaground station - its message reads: 'Long Live 
the King'. There are scenes in Hyde Park, and shots of Herbert Morrison 
addressing an audience. LP Summer School August 1935 was shot by 
Kino, and has already been described. London Workers' Outing, Easter, 
I=, a two-minute film bereft of titles (except the-opening one), depicts 
sports and games at a Pioneers' Camp at High Beech. Tom Mann and Harry 
Pollitt are seen addressing a gathering. 
In 1935 the League abandoned the production of regular newsreels 
and concentrated on short newsfilms - films lasting between two and five 
minutes, each giving news of one particular event. The above clearly 
fall into this category. Despite numerous attempts, and there are 
many- unedited. sequences of actuality footage in the Cuthbertson Collection 
74. BFI, PL (2), 'List of League Groups and Projects, n. d., May 1935. 
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to demonstrate that this conception of film-making was maintained iI 
(including some fascinating footage of the Cable Street confrontation), 
no-further newsfilms were released until 1 937" In that year various 
League members produced material which was later re-edited by Kino ifith 
other footage to form News Review 1937. The review consisted of the 
following items: 'Busmen's Strike', 'May Day', 'Mosley Demonstrations 
at Whiterhapel and N. London!, 'Labour Party demand Arms for Spain at 
Trafalgar Square', tCommunist meeting in support of International Brigades, 
'Strikes in Trinidad'', 'Workers' Sports Olympiad at Amsterdam' and 
'Boycott Japan demonstration in Oxford Street'-(75) Probablyyall. but 
those items depicting foreign events were produced by League members. 
One of the newsfilms included in the review which has survived is 
'Busmen's Strike'. Originally known as_Buamen's Holiday it is a five- 
minute item on the London bus strike, the occasion of a confrontation 
between a communist-led trade union rank and file and the social demo- 
cratic trade union leadership (dominated by Ernest Bevin). The film 
was shot by Herbert and Raymond Green. The strike, arising from 
demands for a reduction in working hours, is indicated by opening scenes 
of people walking to work, rows of stationary-buses, busworkers marching 
and shots of clenched fists and banners. Speakers address a gathering 
in Hyde Park. The film then changes abruptlyto scenes of the strikers 
having a day-out in Brighton, where they have a meal in a hotel, hear 
Tom Mann deliver a speech, and go down to the beach to enjoy community 
singing to the accompaniment of an accordion and a small brass band. 
In the incomplete surviving copy there are no titles, and there is 
little by way of explanation of the issues at stake in the strike, dealing 
more with the 'day out' than either the conflict with the union leader- 
ship or the dispute between the busworkers and their employers. The 
film has the character of a 'home movie', cheerfully capturing the 
holiday spirit of the workers rather than any sense of political or 
economic struggle. 
ßcamples of the 'documentary' productions of the League are 
Revolt of the Fishermen, Dockworkers, March Against Starvation, Holiday 
From Une=loymen, Transport and May First 1937. Shot in Hull by Michael 
75. H. Marshall, EMC. Kino Publicity Leaflet, n. d., ? November 1937. 
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Burke and Adrianne Hanne Revolt of the Fishermen describes the strike 
of Easter 1935. The ten-minute film opens with shots of a lighthouse, 
the seashore and a fishing boat returning to port. 'British fishermen 
bring tc/bur shores the bulk of the fish we eat. ' A close-up of fish 
on the quay is followed by 'The price we pay is high, but the fishermen 
get - what? '. The film proceeds to detail the fishermen's grievances, 
and contrasts scenes of 'derelict homes' with a poster for the Ideal 
Home Exhibition. Despite danger at sea 'they have suffered terriffic 
(sic) wage cuts'. However, 'The Transport Workers' Union begins to 
organise on a national! basis'; and we see local TGWU officials addressing 
meetings. 'Easter 1935 strike for recognition of Union. ' Closed goods 
depots are shown, a quayside is deserted, pickets await the return of 
boats to recruit new members to the union. Some strikers are seen 
fishing for food from rowing boats; others. are shown waiting with police 
for news of the negotiations. 'The Strike is won' is followed bfr rapid 
shots of a pub and smiling faces. The return to work is suggested by 
fishing boats leaving harbour and returning laden with fish; and the 
film ends with 'Like all Workers with an Organised Front - Unceasing in 
their Fight for Social Security'. 
While the events depicted actually took place, and some of 
the scenes are used to good effect, the film is pervaded by a curiously 
ingenuous story-like approach. The struggle for unionism and better 
conditions within the industry was no doubt hard fought, -and 
the outcome 
certainly not a foregone conclusion, but the film presents the issues 
with fairy-tale simplicity, presenting the strike more as a parable 
than an account of a particular dispute. 
March Against Starvation, funded. partly by the National 
Unemployed Workers' Movement, is probably one of the League's most 
accomplished films. Container footage shot in various parts of the 
country by London and provincial League members, the film provides a 
detailed account of a number of NUWM contingents setting out on their 
trek towards London, their convergence on the capital, the organisation 
of the March under Wal Hasmington's direction, and the demonstrations 
and rallies which took place in London in November 1936. The film is 
a cooperative production, with members of Manchester FPL, Doncaster 
Workers' Film Society, Glasgow Kino (Selen Biggar), International 
Sound Films (the Seruyas), the Socialist Film Council (Rudolph Messel) 
and Cambridge Film Productions (Geoffrey Inns and James Harris, who 
932- 
had provided newsreel material for the League in 1934) contributing 
to the filming and editing of the production. It was probably this 
diversity of involvement which was responsible for the release of the 
film being delayed unitl April 1937. 
Presented as a 'Story of the National Protest 1936' the two- 
reel film opens with close-ups of pamphlets and books ccncerned with 
nutrition. Graphics detail the amount of money which the unemployed 
receive for food, the arge ment being reinforced by scenes of slum 
housing and shots of'newspaper. headlines regarding the plight of children 
suffering from the effects of malnutrition. A close up of a UAB, 
official is preceded by 'further cuts are threatened by UAB' and succeeded 
by 'Hut the NUWM has organised the workless people'. Hannington is seen 
in his office organising the 'National Protest March', and marching 
routes are detailed. The film moves quickly to scenes of various act- 
ivities in preparation for the hunger march, including people collect- 
ing money-on the street and marchers choosing footwear. Numerous 
contingents-of marchers are seen setting off from various cities, and 
there are shots, of Ellen Wilkinson addressing crowds before the Jarrow 
march (a coincidental protest march which specifically excluded NUWM 
involvement). One contingent is seen approaching 'York - the Forbidden 
City'; and shots of food being prepared and tables set in a Salvation 
Army hostel are followed by 'But imported police bar the way and try 
to break the marchers' self-control'. The first reel ends here with 
a still of Baldwin and a caption, 'We cannot receive the marchers'. 
Continuing with the progress of the same contingent we see shots of 
the marchers' unscheduled trek to Selby, in whose town hall they are 
allowed to eat and sleep. Some have their hair cut and others their 
clothes washed. A Welsh contingent is seen preparing food and eating 
on the roadside. Several members of the group are seen in close-up, 
and they display- their war-medals. A contingent of women marchers is 
shown arriving at. a scheduled rest-point to a warn reception from a 
largely female gathering, and a title reads, 'Women Unite'. The 
'Scottish East Contingent' is featured, and details of one man who 
died en route are given: 'He-gave his life in the fight to end the 
Means Test and, Poverty'. There follows footage of ranks of police 
in readiness, and graphics explain how the marchers converged on London. 
'London Labour Welcomes Marchers', and a rally is seen in Trafalgar 
Square, addressed by Harry Pollitt and others. The November Day of 
Remeberance is identified by reference to the laying of wreaths. Quickly 
juxtaposed with scenes of another mass rally in Hyde Park, in which 
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various speakers are seen in close-up, including Clement Attlee and 
Ben Tillett, is the following caption: 'Baldwin now says "We cannot 
receive the marchers"'. The latter part of this is crossed out and 
replaced by '"Z will arrange that the Ministry of Labour receive a 
deputation"'. The message is reinforced by close-ups of marchers and 
the final title, 'Nass Pressure Wins'. 
While having less than newsreel value when released, the 
film retained a strong propaganda value, for it recorded not merely 
a hunger march but a national protest against the Unemployment 
Assistance Board which, at. the instruction of the National. Government, 
had postponed introducing its revised unemployment relief scales in 
February 1935 until November 1936. The NUWM response in the autumn of 
1936 had been the same as that in early 1935 --to launch a massive 
publicity campaign and organise a national protest to try and compel 
the Government to change its policy and, ultimately, repeal the 
Unemployment Act of 1934. As with previous Kino or League films of the 
1934 and 1935 NUWM marches that of 1936 was part of this long-term 
publicity campaign, and lost nothing of its relevance despite the long 
delay, ' in release because the NUWM campaign continued throughout 1937 
in opposition to the implementation of the new relief scales. 
Just as national hunger marches proved irresistible attractions 
to the League and other left wing film agencies, so May Day was a 
regular source for League film activity. The events arising therefrom 
(for there were usually two May Day demonstrations, one organised by 
the communist section of the Labour movement, taking place on the 
first day of May, the other organised by the social democratic sections 
taking place on the first Sunday of the month) provided film groups with 
much subject material with which to contribute to both the ritual of 
celebrating the traditions of Laboes history and to the affirmation of 
the political unity- of the Labour movement. The optimism and buoyancy 
of the broad left of this movement during the early months of 1937 has 
been well described by John Saville in his excellent article, May 
Day 1937'. (76) Amid this confident atmosphere Cuthbertson and members of 
the League planned a series of films on the year's May Day demonstrations 
76. J. Saville, 'May Day 1937. in A. Briggs, J. Saville (eds. ), Essays 
in Labour History, 1918 - 1939 (London, 1977). 
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and their significance. May First 1937 is a"ten-minute docimientary 
record of the communist demonstrations in London. Much of the material 
shot for this film was to be incorporated in a larger film, Coronation 
May Dap, which was intended to have a greater propaganda content, 
juxtaposing the Coronation celebrations with war preparations and 
poverty, and the mass organised opposition of the, Labour movement 
to both. Cuthbertson's instructions for camera units preparing to 
film the demonstrations have survived and provide a glimpse of this 
optimism and a suggestion of the League's loose political and organisa- 
tional unity: I 
The May-Day Section of the film will aim to, express the 
Creative, eager JOT of the Progressive movement - hope 
and Faith in the Future - vigour, etc. 
Plenty of close-ups..... Avoid long tedious shots of 
people marching. Very few shots should be longer than 3 
feet. Banners, near, mid and close are very effective. 
..... Specially remember HAPPY expressions in view of theme. 
Keep outlook for UNUSUAL incidents or police incidents. 
AVOID shots of normal. police control. Get united front 
salutes...... Plenty of shots of IOUTH. (77) 
May First 1937 begins with 'The record of the inspiring spectacle 
of London's militant workers', and scenes of marchers. Preparations 
for the march are shown, including the construction of floats. Outside 
an underground station a contingent gathers, complete with brass band. 
Captions make explanatory references to various topical issues publicised. 
by-banners seen among the marching contingents. A banner, for example, 
declaring 'Bakers ban night work' is elaborated in the following ways: 
'Bread gives us strength but it takes it out of these men who lead the 
TU ranks'. A Daily- Worker float, members of the Socialist Christian 
movement and a contingent of the Clarion Cycling Club are seen, together 
with posters and placards depicting Spanish Republican leaders, the 
Left Book Club and Unity Theatre. The League even had its own contingent, 
with banners 'Show Workers' Films' and a car on top of which is a 
member 'operating' a tripod camera. '40,000 people greet the procession, 
as it enters Hyde Park. Individual left wing and communist personalities 
are seen in close-up, including Tom Mann, Bert Papworth and Ted Bramley. 
While the film is'little more than a catalogue of the contingents in 
the demonstration, and is somewhat pedestrian in approach, it nevertheless 
77. BFI1FPL (4), Notes for Cameramen: May Day Demonstration, n. d., 
APr L3.1937. 
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reveals that such events could be extremely colourful and imaginative, 
Equally-significantly, it reveals that this-particular demonstration 
was the occasioh for an impressive display of united frontism, 
attracting a wide assortment of left groups and tendencies. 
Of a more directly propagandistic or agitational character 
are such League productions as The Merry Month of May, Red. Right and 
Bloo, Constructioi, Jubilee and Winter. Construction was produced by 
a group of union militants in the building trade in south London, with 
the assistance of League members. It opens by informing the audience 
that the film was made by 'the men on the job', and shows various aspects 
of building work - surveying, carpentry, bricklaying, etc., with a 
concern for emphasising the 'dignity-of labours reminiscent of the 
mainstream docamentary film-makers. One of the men opens his wage- 
packet 'Total ¬2 12s 6d' and goes home to a slum tenement. 'Only 100% 
trade union will improve our conditions. ' A dispute is then re-enacted 
in which a trade unionist engaged in recruitment on the site is sacked 
as an 'agitator'. The workers discuss the situation at a mass meeting 
and send a deputation to the management, demanding the dismissed na n's 
reinstatement. 'We'll strike for reinstatement'. An empty building 
site is seen, and then, 'Carry on lads - we've won! '. Work resumes: 
'Unity Wins'. 
Much of the shooting for this film was done secretly on the 
site, with a carpenter, Alf Garrard, who was also an amateur cane 
enthusiast, shooting haphazardly with his camera hidden behind his work 
apron. (78) The ten-minute film was only one of a number of propagandist 
activities by building workers in London, and arose from a specific 
confrontation with employers the previous year, (1934). Funds (the film 
cost £8 to make) were raised by such expedients as 'raffling a pound 
note', and equipment and editing facilities were provided by the League. 
It's value of course was confined largely to the building trade, and the 
film was shown mainly to groups of building workers, causing 'something 
of a sensation in Trade Union circles'. Indeed, it was apparently 
considered sufficiently valuable as propaganda to prompt Kino, which 
distributed the film, to organise a meeting of delegates from builders' 
and other unions to discuss the value of films of this type, and plans 
78. For full details of the production of this film, see, B. Hogenkamp, 
"Making Films With A Purpose"1, in J. Clark et al. Culture and 
Crisis-in Britain in the Thirties op. cit., pp. 262-5. 
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were drawn up to produce similar films in cooperation with a number 
of other unions - though nothing appears to have been achieved. (79) 
Attempts were made in the_, spring of 1937 by the League to encourage 
trade union organisations to commission the production of similar 
propaganda/recruitment films. Herbert Marshall, acting on behalf of 
the FPL, wrote to William Squance, General Secretary of ASLEF in the 
following terms: 
we do not suggest malting big films for big cinemas, but small 
films on 16mm for shows in TU halls, Coop. halls, etc., which 
can be run aft a very low cost. 
Our proposal is this: that we make a film specially for the 
ASLEF, as their particular work is one which lends itself 
to this powerful medium. We would show on the screen the 
skill required in running an engine, the heroism often 
called for (as the candidateship for the Carnegie Medal goee- 
ta show) and the part the Union has played in improving 
conditions and maintaining them. Let the General Secretary 
(on the screen) tell of the drive for a l0C% membership and 
the work of the Union. 
This film could then be shown in every depot and every 
Railway centre in the country, as well as be distributed in 
the usual ways by Messrs. Kino Films Ltd. (80) 
National trade union organisations were generally unresponsive, probably 
considering that attractive though such film propaganda may be, the cost 
was too great for the resources avai]a ble, and that its value was too 
indeterminate. Just as documentarists were unable to persuade them to 
commission films so the League, its status and politics less than 
clear cut, was unsuccessful in this respect, and no other films of the 
Construction type were produced. 
One of the most interesting examples of the League's agitation]. 
productions is Jubilee. Shot by the Green brothers of the North London 
Film Society Cine Unit, and edited in conjunction with other League 
members, Jubilee contrasts the 1935 Silver Jubilee celebrations with 
working class poverty and the drift towards war. The film opens with 
'Rejoice, You Children' and scenes of tea parties in East London streets 
decorated with bunting and banners declaring 'Long Live King George'. 
Crowds line the streets, held back by police, as a parade of Life Guards 
79. Kino News. n. d., May 1936; World Film News, June 1936, p. 21. 
80. H. Marshall, HMC, Marshall to Squance, n. d., March 1937. 
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heralds the approach of the royal family. The royal carriage appears 
amid cheering, waving crowds, and newsreel cameras are shown recording 
the arrival of the King-and Queen at a hospital and then moving on to 
Mile End Station. During this sequence there are suggestions that the 
celebrations have more than celebratory significance. Intercut with 
images of the crowds cheering the arrival of the royal entourage is a 
shot of a poster advertising a theatrical performance, the title of the 
play being 'The Age of Innocence'. Shots of commercial newsreel 
cameras recording the event are juxtaposed. with one of a street sign, 
'Commercial Road'. The, tone of the film subsequently changes dramatic- 
ally as images of the procession of cavalry and the royal carriage are 
inter-cut in a quickening montage with shots of bunting and flag-waving 
crowds. 'The National Government Celebrates.... ', scenes of flags and 
the royal carriage, '25 rears of Progress'. Immediately, we see shots 
of slum houses, women peeling potatoes at an outdoor tap, people sat 
outside their decrepit homes. 'Progress? ' is followed by scenes out- 
side an employment exchange with lines of men queueing, some inside 
reading newspaper advertisements, and men standing about, with a sign 
'No Hands Wanted' prominent. 'Progress? ' the film again asks, before 
showing a group of war-disabled singing in the street, a war memorial, 
and a placard advertising for recruits to the army: 'Start your Army 
career in Jubilee Tear'. Images of troops on parade quickly give way 
to, 'Progress ..... Towards..... War', and the film ends with scenes of 
warships at sea and military planes in formation. 
Media coverage of the Jubilee celebrations was extensive. 
Newsreel companies had always thrived on set piece events and particularly 
the spectacular pageantry of royal occasions, which never ceased to 
attract popular interest, both live and in the cinema. But Jubilee 
is more than an attack on the 'commercial' motives behind newsreel 
coverage of these celebrations. The left in Britain saw the media 
coverage of them as a sustained glorification of Britain's imperial 
past and present, and identified this as a conspiracy of the various 
sections of the ruling elite to encourage unity behind the National 
Government during a difficult period. The Government had already faced 
serious opposition to its Unemployment Assistance Board scheme in the 
first two months of the year, had created a furore over the publication 
of the White Paper on Defence in March, and had been dealt, a severe 
shock with Hitler's revelations concerning Germany's air power the same 
month. These last two events had set in train a nationwide discussion 
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as to the possibility of a future war and raised doubts as to how far 
the Government could be trusted in connection with its rearmament plans. 
The issues of government credibility and national support were brought 
into sharper relief by, the anticipated imminent resignation of the 
Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. The Jubilee celebrations coincided 
with a period of political uncertainty within government circles, during 
which the Conservative Party leadership manoeuvred to strengthen its 
grip on the administration, aware that MacDonald's departure could 
prompt serious questiona: as to the 'national' character of the National 
Government. 
Under these circumstances Jubilee is an attempt to suggest 
that the Jubilee celebrations are a spectacle intended to strengthen the 
sinews of national unity, contrived as much for newsreel consumption and 
therefore for mass cinema audiences as for live public involvement. 
But it is also an attempt to raise the question of the discrepancy, 
between what the media presented to the world and the'reality'behind 
that partial view. The familiar trappings of imperial glory are 
contrasted with the salient features of 'Britain today' - poverty, 
slum housing, and unemployment. The nation's past and present are 
typified by images of war veterans - disabled, destitute and rejected. 
The National Government, in contrast to its own film publicity, and that 
of the various newsreel companies, is not, the film argues, leading the 
country out of depression, but into war and, so it implies, using the. 
Jubilee celebrations 'to divert attention' away from the true conditions 
of Britain and muster support for its rearmament programme. 
(iv) Decline 
The aims of the Film and Photo League were just as ambitious 
as those of Kino, but perhaps a little less realistic. Constrained 
constantly by a deficiency-of funds, ill-equipped, badly ran, with a 
severely restricted organisational reach and an increasingly unreliable 
membership, the League was unable to achieve the national status enjoyed 
bT Kino, either as producer or distributor. As the League progressed 
under Cuthbertson's enthusiastic but ultimately. suspect leadership 
it became more politically incoherent. Its organisational survival 
was made possible by tactical agreements with the Left Book Club, whose 
Groups provided a much sought after distribution/exhibition circuit. But 
3ýý 
this organisational dependency was, underpinned by prevailing notions 
of'cultural harmony'. 
The ascendancy of gradualism within the Labour movement 
had never seriously been challenged, but during the later 1930's, 
when notions of dass struggle lost much credibility, paradoxically 
the CPGP enjoyed an unprecedented influence within the country for a 
short period. This was less a testament to the Party's political 
acumen and more a guide to the adjustments which the Labour movement 
and other sections of the' population were prepared to make in response 
to the growing danger of fascism. Within this climate notions of a 
popular front were merely political articulations of a more broadly 
based closing of ranks. Characteristic therefore of this period, and, 
it is suggested, unprecedented in British history since the Great War, 
was a notion of "cultural harmony' - the belief that there was much 
common ground amongst people of the the working classes and between 
-them and other classes, even though class and political differences 
may ultimately separate them. There was of course a strong element of 
pragmatism within this conjuncture of ideas, but the left of the Labour 
movement in particular subscribed to, and, went beyond, the cultural 
and campaign work of the Communist Party and its orbital groups. 
The Left Book Club was the foremost example of this notion 
of cultural harmony in practice; and the Film and Photo League survived- 
not merely- because of the organisational facilities provided by the 
Club's Groups, but because of the idea of cultural harmony which made 
the League's association with the LBC possible. The League collapsed 
for the same reasons: its own membership grew politically diverse, and 
the group began to lose its sense of purpose and perspective, and 
quickly disintegrated, its history sharing, significantly, a similar 
chronological trajectory to the popular front movement. 
Just as the popular front subsided as the Labour movement 
and the country in general. gave critical support to the National Govern- 
ment in the post-Munich period,. so the workerism of the Labour movement 
gave way-to a growing sense of national unity. Under these circumstances 
the League, with no clear political identity or political organisation 
with which to associate (unlike Kino and the PFI) not only lost its 
bearings but found that its audiences, real and potential, had disappeared. 
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Who, it could be asked, wanted to see "workers' films'? Attempts'. 
were made from 1937 to adjust to this crystallising' situation. bnt little 
was achieved. Kino, by contrast, could rely on its library of'doou ent- 
aries and Soviet features to maintain its custom. 
2. Other Film Groups 
Finally, there were a number of other groups operating along 
similar lines to the League, Kino and the Progressive Film Institute. 
Two about which virtually nothing is known were the Vanguard Film 
Association and Crescent Films. The latter was established in the 
autumn of 1938 as the film unit of Unity Theatre, and was intended to 
complement the theatre workshop available to Unity's remarkable member'- 
ship, which had risen from 2000 in May 1938 to 7000 in May the following 
year. (81) The former, set up in the spring of 1936 as a 'workers' film 
unit', declared as its immediate aim 
To make films which by their art and entertainment will 
bring to those who see-them an understanding of the lives 
and problems of the people. (82) 
Established by C. F. Stoneham and Maurice Orbach shortly after the formation 
of the Workers' Music Association, it was intended that the unit rwould 
prove o9Irime importance to Left movements'. Orbach believed that it 
was "time for the ma. king of workers' films in this country with the 
punch and power of Eisenstein ; and production was started, apparently, 
on two films. (83) Interestingly, the group, of approximately 15 people, 
intended to produce fictional films, and hoped to provide"a library of 
books on film acting, and tra; n in film technique for studio 
production. (84) Its first production Tomorrow. Tomorrow, dealt 
with 'unemployment', (85) but references to the unit in the Daily Worker 
quickly cease, and nothing further is known of its activities. - 
Of far more significance, it would appear, was International 
Sound Films, run by Sime and'Lwa. Seruya. As early as December 1933, 
R 
within weeks of"Kino's formation, the Seruyas had independently advertised 
81. D. Brad17, J. McCormick, People's Theatre op. cit., p. 99" 
82. . aily Workez, 20 April 1936, P-7- 
83. Ib 13 April 1936, p. 4. 
84. Ib id.,, 20 April 1936, P"7; 15 May 1936, p. 6. 
85. Ibid.. 1 June 1936. D. 7. 
3ýý 
shows of Kinots films, (86) and. continued to do so throughout 1934. Such 
curiously parallel film work led, in January 1935, to the formation of 
International Filme, which, equally curiously, shared Kin 's offices, and 
Ivan Serum continued to act as Kino's roving projectionist. Using 
League funds he launched International Sound Films (ISF) in the autumn 
of 1936 as 'Specialists in all forms of Film Propaganda', with offices 
in London and Glasgow. (87) Ivan Ser ya's recollection of the enter- 
prise was very hazy, and no documents relating to the company appear 
to have survived. Occasional items of correspondence in the Cuthbertson 
Papers reveal that as with Kino, the ISF sought to boost its status 
and prestige by recruiting prominent personalities to its ranks. ISF's 
Advisory Council consisted of Aneurin Bevan, Maurice Dobb, Ellen Wilkin- 
son and. Stuart Legg, all notable for their left wing or 'progressive' 
views. Its collection of films extended to at least 22, most of which 
were of a left wing character. They included Roman Karmen's Abyssinia 
(Soyazkinochronika, USSR, 1936), a documentary' treatment of the Italian 
invasion of 1935-6; Sun Th's The Road to Life (1937) and Tsai Chosheng's 
The Fishermen's SonR (1937), both anti-Japanese features made in Chinese 
studios; The Dawn (1936), a feature. produced by Tom Cooper in the 
Republic of Ireland on the Irish Republican Army's operations against 
the British armT, during the war of independence; Land of Promise (193T) 
on the settlement of Jewish people in Palestine; Joris Ivents The Spanish 
Earth and G. W. Pabst's West Front 1918. As with the Progressive Film 
InstituU the ISP acquired. material direct from the Spanish Ministry 
of Public rnstroction, notably They Shall Not Pass, 'covering the 
history-of Spanish Democracy from the abdication and flight of Alphonso 
to the presemt day', (88) and. New Spain (also known as Madrid 1936), 
compiled in Paris by Luis Buntel and the French Communist Party at the 
request of the Spanish Government. (89) The Seruyas also acquired sev 
films from Czecholsovakia, including two features, Hey Rup! (or, 
Together Boys), a satirical comedy made by R. Messner on cooperative 
food production and the opposition to it maintained by big business; 
and The World Belongs to Us, whose theme was the threat to democracy 
in Czechoslovakia; and a short, Come With IIs, on communal life in a 
Czechoslovakian summer camp. Of the British films in the ISP library 
the most notable were Enough to Fat?, Housing Problems, and two films 
produced by the London Cooperative Society, Peace Parade and The People 
Who Cour (both produced in 1937). This collection was supplemented. 
86. Daily Worker, 29 December 1933, P"4" 
87. Labour Organiser, June 1937, p. 103; Russia Todau, January 1937, p. 13. 
88. Dais 'Worker, 2 June 1937, P-5- 
89. Francisco Aranda, Luis Bunuel (London, 1975), p. 120. 
Spanish Gazette consisting of footage taken by Ivan Sera in 
Spain in 1937. 
International Sound Films functioned parallel with Kino and the 
PFI'as 'Distributors of Progressive Films to Cinemas and Organisations', 
handling both 35mm and"16mm sound films, aiming at independent cinemas 
and, specifically, Labour organisations. (90) Apart from canvassing 
such organisations, offering a comprehensive hire service, including 
films, equipment and an operator, ISF conducted tours throughout each 
steer, and, also like Kino and the PFI, organised its own exhibitions 
and exhibition-meetings in aid of particular campaigns. A show was 
given, for example, 'In aid of the Bäsque children, by ISF at the 
Phoenix Theatre, Charing Cross, in March 1938, and the films exhibited 
were New Spain, Spanish Gazette and By Sunny Streams. (91) The group 
did not however achieve the level of prominence enjoyed by Kino, and 
by December 1938 the group was struggling, unable to recoup money 
invested in Czechoslovakia 1938, a film on the Munich Crisis and its 
aftermath in central Europe. By March the following year it had 
more or less ceased to operate. (92) 
Finally, apart from Glasgow Kino, the only provincial Iabo- 
oriented production group about which. there is any information is 
People's Newreels, a Communist Party group formed in the summer of 1938 
in Brighton. The origin and nature of the group is well described by 
Ernie ¶ ory, one of'its members: 
The whole idea of making films of Communist Party activities 
came when a home movie enthusiast joined the Party. He had 
a non-political friend who was interested in making films 
about anything and everything and between them (with a little 
political direction from me as Sussex County Organiser of 
the Communist Party. ) these films were made. No one else 
was involved except by way of contributions to the cost. 
We called them Peoplets Newsreels because we had to call 
them something. There was no organisation. (93) 
According to Trory it was only in early 1938 that the CPGB began to 
establish itself in Sussex, and during that year the District organisa-" 
tion held a series of rallies, demonstrations and meetings to 'put the 
90. Daily Worker. 8 September 1938, p. 4; Labour Organiser, June 1937, 
p. 119. 
91. Daily Worker. 12 March 1938, p. 6. 
92. Bp ,, E(3), Brotmacher to Cuthbertson, 4 December 1938; IEL 
(2), 
I. Seruyx to Cuthbertson, 8 March 1939. 
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party on the map'. (94) These efforts coincided with renewed attempts 
by the Party nationally to mobilise the Labour movement in opposition 
to the National Government. In Sussex Trory and his comrades appear 
to have had a less utilitarian approach to political work than communists 
in other districts, and regularly supplemented public meetings and 
demonstrations with dramatic performances and film shows,, including 
exhibitions of many Soviet productions such as You , Storm Over Asia 
and If War Should Come-(95) Two of the most successful of these pub- 
licity events were two 'Sussex People*s Marches of History' through 
Brighton in August and November 1938, both of which were, filmed by 
People's Newsreels using two 9.5mm hand-held cameras. Footage of the 
first of these events was combined with some showing the 21st anni- 
versary celebrations in Brighton in November of the founding of the 
Soviet Union, and of the return the following month of members of the 
International Brigade, including a march through Brighton in honour 
of fallen comrades. Poorly cut and over exposed, the six-minute silent 
film was titled People's Scrapbook 1938 and shown regularly by Trory 
at political meetings or as part of film show entertainment, together 
with a copy of the Daily Worker Trailer and various Soviet films. 
A second film was made, Sussex 1939, covering similar events. 
Although the surviving copy, lasting ten-minutes, contains footage 
shot as late as August 1939, it was actually shown early-in February 
that year and was continually-extended as further items were shot. (96) 
When first screened Sussex 1939 contained two items: the printing of 
The Partr Voice, a local broadsheet, and the '-Brighton Unemployed 
demand Work' march of January 4th - which shows people holding up traffic 
and the arrest of one of their number.. Shortly afterwards footage of 
the Second Sussex People's Congress of the CPGB was added, showing the 
gathering listening to Trory deliver his report, part of which is 
scanned by the camera. The May Day celebrations in Hastings, two items 
on labour Party officials joiner the CPGB, and footage of the Sussex 
People's March of History in Eastbourne in August were gradually added 
to the reel, the latter item featuring both Trory and Isabel Brown 
93. E. lhrory, in a letter to the author, 1 October 1977. 
94. E. Trory, Between the Wars: Recollections of a Communist-Organiser 
(Brighton, 1974 s PP-114 ff. 
95. Ibid., PP-1179 132-6. 
96. Ibid., pp. 126,131,135-6,154-5" 
3(pp 
addressing a meeting on the beach. The film ends with an appeal: 'Help 
us to show more films of working class activity in Sussex. Send a 
donation to 9-11'St. George's Mewsl. 
Just as there. was no organisation, no substantive political 
discussion preceded the decisions to film these events: People's News- 
reels was drawn automatically to the most accessible of events considered. 
appropriate for the audiences to which they were to be addressed - 
party. workers, sympathisers and left wing audiences generally. These 
films, while possessing+a certain propaganda value, used, as Trory put 
it, 'as & method of advertisement for our movement', (97) have little 
agitational value in so far as no attempt is made through titles or 
the intercutting of images to put forward a particular argument or 
viewpoint.. They simply 'record' certain events as news items of interest 
to left wing audiences. This lack of political involvement within 
the frame of the film, combined with the limitations of using 9.5m 
cameras, creates the impression that People's Newsreels' approach to 
film was heavily informed by an 'home movie' enthusiasm for cinematog- 
raphy, and indeed this is substantiated by Trory's own comments quoted 
earlier. The film was however shown in Sussex in conjunction with 
Peace and Plenty, a film with strong agitational qualities. It is 
interesting to note here that neither Ivor Montagu, Bill Megarry nor 
Ralph Bond could recall the group, and all three. were unaware of its 
productions; and Thory knew nothing of the Film and Photo League. So 
there were evidently few connections between People's Newsreels and 
the groups of film technicians, film-makers and distributors based 
in London. Trory merely made use of gin's library of Soviet material 
for local propaganda work, and was evidently uninfluenced by Kin 's- 
or FPL's attempts to build a network of local Labour film bodies. 
97. E. Trory, Between the Wars op. cit., p. 128. 
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Chapter Eight: Film and Social Democratic Organisation 
the Cooperative Movement 
The development of the use of film by'. the social democratic 
sections of the Labour movement was on the whole very slow. While 
quick to recognise the importance of visual media for political purposes, 
they were, under prolonged financial difficulties, reluctant to invest 
the relatively large amounts of capital. needed in dubious projects 
which could quickly be made redundant by events, and considered exhibition 
facilities wholly inadequate should such production be arranged. Pre- 
occupied conceptually with the printed and the spoken word, these 
organisations were prompted into considering the use of film by a 
combination of remarkable enthusiasm on the part, of a small number of 
individuals, the specific political needs of the Labour movement in 
the late 1930's, and the mythology which had evolved appertaining 
to the propagandistic qualities of film itself. Notwithstanding the 
early interest of the second Labour Government in the Masses Stage 
and Film Guild, and in the use of the commercial newsreel for publicity 
puposes, it was sections of the cooperative movement which led the 
field in attempts to use film politically within social democratic 
organisations. 
This hapter is concerned with the use of film for political 
purposes by the cooperative movement. Although the records of marry 
cooperative organisations survive, little information of a detailed 
charactea is available concerning film actvities. The records of the 
London Cooperative Society and the Cooperative Union have been used. 
The records of the Royal Arsenal Cooperative Society and the National. 
Association of Cooperative Education Committees do not exist; and there 
is little of relevance in the records of the Cooperative Wholesale Society. 
The central characters involved in these developments died long ago, 
and appear to have left no papers of relevance. Gladys Reeves, widow 
of Joseph Reeves, the principal figure in this work, was unable to 
provide much information relating to the pre-war period. The films 
which survive are of course a major source of information in themselves, 
and the National Film Archive and the North West Film Archive have been 
very-useful, but their collections are by no means complete. It should. 
be stressed therefore that any conclusions drawn can only be regarded 
as tentative. 
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The cooperative movement consisted of a myriad of organisations. 
But at the national level the main bodies were the Cooperative Union, 
the Cooperative Wholesale Society and the Cooperative Party. The Party 
represented the interests of the movement in parliament. It had, by 
1935, an affiliated membership of over 5 million; nine Ids between 
1929-31, one between 1931 and 1935, and nine between 1935 and 1939"(1) 
The Cooperative Union was the central organisation of the movement, 
coordinating the activities of all other sections. Overall policy was 
decided by the annual. Cooperative Union Congress, at which all sections 
of the movement were represented, and during which the Central Executive 
Committee of the Cooperative Union was elected. In the interval between 
each Congress, the Central Executive was responsible for implementing 
the decisions taken at the Congress. But a National Cooperative 
Authority, representing the main national organisations, would meet 
and decide policy on any matters arising during this interval which 
had not been decided upon by the Congress. The Cooperative Wholesale 
Society was the national organisation representing and supplying 
all local cooperative wholesale societies in Britain. By 193a the 
CWS was a vast productive enterprise which owned 182 factories, employed 
over 46,000 people, and produced goods to the amount of ¬43 million. (2) 
The CWS therefore provided the economic. founda. tion of the movement. 
Individual cooperative wholesale societies were established, and admini 
tered by combinations of local cooperative retail societies, and the 
CWS provided these societies with goods via wholesale depots, at reduced 
prices. The retail society was the fundamental unit of the cooperative 
movement, drawing people into cooperation through individual membership, 
and providing the financial means for establishing wholesale societies. 
In 1928 retail societies in Britain numbered 1245, with their total 
number of individual members reaching 5,885,135; and by 1939 this latter 
figure had gradually risen to 8,643,233. (3) Far outstripping the trade 
1. A. Bonner, British Cooperation rev. ed. (Manchester, 1970), p. 194. 
2. Ibid. " P-170- 
3. J. A. Hough, 'A Guide to Cooperative Statistics, Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, vol. 113,1950, Table 1, p. 240. 
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union membership, these figures alone suggest the importance of the 
cooperative movement for any discussion-of the Labour movement as a 
whole in this period. (4) Of the largest retail societies three were 
London-based; and two"of these, the Royal Arsenal CS and the London CS, 
were the leading forces behind the political use of film. 
1. The Royal Arsenal Cooperative Society, the London Cooperative 
Society and the National Association of Cooperative Education 
Committees, , 
(i) 
The Ro l Arsenal Cooperative Society (RACS), with 'a membership 
of 362,110 in 1937, was an outstanding political force in the cooperative 
movement. The only major cooperative society to affiliate to the 
Labour Party (in 1921) it commanded a formidable political status 
throughout South London as an active and vigorous organisation, fully- 
supporting the Labour Party platform and becoming involved in its 
campaigns. (5) The RACS Education Department, consisting of individual 
members of the Labour Party and trade unionists, was prominent in this 
political work. (6) Devoting considerable resources to its activities, ' 
(representative were figures for 1932, X7,255, and for 1937, £18,792), it 
built up an impressive educational record, including the founding of the 
Woodcraft Folk, and the development of class work in conjunction with 
the London County Council, the Workers' Educational Association, the 
National Council of Labour Colleges and the Marx Memorial Library; and 
it organised eaten ive cultural activities. (7) A 'major educational 
enterpriser, the RACS Education Department was also a pioneer in the 
4. Trade union membership reached 4,806,000 in 1928, and 6,298,000 
in 1939. British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract 1886-196 
(London, 1971), Table 196. 
5. A measure of the RAC 's independence from the cooperative movement, 
which was on the whole a reluctant political force, is the support 
which it gave to the Labour Panty in opposition to the United Peace 
Alliance of all political tendencies against the National Cbvernment, 
which, launched by Revnölds News, the cooperative Sunday paper, 
received wide support for a limited period from national cooperative 
bodies. 
6. J. Attfield, 'The Educational Work of the Royal Arsenal Cooperative. 
Society 1918-1940', a paper delivered to a conference of the History 
of Education Society, December 1977- 
7. RACS, Report -and Balance Sheet. Year Ended January 1933, p. 12. 
(Herea; ter, 'Report'. ) J. Attfield, op. cit. The Woodcraft Polk 
was a movement of cooperative youth organisations, established in 
the mid-1920's. 
ýýý.. ný. 1 
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educational and political use of film, under the guidance. and enthusiasm 
of its Secretary (from 1918 to 1938) Joseph Reeves. Attfield considers 
that Reeves was a'. towering figure'in inter-war cooperative education 
circles'. A. contemporary view, commenting on his departure from the 
SACS to become the Manager of the Workers' Film Association, concurs 
in this judgnentz 'Mr. Reeves was probably the most outstanding figure 
in the world of cooperative education'. (8) In so far as film is 
concerned, he was probably the outstanding personality in the evolution 
of a film service for the social democratic sections of the Labour 
movement. ` 
Reeves, a committed socialist, general election candidate in 
1931 and 1935, and staunch supporter of the Soviet Union (he made at 
least three visits in the inter-war period), believed that formal state 
education was a cornerstone of the capitalist system and, though there 
was room for improvements within its structures, considered. that it 
was essential to combat its ultimate influence by independent education 
in the principles of cooperation. His was a dynamic conception of 
independent working class education - one which believed in its centrality 
to processes of social change. Cooperative education was envisaged. as 
making 'a frontal attack ... upon capitalist institutions in the realm 
of ideas' and mobilising people to participate 'in bringing about a 
new social order'. (9) There was clearly a distinct political character 
to this education which, informed by a militant, anti-capitalist 
pacifism, was intended, as Reeves explained; 
to create a consciousness among members of the vital role 
Cooperation plays in a changing world. We can, if we will, 
make a deliberate contribution to an order of society wherein 
the means of plenty for all will not be frustrated by an out- 
moded system of distribution.... We must plaee the full weight 
of our organisation behind the new forces at work in society 
malting for the overthrow of those who live by the sword, and 
who wax fat on greed and injustice. (10) 
However, the role of the RACS Education Department was not merely con- 
ceived in educational-political terms. It perfacmed a consciously 
distinct: political role as an essential part of its operations, becoming 
8. J. AttfielcltRP. cit.; Cooperative News. 3 September 1938, P-7- 
9. J. Reeves, Edüca tLon for Social Change (Manchester, 1936), pp. 8,13; see 
Coorerastion and the New Social Order (London, 1932). 
10. RACS, e ort 1938, p. 11. 
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involved-in the broad sweep of Labour Party activities. As Attfield 
observes, 
The RAGS Education Department played a full part in many of 
the political campaigns run by the cooperative and Labour 
movements in the 1930's. (11) 
A . pioneer in the use of film for educational purposes, 
(12) 
Reeves quickly realised, the value of the medium as a vehicle for political 
education and propaganda. With the arrival of Soviet films in Britain, 
and the opening of Tooting Cooperative Hall fully equipped and licensed 
for film exhibition, he arranged several film exhibitions in conjunction 
with the London Workers' Film Society. In February 1931 two films hired. 
through Atlas Films, The General Line (USSR, 1929) and The Shadow of the 
Mine (Germany- 1924) were used by the Department to celebrate the spirit 
and publicise the principles of cooperation. (13) Apart from the 
occasional exhibition little further is known about such film work: 
presumably the paucity of Soviet films in 1932 restricted such activity. 
With the arrival of Kino in November 1933 as a distributor of Soviet 
films on 16mm non-inflammable film stock, the situation improved. 
Emphasising the importance of cultural work(14) Reeves finally 
persuaded the mucation Department to try and attradt greater audiences 
to its activities by purchasing 16mm film projection equipment and 
organising a regular programme of 'specially selected films'. The demand 
for shows was so great that within two months 33 performances were 
arranged, prompting the Department to buy from Kino a copy of The General 
L the same month it was made available in Britain in 16mm form. (15) 
11. J. Attfield, op. cit. Comradeship, the Department's monthly journal, 
edited by Reeves and with a peak circulation of nearly 20,000 in 
the late 1930's, was an important political forum for the left of 
the Labour Party, attracting many of the leading Socialists of the 
dag to its pages. 
12. As early as 1920 Reeves gave film shows 'of an educational nature' 
(but also including'a few westerns') to children in Woolwich; and 
from 1922 the RACS Education Department regularly showed films to 
children 'for purposes of counteracting the effect of the sensational 
film', and junior and adult classes were arranged in conjunction 
with Mary Fields of British Instructional Films. Gladys Reeves, 
in letters to the author, 7 March, 21 April 1978; J. Reeves, The 
Film and Education (Stoke, 1937), pp. 6-7. 
13. Comradpship. April 1931. The Soviet film was specifically concerned 
with encouraging cooperation amongst the Russian peasantry. The 
German film, considered. of 'special importance for cooperators', was 
a curious choice, and the reviewer here recognised that it had little 
propaganda value for the type of showings it would receive under 
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The film was subsequently shown, according to Reeves, on over 100 
occasions to local cooperative audiences, numbering approximately 
40,000 people. (16) These shows were supplemented by the exhibition of 
British Instructional' Films' productions, material from the Kodak Library, 
and actuality shorts. which the Education Department itself produced on 
various cooperative events. 
As Kino built up its collection Reeves hired several Soviet 
and other films in an, attempt to introduce a more political character 
to these shows. Kameradschaft (1931) was given six special performances in 
November 1935; and a copy of Battleshiv Potemkin. hired for six months, 
was screened at thirty meetings. (17) During 1936 the RACS Education 
Committee 
concentrated upon the important task of widening the scope 
of their appeal so that the advantages of democracy in all 
fields of life may be made known. By the exhibition of 
silent and sound films, by the launching of popular lecture 
courses, and by- the distribution of literature, they have 
endeavoured to contribute to the enlightenment of both 
members and non-members. (18) 
While attaching no particular prominence to film in this task of enlighten- 
ment, it was eminently suited to 'widening the scope of their appeal', 
and was employed as an integral part of these activities. In the peace 
campaign, for example, films were regularly screened at meetings, and 
over forty silent film shows alone were given. Although the films shown 
may not have had. any, impact on those attending, the Committee was well 
pleased with their drawing power, reporting that meetings were 'well 
attended' and the shows 'very much appreciatedt. (19) 
BRCS auspices. This would suggest perhaps that a mythology of 
'workers' films' had already gained sufficient momentum to over- 
come any doubts concerning 'relevance'. 
14. See, for example, J. Reeves, Education for Social Change op; cit., pp. 
21-26. 
15. RACS, Report, 1934, p. 11. 
16. Kino News, Winter 1935; J. &eeves, The Film and Education . cit., p. 8. 
17. Comradeship. January 1936; SACS, Report. 1936, p. 11. 
18. SACS, Report, 1937, F. 11. 
19. Ibid. The sound films shown included The Doomed Battalion, Peace or 
War, The Pacific Problem. Peace of Britain and Thunder in the Air. 
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In 1937 the RACS began to use sound films systematically 
as part of its activities, 'as a medium of education and propaganda', 
arranging in conjunction with the London Cooperative Society the exhibition 
of no less than 150 different filme in the winter of 1937-8 to audiences 
which ranged from fortk to six-hundred. In late 1937 the RACS embarked 
on production with a film Workers' Education, which illustrated the 
various educational activities of the Society's Education Committee. (20) 
A second film, Educate and Liberate (also known as Workers' Education) 
was released in 1939. This was a ten-minute film with a commentary by 
Joseph Reeves, publicising the educational work of the Society. The 
Society also commissioned People with a Purpose, allocating £1200 to 
the Realist Film Unit for its production, to celebrate sixty years of 
educational work. The film, released in October 1939, was produced by 
Ralph Bond. (21) 
(ii) 
The London Cooperative Society was also keen to use film, and 
in July 1937 established a Film Department under the auspices; of its 
Political Committee, with Frank Cox as its head. The Committee provided. 
¬1,500 for the production of three films for 'publicity and propaganda' 
over an experimental twelve month period. (22) Cox, an expert in sound 
recording with long experience in cinematography, was a. well. known 
political activist and a former member of the Film and Photo League. 
He believed fundamentally that the cinema industry and the capitalist 
State 'purposely' used the cinema as a 'soporific' 'to keep the masses 
satisfielwith their lot in life'. He argued, during the course of the 
discussion within the cooperative movement on the formation and function 
of a national film service, that it was essential not to leave 'this 
weapon almost entirely in the hands of our enemies', the 'capitalists'. 
The cinema, he argued, 'could be used for election propganda or trading 
purposes'; but it was essential for its success that the cooperative 
movement avoid using capitalist methods of film production, and develop 
new forms and methods. (23) Under Cox's guidance the LCS Film Department 
20. RACS, Report, 1938, p. 11; The Cooperators' Tear Book. 1938, p. 69. 
The film cost under ¬25 to produce. 
21. Cooperative News, 22 July 1939, p. 6; TUC Library, Workers Film 
Association Papers, Workers' Film Association, Annual Re Dort and 
Balance Sheet for the Tear Ended September 30th 1 (Hereafter, 
'Annual Report'. ) 
22. LondozýCooperative Society Library, London Cooperative Society 
Committee Minutes, Political Committee Minutes, 2 February, 18 Mays 
1 June 1937. (Hereafter London Cooperative Society, 'LCSCM'. ) 
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produced two sound films in 1937: Peace Parade, a twelve-minute actuality 
film recording the Cooperative Party's Peace Demonstration in Hyde Park 
on 19 September, in which, it was estimated, 7,000 people took part; 
and People Who. Count, a twenty-minute-film descriptive of the aims and 
various activities of the movement, with a strong political statement by 
A. V. Alezander, the Cooperative movement's most prominent NP. Both 
films were produced by Pelly and Healey, a small. independent production 
company, in conjunction with the Film Department, and were released in 
October 1937'. Troubld in Utopia was released in March 1938- it was 
a, twenty. '-minute sound feature films heralded. as the first. non-standard 
sound film to be made by-the professional method of direct sound 
recording. (24) The success of these productions convinced the LCS'of 
the desirability of continuing the project and further allocations 
in March and December 1938 of ¬1500 and 02000 were made. (25) Between 
March 1938 and October the following year, six-films were produced. 
The first, Wembley Pageant, was an actuality record of the Cooperative 
Pageant held at Wembley in June 1938. The Pageant was a celebration 
of the movement an& its ideals, and a spectacular event in the cooperative 
calender. Using six. cameramen and a crew of fourteen with Cox as director, 
a 16mm colour film with synchronised. sound recording was produced. 
The film was considered-in cooperative circles 'an achievement' and 
was circulated throughout the country. (26. ) A New Recruit, billed as 
a 'thrilling story, of the struggle for political power in a small. country- 
town', and released in May, was a fictionalised documentary focussing 
on local government elections. Stressing the importance of eleatoral 
participation it discussed. the dangers of political apathy in the 
presence of a 'villainous'-Conservative Party. (. 27) A forty-minute sound 
23. F. Cox, 'A National Cooperative Film Society'1, Millgate, October- 
1936 - March 1937, pp. 39-40. It is unclear of what these new forms 
and methods were to consist. 
24. F. Cox, 'Experts Said It Could Not Be Done', Cooperative News, 
5 November 1938, p. 8, in which he explains the technical ramifications 
of the achievement. For a brief description of the film, see i_;, 
5 February 1938, P. 3. It was later advertised as'A satire on the 
uses to ich man puts'the bounties of mture. t and pan entertaining 
skit upön the Tory point of view about slums, housing, malnutrition 
and rearmament'. 
25. London Cooperative Society Library, LCSCM. Political Committee 
Minutes, 1. March, 6 December 1938- 
26. Cooperative News, 9 July 1938, P"3; 27 May 1939, P"7. For details of 
the content of the film, see ibid., 17 September 1938, P"5. 
2T. Ibid j 20 May 1939, p. 5; TUC Library, Workers' Film Association 
P anera, Workers' Film Association, Film Catalogue. n. d., c. 1943" 
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production, this was probably-the most ambitious. film made by this 
Film Unit before the war, though final judgergent, is impossible, since 
there is no copy- extant.. Released almost simultaneously, were a batch 
of shorter productions pursuing similar themes. Each for All, a twenty- 
minute colour film, was billed variously as The bee shows man how to 
cooperate', or 'socialist organisation in a beehive', and appears to 
have been an attempt to discuss the practical application of socialist 
principles to the organisation of work and production. The Awakening 
of Christopher Cole (twenty minutes) was descriptive of 'socialit 
relationships r in a 'property sharing world. '; and Potter's Clay (twenty 
minutes) was billed variously as 'events leading to war and aftermath', 
or 'the child as clay in the hands of its parents and teachers r. (28) 
Finally, The StorT of Czechodlovakia, a twenty minute anti-nazi propaganda 
film produced. by Prank Cox, directed by Jiri Weiss, a Czech emigre, and 
with a commentary by Basil Wright. The film was released in October 1939. 
1939. (29) 
(iii) 
The BACS's film work was a distinct success, as was that of 
the LCS. However, Reeves complained in 1937 that 'We still find. it 
difficult to obtain films which serve our purpose... t(30) At his 
initiative therefore, and commensurate with the Ten Year Plan of 
Cooperative Education, which, inaugurated bar the cooperative movement 
in 1936, was ambitiously intended to lay the ideological foundations for 
a radical transfonation in Britain's social and economic. organisation, 
the RACS arranged with the National Association of Cooperative Education 
Committees (RiCEC) to form a National Cooperative Film Society to dis- 
tributer and produce films for the movement to rectify-this deficiency,. (31) 
The project was presented for discussion by Reeves at a National Film 
Conference arranged by the NACEC in early September 1936. (32) The scheme-, 
28. Cooperative News. 9 June 1939, p. 10; TIJC Library, Workers' Film 
Association Pavers, Workers' Film Association, Film Catalogue, n. d., 
c. 1943, provide. details of these films. 
29. For brief details, see Cooperative News. 14 October 1939, P"3; 
2 December 1939, P"3. 
30. RACS, Report, 1937, p. 11. 
31. Ibid 
32. The text of the proposals made by Reeves was published in the form 
of a pamphlet, The Film and Education op. cit. 
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rejecting suggestions that the cooperative movement should enter the 
film industry-as a competitor of the established. film companies, proposed 
firstly that a National Cooperative Film Society be formed under the 
auspices of the NACEC,, to be funded by a share-issue to individual 
cooperative societies. Reeves appealed for fifty societies to pledge 
¬10 each to launch the scheme, and for them to form a circuit of cooper- 
atives willing to take a programme of films once every week for twenty- 
six weeks. While recognising that it would be initially quite diffinult 
to provide a weekly change of films for six months, Reeves was confident 
that the librariee of Kino, British Instauctional Films, the General 
Post Office and other repositories of documentary and educational films 
were expanding at a rate sufficient to provide a regular flow of new 
material. A good programme of sound films, costing between £3 and ¬5, 
was envisaged as consisting of 'educational, topical, humorous, document- 
ary and interest films'-. Secondly, that cooperative education committees 
should instal 16mm sound equipment as the most suitable for the type of 
educational work undertaken; and that this equipment, estimated as costing 
under ¬200, be purchased, or bought on a system of hire purchase, from 
the National Cooperative Film SocietT (NCFS). Recognising-the problems 
created by the technical aspects of exhibition, and the general lack 
of expertise, the scheme envisaged the NCFS as providing a central. 
organisation for the supply, of films, equipment and advice. Programmes 
of films were to be despatched to regional circuits, but where societies 
could not afford. to buy or hire equipment, roadshows would provide 
single programmes of films with equipment and operator and a programme 
of films lasting two hours, for an inclusive charge of ¬6 - £8 per show-. 
Finally-, anticipating a substantial growth rate for the scheme, Reeves 
proposed that as. the demand for films and the revenue of the Society 
grew, it would be in a position to undertake the production of film 
propaganda-03) 
The NACEC and the BACS jointly set up a film committee in the 
wake of the favourable reception of these proposals, under Reeves' 
secretaryship, to make the preliminary arrangements for the scheme. The 
initial appeal. to the NACEC's 280 affiliated groups attracted over 100 
affirmative replies - yet of these only 37 were prepared to subscribe 
the requisite £10. The fundamental difficulty, according to Reeves, 
was the cost of projection equipment and the Committee subsequently 
offered to zcieties hire purchase arrangements for equipment, originally 
33. J. Reeves, The Film and Education ov. cit., pp. 9-19; Cooperative 
Union Congress. 1937', p. 461. 
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priced at 9200, at a specially reduced price of £130. (34) By July 1937' 
the first regional circuit was formed, in the Scunthorpe/Lincoln/Grimsby 
area; and at the end of September, having secured the support of over 
fifty societies, the Film Department of the NACEC (as it became known), 
started operations, based at the Cooperative Institute in Woolwich, the 
home of the RACS. 
There was clearly some considereable interest within the 
cooperative movement in the scheme. Within the first four weeks of 
operation the Department gave over 20Q exhibitions in the form of road- 
shows; and by the end of the year had given approximately 200 exhibitions 
throughout the country. By early the following year, 400 shows, and 
by June, over 600. Its programmes consisted of mainly documentary, 
educational or political films, including Enough to Eat?, Changes in,. 
the Franchise, Heredity-, Ship , Night Mail, Man of Aran, Jew Sttep, 
Kameradschaft, News From SDain. War is Hell, with a mix of musical, 
comedy-, travel and feature films to provide entertainment and thereby- 
maximise audiences. (35) Individual societies responded to the, scheme 
by-purchasing equipment from the Department (at least nine had done 
so by-the end of 1937), and by the formation of film societies. WalsaII 
CS, for example, had fond its own film group as early as March 1937 
to show films 'not uauallg seen in public cinemas', to hold lectures. 
and discussions, - and 
to produce films illustrative of working class life generallT, 
and in particular of suitable propaganda films on behalf of 
the. cooperative movement. (36 
Such was the interest in the NACEC's Film Department that, 
though starting with a capital of. 8500, it was found. unnecessary after 
ix months to use this find, as running costs were met by profits made 
in supplying societies with programmes of films, equipment, and in acting 
as agent procuring such equipment. Within three months a profit of 
£300 had been made, and over the first six months a trading turnover in 
excess of ¬2000 was achieved; and at least twenty cooperatives had 
acquired soundsprojeators in this period. (37) 
34. CoorerativeNews .3 April 193T, P-15- 
35. Zbid., 30 October 1937, p. 5; 8 January 1938, p. 10; The Cooperators' 
Tear Hook. 1938, pp. 68-9; Cooperative Union Congress. 1937, P"4 1; 
Cooperative Union Conuress, 1938, P"533. The potential audience for 
such meetings was considerable. The NACEC had. 280 societies affili- 
ated. to it in 1937, and 311 in 1939, the latter figure representing 
no less than six million cooperators. Coornerative New?, 3 April 
1937, P"15; 8 April 1939, P"5" 
Ir'_ 
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By October 1938 the NACEC Film Department was competing with 
the Workers' Film Association (WFA), the film agency of the Labour Party 
and the TUC, run by Reeves. Nevertheless, in the eight months from 
October 1938 to May 1939, it achieved a trading turnover of £1748, 
(compared with ¬2363 for the WFA over the same period), and for the 
trading year, its turnover was again in excess of £2000. (38) Unfortunately 
there is little direct evidence to indicate the nature of the trans- 
actions involved: whether film hire was more common than the roadshow; 
whether the films most in demand were those supplied by, the commercial 
libraries and the GPQ Film Library, or were productions of the cooperative 
movement and the material from Kino, etc.; or, indeed, in the case of 
cooperative productions, whether trading and publicity shorts produced 
by the Cooperative Wholesale Society (CWS) were in greater demand than 
the more educational/political films produced by the London societies. 
A report given to the NACEC conference on film in April 1939 revealed 
that roadshows were decreasing due to the rapid increase in cooperative 
societies possessing their own projection equipment; and that the 
Department, in extending its own collection of 'propaganda' films, was 
becoming increasingly less reliant on films from the commercial libraries - 
the implication being that the preference of societies was for doaumentaty 
and 'propaganda' material. (39) This inference is supported by the 
hostile attitude of the CWS towards the NACEC Film Department, which 
had led to the fozmer's refusal to allow the latter to include CWS 
publicity shorts. in its programmes. This attitude was maintained from 
the Department's inception to at least mid-1938, and probably until 
early 1939. Film programmes therefore were unlikely- to include many, if 
any, CWS productions during the 1938-9 year, thereby affecting the balance 
36. Coorerative News, 13 March 1937, p. 13. It was reported that 65 
people were present at the society's first meeting. Other film 
societies formed in the wake of the NACEC scheme included Long 
Eatcn,. Kettering,,. &tockton and Leicester, the Tattee frequent1 
producing newsreel and fictional films rfor propaganda purposes'. 
gis, 4 December 1937, P. 5. 
3T. LPNEC. National Joint Film Committee Minutes, 24 March 1938, 
'National Film Service'. However, this rate of response. was not 
maintained. By January 1939 only 25 societies 'and a number of 
Trade Unions' had purchased projectors. Labour Press Service. 
no. 1021,18 January 1939, Supplement. 
38. TUC Library, TUC GC National Joint Film Committee Minutes, 1T June 
1940; Workers-' Film Association Papers, Workersl' Film Association, 
Annual Report, 1939. 
39. Cooperative News, 15 April 1939, p. 6. 
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of programmes offered. in favour of cooperative propaganda material, in 
so far as every show would have been considered -an opportunity to give 
publicity to some aspect of cooperative activity. Finally, most 
organisations which hired material from. the 14ACEC film library 
probably preferred to arrange occasional rather than regular weekly, 
or highly frequent, exhibitions, if only because of the relatively 
large amount of capital required to purchase equipment, which in turn 
could only be justified by a substantial audience 'potential' - even 
though there. was a popular conviction that films attracted more people 
to meetings. What evidence there is pattially substantiates this. 
The first annual, report of the Workers' Film Association reveals that 
'the great proportion' of the Film Department's turnover for the 1938-9 
year 'has been derived from film hire' - rather than sales of equipment. (40) 
If the pattern of film hire experienced by the WFA was representative 
of the film hire generally within the Labour movement, then custom was 
spread fairly evenly, covering a large number of groups, there being few 
which hired material with a high degree of frequency. If this is so, 
then the NACEC's customers were probably a mix of those societies 
conforming to the original scheme of taking weekly programmes, and others 
taking material on an irregular basis. No firm conclusions can be drawn, 
but it would seem that a large number of local groups (not just cooperative 
societies) must have had at least irregular access to projection equipment, 
even though only 25 cooperative societies had their own by January 1939. 
As film hire-was the main source of revenue, therefore a highly tentative 
impression of the demands made on the Department can be suggested. 
If we assume that, for the first eight months of the 1938-91 
trading year (41) only half of its turnover was derived from film hire, 
and that this was all revenue (film hire expenditure plus trade in 
40. TUC Library, Workers' Film Association Pavers, Workers' Film 
Association, Annual-Report, 1939- 
41. The figurestor the eight month period are reliable: the turnover for 
the whole year is referred to only, as 'over ¬2000'. They also 
give a more accurate indication of the level of film hire: film 
shows during the summer months were less popular both inside and- 
outside the commercial cinema in comparison with the rest of 
the year. 
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equipment making up the remainder), with an average two hour programme 
costing E6 15c, approximately 130 programmes would have been hired from 
the Department -a rough average of four programmes per week, and probably 
therefore of four groups hiring films each week. While by no means 
roaring trade this suggests a body of support for the scheme. Moreover, 
organisations appear to have been encouraged not simply to hire prog- 
rammes of films for single shows, but to book them for periods of seven 
dass, giving up"to. s# shows for each hiring. The correlation therefore 
between hiring and showing films is indeterminate, preventing the 
quantification of exhibitions of this type, but offering the speculation 
that in any one week something in the region of twenty exhibitions could 
have been given from the NACEC film library. 
Given the limited resources of the Film Department, the level 
of film hire, the ability from its inception to run on the profits made, 
and that such films as Advance Democracy were in 'constant circulation', C42) 
it would appear that as a service to both the cooperative and the wider 
Labour movement, the scheme was relatively, successful. Indeed, its 
immediate success was the occasion for the Labour Party and the TUC to 
finally approve the formation of a film agency for the whole of the 
Labour movement, after seventeen years of hesitation. Similarly it 
provided encouragement to Reeves and other members of the Department who 
were anxious to secure commissions for the production of cooperative fl-j= 
for the political. and educational elaboration of the cooperative point 
of view. The four London societies,, Royal. Arsenal, London, South Sub- 
urban and Enfield Highway agreed in November 193? to Reeves' suggestion. 
(made in June that year, before the NACEC scheme had started) to collect- 
ively provide £1000 each year for five years to fund the production of 
'five documentary social. films on cooperation'-(43) 
In the space of three months the cooperative movement had 
established a film distribution agency and launched two programmes of 
production to supply-this service with suitable films. These develop- 
ments were quite remarkable in so far as the movement as a whole was 
42. Cooperative News, 15 April 1939, p. 6. 
43. Ibid., 27 November 1937, p. 2; RACS, Report, 1938, p. 11. 
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politically less developed than the rest of the Labour movement, and 
distinctly reluctant to assume a political profile. In rec ogiising this 
widespread political. backwardness members of. the political. leadership 
of the cooperative movement. devised this film service, heavily sponsored 
by -a vision of the role cooperation could perfcr-m in achieving further 
social and political progress, and tapping deeply rooted working class 
traditions of education, community and culture. A high premium was 
therefore placed on political education; and subsequent production, 
largely unrecorded in Ithe 
history of British film, was fashioned to 
precisely-these utilitarian ends. 
(lx) 
What was more remarkable however was the five year scheme of 
joint production of the four London societies, inaugurated in November 
1937. With Reeves as technical secretary to the production committee, 
'We soon decided. ', he explained, 
that our films to be of value must not deal with narrow and 
specific problems but with the broad issues of life in which 
the average man and woman are interested. (44) 
The scheme was based on the assumption that, 
If we are not satisfied with the films provided by Hollywood 
the only alternative is to make our own films. If we make 
our own films they, must serve our ends. (45) 
Reeves was entrusted- with providing an initial scenario for the production 
company the Realist. Film Unit; and 'wanted to illustrate the struggles of 
the workers to achieve social and economic freedom'-(46) Scripted and 
directed by Ralph. Don . the result, a twenty, minute sound film titled 
Advance Democracy and costing £900, was one of the most important political 
films made by the Labour movement in the 1930's, in the context Of its 
technical proficiency, political message and its usage. Released in 
October 1938 it 'scored an instant success'. The NACEC's Film Department 
possessed twelve copies, all of which were in 'constant circulation', 
44. Comradeship, October 1938. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid., where Reeves provides a synopsis. 
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'shown all over the country'. (47) The Workers' Film Association, 
which commenced operations simultaneously with the film's release, 
was appointed distributor for the four London Cooperative Societies' 
Joint Education Committee, thereby securing the film for its own 
library. The surviving records of the WFA reveal that between November 
1938 and September 1939 this film was hired on at least 63 occasions 
from the Association. (48) It was hired therefore an average of at 
least once a week between the date of its release and the outbreak of 
war, from the WFA; an4 possibly more frequently from the NACEC Film 
Department. Of those films produced by the Labour movement that are 
comparable in the broadest sense (professional production, similar 
level of finance, guaranteed distribution, extensive screening potential, 
length, target audience, etc. ) probably only two films achieved similar 
usage, Defence of Madrid and Peace and Plenty. 
The second film from the Joint Education Committees was Voice 
of the People. Made by the Realist Film Unit and produced by. Ralph 
Bond, it cost under £1000, and was released in October 1939. Recording 
the achievements of the Labour movement since the early nineteenth century, 
the film emphasises the centrality of the cooperative movement to this 
progress, and its leading role in the gradual transformation of capitalism 
to a more humane, ordered and egalitarian society. 
go other-film of a political nature was produced by the 
cooperative movement before the war. The NACEC Film Department decided 
to close down for the duration of the war, owing to war conditions, hand- 
ing over its own films and custom to the WFA so that all film work 
might be conducted by one representative Labour organisation; the SACS 
and the Joint Education Committee of the (now five) London cooperatives 
followed, entrusting their film work to the Association as both agent 
and producer. 
The outstanding character of the cooperative film service was 
its political purpose. The NACEC and individual cooperative education 
committees had, acknowledging the threat to social democracy posed by 
capitalist competition on the one hand, and on the other by fascism, 
recognised the need to assume an offensive in the realm of ideas to 
47. Labour Press Service, no. 1034,26 April 1939. 
48. TUC Library, Workers' Film Association Pavers, Ledger. The Ledger, 
a record of all transactions conducted, contains no readily available 
statistics, and the information there is insufficient to provide a 
a clear impression of their nature. All figures collated from this 
source are therefore tentative. 
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mobilise opinion and action not merely in defence of democratic insti- 
tutions, -" but. to achieve further political- advance. As Reeves asserted. 
in 1938'. 
The need for cooperative education is becoming more and more 
evident. Cooperation has something more to offer than a 
mere trading organisation. We must, by our united efforts, 
endeavour to achieve a new social order ..... only an educated 
cooperative democracy can save world peace. (49) 
Some sections of the cooperative movement in the late-1930's became 
involved in the various peace, anti-fascist and Labour campaigns of 
those years. The film work of the NACEC and the London cooperatives 
took place in this context, and had a distinct political basis, focussing, 
on three main areas of activity: in conjunction with relief work for 
Republican Spain and the opposition to the National. Government's 
non-intervention policy; in the politically-oriented. edueationi 
work of the cooperative movement; . and. 
in. the general propagandising of 
cooperative principles in the wider Labour movement. 
In the autumn of 1937 the Cooperative Party and the Cooperative 
Union launched a 'Milk for Spain' campaign to raise funds to purchase 
mx11c through the CWS for immediate shipment to those in need . 
in 
'democratic Spain'. The campaign was to be'the biggest appeal ever made 
to its millions of members'=. (50) With the collaboration of the NACEC 
Pilm. Department, the Cooperative Union prepared plans 'to put the cinema 
screen to a widespread use in presenting the Spanish case', arranging, 
'film shows on a scale never before attempted by the democratic move- 
ments'. Undertaking the entire film work for the campaign the Film 
Department hired four sound films from Gino Films:. News from Spain, 
Madrid Today, The Basque Children and, later, The Spanish Earth. The 
first, three were provided with an appropriate visual intraductory, 
commentax7 by A. V. Alexander. (51) No details on the scope of this film 
campaign are available, the records of the NACEC not having surviveä; 
and there is noo information in Cooperative Union records or sources 
such as Cooperative Sews. 
49. RACS, Report, 1939, P-11- 
50- Cooperative News. 20 November 1937, p. 2. 
51. Ibid'.., 4 December 1937', p. 2; 11 December 1937, P"9. Sufficient 
copies of these films were hired to enable twelve shows to be given 
simultaneously. Daily Worker, 8 December 1937, P"3. 
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The NACECts film work assumed. a more overtly political form 
in conjunction with the Labour Party. The Party had established its 
own 'Spain Campaign Committee' in November 1937 to launch a nationwide 
lobby to compel the Government to abandon the Nan-Intervention Agreement 
and allow the Republican Government to purchase arms from Britain. As 
part of this campaign local Labour Party organisations were encouraged 
to show at their meetings the Spanish material distributed by the IIACEC 
Film Department. Characteristically,, the initiative however came not 
from the Labour Party's National Executive Committee, but fmm Reeves 
and David Mason (who chaired the committee which ran the Department), 
who arranged for local cooper tive societies to loan projectors to their 
respective Labour Party organisations, and where this was not possible, 
for the NACEC to provide roadshow exhibitions. (52) Reeves and Mason 
were in a position to do this having succeeded in July 1937 in persuading 
the Labour. Party NEC and the TUC General Council that a film service for 
the whole of the Labour movement was both feasible and urgently necessary. 
Reeves finally established a Joint Film Committee of these two bodies 
and the NACEC to organise such a service, which first met in Jaruiary 1938. 
Under these arrangements with the I CP, C local Party organisations gave 
over 100 exhibitions within the first two months of the campaign, and 
by late March had given 160. (53) 
Similarly, the RACS participated in special peace campaigns, 
and shows of political material were arranged regularly at 'educational' 
meetings. (54) In late 1938 the Education Committee arranged a series 
of showings at political meetings convened in conjunction with Cooperative 
Guilds and Labour Parties in, ä bid to expand its audience, attracting 
a total of 5000 people, according to one report, within a'four month 
period. (55) 
52. For the Spain Committee, see LPAR. 1939, PP-33-4; $"Mi1ibind, 
Parliamentai-r Socialism ov. cit., pp. 255-6. For the use of film 
in this campaign, see jam, Spain Campaign Committee Minutes, 
8 February 1938; ibid., National Joint Film Committee Mi=tes, 
24 March 1938, 'National Film Service'. 
53" IPNEC. National Joint Film Committee Minutes, 24 March 1938. 
54" J. Reeves, The Film and Education op. cit., p. 15; SACS, Report, 
1937, P"11. 
55. RACS, Report. 1939, p. 11. The Committee considered the average 
attendance far short of expectations. 
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The main film output of these sections of the cooperative 
movement was of a distinctly, political character. The three principal 
productions, People Who Count, Advance Democracy- and Voice of the People, 
used a discussion of the historical importance of the cooperative movement 
within the context of the struggles of- the Labour movement, and as 
elaboration of the principles of cooperation.. to elicit greater support 
for and involvement. within various 'cooperative, activities. These two 
themes were fused to advocate cooperation as the fundamental basis for 
the gradual transition from capitalism to an "enlightened democracy". 
These films indicate how these sections of the cooperative mrvement 
responded to the particu%ar situation.. The follrowfzpg section v 
discuss the two, outstanding cooperative films to be released before the 
war broke out. 
The LCS production People Wha Count was intended to. publicise 
the parent socfaty and, more importantly, ',. assert the relevance- of 
cooperative- pr1haiples in the struggle against reactionary anti-workin 
class capitattsu and the war-danger, both of which were seen as 
threatening social democrat r. The filmy: describing the historic 
achievements of the cooperative. movement,. adapte(E a hostile tone towards 
this 'enemy' Visual images,, with little camera movement and a reliance 
entirely onlrealismrt. are used. to underpin A. V. Alexander's commentary.. 
which sets the theme with its opening sequence:. 
Sow can a great. nation"achiev+e and maintain its. greatness? 
What is the kegrfactor which will decide the means of attain- 
ment of' the nniversaL needs of today: peace and. contentment ? 
Who are the-people who will achieve, a- higher civilisation than 
our present civilisation, and-how wilL they-da it?. 
*0000 
The answer is here. all. around. us,, in the streets, in factories, 
in offices and shops. These are the people who count. The 
workers, the wives and. the mothers: the people who by their 
united. efforts can and. will make our world a better place to. 
live in. This great object can only be obtained. bg cooperation. 
Alexander then discusses the. meaning of cooperation, in the context. of 
the rout-worn system' of capitalism, using the. opportunity-to criticise 
one particular form of 'cooperations, employing newsreel footage of 
Ramsay MacDonald and the National. Government;. 
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The word. $cooperationL- is open to misuse, and an example 
of-'this misuse. occurred. when, in 1931,. certain trusted 
leaders cooperate& with their opponents. 
This was not. just a swipe at. MacDonald and Snowden, but. a device: intend- 
eä to tap the vast reservo it of resentment: towards the 'betrayal' of 1931 
as a means of raising- the receptivity of the audience to the fiindamentallg- 
poaticaL message of the film, sharply contrasting: cooperation and 
capitalism and, bg, implication,, suggesting the dangers of class collabor- 
ation. 
The film then describes - the development of cooperation. 
as a. response to capitalist exploitation of the working class; and than 
relates the achievements of the London and Royal Arsenal societies,, and 
the- success of -their retail stores. Tor- emphasise the contrast between. 
"cooperation' and 'capitalism's and. the benefits (or %otherwise) which- 
they. - bestow,. Alexander discusses one particular Hammersmith shop. 
previously- under 'capitalist' ownership and now thriiing- as. a cooperative 
store. Illustrating the congenial. working conditions Alexander puts 
a. direct question to. a member of the staff, one who. was employed. there 
before the LCS bought the shop. 
To. make these stores into'paying concerns we didn't have to: 
resort to the so-called. 'cooperation' between capital and 
]abovr, which usually means the general reduction of wages. 
..... . 
How did. we do it. Miss Hartem Did we. keep your noses: to 
the grindstone from earlT morning till late at night? 
After. a glowing account, of the workings of the shop, Alexander motes on 
to discuss more 'people who, countt - members of the cooperative movement 
who volunteer, their services to promote their society. 
They know what it. is. they, are fighting against, and they 
know that success will lead to the betterment of their 
position - will eventually mean the ownership. and. control 
of all the means of life. 
Emphasising the importance of political. partictpat n. Alexander urges 
people to vote. Here he explains the function of much cooperative 
education work of those years. - 
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In order that he (the citizen) may use his vote intelligently, 
we have set up machinery for the purpose of enlightening him 
politically. 
..... . 
The cooperative movement sends members to Parliament.... Such 
members are in Parl iament to defend and retain the rights 
which we have won in the past, and which are now being 
threatened by the representatives of those capitalist enter- 
prises which do not wish to see a continuation and increase 
in the prosperity of working class cooperative efforts. 
Following an explanation of the activities of various cooperative organ- 
isations, and of the spirit of service of the committee members who ran 
them, Alexander discusses the importance of more people becoming involved 
in the movement in the light of the deteriorating global situation, 
emphasising that only through active participation can cooperative 
ideals be attained. This final section of the monologue is worth 
quoting at length, revealing the bitterness and hostility prevalent 
in cooperative circles towards capitalist ideas and institutions. 
Selfishness and greed are at the bottom of all poverty and 
misery. There is no real defence for the continuation 
of a system which maintains poverty and misery. .. bile a 
few are content to enjoy wealth in extreme and to hold 
on to it by every means, the power placed in their 
hands by the possession of this wealth makes the attainment 
of our objectives very difficult. in the cooperative 
movement they recognise an enemy. In times of crisis 
when 'the Budget needs balancing', [ironical tone? the 
Gold Standard must be saved, when capitalist interests 
are threatened, their Press Lords scream at the Coops. 
: that a strange world we live in: money for destruction, 
thousands of millions forthcoming without a protest, for 
warships, guns, defence, the people's tax on what they. 
earn, tax on what they eat and drinLc, and tax on what 
they do - and the final demand may be death, not only to 
the soldier, but to women and children. [long pause] 
What a strange world we live in. Money for construction, 
health and saving life, provided by voluntary contributions. 
A world where the poor pay for their health and small 
amenities by' giving money to charitable institutions, and 
then have wrung from them the wherewithal to protect the 
rich man's property. Yes, to their very last. 
This is a good world used rightly, with room for all, work 
and play for all, and food and clothes for all. You who 
listen to me realise, I an sure, the insanity of man's 
use of the world today, and yet you do not realise your 
Dower to change this. Why not decide now to sup:; ort a 
system of equality of ownership, of production for use and 
not for profit; equality of opportunity for these eight 
thousand citizens of the future, and their brothers and 
sisters all over the world regardless of colour or creed. 
Internatioral cooperation, typified by the canners they carry, 
is the only hone of ifnich we can build our new Statu. 
Cd: with shots of the Cooperative Party's Peace Demonstration, 
showing banners - 'Cooperation i: eans World Peace'. 3 
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Although events were, by the autumn of 1937, beginning to penetrate 
deeply into: the Labour. consciousness, Peovle Who Count was produced. at 
a time when Labour was still preoccupied. with the domestic situation. 
The emphases in the film reflect this. The fascist menace is subsume& 
in somewhat bland references to war, which. is turn are.. aubordinats to 
the hostile condemnation, of capitalism, a politiedZ view widely heIs 
within Labour ranks. (j6) The main context of the film was firstly, 
the striking social and political changes won by the Labour movement 
over previous decades; secondly, the prevailing, sensitivity within 
cooperative. circles to- what wau considered to be unfair treatment by 
the State, imposing discriminatory taxes and restrictions which operated 
to the benefit. of its commercial rivals, and to the villifying and 
declamatory attitude of sections of the press; and thirdly,, the 
contemporary concerti for housing, health and: nutrition is a period. of 
frenetic social investigation. C57) The film Is focal point therefore 
was social. and, political progress; its thrust,. to publicise cooperation 
as the indispensable condition of that advance - as the vanguard of-the 
working class in their struggle against capitalism. 
Advance Democracyl was produced. within an entirelg different 
political climate. Though hostilitg towards capitalism had not end 
sided, and. thenxelfare: of the working class was still a major political 
issue, international. developments had partiallg, yet decisively= eclipsed 
56. B'. Pimlott., Labour' and the Left in the 1930's (Cambridge, 197T), 
pp. 3-4. 
57. For- cooperative attitudes to the State see, for example, the Editorial 
in Cooperative News p 13 Februar,, 193Tr p. 8. For- the concern over 
press attacks: on the movement see, for example, Cooperative Union. 
Library,. erat ve Union. Minutes of the Central Executive: 
Executive Committee Minutes, 17' Februars 1934; 8 July 19397: i i, 
National Cooperative Authority- Minutest 5 December 1935; Cooperative 
New, 26- June 1937,: Supplement. For information on. the social 
inquiries. of this period,. see J. Stevenson, Social Conditions in 
Britain Between the Wars (Harmondsworth, 1977 t pp. 46 ff. The 
Ivisuaz_ context' of the film was, of course,, the documentary use 
of the medium as part of this. social inquiry, most notably in 
Horsing Problems and Enough to Eat?. See P: Botha,. Document! = 
DiarT. o . cit., pp. 154-60; E. Barnouw, Documentary: A Histor9ro£ 
Non-Fiction Film (New Mork-, 1974), pp-90-5- 
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domestic concerns. U to the end- of 193? one of the issues posed within 
the Labour movement was the most effective strategy to be adopted. in 
opposing- the National Government tra foreign policies. With a view to 
creating a groundswell of opinion sufficient to influence the direction 
of Government policy or force an early general election, Labour policy- 
had centred on the attractions or- otherwise of a ! united. fxontt - 
that is to iayt a political/electoral alliance of *the 112 p. the Communist 
Party., the Labour Party, and other Labour organisations. The former two 
bodies had campaigned-vigorously for unity, with little success amongst 
the TUC and the Labour. Party. By early- 1938 the international situation 
had deteriorated dramatically- with fascism in the ascendent: the 
Republicans in Spain had lost much ground; German forces had occupied. 
Austria; Hitler was threatening Czechoslovakia; and invading Japanese 
forces were rapidlyrextending their control over key cities in China. 
In response to these developments the idea of a 'populan front= or a 
'united Ream. allian(mL embracing people, of all political persuasions- 
whoaopposed fascism and considered the Government's foreign policies 
disastrous, was discussed widely within the Laboer movement. The purpose 
behind: the 'popular- front' was to, exert maxi um pressure to bring an end, 
to appeasement. Substantial support for this strategy existed. within 
the mainstream of the Labour movement; 120 constituency Labour Parties: 
registered. their disapproval, together with left wing Party intellectuals,. 
and even the Cooperative Party endorsed. the 'united peace alliance" at 
its Faster Congress. ( 
. 
58). Short-lived as the momentum. was for a 
rpopular front'-* it being virtually exhausted: by mid-1938, the issue 
prompted 'the most. bitter battle of the decade between. Left and Eight 
for the loyalty of Labour's rank. and file ". (59) For the most part the 
Labour Party leadership fizmly opposed the strategy, and. the NEC, anxiiýus 
to maintain a tight control over its constituency organisations, even 
threatens& dissenting local. Parties with disaffiliation. However,, while 
left sections of the Party and the CPGB, in supporting a 'popular front's 
advocated. a vigorous anti-fascist: foreign policy, their opposition to. 
rea=nament. under the National Government was in direct conflict with many- 
58. G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (Londons 1948), 
Pp. 352-3; R. Miliband, op. cit., p. 257- 
59. B. Pimlottf OP-cit., pp. 5,, 147-54. 
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of' the centre and. right leaders of the 'popular front'- who insisted. on 
the need: for immediate rearmament for. the required. opposition, to fascist 
aggression. The various cross-currents created. a confusing situation, 
and the decision of the Cooperative Congress in Sane 1938 to reject bgr 
a two to. one majority- a resolution sponsored. by the Cooperative Party 
calling for a tvnite3 peace alliance', dealt a, crucial blow. th the 
status of the strategy, and the idea quickly- lost support within the 
mainstream of Labour politics. (60) 
It was amid. the political flux of these months that Advance 
Democracy was produced, and the confusions and uncertaintisa of the 
period are present in its political message. The film employed various 
techniques toamake it more attractive. than the monologue style of 
PeoDle Whv Count: fictional format., realistic. setting; actualitj record- 
ing of a. particular event of intrinsic interest (it was assumed) to 
Labour audiences - the 1938 May Day Labour demonstration - and location 
sequences. 
Commencing with a contrast between the life and welfare of the 
wealtY -and the working class, the commentary introduces two members of 
the latter,. Bert and Mai'. Bert is seen working in London's dockland, 
and at the end or the working day is involved, in a casual conversation 
about war and. the international situation, hoping that 'we don't get 
mixed ups in it'. On arriving home Bert switches on the radio-- 
BBC: Here is the weather. A deep depression is centred aver 
Central Europe, and is rapidly moving westwards. 
Bert: Ibu' e. telling me. 
BBC: The news copyright reserved. The Prime Minister, 
replying to. questions in the House, said that the 
international situation was. cave. He hoped however 
that by the exercise of statesmanship, calm ancl 
patience - 
Sert: (abruptly switching off the radio: ) 
An they- can talk about is war - get's on yer nerves..... 
The. sequence suggests the irritation and. nervousness of the ordinary 
worker regarding the seeming paralysis of the Government in the face or 
the drift towards war. It also suggests frustration and impatience 
with the Chamberlain Government's foreign policy. The viewer has already 
been presented with a picture of Bert as a potential. anti-fascist, in a 
hostile mood, which belies his complacent conversation with his work-mates: 
on his way- home from work he sees posters. referring to and showing '. Duce ', 
60. H. Pimlott, ov. cit., PP"147-54; G. D. H. Cole, OD_, cit., PP"353-6. 
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Chamberlain and Hitler; his facial expression one of contempt, Bert stubs 
out a cigarette with his boot. 
At home May mentions that the war danger had been discussed 
at the local Women's Cooperative Guild. -Bert questions the Guild's 
worth, and an exchange follows in which May defends the value of the 
coop. and the 'dividend'. Unimpressed, Bert is persuaded to listen 
to a broadcast on 'Democracy and the Cooperative Movement' the following 
evening: 
Alright, alright. That means I'll have to fill in me football 
coupons tonight..... 
Bert is nest seen returning home from work and turning on the radio, 
just in time for A. P. Alexander's talk, which focuses on the sacrifices 
and achievements of the 'workers' movement' over the past one hundred 
years, detailing the role of the cooperative movement in these struggles 
and the present scope of cooperative activities. Fictional and actuality- 
sequences are used to illustrate these. Alexander then pauses to take 
a glass of water, permitting May to interject, 
There! 'hat did I tell you! It's worth belonging to 
isn't it! 
and Bert to reply, cautiously, 
I1mmm. Their haven tt done too badly. 
The interlude i, brief, and with not a little humour, but provides a 
convenient break, allowing Alexander to launch into a final passage, 
and the film's vain political statement, which is quoted in full. 
The cooperative movement remains true to th3 der_ocratic 
principles of the Rochdale Pioneers. But today those 
principles are in dander. Democracy everywhere is 
threatened. Fascist countries have destroyed every vestige 
of freedom for their'people. Racial persecution has become 
an integral part of state policy. 'heir rulers "lorify 
war as the supreme achievement of mankind. Their aero- 
planes rain bombs on defenceless civilian po ulations, 
massacring men, women and children - destroying whole towns and cities. If democracy is to survive the democrats 
nu st assert themselves. If the war policy of the aGZressors 
is to be defeated all friends of peace and 
freedom must 
unite. The cooperative movement will play its part in defence of peace, freedom and democracy. 'iIZL YOU ? 
3T0 
During. this statement newsreel footage is used. depicting scenes o f' war, 
Hitlez at. a military. - parade, and footage of bomb. damage and civilian 
distress in Republican Madrid. When in. view- Alezander does not look up. 
Prom his script, but. on completing his penultimate sentence peers. into. 
the camera,. which moves in fier a full. close-up,, to issue his last words. C61) 
While there. is. no. doubt as to the anti-fascist. credentials of 
the message, in the context of the. strategic formulae being discussed, 
at. the very centre of Labour politics in the first eight months of 1935, 
the film offers nothing but confusion, merely calling on 'all. friends of 
peace and free omL to unite and for them toa "assert. themselves -. never- 
theless,, even this was a considerable step, beyond the Labour Partg's 
positions and in marked. contrast to the emphases of People Who Count 
I. the following sequence! implying that. he was inspired to 
activism: by the radio. talk,. Bert is seen. addressing his work-mates. 
And if the fascists ever get to power it '-11 be the finish 
of us. They'll-smash our unions. Our wages are low enough. 
And if that happens they'll be a damn sight lower. Well we 
wontt let it. happen. 'ere. We must all get together and 
show them. that we tre. not. gonna. stand. for it. 
Bert proposes that they all march in the Mag Day demonstration;. and 
in reply- to a fellow worker querying the value of this says. - 
It'll do a hell. of a lot of good. If we can get a million 
Londoners to. act at a meeting together it'll. show that we 
mean business. 
Participation in the march is agreed: 
61. It is not without significance that no members of the cooperative 
movement in the 1930's were given airtime bg-the BBC to talk on 
the political importance of their movement. Facilities were 
provided for discussion,, with representatives of non-cooperative 
commercial. organisations, on aspects of retailing; but despite 
many requests to permit broadcasts on cooperation the BBC refused. 
It. would appear that this film-was making an ironical statement 
on what was considered to be the BBC "a political prejudice, 
though no internal indication. of this is given. The device would. 
certainly have-not been lost on. politically motivated members. of 
the movement. 
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Tom mow we march. To, defend wages,, and our right tc work 
of' ours. Csic] To, show that wa woatt tolerate aggression 
and. injustice. Our watchwords: Peace! Preedom: Democracy. 
The* final sequence ofthe film focusses. entireIg on the. May Day demon- 
stration. Banners depicting a pageant; of workers' history- are shown. 
Sections of* the Labour League of Youth.. the. Young. Communist League, 
the International Brigade! various. CPGB branches, Irish. Republican. 
groups-, the Labour Partr and various trade unions are seen; and,. all 
in the same framer banners: äepieting Attlee, Leon. Bli and: Stalin. 
Camera positions parallel with the marching contingents,.. above them,. 
and in front of' them. (mounted. on a vanj provide good shots of the 
demonstration; and there is a brisk. piece of editing of shots of the 
marchers in time with the accompanying socialist. choral music, finishing. - 
with a staged sequence,, again in rhythm with the music, emphasising 
the pmsence: of people from all classes and occupations in a broad. 
anti-fascist alliance. 
The 'line 9' of the film corresponds. to that. of the tnnited peace 
alliance' launched by Reynolds News, the cooperative Sunday paper:, and' 
supported by the Cooperative Party. The film: is clearly- aimed. at non- 
cooperators as much it not more than members of the cooperative movement! 
urging a combination of all democrats and 'lovers of peaces to act in. 
defence of democracy. The burden of responsibility for transforming- 
this defence into a progressive political movement is placed on 'cooper- 
ationr - only by adopting the principles of cooperation can democracy 
develop-. While not. neglecting the working class/'capitalism - conflict. 
central to People Who Count, "the film minimises this.. emphasising- 
rather"the explicit dangers to- the traditions and achievements of' the, 
Labour movement presented. by fase-i=. The film's main concern, and this 
is the central significance of Advance Democracy, is, to intervene is the 
debates within the Labour movement as to the correct strategy~to be 
adopted. with regard to resisting fasc . sm, proposing a strategy which 
was contrary to that put forward by the Labour Party. (62) No criticism 
of the National Government is apparent Cin contrast to the earlier film). 
Amid. the confusion and agonising of the months of 1938 the film urged. 
unity, but only in opposition to fascism. There was, as with the Labour. 
Party; little guidance to- political. action beyond encouragement to 
mere activism. No suggestion is made as to the relation between unity- 
62.. Reeves, vhar wrote the original scenario for., the film, expressed in 
an Editorial in Comradeship, July 1938,. his full support for the. 
Uinited Peace Alliance; and Ralph. Bbnd, a member of the Communist. 
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and, the defeat of the taggressors t* relying mere1 on urging people to 
join is demonstrations and to 'shot that we mean business'. 
Advance Democracy is very- much a product. of. Labour politics 
in Britain in 1938, reflecting the contusions and evasions which 
characterise them. (In advocating a'popular front' was it t£or" or 
'against' National Government rearmament? ) Despite. Sts wealmesses, it is 
an important film precise1 because of its intervention in these, vital 
issues. Curioßsly, released. a-'week after they Munich crisis, it was 
exhibited: is markedly different circumstances fron the period. of its 
production. Although Labour leaders had consideaeci that an electoral 
pact with, dissenting Conservatives was desirable should. there be. a. 
substantial- anti-Chamberlain rebellion, the idea of a 'popular front' 
was summarily rejected., as Sf= Stafford. Cripps discovered to his. cost 
in early I939`t expelled. from. the Part- for- his. attempt to organise a 
new 'popular fronte' with support in the Labour Party ranks. (63) 'lie: post- 
Munich. situation in which Advance Democracy- was exhibited. was,. within 
the Labour movement, politically less confused.. There was a more clearly 
defined polarisation between those who supported the Labour Party leadership 
an& its devotion to an eleotorally-oriented. campaign against the Govera- 
ment - one which precluded alliances with far-left groupings, and rpopu! ar 
fronters ':. While many divisional. Labour Parties sympathis ed with Crippat 
National Petition, Party-Headquarters was exercising considerable press 
in organising pre-election campaign, work,, leaving little room for 
manoeuvre in a political competition for very high stakes: victory could 
bring socialist construction, defeat - possibly electoral irrelevance. 
Aligning fi Lly with the Labour Party, the Cooperative Union and the 
Cooperative Party were similarly opposed to a broad political alignment,. 
although it is unclear whether ox not this. accurately. reflected the position 
of individual cooperative societies. 
The film; was, judging by the commentary,, aimed mainly at audiences. 
constitute& either as cooperators,. or as members: of or- sympathisers with. 
the Labour Party. The Cooperative Party aad the Labour Party ha<iq bg 
January 1939 coordinated. their activities in a campaign against, the 
Party, was a popuia frontist; and, it was he who scripted. and. 
directed. the film. 
63. See, S. Dalton,. The Pateful Years: Memos 1931 - 1(London,. 1957'), 
pp. 200,, 207; B. Pimlott, op. cit., pp. 162 if. 
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National. Government. to which local. cooperative. political. and. educational. 
groups- and. divisional Labour Parties were fully, involved. It. would , 
weem: therefore that, within two, months of its- release Advance Democracy 
was: made partially redundantem its, target audience fi'll'y committed to 
a line: to which the film was opposed. %t the film flourished,, being 
in 'constant circulation"... shown by, Labour Parties,, cooperative groups 
and. trade-union branches. The film was. even used. in this joint pre- 
election. campaign. Campaign. organisers. bad. urged. the use of film 
propaganda in a bid. to mobilise all possible resources against the 
Government; and there are reports. suggesting that this was carried oat: 
in the Tamworth. and Brighton areas for example, cooperative political 
organisations supplemented. their usual propaganda repertoire with. 
showings of Advance Democracy and. other. films at political meetings. 
C64) 
There- is no3 clear indication. whether the attraction of this film resicc ect 
less in the film itself and more in, the use, indiscriminatell, of 'Labour" 
films ver se, or, and this. is less likelT,. in the existence of a subdued. 
body of "popular iio nt. " support within the ranks. of the cooperative 
movement and. the Labour Party. Whatever the case may be the film was- 
given. enthnsiastia support. 
The Cooperative Union and the Cooperative Wholesale Society 
While other sections of the cooperative movement also. mse& film, 
an3 quite extensively, none did. so. for specifically, political purposes, 
although attempts were made in this direction. The Cooperative Wholesale 
Society, as a national. organisat. ion,. had been using films for trade 
publicity; sinca 1898. In. 192ß it began exhibiting film in 'public. t,, the 
first film being The Magic Basket, which was scheduled. for showing in 
IOOQ cinemas that year. By the end of 193Q six CO films advertising 
the production activities of the, rganisation"were being shown in 
this 
way, including two- stalkiest; and twelve silent films illustrating 
manufacturing and trading activties were, from 1929, routinely shown. by 
the CWS Publicity Department, which organised. 'Film Entertainment Nights' 
6¢. Cooperative News, 21 January 1939, P"1; 18. iPebrvarT 1939, P"5; 
tbotsr, February 1939, P"8" 
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for cooperators in cooperative halla. (65) This publicity material was 
the principal film output of the CWS in the 1930's, a regular programme 
of production being maintained. with, for instance, four fi]: ms being 
produced in 1936, including ones. with such titles as Biscuit. Time and 
Merry Mondays. Exhibition was quite: extensive. For example, during the 
winter of 1937-a 1206 shows were arranged, to an estimated total audience 
of 323,000. Typical of programmes. for these. meetings was one given-in 
Middlesborough in December 193T to 250 people:. Clothes Make the Man, 
Let *s Dress the Ladies.. K Ltchen Capers and -The 
Sweets of Victory, all. of 
which were publicity or advertising films. These shows were very popular, 
becoming- an integral. part of local. cooperative social and community 
gatherings; and. in the winter- of 1g58-9 films were hired. from the CWS 
film. servica on no. less than. 162ß mceasions for- shows of this kind. (66) 
The majority of exhibitions were given non-theatrieallg,, either using. 
outdoor filmt vans which employeä a system: of back-projection, or in 
halls and. cooperative roams. Advertising in cinemas appears to have 
been tog6zpensiva. to maintain, and. the CWS confined. such publicity 
to: the screening of slides. Where,, however, cooperative societies 
owned: cinemas full advantage was taken to. show material- to the exclusion 
of the publicity of rival traders. By 1936 there were 
probably twelve societieilän the conntrg which have successfully 
entered the entertainment industry, and own cinemas for the. 
benefit of their members and the general. public..... (673 
HarngIe7 CSC For example, was giving free sound. film shows, none of a 
propaganda or publicity nature, as early as October 1935. Audiences were 
invited, to contribute to a collection in aid of a local charity-. (6a) 
65. Labour Magazine, January 1928, P"430; October 1929, p. 286; April' 
19309, P"575; December 1930, P"383; F. &edtearn, The New Histoxcr- of 
the (London, 1938): PP"429-30. 
66'. Cooperative Union Congress, 1936, P"332; 1939, p. 80; Cooperative. 
News, 1 January 1938, P"7; 23 April" p. 9. This figure does not 
include over 300 educational and entertainment films hired, over 
the same period. A. fascinating collection of CWS publicity films 
is available for study at the North West Film Archive, Manchester 
Folytechintc. 
67. The Cooperative Educator,. April 1936: P"35. The move by the Cine- 
matograph Exhibitors' Association in 1934 filing on the Home Office 
to introduce provisions whereby- the 1909 Cinematograph Act would be- 
applicable to. 16mn exhibition was strongly rejected by the CWS on 
the grounds that it would effectively end. its film publicity work.. 
as displays. -in. cinemas 'cannot always be made'. Cooperative Union 
Library, Coo erative Union: Minutes of the Central Executive, 
Executive Committee Minutes, 20 October 1934. Hereafter, 'CUMCE', ) 
rfl ý., ew. afýt, t`LToolcly iT nr"tnber 1935ýu. 13. -__ 
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P- 1939 there appears to have been a decline in ownership of cinemas, 
and there were only between five and. eight cooperative societies which 
did sa. Of these, all but one appear to have given. exhibitions in a 
commercial format. The exception, Derby CS Education. Committee, inter- 
spersed regu]a r commercial programmes with lectures, educational 
exhibitions and even concerts. (69) 
The Qacperative Union, in accordance with its. coordinating 
and advisory roles, was more disposed. to use films for political- 
educational purposes. Proves to use film to advertise cooperative 
principles were first made at the Congress of the International. Cooperativ 
Alliance in August 1927; anä attempts were made subsequently- to organise 
an international distribution network! for the supply of such films. 
$r 1930 the Cooperative Union had implemented. a scheme of educational 
filidisplays , including- the use of two mobile vans touring the country. 
Shows: combined educational with entertainment and publicity,, material 
, calculated to attract and hold the interest of audiences t. (70) In 
1933 the Educational bcecutive of the Cooperative Union arranged, in 
conjunction with the neo-marxist (and. influential) National Council of 
Labour Colleges (NCLC), a series of film exhibitions as part of a joint 
teducational' programme'. T. P. LXi]. lar of the NCLC had already arrangest 
for the supply of Soviat. iiasssia: Fast and Present, and. two films produced 
bi the. Socialist Film. Council, Road. to Hell and What. the Newsreel Does 
Mot Show, to NCLC g cups, and presumably the joint scheme with the 
Cooperative Union involved the showing of these and. cooperative films. (71) 
The value of this educational work was becoming increasingly apparent, 
and by the mid-1930's there were calls from. a number of cooperative 
bodies, including Scottish cooperators, for 
the preparation of educational and propaganda films,. distinct- 
from the Trade publicity- films now is use, by the CG1S and thee. 
Scottish CWS. (72) 
69F. Kinematograph 'rear Book, 1940. 
7C1. Cooperative Union Library, CUMCE. Central Edcuation Committee 
Minutes, 18 January 1930,17 May 1930; The Cooperative Educator, 
January 1930,, p. 1T. 
71. Cooperative Union Library, CDMCE, Educational Executive Committee 
Minutes,. 16 September 1933; Plebs. September 1933, pp"209 I0; 
-Tuns 1934,. P ? 142-. 
72. Cooperative Union Library, CUMCE, Joint Propaganda and Trade. 
Committee Minutes, 19 November 1334. 
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The. Goveri entts attitude to the cooperative movement, the. 
hostile press campaigns of the Daily- Express anc: the Daily Mil, and the 
result of the 1935 General Election gave: further impetus to these demands. 
The National Cooperative Authority,, reviewing the situation in December 
that year, concluded. that as the influence of the movement had been 
insuffieient to change the character of the Government it was imperative 
that the movement adopted. a political stand and. used its power to defend 
itself and regain some of the lost grouncl of recent years. In particular,. 
the repeal of the additional. tax liabilities imposed. on cooperative 
trade which had, bg benefiting ordinary commerce, been a source of much 
bitterness throughout the movement. (73}. 
This political shift ha& an impact on the use of film by- the 
movement. In response to the political attacks on cooperation a 'Ten 
rear Plan for Education' was drawn up in 1936 to extend the. junior and 
adult education classes within the movement. The emphasis was to be on 
instruction in cooperative principles in a remarkably ambitious attempt 
to. lag the foundations of a more 'cooperative' society. (74) The develop-. 
ment of a film service was included in this Plan, not simplT to augment 
existing: teaching methods in relation to the standard. range of class 
subj*ects,. but because, as one member of the committee which drew up 
the Plan explained, tfilms can be most effective means of cooperative 
education and propaganda that. is possible', and there was a need for 
'education films dealing with the Cooperative Movement and Cooperative 
ideals t. C7.5) Sowever the Cooperative Union quickly discovered that the. 
provision of'such a film servica required financial resources far 
beyond. its reach,. and approached. the CWS in the auttn of 1936 with a 
view to developing a joint operation. 
It was at this point that the National Association of Cooperative 
Education Committees canvassed. the movement. for support for a film 
service under its own auspiaea. There followed. a bitter and. prolongeä 
wrangle- (which was never resolved) as to which organisation was in the 
more "favourable position to provide the service-. The NLCEC maititained. 
73. Cooperative Union Library, CUMCE. National Cooperative Authority 
Minutes, 5 December 1935" 
74. See the Cooperative Union's pamphlet, FAucation for- Social Change 
op. cit., written by Reeves. 
75. J. LPoyser, 'Cinema Filmst, The Cooperative Educator, April 1936, 
P"391. Cooperative Union Con=ess, 1937, PP"460-1. 
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that it had. been pressing for such a scheme since 1932, and that as the 
Cooperative- Union had been unwilling or unable to do- anything in this 
direction, it had. assumed responsibility- for the project. The CU anti 
the CWS objected, that as firstly,, one film organisation had. already 
built up within the movement a body of experience and a network of 
contacts, another was unnecessary and wasteful; and that any new service 
should be- built around. this. existing department. Secondly, that whereas 
the AACEC operated: on a very tight budget and would. be unable to fund. 
film production, the combined: resources of their organisations would. 
be: adequate for the task. In reply. - the NACEC maintained that the CWS- 
had not produced a single *socs! aiti film, being pre-occupied with film- 
advertising material, and was not concerned with the. more politically 
oriented. films which the NLCEC wished. to show. Despite several attempts 
by- the NACEC'to negotiate a compromise solution, the acrimozr generated 
by, the issuer soured- relationships badly, and neither the Cooperative, 
Union nor the CWS were willing to even consider forming a tri-partite 
service. 
The histolY. of the wrangle extends. into. the war years, and the 
details ax5e: of little relevance to. the main course of events under 
scrutiny here . 
(7) The three main. points in the whole affair which 
merit consideration are, firstly,, that it would appear that. the CWS. 
Film: Department wa(ldstinctly piqued by the NLCEC initiative, and 
persuaded, the CT that its film interests would be better served in. 
collaboration with the Department. Secondly, that the CU took a 
political decision not to. subscribe to the NACEC scheme, considering that 
the perspectives of that body were not readily compatible with its own. 
Thirdly, that before the Labour Party and the TIIC had finally agreed on. 
funding a Labour film service, the cooperative movement was prepared. to 
run two such. schemes, both informed. by political motives, and. one, that 
of the CU/CWS, unwilling to 'cooperate' with the other. 
The formation, of the CU/CWS film service was announced. in 
October 1931. Realising that due to competition from the commercial 
cinemas the 'old? -fashioned. -type of propaganda meeting is losing its. 
appeal!, it was intended. to combine. 'entertainment, education. and. 
76. For details of the dispute, see, Cooperative Union Congress, 1938, 
Pp"533,538-40; The Cooperators- Year Book, 1938, pp. 67-9; The 
Cooperative Educator,. January 1938, p. 10; Cooperative News, 23 April 
1938, P"9; 7. May 1938, p. 12; 14 May 1938, p. 2; 21 May 1938,. p. 3. 
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propaganda' films as a 'valuable alternativer basis. for. attracting 
audiences to meetings and. classes. (. ) The impulse behind. the scheme 
had. been political as well as educational; and the service was anticipated. 
with much enthusiasm by- cooperative education committees anxious 'to. 
show the public not only, how cooperative goods are made, but why- th2X 
are made'. There was, as is revealed. in this statement,. a recognitiaa 
of the need. to reach the public. - that is, non-cooperators; and the 
same advocate went on to-explain 
propaganda. films should. be exhibiteä to the. general public.... 
while instructive pictures ..... could. be shown to- cooperative 
guilds and classes....... because if"we are to. have talking 
pictures for propaganda and education,, let us be quite sure 
in advance of what we want. Propaganda. and. education are 
not synoz mous. We need. two kinds of instructive pictures, 
propaganda films to sow the seed, and educational films to 
nurture the young plants which have sprung up from the seed.. (78) 
Anticipate& as taking 'a foremost place. - in the Ten. Year Elan: objective, 
or popularising the cooperative. idea and ideals x, the. CWS. National 
Film Service (as the. CU/CWS scheme came to be Imown) was inaugurateä to 
April 1938, offering a fall range of documentary, publicityt travel an& 
entertainment films?, equipment and advice t and_ special services such as 
roadshows. The Service was to be supervised. by a joint CU/CWS committee, 
with the fo=e= assuming responsibility for- all educational film work. C75). 
ünfortunatelg,, the records of the CWS National Film Service 
are not available, and. there is nothing in. Cooperative Union records 
which provides information on the scope of the Service. From what 
few references there are in sources such as the, Cooperative News, it 
would seem that it confined its activities largely to the provision of 
publicity- material and. entertainment films: the intention being to 
attract people to. meetings. A. few films survive from this period and 
they, either advertise CWS goods or publicise the work of various 
cooperative organisations. An exception is Women's Cooperative Guild 
Congress, Hull 1939, a 16mm silent film lasting 10 minutes. The film 
examines how business is conducteä at such a conference, described in 
the introductory title sequence as 'The Mothers' Parliament of Britain'. 
The surviving copy is incomplete, but from the internal evidence of the 
7T. Cooperative News, 3Q October 1937, p. 8. 
78. Anon., 'Films sell our goodst Why not employ them to "sell" our 
principles? ', ibi&.,. 9 April 1938, Supplement. Emphasis in original. 
79. Ibid., 23 April 1938, P. 9; 30 April 1938, P"4. 
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film it is unlikely- that. the few minutes of. filrit. which no longer 
survive were concerned. with cooperative ideals beyond the general 
statements of cooperative philosoph given in the speeches of the 
Mayor of Hull and the President of' the Congress - and. with silent 
film nothing ambitions could be achieved anyway in the manner of 
of a persuasive disquisition on cooperation. Despite the pressures 
which prompted a more. politically motivated. use of film, there is 
nothing overtly, political in these surviving films. They conform, 
more accurately to the educational ambitions of the Ten Year Plan, 
explaining and promoting cooperation in a manner very similar to the 
more =usual CWS publicity films of. the pre-1938 period. The National 
Film: Service, judging by such films, was a cadre organisation in 
classic style, showing propaganda to promote the movement at specially- 
convened: meetings before audiences largely composed of cooperators 
and those sympathetic to the ideals of the movement. In the absence of 
more detailed information, and more CU/CWS films to study, no M=, 
conclusions can be drawn. Bitt; it would seen that the Service did. not 
trg to, prodiwe specific propaganda films to engage in some of the 
political issues which affected the movement. Plans were. drawn up along 
the/iines recommended byl the anonymous writer quoted above, ((p. 378). The 
Educational Executive of the Cooperative Union resolved to allocate 
£35, QOQ for the production of two films, one a documentary on. the history 
and achievements of the movement; and the other, a feature on the 
Rochdale Pioneers intended for exhibition in cinemas. Neither was 
prodnceä before war broke out. Similarly, a more political intention 
may be inferred. from.. the decision to approve in principle the proposals 
made by the National. Joint Film Committee of the Labour Party and the 
TUC" for the formation of a unified. Labour Film Service. But again., 
nothing was achieved. as far as merging the CWS National Film Service and 
the Workers'' Film Association was concerned. before September 1939. (80) 
80. Cooperative News, 15 April. 1939; Cooperative Union Library, 
CUMCE. Education Executive Committee Minutes, 18 March 1939; 
15 September 1939. Two films were produced- by. the Cooperative 
Union: one a silent. record of the proceedings of the CU's 
Congress at Scarborough in 1938; the other a five minute sound 
film of a junior educational class organised. by the CU, also in. 
1938. 
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The CWS x. de far greater use of film than and other section 
of the Labour movement. But this usage, although of the cadre type, 
was- essentially- of a commercial and educational character rather than 
a political. one. Education was of course. central to the political 
strategy of the cooperative movement as a whole; but it was left largely 
to. the small but indfluential, RACS. and the Inndon Cooperative Society 
to give to such educational. works, distinct. political. purpose. But 
even though the National Association of Cooperative Education Committees 
provided this work with. a national scope, such a project was necessarilIr 
limited since few cooperative- societies had. the means of projection 
on a regular basis, and. few films relating specifically- to cooperation- 
were available for use in such a context. The large capital investment 
needed. for a serious attempt. to use film for overt political purposes 
was- eventually made, but came rather late in. the day- for the original 
purpose- of the scheme,. as war- intervened. It, is difficult to quantify 
the- full scope of cooperative film... -work: 
The CWS appears. to have 
used films- extensively in its work. I, TACEC. film work was sizeable in. 
the context in which it was operating,, but, in comparison with that of- 
the CWS was probably- quite limited, reaching only a small proportion 
of: cooperators,, trade unionists; and. members of, the Labour Party. 
The history of these developments is one of curious ironies.. 
The cooperative movement, the least politically dynamic section of the 
Labour movement,; produce& the most sophisticated and attractive political 
propaganda films for the social democratic oxganinations of that movement. 
Perhaps- more poignantly, internal squabbles prevented: different bodies 
within the cooperative movement, from 'cooperating" to maximise the 
effectiveness of film worl: ý. The film work of the CWS was one- point of' 
departure for those within the Labour Party and the TUC who considere(L that 
the. medium. could be used for political purposes, since. it was. clear. that 
gooct films could be made which had. style, professionalism, conviction 
and made. än. - impact. But it was. the energy and. enthusiasm of Joseph 
Reeves, and the obvious success of the NACEa Film. Department, which 
prompte& Labour Party and TUC leaders to initiate their own agency- for 
film publicity- and propaganda,, the Workers ' Film AssocUtUn. 
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Chapter Beines Pilz and. Social Democratic Organisation: 
The Labour Partýr'and. the- Trades- Union Congress 
1. 
Daring those years,. l91. ß. - 1930,, when. the. two principal. 
organisations of the Labour movement, the Labour Party and. the Thades 
Union Congress,, rose to national grominence-, new. mass media, radio 
anl file, emergefi as sources for mass political communication. These 
developments. coincided. with. eztensiona of the franchise which increased. 
#ier voting opurlation by approximately twenty million people - a___ 
half the` total population. The partial assimilation of the Labour 
Party leadership to the political. elite of the cauntx7 was. fiercely 
contested. by the Conservative. an& Liberal Parties. The 192u1's were, 
subsequently char cterise: by intense competition for political dominaace 
within the expanding and. uncertain territory of the newly enfranchised. 
Tin. new media, in providing access to means of political communication, 
contested to this competition= thereby consolidating their own. political 
importance an& contributing to the democratisation of the: British political 
culture. 
2 he cinema, though. its. Political. utility did not become fully 
apparent-until the arrival. of synchronised sound,, was attractive for. 
sociological and psychological reasons. . Zt was not merely a major form 
of entertainment but a central aspect of working class culture, with 
weekly- attendances reaching l8.5 million by 19340, the overwheliing 
majority of these people- being working class. Commentators. within the 
Labour movement were convinced. of the residual power: of Lila. to influence 
the minäý of people almost against their will, and. perceived. In the cinema 
trada'a use of the medin- a disturbing political-psychological danger 
the mass of people were slowly being 'dr ggeä' into a passivity ideal 
for authoritarian government or"even dictatorship. 
Highly. critical and euepicioua though. they, may have been, Labaax 
leaders were compelled. to, reconsider their dismissive attitude towards 
the mediu= as new possibilities. for visnaL education, pnblioity- an&. 
persuasion were developed. Both major political parties responded. in a 
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a4m-tT manner' to the. prospect of using film for direct political communi- 
cation, in so= far as the Conservative. and Labour Parties shared, the: view 
that. the medics was potentially- influential because of its facility for 
manipulating' emotional responses:. They also believed. that as the elect- 
orate: was. sufficiently- vulnerable to the propaganda of their opponents, 
it was- no longer possible, with the. expansion of th* voting population, 
to reliably assess the probabl& political preferences of a considerable 
number of constituencies. Each Party therefore considered that it could 
not afford. to ignore the - use of the film medium as a channel, for publicity 
and as an electoral weapon. 
Ebwever, first considering the use of film in 1918, the Labour 
Party did not establish. a film service for itself and the Labour move- 
ment until 1938; ' whereas the Core ervative> Party quickly developed. a 
film propaganda technique in 1925. Cl) Developed, essentially as an er- 
tension of existing publicity services p film propaganda was given con- 
siderable" status by members. of the. Conservative Party leadership,. Day- 
light cinema vans, were used showing specially- produced films (using a 
system. of back pro j ection) s and. Party. ý units toured the country- giving 
free shows on street corners% using the films both to convey a message 
anX attract an audience for the accompanying- speakers. By 193a the Partýg 
bam built up a fleet. of twelve daylight vans and twelve vans. carrying 
portable, equipment for indoor use.. The same year the service was placed. 
on a professional footing, under the auspices of a Party-financed. 
Conservative, and Unionist. Films. Association, and. a film company was 
lanncheä to.. run, the vans- and. produce: films for the Party. With consider-- 
able assistance from: leadpersonalities in the film trade, notably 
Sir Albert Clavering,. the Conservative. Partyt-s film propaganda organisation 
made a substantial contribution to the electoral publicity of the rational 
Government; in 1931,1935 and 1939" The filme shown by the CFA, mainly 
lII - 15 minute shorts,, ranged from. ca*toons and acted dialogues to ece- 
pilatioa material and. direct speeches by Party' leaders. It would appear 
that. the cinema van system was considered. to be successful by. Party 
publicists, and. Conservative Central Office attached. increasing importance 
to this method of publicity with each. passing year, its appeal. residing 
acct merely in assumptions about the persuasive: qualities. of film. or 
1. The Times,. 8 April. 1926,. p. 9; 13 April 1926t, p. 12. 
Salt 
its ability to attract audiences, but to its. unignenesst no. other party 
used such. a system during the inter-war period. (2) 
The- consistent use of cinema vans. by, the Conservative: Pats-, 
aaä by the National Government is National. Publicity Bareau, (3. ) was a 
measure: of' Conservatisea''. belief in the" political utility of film. The. 
Labour Party-, as a national organisation, attached. similar importances 
to, the medium, yet- did. not begin to utilise the medium. in an. organise (I 
fashi= until 1938. ' 
- The publicity- of the Labour Party, was closely coordinated. 
with that of the- Trades: Union. Congress from 1921 under the auspices: of 
the- National Toint Cbunc, L of the- two organisations F and,, after 1934 
much: of the Party's campaign. work was integrated. with that äf the T[IC. 
It is from within- this established practice of joint publioi activities: 
that plans tos introduce- a filz service, for the, Labour movement were made. 
The following discussion will consequently consider these two, organisa- 
tions largely concurrently. Moreover,. the chapter will concentrate 
almost entirelýön these two national bodies. The Scottish TUC disp"Taye& 
nm recorded. interest in the medium. Cinema trade unions apart: (the 
Association of Cinematograph, rechnicians. and the National Association. 
of Theatrical and Sine Employees) only one trade union, the RScansport 
am General Workers. ' Union, was 'represented* on the various committees 
of the TUG and the Labour Party not ug to devise a film service; and. 
its ''representative wa . resent in a personal. capacity. Only three trade 
unions at national. level' were willing to sponsor film production during 
the 193a's, and of the resulting. films, only one was available for 
exhibition. before 1940« Britain ErDects, produced by the., Progressive 
Film. Institute in 1938 and sponsored by the National Union of Seamen. 
Lack of achievement does not necessarily signif r lack of attempt 
or. - insufficient interest. There were throughout the 1930's over a thousand. 
2. T. J. Bollins, 'The. Conservative Party and Pi1m Propaganda Between 
the Wars', English SistoriaaL Review, vo1.96, April 1981, pp. 35-9. 
The Bureau. was establisheä in 1935 bT the Government to publicise 
its: achievements and generally prepare the ground for the General- 
Election. For a contemporary view of its activities, see R. D. Caseg, 
'TheeNational. Publicity Bureau and British Party Propaganda', 
Public Opinion Quarterly.,, October 1939, pp. 632-34. 
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individual trade. unions, 20S. of which were affiliated. to the TUC. C4) 
The. executive recozäs of some- of these unions no. longer exist,. such as 
those: of the National. Union of Seamen. Some, are not open to researchers, 
such. as those of the Amalgamated. Engineering Union; some are located. 
around the- country and it has hot been possible to consult them; others. 
record' very- little, information, such as those of the Electrical Trade 
Union; and some- provide a wealth. of informations, such as those of the. 
Ttanspbrt and. General. Workers" ffnion. A, sample of large , medium anti 
small unions- was: seIecteä, and the executive records of the following 
unions were consulted& the Tranport and General, Workers' Union, the. 
National Union of General and. Municipal Workers, the Miners. " Federation. 
of Great Britain, the National Union of Railwa'men, the. Electrical Trades. 
Umfon and. the Ccnfederatiorn of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. 
The An-al 8sports; and Reports of Proceedings of the Annual General 
Meetings: of the, following were also consulteft the National Union. of 
Seamen, the National I ion: of Genera and Municipal Wbrkers,. the Union. 
of Post Office Workers, the National. Society of Operative Printers and. 
Assistants, the National Union. of Distributive and Allied. Workers, the. 
United Society of Boilermakers; and Iron and Steel. Shipbuilders,, the 
National Federation of Building; Trades Operatives,, that Amalgamated: Uainv 
of Engineering Workers, the United. Patternmakera Association, the 
Amalgamated. Union of Hiiilding: grade Vo=kers, the- inners" Federation of 
Great; Britain and. the Transport and General Workers. ' Union. There is 
na indication in any of these records that the question of film as a 
medium: of publicity for the movement, was seriously considered. Journals 
such as the. AEÜ Monthly, the TC t1U "s The Eecord, and! EATSCPA Journal 
proved: simdlarlr unrevealing, 
Because. no comprehensbm survey of trade. union records has been 
undertaken. some caution is necessary in. drawing conclusions,, and. farther 
research is needed. for a complete surrqg of such records to establish 
which,, it ans,. unions showed as interest in using- film. Caution is also 
required regarding-those records consulted- lack of evidence does not 
establish. that conversations did not take place. However, fronn" records 
4. LPelling, A History- of British Trade Unionism. (Sa? n ndaworth* 1965), 
pp. 262-3'. At its. lowest paint, in 1934, TUC affiliated membership. 
accounted. for 73% of total union membership. Union membership, 
affiliateSAo the.. Labour PartT varied. between 39% and 45% of total 
union membership: during the, decade. A. H. Halse7 (, ed. ), Trends in 
British Society Since 19oä (London, 1972), Table 4.13, P"125. 
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of they Labour Party and the TUC,. which. tried. to establish a film serrice 
for the-rhala of the Labour movvement, and which attempted to draw is 
indiidduaL unions during the planning of the, service, it is clear that 
no format interest was- shown. by an 7 apart from the ACT, in 
establishing such. a filmy service; and. Lt is. doubtful. that more extensive 
research in trade union records would reveal more than statements- showing 
that, in principle, such- a film sezrioe was desirable. A general con- 
clusion. therefore that. individuaL trade unions at the national level. 
displayed: little, or na interest in the 'formation of a film service tor- 
thee Labour movement, holds good, regaixiless of the limited sample of 
trade union. records consulted. The perspective of trade union leaders 
was. neatl3 fonnlateä by the, Special. ßiecutive Committee of the Nationat 
Union -or Bailwa4ymen which, in response to. suggestions bT the, Workers. ' 
Film Association that the Union- might participate in *a film depicting: 
the, life of the railwar worker",, recorded. that 
such a f11n would not advance the interests of the workers 
frosi either a trade union or an economic. standpoint:. (5) 
and decided to take no action.. ather unions approacheä by the WEL dt& 
not even formallg'consider. the question. It would appear that in general 
they- believed. that the development of a Labour film service, and the 
production of Labour film propaganda , was 
the responsiblity of the TUC',. 
or- even of the Labour Party (to, whose political funds they contribute& 
considerablý, r).. an& that just as it was the responsibility of individual 
branches or area organisations to arrange routine political, trade union 
crn cultural social meetings f sm it was their, responsibility, ' for arranging 
film exhibition at such meetings. 
3T records of the following; constituency Parties and` Trade 
Councils,. largely- minute books. and annual reports, have been consulteir 
Huddersfield. LP, Greenwich LP, Sheffield City 12, York. City ICE, Leeds 
City- LP, Clapham LP, South Hammersmith LP, Bradford. Trades. Council, 
Leeds. TC.,. Brighouse TC, Keighley TC, Wakefield TC, Torlc and District TC, 
Manchester and. Salford.. TC,. Glaegov TC,. Hull TC,. Halifax ftadea and Labour 
Council, and. London Trades Council. Na systematic examination of con- 
stituency- party, records has been undertaken, due partly tothe practical 
difficulties involved in seeing them; and. maw records for the 1930's 
have not, survived., for instanceg, those of the, Bradford- Labour Party-. Those. 
5. TQC Librarg, National Union of. EailwVmen, Proceedings and, Reports, 
Special. Exeantiva. Committee Minutea, 2)tarch 1939" 
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which have: been. consulteä can not be. regarded as a representative sample, 
as the sample. is too small. TheT onIZ- rarely contain items of information 
3telattW to film exhibitiona, 'etc.,, 'and what there is is in the briefest 
detail. Little of value to. this; studg has. emerged therefore from what 
was a very time-consuming- exercise. Additional information has been. 
gleans&. from the correspondence files of the records of the National 
Council. for Civil Liberties. But again it sheds, little light on local 
activities: The Cashbook and Ledger of the Workers I- Pita Association 
provide the clearest indication of which Labour. -Parties: and. Trades 
Councils used film as part of their activities. But only- occasionally 
did a. local branch o3tParty- show films on more than two or three occasions; 
anä. these sources are limited since they only- indicate which local bodies 
used. films from. the TWA library: The Labour Party was not a fully 
integrated: political party,, and. mang constituency pasties pursued, a line. 
in some measure independent of the-National Executive: Committee. Purther 
research therefore is needed, to sptematically examine Labour Party 
records across the country; to provide an accurate picture. of the extent 
to, chick such activity varied. fry one are&. to another,, and. of the extent 
tja whicIAocal activity followed, or was in advance of the intiativea of 
the national leadership. This chapter is therefore a study, of the 
Mrades. ion Congress and the Labour Party rational Exedutive Committee. 
Their adiministrative records are complete} and the Kiaates of the 
National Joint PilmCommittee provide a detailed. source of information. 
This has. been supplemented. by interviews and correspondence with members 
of that Committee, including Ja. Taylor, Lord.. Citrine, Sir Vincent Thwoon, 
George: Elvin, rcrä Calder, and. Paul Eotha. , 
2. 
s0 ut the inter-war perio& the. Labour Parte and the TUC 
attached. great emphaais:. to publicitg work. There were many reasons f= 
this. Both organisations needed: to increase their membershg; the former., 
to improve: the strength. of its electoral. organisation, the latter to end 
the dramatio decline in trade union membershig1which had oontinasci to 
fall relentleselr since' 1920, to strengthen its ailing finances, and. 
establish greater control over the trade union movement as a whale. Of 
equally fundamental. importance. was. an equation, of the political progpess: 
of the Labour Party with democratic advancer. This- view conferred upon 
the state. of public opinion a considerable importance. ' In the context of 
36T 
m struggle to establish. credibilitf and: support for a political organisar- 
tion of the vo*{ class, publictitg or propaganda:. Cusect synonrmcusl$ 
is this period) was conceived. as. the. principal method&, of. ' acquiring not 
simply- greater. - psarliaamentsry representation but Statu power. Labotsr2s 
response- to the pos t. -war situation, Bernard. Barher has noted, was. 
a. vigc=ua emphasis, on medncationt; an. outpouring- of leaf- Iota, classes; special efforts and,, above. al L else, new. 
papers. (6) 
The leaders; of the Labour: Parte in particul= attached. immense signifi- 
cance to the, need both to informs: people. as to the. views and policies of 
the Party; and. to educate public opinion as, to its ideals and, purposes, 
Philp Saovdea, r for esampl',, maintained. that. both the Party "ink and. file 
and public ctiginion generally baiL to be educated before theT could be 
eipecte&- to act politically in a responsible and. constructive. manner. 
According to him Labour's policies: and propaganda were to be patt of a 
Better and.. truer education, an. education which will. teach, 
the citizens, to use their power wisely and veil. (7) 
Ramsay MacDonald= conc=eä in this view. Believing that it would be 
unwise for the PartT to go beyond: the levels of political- understanding 
so: far achieved by the bulk of the electorate he: asserted in I9,3 that 
fithe, only action which is possible at the moment is that of changfng 
opinion. and. awal ening intellig+encee". Me, sole way leading to Socialtsmi', 
hm argue& later, ''is the- way of education. &CO) 
The- Party's political progress was conceived as contingent upon 
the Tavel. of underatand: ing of the voting, population. Mass publics; apdnion: 
was conceptualised. as -a major site.. of political. struggla and the basis 
t'o= future advance. In the evolution of a national. Labour Parts aster 1518 
considerable resources; ämd status were given to research and publicity in 
recognition of the need to contest the Partgr-s opponents on all, issues: 
which affected: working people, and to do. as with reliable and. convincing 
information and policy- statements. It. was with. such. considerations in 
6. B. Harker, The Politics of ProRagmada (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, 
IInivara typ. of Ynrks 1972)t p. xiii. 
t. P. Snowden, Labour and. the New World, (London, 1921), p"224" 
8: J. B. MacDonald, Parliament and. Revolution. (Manchester,. 1919),. F. 89£ 
. Socialism: Critical and. Constructive: 2nd. ed., (London, '924)., p. 229,. 
3. aa 
mind that, for exaarplez the Party and the TUC coordinated: their publicity 
work is 1921. through the National Joint. Council, and, a number of specialist 
research and. advisory, committees.: were set. up. (9) 
Equally- compelling in this view of public: opinion was a neecL 
to. combat what was considered, the often distorted. and hostile. presentation 
of Labour and its national organisations. by the press and, increasingly, 
bP other media. While believing that the individual was ultimately a 
rational being, Labour leaders, assumed that the bulk of the population. 
wasp so- ill-Info=eä as to, be incapable of making rational political 
choices. This situation, it was assumed, was due in part to the, 
galIibilityj, the suggestibility- of the masses;, and this opinion. was 
reinforce& by widely held views as to. the nature of the crowd mentalit7, 
and. the potential for emotional 3 eteria. 
Public opinion was. considered. tm be., heavily- determined. by the 
press,. an4 reeling from the assaults on. Labour in 1924: and. 1931, Labour 
leaders- were convincedl that not only were they victims of deception. 
an& tricker, but waiaid continue to be sa until. Labour could explain. 
its: case tc; the people. Profound distrust of the: -press was. therefore 
matched. by a political determination share& by both the Party and the TUC 
to inform and educate. people, both with regard to the movement anä the 
issues central to its development., and broader political and social. 
issues. 
Such considerations were informed by a broader realisation. that 
the bulk of the working class was. either politically indifferent. to,, 
ignorant of, or opposel to social democratic ideas. At one. level the 
Fatty an& the TUC responded to this by advocating changes in the formal 
educational system to allow greater access for working class chilthr' v?. Cia) 
At the level of immediate practical-politics emphasis was given to the 
conduct of campaigns,. publicity,, exercises and the organisation. of a 
regular supply- of infoxmatiom on key issues,, explaining the facts at the 
case r and the Partys or the, TUC. " views: on them. An. example of this 
educational campaign work is the concentration, in the 1924-29 periods 
as LLFamilton. observed, on. 
91. See mSarker, The Politics of Propaganda op. oit.,. pp. 189-+208. 
10. See It. Barker, Education and Politics 1- 1951: A. S" of the- 
Labour Party (Oxford,, 1972 . 
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the great issues. of international policy. Peace, disarmament, 
the Leaga& of Nationa - these were the major themes at Labour 
meetings ..... A. great educational campaign was patientIy- 
carried. on. (1I) 
There was therefore a considerable emphasis within the Labour 
leaderships before 1929 on the importance of publicity and campaign 
work as a major area of actiiity. With successive. election defeats and 
the continuing- prospect of parliamentary-paralysis, the Labour Party 
was confronte& with the related. tasks of restoring its image and. re- 
estaIilishing. its: credibility as the alternative party. of Government.. 
These tasks were set in relie: C by the prospect, after 1935, of possibly- 
losing a thin consecuttye election. Unablesto make azir substantial 
parliamentary- impact on the course of events. Chaving, in. 193L less than 
one tenth of the number of seats, of the National. aovernmentr and is 19359 
only a third . ), convinced, that the Government's foreign policiew. were 
leading the country., to disaster, and facing: the prospect after-19353 at 
serious political decline,, the Labour Party, was in a difficult position, 
nade" more' uncertain by internal divisions which threaten:: to repeat 
an ea3zlib= split with - equally rainons consequences. Bea Pimlott 
has: observed that 
Labour might have exercised a major influence in the 1930's 
but the mass movement did. wt provide the means for it to 
dm so. (121 
This view overlooks however one of the outstan&ing ohasacteristi, ca of 
the Labour Party leadership of those years: there was neither the 
political will nor the combative instinct for assertive action. outside 
parliament designed to seriously challenge the Government. Essentially 
an electoral or anisat%m, the Party 'quite deliberately narrowed its 
field of action',, content tcD wait for' the election of 1939/40. C25-) Bo 
was the. Party alone in this approach. Under the leadership of Sir Walter 
Cit ine and: the. TUC GeneraX Counct. T, the trade. union movement was 
politically supine.. demoralised by the defeats: of 1926: and 192T,, And the 
industrial decline which set in after 1929. The TQC was particu]arly 
U. LA. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson (London, 1938). p. 279- 
12* B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930to ova, p. 2. 
13. R. Hiliband, Parliamentar-*Sbcialism. op. cit:, pp. 233-5. 
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concerned to establish for itself a role in the routine consultation, 
popes-formnIatioa an(E decision-making processes. or State and indnst . 
Such a rale-required. the transtoxmation. of'the TUC's. public imago and, 
as with Party leaders, members: of the General. Council were unwilling to 
embark on a policy or confrontation, with, the National Government. They 
tour were: essentially constitutional. in outlook,. and were dispose& to 
await the general election of -1939/cW. CI4) 
Undez such circumstances, traditional emphasis on g+enera1': 
puh : ttT an& political education provided. the foundation. for much of 
the Party's activities. Performing a diminutive: and largely- Ineffectual 
parliamentary- role the Part- concentrate& on. the immediate task of main.. 
taining its" political presence and the longer-term: task of improving 
its public image, hoping t& restore its political stature sufficiently 
tm ensure the return. of a majority Labour Government by the end of the 
decade. Heavy- investment in the hopes of success, in that election, and 
fear of the appsallin consequences of further electoral falure, g+enerate& 
considerable reliance on educational, campaign: and publicity work, to 
build up electoral support. Thus. after the. debacle of 1931, on& of the 
most conspicuous aspects of Party work was the. 'Victory for Socialist 
campaign. Intended to educate millions in social democratic ideas. and: 
thereby pave the way for electoral tri gh, the campaign was. a massive 
propaganda operation, which demanded such a large proportion of Party 
and. trade union resources: that its oantf ation over eighteen. months 
seriously hampere& the routine propaganda work of the Party. Again,, 
after the, 1933: defeat: ±vo massive, campaigns w launched specifically- 
geared to electoral. purposes; one in. early 1936, anfi the other,, the 
'lationai Camp& iga' to: publicise Labour's Immediate, Programme (the Party's 
manifesto . It also. was- such a drain. on resources: that in early 1935, 
tx® years after its inauguration, the. Party was in serimm financial 
difficulty. 
The reasons for the emphasis on education. and publicitg work 
were the reasons which. le& the Laborar Party to donsider using film« As 
early, as April 1918. the. Party considered. using- fila. for propaganda 
purposes-, and suggestions were drawn up for using daylight cinema vans. 
14. R. Miliband, off. cit ", 8.236:. See also,. H. A. C1egg, The System of I nstr1a1 Relations in Great Britain (Oxford, 197 , PP`"3389,398-5; - S. Wighaaa,. Strikes and the Gövernment London,. 1976), p. 74. 
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Kventzaallgr proposals were put forward, in November the following Zeaz, 
fbr. " the, formation of a company to produce films for- exhibition by 
UT. siona. I Labour Parties. in local balls., and films suitable for 
exhibition in cinemas-. (15) Discovering. that. 
the mannfactnrera of films have not, made. ate films presenting 
directly or indirectly the Labour point. of view (IQ 
a P11m: Committee was set up: to establish a syndicate. to produce scenarios 
for film production and organis e the provision. of equipment,, ffl? m and 
advice to the Party's constituency candidates, on a profit'-sharing 
bsats. (I7f 
. 
The scheme was; publicised in a circular to Trades Councils 
in March L9201. Pila,, it claimed. haddL, been used with great. success by 
the ffovernment: during the war. The experiences gained. in this method 
of publicity 
is neue being. use& by capitalist interests, in various vays 
to undermine: and. check the progress of Labour throughout 
the country,. and. there is little doubt that unless efreatiye 
measures: are taken to- counteract; this new Porn of political 
warfare it mag have serious. consequences at election time. (ia 
Portable projectors: an3 three types. of film were to be proTided by the 
Committee r ''films of a poly propaganda nature", 'films not purely 
propaganda. bnt capable of being nse& to point a moral' and*filma of 
ordinary and topical, interest". The first category would have to be 
specially produced,, and arrangements. were being made. with the cinema 
'trade for the supply- of the other types. The circular concluded. that 
the potential importance:, of the scheme 'can scarcely be exaggerated', 
anti appealed. to all Labour organisations. to participate in it as 'no time' 
should be, lost. in utilising such a powerful Weapom in the cause- at 
Labours. C19 
Nothing materialised, and the reoords of the Party give no 
indication as to wily, - probably the project was abandoned due to lack 
of support. from constituency organisations. Even so, the episode-reveals 
15. PN1 Literature. arc . Publicity Committee,, 11 November 1919; Laboer Party Press and Publicity Department, 'Pi m. Propag4ndat,, IS December 
1919. 
16. Ibid.,, Labour Party Press and Publicity Department, 'Pi1m. Propa- 
gandat,. 18 December 1919. 
17. Ibid.; Labour- Party Press ani1 Publicitg Department, 8eporta an 
labour Propaganda Films 8 and. 4Capital of Proposed. Syndicate', n. d.,. 
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the Labour leaders (including Sidney Webb, Arthur Henderaanand. William 
Brace) and. prominent- Fabians (notably George Bermrä Shaw) responded. 
quickly- tar the new. possibilities: for publicity, - developect during the 
war, and considered the medium highly appropriate for electoral. 
Purposes, 
digit. yea= passeä before the use, of film was reconsidereä by 
the Party,.; s. NEM Determined: to utilise.. all. possible channels to boost 
the' Party's standing: is readiness for the approaching General IIectio'4 
publicists at Sead. Office sought new and. novel vage to publicises the 
organisation and Its- leaders: Seeking fresh ideas, W. W. Menderson, Esad. 
of the Publicity- Department= requested: advice f om" the German Social 
Democratic Party, which obliged. by sending samples; of 'election soap 
with verses on them,, inscribed balloons, and amophone records of Labour 
songs: and speeches By- Labour leaders-. It also recommenäed the. use of 
electric: election signs,, the aerial distribution of leaflets, and film 
exhibitions both in Bmlls and by daylight cinema vans. (20) During the 
fallowing air. months the Party 's& Research and Publicity, Committee consid- 
azed many of' these suggestions;. including dayligkt and. nigh Tight eleattic 
signs urging svote labour',, film slides, gramophone records:,, and mobile 
laud-speaker apparatus. Inquiries were also made into 'mobile cinema 
prop ns, the production of a "propaganda newsfilm" and the production 
of to ODod' Labour film'. (21) Although costs submitted for the- newsfilm 
were considered. prohibitivel, a sum of £2O for a thirty, minty silent 
film appears to have been accepted in principle. Moreoever, perhaps 
impressed. by the success of the two sound pictures of MacDonald. and 
J". S. Thomaa made that year, (22) approaches; were made, to Pritish T -Th Thg 
Pictures to produce a sound. film for the Party. The approach was. rejected, 
and, with constituency-patties displaying little interest in the idea, 
the project,. already- in jeopardy due to the Party's financial difficulties., 
was abandoned. (23) 
18. LPIIEC, Labour Partg circular, 'Labour Cinema Propaganda t,, 'Match. 3320. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid.. Research and. PnblioitT Committee Minutes, 25 Juna 1928, 
ä. Ladvig-(German Social Democratic Pa -) to the Labour Party,. 
13 tune 1928. The SDP-even sent a copg of one of its election 
films to Transport. Bouse. 
21. jhidX * "General Election Campaign Propaganda 1-, 2y September 1928. 
22. These were purely experimental. films arranged. by British Talking- 
Pictures:, British Acoustic Films. and Gaumont. Par details, 
sees P80, Ramsay MacDonald Papers, 30169116131, and 30[69/6132, 
correspondence with British Acoustic- F31ma and The Bioscooe. 
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CT. taking- office in Jima':. 1929 Lab6us Ministers; willingly tack 
advantage of the numerous opportunities.: which arose. to make newsreel 
appearances. (24) Considerable value was attached. to.. sumo appearances;. 
and influential Pam members were apparently-- keen to use the' medivw 
because, as William Mellor- advised MacDonald, it could. be. used as a 
"counteractive to other sound films. being- exhibited. by Labour's political 
opponents. (-5) - Other considerations als a suggest an interest; in utilising 
newsreel. opportunities, whenever they arose. The Rational Agent, (. 8.. 
Shepherd-, reported in 1930 that 
S171rituai1y: the rank and file of the Party- were not. connected: 
up with. the National Movement. There is no closeness of touch,, 
or. personal contact,; between the leadership and responsihIe- 
peoplee, in the Provinces. (26) 
There was evidentlT some recognition of the need for Labour leaders tao 
establish, their presence in the public eye. Newsreels offere& one 
possibility far reaching large audiences. simultaneously- -and with little 
cost ter, the P. artg or the Gbvernment. Aa interest in newsreel publicity 
also arose-in connection with. the conduct. of international relations. 
The. 1929 Party Programmer Laboer and the Nation., in repudiating the- 
principles of traditioma$ d%plo '! constructed. Labourta foreign 
policy arcnn& collective seovritr. The programme, discussed 'six pillars 
of peace r; the renunciatiom of war, disarmament, arbitration. econö e 
cooperation, publicity and. political. cooperation. 
The. Fifth Pillar of Peace is Publicity- -. the fullest publicit3-, 
bath in Parliament and in. the Council,. Assembly, and other 
organa of the. Leagun,. with regard. to all dealings with foreign. 
aovernmenta. The Labour Government would submit all inter- 
national agreements; to the Sonne of Commons for its. consent, 
and. would. see that. the public. was ke1 fully informed.. of the 
bandrling of foreign affairs. (27 
Here was. a categorical. commitment to. fully publicise a future Labour 
Government's conduct of foreign affairs. The news values of the newsreels 
were determined. more br entertainment criteria than principles of 
politicaL Journalism. Producing material. for internationaI consumption.. 
23. PEC, Research and. Publicity, Committee, 1'[ December 1928. For the- 
financial-problems of the Party see, Pinance and. General. Purposes: 
Committee, 3Q September 1927; NEC Memorandum, 'The: Financial Position, 
6 November: 1929. 
24. See above-Chapter- Three,. pp. 48,78-80. 
25. PRO*, RamsaT MacDonald Pacers, 3016916131, Mellor to. MacDonald, 
2 February. 1928. 
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Editors quickly. discovered that the coverage, of foreign. affairs. provided, a 
more attractive-. combination of topical interest,. exoticism, entertain- 
ment and political news than coverage of domestic events (unless, of . 
cause,, such events. were very, 'dramatic'). Newsreel coverage was con- 
sequently-drawn towards political events of a more international char-- 
acter - na doubt encouraged bg a profusion of such events. While Arthur 
Greenwood:. could be seen announcing a new housing scheme,, MacDonald and.. 
&nd'erson were seen more frequently' at the London Naval Conference, in 
Geneva., in Berlin, or speaking on the Hoover Moratorium. Between Suns! 
1929 and the resignation of the Cabinet in August'1931 British. Hovid±oner 
News; gave political coverage- ta. Labmm" Ministers on average once a 
month; and of these 26 items, at least ten were concerneä with the 
Government. rs conduct of foreign affairs. British Paramount Newa, commenF- 
Ging. in March 1931, covered Labour KIM ters in twelve issues before the 
fall of the C'overnment, and of these, nine were concerned. with foreign 
affairs. 
Whatever editorial principles may have underpinned the dectsioat 
of- the newsreel companies to. cover the Government's conduct of inter- 
national. affairs,, in so doing they, offered opportunities; fog- Labour 
leaders: -to, maintain a screen presence and 
to: speak not only to British. 
audiences, but American, Canadian, Australian, etc., fulfilling thereby 
an electoral. pledge and realising a deeply rooted: principle. The short 
tee success of Eenderson'a foreign policy enabled the Government to 
bathe- in the light of favourable publicity freely given by the newsreels. 
There was clearly some dsgree of mutual interests and while no fizmi 
conclusions can be drawn, because of insufficient evidence, it is possible to 
infer from what there is that the Labour Government not only welcomeä 
such coverage. but. actively aught it. Indeed, Assistant General. Secretary 
of the Party, S. S. Middleton, was, by- mid-1931, arranging: with Paramount 
details of 'General Election Pikt Propaganda'. It. is unclear at whose 
26. LPNEC, National Agent's Report, 27 October 1930. The repot noted 
that publicity work-was failing- to. put Labour's case adequately 
and. was in some cases defeatist in spirit. 
27. Labour party, Labour and the Nation, London,. 1928) 9, p-. 42. 
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initiative the subject was discussed, but it is not without significance 
that the Covernment. was, at precisely that moment, considering calling 
a general. election in the autumn. or winter of that year, and the Party 
had drawn up a large amount of publicity- material in readiness. C28) 
After the fall of the Labour administration the opportunities 
for making newsreel appearances were considerably, fewer. Following the 
disaster in the October Cenera: L Election the Labour AationaT Executive 
and the"TUC General Council gave considerable priority to re-establish- 
Ing the Party's electoral status. Condemning the media's role in 'the: 
unscrupulous: misrepresentation, of the Labour Party's position' during, 
the election campaign, a joint meeting of the NEC and the General Council, 
reviewing the events of those weeks, resolved that the public image. of 
the-Party needed. re-shaping and that the policies and views of the Party 
were not reaching large sections of the working-class:. (29) 
A campaign was subsequently launched in the autumn of 1932 
(having given constituency parties. time to recover physicallyand. finan- 
cially- from'the election) to promote the new arty programme-, give a 
lead to constituency Parties in preparatory work. for the anticipated. 
general election, and to, create 'by education and organisation, a mighty 
force o. C Socialist faith. that will carry Labour to victory '. (30) Several 
campaigns followed, including a drive to s=core a million members-; and 
from 1932 until the 1935 Election-both the NEC and the General Camnail 
attempted by- campaigns and publicity to restore the Party's imago and. 
create a basis of political support within the working class based upon 
'knowledge and understanding". Considerable em;, phaiis. was given to assisting 
the Dailvf Herald's circulation drive, believing that the principal reason 
for Labour's Tote remaining in tact in 1931. was the paper's ability to 
reach large sections of the working class and counter the misrepresentation 
of the press. (31) 
Equally fnndamentanrt Laboer leaders had, in the aftermath of 
the 193L defeat, expresse& the view that there was an urgent need, as 
28. PRO, Ramsay MacDonald Papers, 30/69/6/34, Middleton to MacDonald',. 
5r 1931; _, NEC. fites, A. Henderson, 'Report on the Eenerai 
Election, 10 November 1931- 
27. IPA IMMinites, '-]Q November- 1931; - A. Henderson, 'Riport, on. the 
General Electiron', 10 November -1931. 
30. IbLL... NEC Memorandum; 'Proposed. Autumn Campaign", 30 September . 1932, "- LPAR 1932, P. 4*" Fon, Party publicity generally after- the 1931. 
General Elections-'see C. T. Stannage, The British General Election 
Wne 
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F neat Ben put it, tar 
the spread: of knowledge in every possible way in order tob 
get. the prinniples of socialism more deeply rooted. in. the, 
hearts of the people.... there is nothing for it. but. grim, 
determined effort and intensive and continuous educational 
work. C32) 
This educational work. was pursued. in several ways. The New Clarioa. 
for example-,. was launched to provide publicity for the trade union move- 
ment and the Party with a definite. socialist character and political 
purpose,, intende& to educate as well as infona. Herbert Morrison organised 
lecture courses in tsocialismi for members of the London Labour'Partg 
in =932-3, to enable, them to. educate people. in. "common-sense socialist 
ideas e. C33) The cu m ire, tion of these developments, and probably the 
single most important focus of Party activitg between. the 193L Election 
and the campaign for the 1935 Election, was the'-Victory for Socialismt 
campaign. 
After campaign work unparalleleä in the Party's history; the 
'Victory- for Socialismt project was envisaged as the rs'apreme effort$ 
to achieve. - power, 'the ' outstanding immediate task of the Labour Parts,. 
Which accepted. that 'a. gigantic task of conversion had to be done 
before a majority' for Socialism can. be secured'. (34). rn the first phase 
of the campaign forty-eight mass conferences were held,. fifty public 
meetings,. and rallies and demonstrations organised, and special propa- 
gandists toured. the country apparently addressing over 400' meetings cover - 
ing over 100 constituencies and area organisations;. 900,000 leaflets were 
distributed door-to-door monthly, together with masses of other types 
of literature; and even 10,000 10-inch gramophone records of Party leaders' 
of 1935 (unpubliahed. PhD. thesis, University of Cambridge, 15.72 ), 
pp. 85 if. See als*, T. J. Eollina-, The Presentation of Politics: 
s 
31. IPA 1932, pp. 65,. 158; LPG, EEC Minutes, 30. September 1932; TUC GC tonal Joint council, 19 July 1932; TUC 1932,. p. 200. 
32. , Cited A. EnIldck,, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin vol. 1, (LondIon,. 
3360) P-. 503*. 
33. mid-9, PP"504-5; TUC 1932, p. 200;: B. Dononghne, G. W. Jones, Herbert 
Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London, 19Th), 8.188. 
34" RE 1933, P. 4; 1934': P"5T; Labour Party' leaflet ºYicto- for Soolal. ism' 
October- 1933; Labour Organic er, November-1935,8.216. 
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speeches and Labour songs were made available. C35) 
ParalleL with this activity were attempts to. re-state Labonr. ''e 
position on a multiplicity- of issues in response to what both the TC 
General Council. and the NEC considered a direct challenge by, the rise: 
of fascism: to social democratic: ideas, and its explicit threat to the 
existence of the Labour movement. (36) The debate on this threat extended. 
ta"discnssion on the dangers of war and its prevention, and was higä1Ir 
sensitive to a 
concentrated attack launched. in the press, on the platfo=,, 
in propaganda literature,; and over the wireless, bg members. 
anä supporters of the "NationaL"Gövernment, the object of 
which is to: mislead. public opinion into believing that 
Labour stands for anti-democratic: methods of Government-.... C37') 
Pubilicit º in Labonrts defence was linked tQ electoral strategies, anä 
both national leaderships sought; new ways to promote their views attraa"- 
tively and convincingly,. Perms of publicity considered were photographs, 
slides, cartoons-, badges, posters and postcards, films as well as tmechani- 
cal apparatus of all. kinds'. (3.8) 
3" 
It was in the context of electorai/educationa- campaign work 
and this response to attacks- front both Government supporters and the 
Pkitish Fascist movement, that the question of film was considered. 
After initiating inquiries; in December 1932, the labour Party was offered 
a daylight cinema van. and the services of an operator fully paid for a 
year by the Daily Herald in return for assistance: in the paper's bid tm 
reach a daily circulation. of two million readers. The TUC was included in 
35" NEC Minutes,, 12 July- 1934; Research and Publicity Committee 
Minutes,. 22 March 1934,. 22 November 1934; LA& 1935, PP. 24-E. It 
im difficult. to judge how ref able these figures are,. since they ' 
cannot be verified. 
36. See for example,. VS. 1933t PP. 67-8y' 1934, pp. 65-6; - TO National 
Joint Council., 'Campaign for Peace and Freedom. and Against. Waz', 
2.5 J'ulyj 1933. 
37. MNE99 Research and Publioitg Committee, ]6 December 1933. 
38. Ibid.; Joint Meeting of the General. Council, the ParliamentaxT 
Labour Partj and the National. Executive Committee, 22 March 1934; 
Tuc' 1934,. pp. 156,. 160-1. See also C. T. Stanna¬e, The British General 
Election of 1935 op. oit.,. pp. 107-4.. 
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this arrangement. Walter Citrine, the TUC General. Secretary, appears 
to: have been particularly- keen to. use film. publicity and became personally 
involve& in negotiations with the Herald. Ire als a. negotiated with various 
film companies: for the production of 'an industrial cavalcade depicting 
outstanding- events of trade unionism over the. past hundred years 
The film was conceived-as part of the centenary celebrations of the 
Tolpuddle Martyrs, the occasion being use& by the General Council for 
publicise trade unionism and social democratic ideas. Though the film 
vas' never- produced, due- to, the (understandable) inability of akr filar 
,, company- to complete it is time for the celebrations in September 1954 
the Council had been. prepared to invest. up to: £500x. for. - its production,, 
an . had enlisted Miles 
Malleson. and H. G. Wells to write a scenario. (39). 
Delays in, thgprovision of the Herald's film van allowed then 
two natioml organisations time to conduct a thoiroughýsurvey-of the, 
ramifications of utilising film: in publicitg work. The twos prinoipat 
sources for their subsequent approach to. the question were the, productioaa: 
of various doementiarT film-makers, and the activities of the Socialist. 
Film Council, the first. l6mm film. production. unit to be established. with- 
in the Labour movement. 
Fb=ecä in the spring. of 1933 bT $udolph Kessel, the Socialist 
Pilm; Council (SFC) consisted. of a. number of prominent socialists s fond 
Postgate, historian of the Labour movement and. farmer leading member of 
the National CounnciT_ of' Labour Colleges, was chairman; Daisy Postgate 
acted as Secretary Terence Greenidge, a member of the production. crew, 
was a re$plar contributor. - to Socialist. Review; az George Lansbart, 
Leader- of the Labour Party,. was persuaded. to act as. President. Other 
socialists of those. years, including Naomi Mitch. ison, became involved. 
in the, ConnolI. ra productions. Lansbnry however played no role in the. 
SFa's work, merely being sufficiently interested in the curious, spectacle: 
of film-making toi* allow the Council to use his position as Leader of the 
Party, - to attract interest within the movement. C40) Messel, a wealthy 
businessman who had made his money from. oil, provided. the funds.. for the 
Council,, was the director for all its productions, and. was the Counoilra 
publicist. 
3g. MC. GC, Finance. and. General Purposes Committee; lUnntes, 20 November 
19339,26:. Febraarr 1934,25 Sune 1934" 
40. L titchison, Tou Mays Well Ask (London, 1979),, p. 196. Neither the 
Lan burr Papers. nor the biography- by- R. Postgate, The Life of George- 
Lansbur London, 19.11), reveal anything of the Council. Messelrs 
papers-, in the possession of his widow, Judith Messel, contain 
nothing-relating to the Council. 
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As film critic for the Nev Clarion Nessel= in March 1933, 
wrote an article condemning the capitalist film, industry-for existing 
"to. make Capitalism seem attractive to the working classes". He insisted 
that the only way to counter this propaganda was for the Labour movement; 
to pm duce" its own films. Acknowledging some of the difficulties in 
producing and showing such films, he appealed. to socialists in the possess- 
ion of 16mm projectors to allow them to be used. at public meetings; and. 
for people with cameras to assist by 'securing shots of local conditions' 
'showing- just how bad things are',. which could. then be put together in 
newsreel f niL and distributed. to, ' Labour Parties. (41) The aim was to 
provide the Labour Party with a film service; and its success wasp to be 
dependent upon how wiielg the Council's films were shown. 
Hiss appeal for assistance: In projection produced meagre: results--. 
only- eight people volunteere& their equipment. The shooting of local, 
material however was apparently quite successful,, in so far as it was 
claims& that approzimatelT four hundred feet of' film. hadd, been sent to 
the SFC by- the end of May that year. (42) Two films were initially 
released. to August, both silent on. 16mx stocks The Road to Hell and 
What the Newsreel Does: Not Show. Lasting forty minutes, the former,, 
to melodrama of the Means Test, tells the story. of thou a family is 
ground down by- the operation of the Test, and how that. Test. is the source 
of suicide: and crime. '. (43) While well produced it uses untypical 
episodes to generate - audience: hostility to the Means Test. There iss for 
example, a failure to- analyse the cause of unemployment: the father 
becomes unemployed not because of rationalisation or closure, bt& because 
he was run down by a rich and reckless driver. Ow tragedy quickly- follows 
another, and the. film. becomes laden with. sentimentality. Offering no 
guide to actions no solution to the problems raised, it is unintentionally 
defeatist in its message. 
What. the Newsreel Does Not Show was envisaged. as part of a 
newsreel. series,,, intended. as an aggressive counter to the ordinary 
commercial newsreels. Lasting thirty minute,, the reel. opened irithi the 
caption 'This. is an attempt bra group of Socialists to, show the true. 
41. }Tea Clarion, 11 March 1933, p. 267; I April. 1933, P. 327. 
42. Ibid., 27 Mar 1933, P. 486. 
43. R. Postgate" '1' 4S Films to Make Socialists', Iabonr, September- 
1933, p. 21. The-film cost. £66 to make. 
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picture- of the world todalt=. Shots of Counci . 
Members were followed. by, 
scenes showing: theproduction. of The Road to Hell. Then a long sequence, 
taken. by- Kassel. in the Soviet Union, depicted. various. aspects of the 
Five: gear- Plan, including the building and opening- of the Dnieperstroyj 
Dam: Shots of London slums, were then contrasted with footage (sent in 
by an English woman) of working class houses in Germany, intended to 
demonstrate the achievements of Gen socialists in municipal govern- 
ment. The film ended. with more locally-shot footage of various Mag Bar 
demonstrations. (44) 
The SFC was confident that, as Terence. Q eenidge put it, ''Ibe 
truth of the Labour Newsreel should ensure its popularityt'; and Daisy, - 
Postgate a year later claime& that both films 
were well Iiked, and during last winter were booked up"to 
capacity by Labour Parties., which showed them in local 
halls without much difficnltT. (45) 
This: claim apart, no inforation is available as to the usage of these 
films. Produced specifically, for exhibitibn bg local Labour Parties-, 
they-Were shown to-delegates at the 1933 Partg Conference; and in October 
the following year the Labour Organiser, the constitnenc7 party 5onrrml 
devoted to- publicityrr, electioneering and business matters, announced. 
the C-ounci . as 
1A Sex Service for Local Parties'. Be that as it maT, 
there is na evidence in the records of the NEC. or the TUC General Counoil 
to confirm this; and it seems-unlikely-that. the SFC received official. 
backing. 
Paradoxically,. at the point when the SPC may- have established. 
itself as a ýseryice: & to constituency Labour Parties, it only, ha& one 
film. available for diet ibation, Blow, Bugles, Blow . The earlier 
productions. had apparently; been, in such demand, and had. been. handled 
so inexpertly, that all three copies of each were too badly- damage& to 
be used. Blow. Bugles, Blow., made available in September 1934, Was M. 
44. Pew clarion, 27 May 19339, p. 486;. Socialist- Review, September 1933, 
p. 357*" An incomplete copy of this film svrvives. 
45" Socialist Review, September 1933, P"357'; Daisy Postgate, 
Organiser, October 1934,. P"191" 
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sound: film on tnom inflammable' 35mm stock, C46) cost Messet £1500 to, 
produce, and, lasting 75 minutes, was a 'peace film, showing how a 
Labour movement. stopped a war IL by-using the method of a genera]: strike. (4T) 
Although the first two productions were available at a combined cost of 
Cl- lOs, Blow, Bügles, Blow! cost, £5 to hire, probabIT pricing the film 
out of reach of most Labour Party exhibitors, who may, have had. great 
difficulties in arranging: 35mm exhibition anyway, because of censorship 
requirements, the film having been banneä by-the BBPC. While there is 
no evidence to indicate the extent of its usage, it would appear that, 
proposing -a view contrary-tothe weight of opinion within the Party; 
it received little attention from Party organisations, and,, according 
to one report,. never had a public. showing. (48) 
Thegeneraal approach of the Socialist Film Council appears: 
to have- been. one: of misgaideds naive but sincere irresponsibiiityj. 
Rudolph. SesseIr its leading personality, was considered. by Paul Rothes. 
in 1933 to be 'of the dilettante kind' full of 'sympathy for the working 
classes r: whose first tw+a films were 'amateur and immature I:. 
C451) F'rOM 
descriptions in various journals by participants, the strongest impression 
is conveye& that the members of the Council were playing at making films. 
Yet they had some political acunen: they' were the first Labour group in 
Britain to make films on. 16mm stock specifically to avoid. censorship 
restrictions; - their productions were aimed at a clearly defined. audience; - 
and constructed in conscious opposition to the dominant. forms of cinema. 
The"Council. even defined the most appropriate format for exhibition - 
urging; that their films should be exhibited sandwiched between speakers at 
party-political meetings. 
46. Partially 'non-inflammable' 35mm. film stocks were available at this 
time, made. of nitrocellulose in combination with acetocellulose, 
leading to much confusion, for censorship: purposes, as to what: was, 
or was not, an inflammable film, and. whether it came under 
the 1909 Act. 
47. Labour Or ser, October 1934, p"191. The film was reviewed in 
Kinematograph Weekly, 16 April 1936, shortly after being trade-shown. 
by-the Progressive Film. Institute, which had intended to release the: 
-film later that year-. Interestingly, it was in October 
1934 that 
Attlee considered writing socialist film scripts. See, W. Golant, 
'The Energence of C. B. Attlee as Leader of the Parliamentary-Labour 
Party-in 1935', Historical Journal, vol. 13 (1970), P"328. 
48. R. Cordwell, The Wa , December 1966. It did get showings however. 
The-Manchester and. Salford. Film Society, for example, gave an exhibit- 
ion of the: film in October 1936. 
49" P. Ro . Doentarte Diary op. cit. pp. 
109-10. Ivor Montagu,, in an. 
interview with the=author, concurred. in Rothals opinion, recall 
that. Messel was an embarrassment, repared. to offer his money for 
film projects (which was desirable yet tmderstandab1 keen to 
""ý"ýý ntvpti- n_theirpxodnction 
(which was not). 
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While the Council was probably regarded. with some disdain by 
the TUC and the REG the interest in 'propaganda filmst. within the rank 
and file which the SFG apparently revealed: may have done much tor enconra e 
them in their inquiries into, film's %rtilitr for their various campaigns. 
Most encouraging of ally in the context of the availability of projection 
equipment (the cinema van from the fails Berald), the relatively cheap 
production of technically- proficient films byr the SEG cast doubts on. 
the prevailing view that adequate film. production was beyond. the financial 
means of either organisation. 
The Socialist Filar Council probably played. some part therefore 
in making the TUC and the Labour Partys NEC more receptive to the idea 
that a film service for the movement was feasible. Moreover; the politic:. - 
ally inept character of the Council. 's productions prompted both to, seek 
professional advice, and to: canceive of future production in terms of 
production by professional. film-makers sympathetic to the aims of the 
movement,. and under the overall. political control of the Labour leader- 
ship organising the service. (50) 
The main pat of reference for the Genneral. Council and the NEC' 
was the documentarg movement. The history of this movement has been 
substantially covered, though more by its members and historians of MM 
than by those of social and political history. C511 The British documentary 
5Q. . Eogenkamp, 'Workers 0 Newsreels in the 1920's and 1930's', .Q sto op. cit., p. l7, suggests that 'the most striking aspect of 
the SFC's histary 'is its failure to create a broad. movement among 
Labour organisations that would use film as a means of propaganda'. 
Three films were hardly sufficient to provide the basis for any 
'bread movement. ', and production discontinued not through lack: of 
money, nor, evidently, through lack of interest in Labour: circles, 
but because the business of making politically-motivated films 
requires a certain dedication,, professionalism auipolitical perspicacity 
onlr thinly apparent within the CouncilL Above all, they were not 
sufficiently serious, in film production, to see the project through. 
51. For introductory, surveys by film historians . see A. Lovell,. J. Efillier, 
Studies- in Docamentary (London, 1972); R. Armes, A Critical History 
of British Cinema (London 1978); R. Low! Films of Comment-and 
Persuasion of the 190' 
(London, 1979) and Documenta3vr and Dducational 
Films of the 1930''x_ (London, 1979). The international evolution of 
documentary- is surveyed- by E. Barnouw,. Documentary (London, 19T4 )" 
Memoirs include P. Potha, Docent Diarr op. cit.; D~Watt,, Don't 
Look at the Camera (London,, 1874. Interviews. with most of, the. 
leading documentarista are to be found. in E. Snssex (ed. ), The Rise 
and Fall of British Document (London, 1975) and E. Orbanz: ed. , 
Journey to a Legend and Hack (Berlin, 1977). 
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fiTm: was conceived by its. exponents as a medium for the communication 
of public information, with a social purpose. It was intended ta make 
some contribution ta. the crystallisation. of mass social democracy, using 
f11* in educative, informational and propagandist. roles,. geared. to social 
progress. Documentary- film was operative at three levels. Ey, the 
provision of visual information it would assist in the civic education. 
of the 'community' and promote. awareness and understanding of the worl. - 
ings abd_problems of the communitgfis various parts. It was fashioned 
to influence national opinion-makers and those prominent in the local. 
community, in the workplace,, cultural associations-, etc., who could. 
influence the ideas and beliefs of ordinary] working people.. Lastly, it 
was designeä. as a means-of persuading decisicnt-makers, in government and. 
industry- as to the need. for reforms. Of the mazy disquisitions: on 
documentary by its:: iroponents,, the following, written by Paul Botha in 
1935* captures much of the core of the documentary ideas 
The, immediate task- of the documentariat is j. L believe, 
to find the means whereby he can employ a mastery of 
his art of public persuasion to put the people and 
their problems, their-labour and their service; before 
themselves. His is a job. of presenting one -half of 
the 
populace to the other; of bringing a deeper and more intelli- 
gent social analysis: to bear upon. the whole cross-section of 
modern society; - exploring its; wealatiesaes, reporting- its. 
events-,. dramatising. its. experiences and suggesting a 
wider and. more sympathetic understanding among the pre- 
vailing class of society. He does not, L thins, seek 
to draw conclusions but rather to"make a statement-of 
the case so that conclusions may-lie drawn. (52) 
The documentary movement distinguished itself from. the 
commercial cinema not only bg clafma distinct social function for 
its films, but by emphasising that these films. were identifiably =t 
fiction. The focus was indisputably the 'real warid'. But actuality 
was not merely to. be recorded, offering a neutral factual description. 
of a subject: it was to be treated 'creatively'= to assist in the film's 
digestion. by an audience,. and to. facilitate within the cinematic represent, -. 
ation of the subject means for the guidance of the audience towaxds. a 
preferred. reading of the film. (53) In practice the sources of finance 
52. P. Rotha,. writing in 1935, in P. Rotha S'. Rcad, R. Griffith, Docientarr 
Film 3rd. enlarged. ed. (London,. 1952),. p. 115. See also. R. Wright, 
The Long View (St. Albans, 1976), PP. 108-9. 
53" S. LeBS, 'Re&list. Films. ', The Journal of the ACT, August-October 
1936,. P-34; P. Botha et. al, Documentary Film o p. cit rt PP " 115-8. 
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for documentary films, state departments, industrial. corporations, 
and charitable trusts, imposed certain constraints on prodnction. 
Consequently, a largge'proportion of the documentary output was devoted. 
to publicising-the various services of the Post Office, under whose 
auspices the main documentary film unit operated. Much of the remainder 
was unable to offer little more than description of the numerous social. 
problems they-had identified. Differences of approach between individual 
documentarists necessarily-led to considerable differences in the type 
of documentary- produced, ranging from material descriptive of machinery- 
and the work and expertise involved in its production, to reportage on 
sliim: life using camera interviews, to didactic film lectures on nutrition 
using visual aids, to material publicising the Post Office's National 
Savings scheme using a fictional format.. Differences in technique: 
employed raised the question of the nature of documentaryl and the 
purposes to which it was to be pnt. 04) 
Nevertheless,; one of its fnndamentaL characteristies was its 
preoccupation with actuality, and, within this perspective, with socisi. 
problems. The docvmentarr movement established for itself a considerable 
status-within left. wing and progressive circles as the repositor7 of 
political liberalism within the British cinema. Its members considereä 
themselves to. be ldit wing, and carefully nurtured their imams of 
progressivism br emphasisi g the importance of their self-appainteä 
task- of establishing, as Sarr- Watt, one of the members of the group 
least given to myth-making,, pat it, "the dignity- of the ordinary, man' 
on the screen. Stress on the movement's social. democratic pedigree 
servedl further to establish-the credentials of documentary- film-makers 
vis-a-vis es 
the Labour movement, and progressive. groups. (55) 
The doccmientax movement was an alternative cinenntic. practice 
consciously set. apart. from the commercial cinema. In 1933 there were, 
according to Jobe Grierson, hardly any recognised. doasnentary-directors 
in Britain apart. fromm Basil Wright, Stuart Legg and Arthur Elton, and 
tone or two others1. The success of the first four years of doctimentazg 
resided not in any cinematic achievement but in firstly the training of 
a number of individuals,, imbue& with a reforming zeal and a strong 
54. See for example, H. Watt, . cit., pp. 109-10,, 186-9. 
55. Ibid",. pp'. 39, " 47,191-2. 
J. Grierson, in his preface to P. Rotha 
" et al, Documentarv Film on,. cit_,. p. 16. 
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educational impulse, in. the craft of film production. Secondly, in 
establishing the notion that films could. be made independently of 
the traditional sources of finance open to the cinema trade. Br recourse to 
an ethic- of public service, and. supported by notions of public- relatiox , 
government and industry- were persuaded. to sponsor the production of 
films for broad social. and educational purposes. Thirdly, this success- 
resided in establishing- a distinct -" social function for the cinema, 
as opposed to the commerical, - exploitative function of the medium. upheld , b. 
byrthe cinema industrT as a whole. With the establishment in 1934 of 
the GPO Film Unit from the film unit of the defunct Empire Marketing 
Boarci, and the formation the following year of the first independent fj 
(freelance-) documentary units Strand Films, the documentary movement 
expanded. considerablg, and. its productions did much to demonstrate 
cinematicalI the utility of film for publicity and social. oaes. 
Before 1934 there few successful attempts to present: 'the voice of the. 
people speaking from the houses and. factories and fields, 6 the peogl&&. C56) 
With the conso3iidation of the movement, and a broadening of. its perspeat- 
ives, there were more substantive attempts to produce films which 
recorded or dramatised the lives of working people. As Grierson observed, 
'Then documentary-of work and Workers has founä endless possibilities 
stretching out before its... xf and Eousina Problems and Workers; and Tobe. 
took. the documentary film into. -the field of social. problems, 
and keyed it. to the task of describing not only industrial 
but. soeial: truth as well. (57) 
The documentary- film: -makers, were sympathetic to the aims of the Labour 
Party; and their view's. were broadly congruent with the ideas and beliefs 
within. the leaderships of the Labour movement. The concern of these 
film-makers with portraying the lives and -problems of working class people 
at home-and at work was receive& with approval in Labour circles. (58) 
Just. as doemmentarista were concerned to portray. - 'social truth-, a mad= 
thrust of Labour publicity and educational work was to reveal tthe factst 
of a particu]ar issue; fundamentallT assuming that in so doing the merits 
and rationality of Labour's case would be. self-evidently correct and 
that eventually; despite media distortion, people would recognise this: 
and act accordingly-during the next general election. Similarly. in: 
56. P. Rotha et al, Documentary Film, op. cit., pp. 979,111,. 113- 
57. 'summary' and. surveys 1935, Cin G. Grigson, The Arta Today (London. - 1935) ! Battle for AuthenticityL, World Film News, November 1938- 
5E1- For example, R. Calder, Labo October 1936, P"35" 
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affirming the importance and validitT of the working class experience,, 
particularl, * skills, and crafts. at. workr documentarists were tapping 
workerist=ideas - ideas which were formative. influences in the perspectives 
of the Labour movement. 
4.. 
At. that point, 1934-5. when documentaxT rapidly extended. ita 
ranger and clarified its perspectives, the General Council of the TQC 
and the Labour Party NEC Were becoming interested in providing a film. 
service for the Labour movement. There was clearlT a certain amount 
of common ground between these film-makers and Labour leaders. Moreover, 
a number of documentarists enthused over the idea of such a service. 
Grierson had. already proposed: plans to the Labour Party- for a Labour 
film: propaganda agencg,. In 1931. This was rejected at the time by- 
Herbert Morrison. (59) Zn February 1935 a documentary film exhibition. 
was held at Transport Souse,, resulting in detailed plans being drawn 
up, with the generous assistance of two documentary film-makers, Paul 
Ratha and Donald Taylorr for its provision. 
The Daily fferald's offer of a film an had prompted a thorough 
inquiry into the whole question of film publicity, which concluded that 
running costs would be disproportionately high for the value which could: 
be, gained from the work which. could be lane- bb one van. Consequently 
the cinema van was never purchased:. (160) Walter Citrine envisaged a more 
complete service for the movement in which a central office would be 
established to arrange for the production,, distribution and, where 
necessary,. exhibition of films, including special propaganda tours to 
correspond with particular publicity, drives. Several types of 
exhibition were anticipated, which would require different types of 
59" N. Prona3', in his Introduction} in F. Thorpe, B. Prona7j, ]kitish 
Official Films in the Second World. War: ADescriptivveCatalogue 
(Oxford, 19801, p. 30. In the same year Isidore Ostrer offered. hia 
controlling shares in Gßumont British Picture Corporation to the 
Labour Government,. but the proposal was similarly rejected. P. Swann, 
Asi-ects of the History-of the Hritish Documentary Movement, With 
Special. Reference to its Place in the Social Histo of the 1 0'sr 
unpublished PhD. thesis, University of Leeds, 1979 , P'"15" 
60. It would have cost £600. second-hand). C. T. Stannage, The 31ritish 
General Election of 1935 op. cit., pp. 96,100,110,275-6, miatakenlr 
claims that the Party had two cinema vans, both gifts fromm the 
DaU3r herald, which were used in various campaigns in 1933-4 and 
during the, 1935 General. Election. 
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apparatus (all however: wereeto be sound shows) and the TUC would purchase 
projection equipment both for hire and. use in its: own publicity work, 
A. range of films therefore. waald have to be. available which were suitable 
for these exhibitions - at. political meetings, educational. classes-,. 
conferences, social gatherings - and, for 'normal purposes', a'distinct 
entertainment interest' would have to be provided. However the greatest 
problem, Citrine believed, would be the production of films dearer with 
the Labour movement. Films could be made of Labour leaders delivering 
speeches (five minutes), or of important aspects of trade union activity 
(ten to twelve minutes,, costing E300). But the difficulty here would: 
be- to. produce films 
dealing with the Trade Union and Labour Movement which wouI& 
be or sufficient interest to attract and retain the attention 
of an audience. (GTj 
Fortunately., documentary, film-makers had. offered their assistance in the 
production of this material. Cifri4 s memorandum revealed that 
Consultations have taken place with a group of people in 
the movement interested. in the question of film production. 
They-are desirous of forming a film company which would 
produce cultural films for general exhibition on the lines' 
of those which were produced by Sohn Grierson and others 
under the auspices of the Empire Marketing Poard and, later, 
of the Post Office. The people concerned are confident that 
there is a demand for these pictures and, providing that any 
apparent connection of the company- with the two national 
bodies was avoided, they feel that sufficient profit would. 
be made out of this venture to enable them: to produce either- 
free of charge or at very lour costs propaganda films for the, 
Movement. (62) 
These 'people in the movements were Ritchie Calder, a Daily Herald 
journalist, J. J. Taylor, Political Secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers' Union, Domöd Taylor änd Paul Rotha. (63) No. indication is 
given however- of the source for- the supply, - of what. Citrine called. 
'general propaganda . 
The film. service was estimated as requiring an initial capital 
of'£3000 and recurring annual coats were estimated at £2000 - for 
general. running, the production of films, and the replacement of old copies. 
61. TU, Einance and General. Purposes' Committee Minifites, W. Citrine, 
'Cinema Films in Trade: ünion Propaganda', 25 March 1935. 
62. Ibid. 
0 Paul. Rotha, in an interview with the author, 25'Januarg 1978. 
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Citrine hoped that some assistance would be forthcoming from individual 
or group: unions, which mould sponsor films on subjects related to 
their particu]ar- industries. There were considerable problems however 
in raising the money toýfinance the project, and though: it could be 
"of tremendous assistance in organising work", Citrine concluded that 
On income at the moment rules out. any. - development such as 
is contemplated on the question of modern film. propaganda. (64) 
The difficulty-vas not that the scheme cost too much, but that. for the 
previous five years the work of the Council had. already been slowly 
expanding, yet its income had been reduced by- over £B. 000 per year, due 
mainly- to. a drop in affiliated membership since 1930. of 450,000. Eager' 
to use film publicity- Citrine attempted to-secure an increase in 
affiliation fees, which would barely eliminate the increasing annual- 
deficit,. but union responses were unfavourable and the TUCý! a Finances' 
continued to exist. on a hand-to-mouth basis. (65) 
The Labour Partr was in a similar- position. The annual income 
of the Party's General Account, hum which all organisational and 
publicit. r expenses were paid, never exceeded. £50,000 in the 1930's; and 
it was frequently in defioit. C66) The years 1932 to 1934 were such years. 
In such circumstances, the Party's income was taken upcalmost entirely 
by-standing expenses, leaving hardly any spare funds for additional 
expenditure. From November 1934, it bad been preparing for an autumn: 1535 
general election. Previous campaign work had generally-been unsuccessful, 
in terms. of generating enthusiasm amongst divisional Labour: Parties for 
the work involved, and in. raising funds from. them to finance it. (67) 
it the point when the? Party. - leaderships wished. to step. up, its electoral 
preparations financial difficulties were compelling it to restrict itm 
activities,. with income in 1934 f3000 below that of the previous; year. C68) 
64. C. Finance and General Purposes Committee Minutes, 'Cinema 
Film in Trade Union Propaganda': 25 March 3-935- 
65. For the financial position of the TUC, see TUC GC, Finance and. 
General Purposes Committee Minutes, W. Citrine, Memorandum. on TUC' 
Affiliation Fees.. 21 June 1935; and 18 Febriy'1936. 
66. The information is derived from the statement of'Party Accounts in 
the Labour Party Annual Retort for each year, 1929-31. 
67. C. T. Stannage, op. cit.,. pp. 108-10. 
68. LPNEC, Finance and General Purposes Committee Minutes, 16 November 
1934; NEC Minutes, 'Xinancial Report for 1934',. 23 Jerry 1935. 
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This was all the more problematic because a considerable number of 
constituency- parties were badly disorganised, increasing the burden. ot 
responsibility for propaganda and organisational work on Transport 
Rouse. (69) 
Consequently, as with many other projects, the film scheme 
was deferred. Nevertheless, Botha and Donald Taylor proposed the for- 
mation of a limited liability company, and appealed to both organisations 
for assistance in raising the capital needed to launch the business. 
The Party- Executive resob©ed, in April 1935, to approach 'sympathetic 
persons t to raise capital of 94000. To improve the chances of raisizig 
this money both the General. Council and the NEC agreed to guarantee the 
interest on any money raised, up to £200 per year. The capital was 
never raised, and the company never materialised. (70) 
The project Was. not abandoned= due largely to the pressure- 
maintaine3 by., Ja. Taylorr Paul Rotha, and Ritchie Calder; and evvem 
John. Grierson was recruited to assist in publicising the importance of 
using . 
ilm. (71) There was- also much *encouragement. from. Trades. Councils. 
These bodies-. were: the' principal channel through which TUC propaganda 
and publicity material was distributed; and if any film scheme was to 
be"successful, then it would need their active support. At the 193.5 
Trades Councils' Annual. Conference a resolution was passed recommending 
the adoption of more modern publicity methods, and ¬12,500 be raised each 
year, by means of a penny levy on each union member. Of' this sum, £5,500 
would pay for broadcasting-from continental stations to Britain, £200a 
would pay-for newspaper advertising: and the remaining, ¬5,000 would pay- 
for the production of propaganda films. In the first instance,, a 
propaganda film would be produced 
of sufficient interest to warrant commercial circulation, 
yet put the story of Trade Unionism over to the public. (72) 
There was clearly a measure of support within local. ILabour organisations 
for developing the use of film; and a source of finance was available. 
69. C. T. Stannage, op. cit., p. 118. 
70. P. Erotha, in an interview with the author, 25 January 1978. See 
TUC GC, Finance and General Purposes Committee Minutes, 15 April. 
1935; General Council Minutes, 17 April 1935; LPNEC, Finance and 
General. Purposes Committee Minutes, 20 May 1935, ". DEC Minutes, 21 
Nair 1935- 
71. 'Getting a Move on the Movies', Labour, February 1936.. 
72. Report of the Annual Conference of Trades Councils 1935, p"35. 
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The Labour-Party/TUC Film Committee, which had been established in early 
1935: issued. a circular to Trades Councils in April the following year 
under the auspices of the National Council of Labour (the joint coordinat- 
ing committee of the TUC, the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour 
Party),. canvassing the formation of a central organisation 
for the supply of information, projectors and films to those 
localities where suitable machinery (for exhibition) can be- 
established. (73) 
The circular proposed that in order to avoid 'preaching to the convertedv 
local parties would fora. film societies open to affiliation by nor-Party, 
organisations - trade unions, cooperative societies, branches of the 
Workers'" Educational Association, NCLC groups and individuals. Appended 
to the circular was a questionnaire requesting details on local conditions: 
availability of suitable projection equipment for non-theatrical showing, 
availability of suitable public halls, degree of access to facilities 
for theatrical showing on Sundays, and likely level of support. 
Though the records of the two national organisations reveal 
little of the preferences of the members of the national Film Committee, 
there was evidently some debate as to. the general emphasis of the proposed. 
Z'Ylm eervice. Citrine vs view as suggested by- his report in early. - 1935, 
was clearly a cadre approach based. on non-theatrical showing in Labour 
halls, etc., but Geroge Elvin, Secretary of the ACT and a long-standing 
advocate of Labour film. propaganda, speaking in April 1936 at the first 
annual conference of Kino Films, the left wing 16mm. film distributor, 
revealed that 
the official Labour Part r, attitude to film. was that they 
should produce films which were films first and propaganda 
second. Distribution of films through the media of Labour 
Halls, Trade Halls, Coop. Halls, does not get to the film 
going public, and is mainly preaching to the converted. Film 
propaganda must be done through the medium of the commercial 
cinema. (. 74) 
73. TUB C, National Council. of Labour, Circular no. 101, '-Labour Cinema 
Propaganda', April 1936. 
741, Lino News, n. d., Nay' 1936. See also Daily Worker, 27 April 1936, P-"8'. 
Elvin was in a position to express the views of the Party, being 
one of the advisers on the Film. Committee. 
n 
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Frank Jackson, a member of Kino,, commenting on the circular, reveale& 
that 
Latest information has it that the types of films which. will. 
be produced. for the commercial market will be one- or two- 
reelers. ' dealing with such. subjects as rA Day in the Life of 
a Railway Worker". C75) 
Replies to the questionnaire reveale& that 'Up-and down the 
country- there are cinema owners and managers who are "with uslt-'. 1.76) 
There were mang independent cinema-exhibitors, unattached. ta any cinema 
circuit. In 1934 there were, according to Rowson, 4,305 cinemas in 
Britain. $t mid-1936, according to one report; approximatelg. 1890 
cinemas which belonged to circuits of two or more halls. With over 2400 
independently owned cinemas in Britain and over, 60a belonging-to circuits 
of fewer than 11 cinemas, there were consequentlg a large number-: 
independent to .. a greater or'lesser extent of the exhibition policies of 
the large circuits. (77) While the cinema trade generally attempted to 
'keep., politics off the sareent, and the President of the BB'C- Lord 
Tyrrell,. amongst others, constantlg warned that every effort should be 
made to resist tthe creeping of politics into films', many independent 
cinema owners were able to ignore the strictures of those controlling 
the larger circuits. An example of this measure of independence is the 
widespread- exhibition of Rotha's Peace of Britain. which, after much 
publicity concerning thetntervention of the BBPC, was shown, according 
to one report, in 57Q cinema C78) 
Evidently, there Were a number of cinema owners sympathetic to, 
the Labour Party who were prepared to permit the exhibition of film 
75, Left Review, June 1936, P"477. Using 'rumour' as evidence needs 
to be qualified; in this case Jackson's information was apparently- 
qui reliable, there being several proposals made to produce this 
type of film at later meetings of the Film Committee in the 1937-4 
period. 
76. R. Calder, Labour! October 1936, PP-35-6- 
77. This information is taken from F. D. X1ingender, S. Legg, Money-Behind 
the Screen (. London, 1937;, p. 21. The reliability of this source 
is uncertain. H. E. Brovning, A. A. Sorrell, 'Cinemas and Cinema-Going 
in Great. Britain', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. l17', 
1954, P"141, claimed that as late as 1951 155 cinemas remained 
outside circuit control. 
78. J. Eeeves,. The Film and Education. o . cit., p. 15. See also Report 
of the Annual Conference of Trades Councils 1936, p. 18. 
fi 
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material provided by the proposed Labour film service. The 26' cinema 
circuit owned by Sidney] Bernstein, who. had been a Party, member since 1919 
and att various times a Labour Councillor, may, have been open to the Party. 
There weroalso of course, the dozen or so cooperative cinemas, and the 
cinemas owned by Labour organisations such as Bedwas Workmen's Hall . 
Institute., the Morpeth Miners' Hall, the Cooperative gall owned by 
Long Buckley. -Self Assistance Industrial Society, and the Popular Picture 
Palace owneä by Miles Platting (Manchester) Independent Labour Partr. (79) 
8a evidence is available to indicate which cinemas were open to the 
Party-,. no= as to precisely- what their owners were prepared to show, or 
in what context.: favourable replies may simply have been confined to 
offers to open these cinemas for use on Sunday . afternoons on a strictly 
commercial basisp as was the usual practice with film societies. 
Replies to the. questionnaire: revealed, however that thirtyfive Labour 
groups were suitable- for =immediate development. ', but only for 16m a 
non-theatrical exhibition. The view of Citrine subsequently prevailed. 
and the new film. scheme, as Ritchie Calder announced in November 1,93ä, 
was to be'based entirely on non-theatrical distribution'. Divisional 
Labou= Parties were to spoceor Film. Guilds t which would equip. themselves 
with 16mm sound projectors. The Guilds would act as 
discussion groups bringing not only Labour Party members,. 
Trade Unionists, Cooperators and social workers together.. 
bat attracting also the marginal or unconverted electors. 0803 
There were, it was considered, sufficient docvmentarg films available 
to make the scheme immediately practicable; and these films would be 
used 'to create a "social eonscience't and a reforming ideal. in the 
potential voters*. There was some confusion of purpose regarding these 
films. Calder explains& that these documentary films were suitable mainlg 
for making people hitherto uncommitted. 'alive to the need for reform'p 
and. were therefore more suitable for exhibition in cinemas. (81) More 
79. Information. olt these and others is " to be found in Kinematogranh 
Tear Book. the official. trade directory,. These halls were' not. 
simpl, halls with projectors and screens, giving a weekly-show, 
bat-cinemas with daily programmes. The Popular Picture Palace, 
for example, gave two shows nightly, and three matinee performances 
every- week. 
80. K. Calder, 'Federation of Film Guilds for. the Labour Party', World1 
Film News, November 1936, p. 29. There are no details of this scheme 
in the records of the two national organisations. 
81.8. Calder, Labour, oc cit , p. 36. 
433 
appropriate for non-theatrical showings were tfilms which educate the 
converted in the ideals and. objectives of Socialism. '. This type was to 
consist of 'the broad. propaganda or instructional films explaining, 
i instrating and. underlining the Socialist polio r' . löt the teesentiai' 
films: for this function. were, according to- Calder, documentaries; and. 
he gave examples: ifters, Lancashire at Work and. Play, Citizens of the 
Fýiiture, Shipyard . and. io gh. to Eat?. 
(82) PinaI ly, a third. categprr- 
of films was to be produced: 
films. which. are straight-from-the. -shoulder propaganda 
using hard-hitting arguments which carry conviction amoz 
the unconverted, and win, elections. (83. ) 
There was a distinct electoral. emphasis in the scheme-. Eventually, it 
was hoped, every constituencl* Labour Party in. Ehitaia would be equipped 
with. projection apparatus, so that during elections "films could be used. 
as a mass attack'. Na reference was made to daylight. cinema vans, and. 
street corner meetings of the type-. arranged bg the Conservative and 
Unionist Films Association appear to have been rejected as a tactic for 
publicity. The projector recommended by the Film Committee was portable 
however, and it was envisaged that. FiIm. Guilds would arrange indoor 
shows throughout. their localities: as' part of the- normal publicity work 
of the Party during elections. 
The main task of the Film. Guilds was to perform a cadre function. 
As Calder explained. 
Winning votes ma be important., bat initiating and instructing 
people in what are the ideals, the practical policy-and pro- 
e and. the true objectives of Socialism are more so. 0841 
Despite a certain confusion regarding the appropriateness of documentary 
films for theatrical exhibition,. their main value, according to "alder,. 
was in education and instruction. tt. must be. recalled- here that he was 
not arguing a case but. publicising the new acheme of the Party and the 
TUC. Echoing Philip Showdents observation quoted earlier in this chapter 
that it wasn't simply a question of educating those who were not members 
82. R. Calder, Igo ru , 1oa c 
83. R: Calder, 'Federation of Film Guilds for the Labour. Party', World 
Film Ne w$, loa. cit 
84. DUL 
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of the Party, or who were not ardent trade unionists,, but raising also 
the lever of understanding and knowledge of the tconverte& ,, the film. 
scheme-recognised that: much of the Party; s support. derived from. class. 
loyaLtar, fr= blind faith in the party- of the working class, rather than 
fromm. any articulated political opinions or considered support ror £ts 
policies-. This approach coincided with the perspectives behind the 
y- for Socsm campaign, and reflected current thinking in the Motor 
Party as to the main tasks. confronting the Party in the post-19355 situation. 
Mere was a continuing need to create a mighty force of 
socialist faith', educating the people in the ideas and values which 
formed the fabric of social democratic philosophy. But there was also 
a need to preps . the ground for a sudden electoral contest. 
Reviewing 
the political situation. in May 1.936 the Party is Publicity- Department. 
decided to inaugurate a sustained campaign. to promote party support 
on the assumption that 
the petition. of the Government is such. as to justify the 
Labour Party in planning its work now on the basis of 
election preparations. (85. ) 
There was a certain degree of political neurosis within the Labour Party 
leadership after 1935. Confident that the Government was losing support, 
it was concerned'that there were na strong indications that the Party 
was growing proportionately in stature in the country. (86) The Party 
coulä not afford to be. cauit by a snap election. Nor could it risk the 
possibility of losing a general. election a- third. consecutive time. A 
considerable emphasis in publicity-work therefore was placed on. educating 
the public is the Party's : socialist' ideals, and on instructing Party 
workers and sympathisers, in cadre fashion. Consequently, after a 
prolonged literature campaiga very similar to the 'Victory for Socialism. ' 
drive., a National Campaign was launched in the autumn of 193T after months 
of planning, 
To inspire and equip all ranks of the Patty for. the 
greatest and most intense effort in its history; 
ýý To" increase the affiliated membership of the Party; and 
85. IPNEC. Press and Publicity Department Memorandum, 2II May 1936'. 
86. Ibid. The total. individual. membership. of the Party increased, b_r 
nearly 30,000: between 1935 and 193T to a peak of 447,15(1,, but b- 
1939 had dropped by nearly 40,000. to. 408,844. 
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Ta secure such widespread. public support. for the, policy 
of the Party that a majority Labour Government,, with an 
understanding electorate behind its will take office 
after the General. Election. (87) 
It was in the context of these strategies that the Film Guild system was 
devised. Despite claims however that 
the leading documentary film directors and producers.... will 
be. available for the type of film which we. propose to sponsor 
and promote. (88) 
no orders were placed with the two independent documentary production 
units which existed at the end of 1936, Strand Films and Realist Film. 
Unit; and the Film Conference convened. at the 1936 Party' Conference to 
publicise the scheme and persuade divisional Labour Parties. to purchase 
equipment was a failure. (89) EEpected to commence in the winter of 1936-T 
the scheme was again deferred, thou& not on this occasion for financial. 
reäs ons " 
Mille the service would adxie. in the procurement. of projection. 
equipment and even offer such equipment. for sale on favourable terms, 
it had long been assumed. that the burden of rewponsibility for the 
acquisition of such equipment rested with. local Labour organisations, and, 
specifically, constituency Parties. There were serious doubts as to the 
interest in the scheme within these local Labour groups, and only a small 
number hacl possession of suitable projection equipment. )Loreoever, the: 
Film Committee recorded. in mid-1937 that 
At this stage there seems little likelihood of Local Labour 
and. trade Union Organisations being able to purchase 
projectors. ((90) 
8T. x.. 1936, pp. 81-2; 1937, p. 21. 
88. R. Calder", labour. loo. cit, 
89. P. Rotha, in an interview with the author. According to Rotha not 
a single order was made for equipment. Despite his own talk to the 
Conference, which provided a pithy class analysis of the cinema 
industry, delegates displayed little interest in. using film as-a. 
political. weapon. The text. of flotha's talk was published in pamphlet form, Pilms and the Labour- Party (London, 1936). 
90. LPHEC. Joint Film Committee Minutes, 22 July 1937. No figures are. 
available for the numbers of projectors in the possession of Labour 
groups. Constituencj Parties appear to have been in serious 
7 
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The network of Film. Guilds had failed. evidently to materialise and, with, 
unfavourable financial circumstances. and. greater- priorities in other 
means of publicity,. the launching of the scheme appeared to both mtionat 
organisations unjustifiable. 
We have felt all along that in the absence of facilities 
for showing films of a special character. of interest. to 
audiences we represent, no. good. purpose would have. been. 
served. in spending large sums of money-on producing films 
which would have not been acceptable to the commercial, 
cinema proprietors. (91) 
ror was it simply a case of Labour Parties hiring projection apparatus 
from other working class organisations. Only a small number of branches 
of the Workers, ' Educational Association, for example, possesse& so=& 
projection equipment, the majority hiring it from cooperative societies, 
schools or commercial sources. Moreover, Labour halls were not always. 
the most suitable for exhibition, even if projection equipment was- 
available. As the WEL explained. in its evidence to-the Cinematograph 
Advisory Committee to the Some Office on the question of the censorship 
of 16mm film exhibitionz 
Even in the largest towns, the problem of finding suitable 
meeting places E£br exhibiting film] at a cost withim the 
means of those interested is always difficuitg, often 
insuperable. (92) 
or were Labour and social. clubs always available for showing films. 
According to evidence given by a representative of the Working Mealla Club 
and Institute Union, to. this Advisory Committee, working men's clubs did 
not. arrange film exhibitions as a regular part of their activties - indeed, 
such shows "were few and far between. Presumablg, therefore,. of the 
financial. difficulties. The City of Leeds Labour Party, for example, 
found that in 1937 'the normal income of the Party is not yet large 
enough to finance its routine work"-. Annual Report of the Executive 
situation arose the following year,. 
91. 
1937, P. 39. 
38, P. 39. 
92. PRa MO, E 45 21109/. 695383173, Workers" Educational Association, 
Me Use of Non-Thflamaable Filmst, 23 February 1939, (evidence 
submitted. to the Cinematograph. Advisory-Committee to the Home Office, 
3 March 1939). 
LPNEC, Rational. Soint Film Committee, 'Rational. Film Service 
24, March 1938. 
41T 
280Q clubs in Britain tthe vast majority, being social clubs ý, very few,, 
if any, possessed projection equipment. C93) 
5. 
Interest in a Labour film scheme was however growing. Evidence 
of'this is suggested by the expansion of Kino Filmst collection of sound 
films and the extension of their field of operations - by acid-1937 they 
had agents who could give shows in nearly every major city and town 
in England. So-successful were Kino. 's films in drawing people to meetings 
and helping to raise funds that the NACEC Film Department hired several 
for its contribution to the cooperative movement's 'Milkt for Spain' 
campaign. Following this intitiative local constituency-Parties gave 
over l60shows of films within three months as part of the Labour Party's 
own Spain Campaign. (94) Even Head Office discovered that it could put 
on regular. exhibitions of films at. Rransport House -(95) Furthermore, 
the Party's Spain Campaign Committee quickly realised that there was 
a tremendous interest across the country in seeing The Smnish Earth. 
Accordingly, the Committee instructed. local Parties to arrange collections 
outside cinemas wherever the film was being shown, and to assist is 
publicity for its exhibition. (96) 
93" PR H4, KG 45 2109/. 695383173, Working Men's Club and Institute 
ünion,. tSummary of evidence to be submitted (to the Cinematograph 
Advisory Committee to: the &rome Office) $,. n. d.; Cinematograph 
Advisory. Committee,. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee, 
3 March 1939, Kvidence of the Working Men*s Club. and Institute 
Union. 
94. LPNEC, National Soint. Fi]m Committee, 'National Film Service', 
24 March 1938. 
95.. New Leader,, 17 April 1936, p. 6. These shows, dating from early I936, 
were apparently very popular. An example of the type of programme 
arranged is one for 16 April 19361 End of St. Petersburg, tJSSB 
(=ntouri t, 1935) and Peace of Britain, five performances of--which 
were given. Bead Office even began to. acquire copies of films in. 
anticipation of the establishment of a central film service, buying, 
for example, four copies of Peace Of Britain, and one of Millions 
of Us, produced by American trade unionists in 1936. 
96. LPNEC, Spahr Campaign Committee Minutes, 8 February 1938. 
41a 
Perhaps. revitalised. by Herbert_ Morrisonts vigorous organisation 
of Labour's National Campaign (tglaunch the campaign 500a meetings were 
arranged: in one week alone, according to one report )(9t) and impressed 
by the obvious success of the NACEC*s Film Department, the Film Committee 
of the TQC and the Labour Party became convinced that there was a wide- 
spread interest within the movement for showing Labour films, and sufficient 
projectors available to. justify the existence of a central service. The 
TU appears to have been increasingly impressed. by the productions of 
the documentary' movement which 'show graphically how the wage-earners 
live and work'. The need to arrange for the production of such films. 
was considered to be- 'a problem of first importance'. (98) in October 
193T the Party's Publicity Committee strongly recommended to the NEC 
that, in view of the Fi1- Committee's findings, the fullest possible 
assistance,. financially and otherwise"- should be given to the Film 
Committee to establish the film service. (99) Consequently'a National 
Jaint Film Committeel, which included representatives from the NACEC', 
was set up authorised to to establish the service. The Committee - first' 
met in Jan= 7 1938, and the Workers" Film Association commencec! 
operations on October ist that year. 
Tha membership of this. Committee, suggesting the seriousness 
with which both national. organisations approached the subject, included 
Che. fnan Harold Elvin,, Chairman of the TQC General Council in 1938; Sir 
Walter Citri'ne, General Secretary of the TUC and' the dominant figure in 
the trade union movement; Vincent Towson, the TUC's Assistant General 
Secretary; W. W. Sendersont Head. of the labour Party's Press and Publicity- 
Department since 192Q; Maurice Webb, a Party Propaganda Officer; Ellen 
97. LEAR 1937, P"193" Morrison was a keen publicist with . much 
experience of organising public relations exercises and using 
professional. advertising consultants, and clearly brought fresh. 
ideas to the Party's wilting Campaign Committee. See B. Donoughue, 
G. W. Jones, Herbert; Morrison: Portrait of a Politician op. cit., 
PP. 20T=10. 
9ß. =. 1937, p. 196. 
99. JZNECý, Toint Pun Committee, Memorandum, 22 July 1937; Memorandum, 
"The Eisture of the National Campaigns-, Rotober 1937" 
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Wilkinson.. who had many contacts with the film trade; Joseph Reeves, 
Secretary- of the NACEC Film Department; David. Mason, Chairman of the 
NACEC; J. J. bylort, Political. Secretary, of the Transport and General. 
Workerst" Union; George Elvin, Secretary- of the Association. of Cinemato- 
graph Technicians; T. O'Brien, Secretary-of the National. Association 
of Theatrical and Eine-Employees; and Pant Botha. 
In order to avoid duplication of effort, ease the financial 
burdens of each sponsoring body, and establish as wide a representation 
of the Labour movement as possible, moves were made by the Committee 
to secure the involvement, of the Workers' Travel. Association, the WEL, 
the Cooperative Union and the Cooperative Wholesale Society. Estimating 
that the Workers. " Film Association would need £1000 per year for two, 
years to become established (and thereafter self supporting), the NEC" 
and the General Council resolved to funci. the service on the principle 
of equal sponsorship, and both agreed to provide 925Q per year for those 
two years, on the assumption that other org?. nisations represented. on the 
Committee would comply. None did,, the WTA and the WEA. were unable to 
afford that level of finding; and the Cü and the CWS refused to participate 
to the Association. Moreover, due to the unwillingness of these two. 
latter organsiations, the NACEC was also, reluctant to-sponsor the service. 
Cönsequently, although. it. was involved in the formation of the WörkersV 
Film Association, the NACEC performed no decision-making role, and the 
service, despite. strenuous efforts to secure representation. of the bulk 
of the Labo= movement:, was funded and directed only bg the Labour Party 
and the TQC, is implicit competition with the NACEC Film Department. and 
the CU'/CWS Bational Filar Service. (10a) 
100. The CU and the CWS were determined that if any organisation of 
the Labour movement was going to provide that movement with, a 
film service then their own was the most. appropriate. They 
subsequently argued that the WFA should merge with the National. 
Film. Service, under CtT/CWS management and subject to their policy 
decisions. Neither the NEC nor-the General CounciL could agree 
to this, considerable resentment was generated, and the stalemate 
was interrupted only by the war, on the outbreak of which the 
cooperative organisations dropped the question completely. For 
the negotiations over the issue,, see IPNEC National Joint Film 
Committee Minutes, 7 October 1938; TUC GC. General Council Minutes, 
22 March 1939; Education Committee Minutes, 9 May 1939" 
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Installed in two rooms in Wardour Street above the ACT offices, 
Reeves and his one assistant were entruste& with formidable tasks. They, 
had. to encourage local Parties, union branches and. cooperative societies. 
as well as national Labur organisations, to use films generally -a 
habit. to which they were largely not, accustomed. To assist them in this 
they-provided .a wide range of films from the commercial libraries, the. 
Association not having an adequate film library until mid-1939; and 
offered. guidance and advice! regarding the types of film and equipment 
available and the technical problems involved in exhibition. Equipment 
was offered-for sale or hire, at highly competitive: prices, or hire purchase; 
and roadshow, facilities were provided for those groups which neither could. 
afford equipment nor. has. access to it. For those Labour organisations 
wishing to sponsor film production. the WFA offered. its services-as agent, 
providing advice, drawing up scenariost engaging production companies, 
etc. As the Association was also a production unit,, it had to encoura&3r 
Labour organisations to commission. WPA productions; trade unions in 
particular were expected. by the TUC to, provide funds for the production 
of documentaries related to the work of their members in specific indust- 
ries. The WFA. was expected to integrate its. film work generally with 
the political needs of the Labour Party's NEC. (101) 
As with the Filz Guild acheme exhibition. was conceived in terms of 
non-theatrical showing in Labour clubs and halls;, and production, in terms 
of 16mn sound film. rn practice occasional shows were given using 351mm 
films obtained from the Progressive Film Institute, which also distributed 
this material for the Association. 
The WFA was expected. ta operate at two levels: as an eventually 
self-supporting company providing a film eert°ice for the labour movement 
in competition. with the commercial cinema; and as a politicaal agency 
augmenting the publicity work of the TUC and the Labour Party. The. WIA. 
also functioned to cater for Labour social gatherings, and. educational 
classes,, providing programmes of films from a wide selection of interest,, 
travelogue, entertainment and educational material. In its first catalogue 
the WFA offered. 31 sample 'educational and entertainment" programmes t 
including films ranging from, documentaries such as Changes in the Franchise, 
101. Rules of the Workers' Film Association Ltd. (London,, 1939); Workers 
Film. Association Catalogue, Films and Equipment for Education and 
Propaganda (London, 1939); LPNEC, National. Joint Film Committee, 
'National Film. Service', 24 Ma=ch 1938. 
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and. Great Cargoes, to newsreel. and topical magazines, Pattie Super Gazette 
and Pathetone Weekly, to popular fiction films such as Great E=ectations 
and The Good' Companions, and cartoons such as Popeye and Micke . An 
average programme ran for two hours, and cost ¬2 15s. 
The provision of these types of film derived from a number of 
sources. Firstly, the belief that film attracted people to meetings 
(of whatever sort). Secondly, the residual workerism of many of the 
active members of the labour movement prompted a belief in the need for 
the working class to develop its own culture, and for it to db so through 
its own organisations and with its own methods. Thirdly, and perhaps 
the most significaant, it was apparent to Reeves and the Film Committee that 
no substantial. political/educational film usage would materialise unless 
Labour groups could develop a routine of film exhibition and attract, a 
body of interest. in and support for Labour film shows. At its most basic 
the WFA functioned to attract workers to meetings. Attracting them to 
social and educational gatherings was a means of strengthening cultural 
and community bonds, and thereby consolidating 'worker-culture'. But 
it was also a necessary prelude to encouraging-people to participate 
in educational/political activities and to attend political meetings. 
The film show, irrespective of the films shown, was another medium for 
Labour publicity in its broadest sense, of publicising Labour's organisa- 
tional presence. More importantly, it was perceived as an organisational 
tactic. Thus, for example, Joseph Reeves explained that 
The Workers' Film Association will not be content until the 
great gifts which working people make to Society are pictor- 
ially portrayed for all to see, so as to make up for the 
neglect of centuries..... 
Film Societies for showing and producing films should be formed 
for the purpose of propagating the principles of Socialism, 
Cooperation and 'trade Unionism. Summer and weekend schools 
to discuss film production should be organised. If this is 
done, gradually we shall find the Workers' Movement becoming 
film-minded. Obsolete methods of propaganda will then be 
discarded for this more potent medium. The competition of the 
wireless and cinema will no longer be the bane of the organiser 
of propaganda. (102) 
102. Labour Press Service, no. 1021,18 January 1939, Supplement. 
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Equally revealing regarding the function of the WFA is the following 
statement by J. W. Prench, Secretary of Clay Cross Labour Party, in which 
he explained that the Party intended to use WFA films 
a To increase the attraction to public meetings. 
b For educational purposes. 
c To maintain interest among the branch members, and to 
aid League of Ibuth activity. 
(d) For augmenting thorogrammes at social activities. (103) 
Rhetoric though there may have been in the press release by Reeves, his 
statement, and that of French, reveals the cadre function of the WFA 
(though there is a vague implication by Reeves that ultimately the WFA 
would create a mass audience for its shows). Reeves indicates the long- 
term nature of the project for which the WPA assumed responsibility 
of building up an independent working class film culture. No evidence 
has been found to suggest that this 'independence' was to extend to 
the production of entertainment material, or even that the full implications 
of 'independende' were thought through. Clearly influenced by cooperative 
ideas, this notion of independence considered that the exhibition of 
films to the labour movement and the working class should also be 
conducted by, organisations of that movement, in direct competition with 
the capitalist cinema', even though much of the material offered for 
consumption may, have been of 'capitalist' origin. 
The distinctly political orientation of the Workers' Film 
Association was derived from the electoral/educational perspectives 
informing the approach of both the Labour Party NEC and the TUC General 
Council. In November 1938 the National Campaign Committee considezed. 
that a general election would probably take place the following year, 
either in February or early autumn, and instructed Head Office to prepare 
publicity-and organise propaganda work in readiness for the earlier 
date. (104) The Press and Publicity Department had already been drawing 
up plans for election publicity, and, with screen publicity under its 
broad direction, arrangements were being made in the autumn of 1938 
for the production of a film dealing with Labour's Immediate Programme, 
103. Labour Orgaaniser9 May 1939, P-87- 
104. IPNEC, Campaign Committee Minutes, 18 November 1938. 
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the electoral programme laid down in early 1937. (105) Although no 
election took place in February the following year, the use of film 
propaganda as part of the joint campaign of the Labour Party and the 
Cooperative Party against the National Government was strongly recommended 
by Labour's campaign organisers, and the WFA kept 
in constant touch with the Publicity Department of the Labour 
Party on the question of film propaganda prior to the antici- 
pated General Election. (106) 
In March that year the WFA devised a scheme for the production of one-and- 
a-half minute films for exhibition in cinemas during an election, and 
invited candidates to volunteer (presumably, with local Party sponsor- 
ship). It was envisaged that a candidate would deliver a speech on film 
stating his/her views on current issues; but the scheme had to be aban- 
doned after consultations with the cinema trade revealed that there was 
a ban on party political propaganda. (107) The Association also undertook 
to provide short films of Party leaders for the election. A further 
scheme was devised for the production and use of film in marginal con- 
stituencies. The films, illustrating various aspects of the Party's 
policies, were to be offered freely as part of a complete service, whi ch 
included an operator, equipment and a programme of films, to selected, 
constituencies. The Association was to produce these films and the Party, 
sanctioning the preparation of up to twelve mobile units in readiness, 
financed the scheme with ¬1500 from its General Election F nd. (108) 
105. LPNEC, Joint Film Committee Minutes, 4 August 1938. Finance for 
the film was provided anonymously-by a member of the Party. There 
is only indirect evidence to duggest that it was ever completed; 
none to indicate which organisation was involved in its production. 
106. B. Arrton Gould, Labour, February 1939, p. 8; TUC Library, Workers: 
Film Association Papers, Workers' Film Association Annual Report 
1939- 
107. TUC Library, Workers' Film Association Papers, Workers' Film 
Association Annual Report 1939; LPNEC. Press, Publicity and 
Campaign Committee, 'Film Publicity', 18 July 1939. 
108. LPNEC, National Joint Film Committee Minutes, 21 March 1939; 
Finance and General Purposes Committee, 'General Election Film 
Propaganda', 20 April 1939" None of these mobile units were day- 
light cinema vans, which, costing over ¬1000 each, were far too 
expensive for Party resources. The films of various Party leaders 
were never completed, though the short films illustrating Party, 
policies were apparently ready for the election. These have not 
survived. 
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Finally, a film was made of Labour Party leaders (Attlee, Morrison, 
Greenwood and Dalton) on 35mm stock, though it is unclear whether the 
WFA produced it, or which organisation financed its production. The film 
was available for use by the WFA, although its completion was held in 
abeyance until a dissolution was announced, only needing to be reduced 
to 16mm and a 'topical commentary' recorded for its completion. (109) 
As no election took place the electoral role of the Association 
was overshadowed by its other functions. Apart from distributing 
educational, cartoon and fiction films, the WFA. offered a wide range of 
social and political films. Sample programmes in its catalogue included 
four films from the Workers' Travel Association, at least ten document- 
aries from the British Commercial Gass Association and Gaumont British 
Instructional, productions from the London Cooperative Societies, and 
fourteen films from the collection of Kino Films, whose entire library 
was placed at the Association's disposal. (110) Charges for films were 
5s per 16mm reel and 12s per 35mm reel. Where equipment and an operator 
were hired from the WFA an additional charge of ¬4 10s was made for a 
single performance, and ¬3 for each of a series of consecutive perform- 
ances. As good sound projectors cost upwards of ¬125 it is not surprising 
that only between twenty five and thirty five cooperative societies and 
trade union organisations possessed them. However, as discussed earlier, 
through Reeves' contacts arrangements were made for the joint ownership 
or usage of many projectors and other equipment in the possession of 
Labour and cooperative groups. While film hire was relatively cheap 
it is therefore difficult to assess the degree to which film exhibition 
was within the reach of most local Labour groups. The cost of projection 
equipment was generally prohibitive - especially for Parties hoping to 
attract audiences of around 1000 - 2000 for public meetings, where the 
projection 'throw' needed for such large audiences required equipment 
costing approximately £400. (111) Whether due to this type of difficulty 
or indifference the number of road shows and film hirings was small during 
109. LPNEC, Finance and General Purposes Committee Minutes, 20 April 1939; 
Workers' Film Association Papers, Workers' Film Association Annual 
Report 1939. 
110. Labour Press Service, no. 1021,18 January 1939, Supplement; Workers' 
Film Association Catalogue, Films and Equipment for Education and 
Propaganda op. cit. gin 's entire library was given to the WFA in 
1941. 
111. Labour Organiser, May 1939, pp. 86-7. 
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the WFA's first year, and poor. in comparison with the achievements of 
the NACEC Film Department. Although total sales were in excess of ¬5400, 
road shows provided only ¬337 of this, and film hire £236. Programmes 
were hired from the Association on 95 occasions; and 31 roadshows were 
given. (112) Of interest here is that there were at least 63 hirings of 
Advance Democracy from the Association - that is, two thirds of all 
film hire transactions involved this film. (113) Some indication of the 
custom for the service is suggested in the following list of Labour 
organisations which hired material from or arranged roadshows by the 
WFA, in a randomly chosen period of two consecutive weeks in April 
1939-(114) 
Film Hire: Nottingham Cooperative Society 
Stockton CS 
Finchley Labour Party 
Pontypridd and District Educational Settlement 
NACEC 
Kino Films 
Clay Cross LP 
Ipswich and District Trades Council and LP 
Trades Union Congress 
Brightside and Carbrook CS 
Road Showt West Layton LP 
East Ham South LP 
United Jewish Workers' Association 
Hatfield and Brcad Oak LP 
Eeaham LP 
Sowerby LP 
Enfield Highway CS 
Disappointed though Reeves was at the poor response, and there was a 
general feeling that many trade unions in particular were still unaware 
of the WFA's sponsorship by the TUC and the Labour Party, the first year's 
work was considered an overall success. A gross trading profit of ¬1130 
was achieved which, after office expenses were deducted, revealed a pre- 
tax surplus on the year's account of ¬230. (115) 
112. Workers' Film Association Papers, Workers' Film Association 
Annual Report 1939; Cashbook 1938-9- 
113. Ibid., Ledger. The General Council's Report to Congress in 
September 1939 referred to 'some thousands of film hirings' having 
been arranged. 
114. Ibid., Cashbook 1938-9. Eight other organisations made similar 
transaction during the same period, but are unidentifiable; and 
three more hired equipment. 
115. Ibid., Annual Report 1939" 
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Of the ¬5460 revenue 90% was derived from production and 
sales of equipment. Acting as agent for the London Cooperatives, the 
WFA arranged for the Realist Film Unit to produce People With A Purpose 
and Voice of the People, engaging Ritchie Calder to write the scenario 
for the latter. Camberwell Borough Council commissioned the Association 
to produce a film on municipal services, emphasising A. R. P. (116) The 
sound film, Camberwell is Prepared, costing ¬350 and lasting 30 minutes, 
was made direct on 16mm stock, directed by Reeves, and exhibited each 
day for a month in August 1939 by the WFA, which hired a daylight cinema 
van, f om Kino for the purpose. Two trade unions were persuaded in April 
1939 to sponsor the production of films: the National Society of Operative 
Printers and Assistants and the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade 
Workers. Neither of these films was completed. before 1940; and merit only 
brief attention. NATSOPA's Jubilee was made to celebrate the uniog's past 
and presented its early struggles, its contemporary role, and various 
union personalities discussing the union's achievements. The sound film 
was scheduled to last twenty minutes, and was made for ¬200. The Builders 
'deals with the life of the builder and the story of the benefits which 
trade unionism confers upon the rank and file member'. Costing ¬350 
the sound film was shot direct on 16mm stock and lasts thirty minutes. (117) 
Several other unions were approached by Reeves without success - though 
this may have been due more to the threat of war than to lack of interest, 
or insufficient funds. Other films produced by the WFA included Sport for 
the British Workers Sports Association, and The Children's Republic for 
the Woodcraft Polk - both silent shorts; and an advertising short was 
prepared for Grays Cooperative Society. A series of W, FA trailers was 
issued for use by cooperative societies and trade union branches at the 
end of their film exhibitions urging audiences to become more involved in 
society/union activities. Finally, a Workers' Film Association Newsreel 
was produced, which included footage of the 1939 May Day demonstration. 
Just; as production by the Association was neither prolific nor 
ambitious, the'large budget' films being handed over to the Realist Film 
Unit, the sale of equipment was poor. The cheapest sound projector made 
available by the WFA cost approximately ¬130; and as the Association's 
equipment sales amounted to ¬2180 no more than 16 projectors could have 
been sold. 
116. Information on this film is'derived from the WorcersR Film 
Association Annual Report 1939. 
117. For a review of The Builder see Documentary News Letter, June 
1940, P. S. 
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All aspects of the Workers' Film Association's activities 
in its first year of operations were of very modest proportions indeed. 
Reeves and the National Joint Film Committee were reasonably satisfied 
with the results. Reeves even considered that had it not been for the 
outbreak of war the future of the WFA would have been 'very rosy*. (118) 
Meagre though the Association's achievements were its work needs to be. 
assessed as part of a long-term project to build up a substantial and 
well-informed workers' film culture within the Labour movement. The 
Association, in this context, had made a start of sorts in 1938-9. Its 
main achievement in 1939 was to have survived the outbreak of hostilities. 
This foundation proved of great value during the war, when its scope 
of operations expanded considerably. However, the high level of interest 
in film which the WFA attempted to satisfy during the war did not 
survive its conclusion, and the Association appears to have subsequently 
gone into a decline. By the late 1940's many of those involved in 
various aspects of the WPA's work were engaged in a discussion concerning 
the lack of interestin the service it had provided, implying that ultimately 
the Association had failed in its long-term aims. (119) 
Ov 
The Labour Patty and the Trades Union Congress responded to 
the evolution of film as a medium of political communication in several 
distinct but related ways. Firstly, the medium's facility for conveying in 
powerful images the propaganda of the movement's political opponents 
prompted on the one hand a profound distrust of commercial cinema, and 
on the other an acceptance that Labour could only oppose effectively the 
118. Workers' Film Association Papers, Workers' Film Association Annual 
Report 1939. Reeves' estimate was probably accurate: by 1941, in 
face of 'competition'from the Ministry of Information, which issued 
similar material free of charge, the WFA's film hire in the last six 
months of the year was five times as great as that for the 1938-9 
year, and 62 roadshows were given in one month alone. Workers' 
Film Association Annual Report 1941. 
119. V. Tewson, The NFA. Journal, September-October 1948, pp. 6-7; A. Bax, 
'Can Films Win Votes? ', ibid., November-December 1948, pp-14-5- The 
WFA folded in February 1948, becoming the National Film Association, 
representing the TUC, the Labour Party and the Cooperative Wholesale 
Society. 
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overt party political propaganda of the Conservative Party and the 
National Government, and challenge the general representation of working 
class people in the commercial cinema, by recourse to the medium itself. 
Such considerations, in the context of the general character of Labour 
publicity, and the political. predicament facing the Labour Party in the 
1931 - 1939 period, determined an essentially political, utilitarian 
conception of film's value for Labour. 
Coinciding with developments in the field of educational and 
instructional film, and in the context of the 'educational' thrust of 
much of Labour publicity work, the two Labour leaderships, secondly, 
were interested in the medium's suitability for instruction and education 
in the principles of socialism. This interest grew proporionately as 
the cost of production and exhibition dropped, with the arrival of a 
reliable 16mm sound film stock (Kodak first issued such a stock in 1933), 
the expansion of the 16mm market and the availability of cheap films 
and projection equipment, and with the crisis in the British film 
industry in 1937. (120) These factors made a Labour film service appear 
financially feasible. The rapid development of documentary film after 
1933 offered a form of cinematic representation which was considered 
by members of the Labour Film Committee most appropriate for Labour's 
purposes. This was due in part to the professional concern of several 
documentarists with working class life and. work, to the political motivation 
of two of these in particular, Paul Rotha and Donald Taylor, and to the 
technique of realism to which documentary so enthusiastcially subscribed. 
Such a service was attractive because it would not only sidestep the 
commercial cinema trade, but offered the possibility of building up a 
practice of Labour film exhibition as an integral part of the social and 
cultural as well as the political life of the Labour movement. 
Thirdly, and determined to a large extent by these perspectives, 
there was a rejection of the commercial cinema as a source for film 
publicity. Interest was shown in that forum, and there was a longing 
to produce a first class film which could reach mass audiences. However, 
120. LPNEC, National Joint Film Committee, 'National Film Service', 
24 Marc-1938. 
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the financial and political implications of commercial exhibition, 
as well as the practical problems which would arise, precluded any 
serious attempt to secure this type of film exhibition. The non-theatrical 
strategy was in practice only partially independent of the commercial 
cinema, but the electoral/educational approach which was adopted reflected 
the established conception of Labour propaganda and publicity work. 
The medium was considered suitable for both a $mass attack in every 
constituency', and for cadre work in educating activists, local leaders, 
sympathisers, etc., who were in positions to influence through their 
more direct, day-to-day contact, larger numbers of 'unconverted' people 
than party meetings could ever reach. 
Given this level of interest, very general though it was, how 
then can we account for the considerable discrepancy between the Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party in their use of film in the 1930's? 
The latter was in a more advantageous position to utilise the medium. 
Manifestly wealthier as an organisation, it also had access to greater 
private financial resources than either the Labour Party or the TUC. 
Leading Conservatives had many close contacts with prominent individuals 
in the cinema industry, and a degree of access therefrom to film prod- 
uction, equipment and advice. Sir Albert Clavering, the Director of 
the Conservative and Unionist Films Association was a major figure in 
the British commercial cinema. He was assisted and advised in film 
production for the CFA by Michael Balcon and Alexander Korda, two 
leading film producers at major British film studios. Others involved 
included Sir Gordon Craig and Gerald Sanger of British Movietone News. (121) 
Such advantages were extremely important, but they do not nevertheless 
fully- account for this disparity. 
Several documentary film-makers who had dealings with both 
Parties have concurred in the view expressed by Basil Wright that 
121. See Kinemato ah Weekl , 19 April 1934, P"3; 7 November 1935, p. 27. See also T. J. Hollins, 'e Conservative Party and Pilm Propaganda 
Between the Wars' loc. cit. 
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the most difficult people to make films for were the so- 
called progressives - the trade unions, the coops., the 
socialist administrators.... (122) 
Where the Conservative leaders were adventurous and keen to use the most 
modern methods of publicity, the leaders of the Labour Party were hesitant 
and cautious. Aware that keeping publicity methods up-to-date was in 
itself a form of publicity, contributing to the' public image of the 
organisation, the Labour Party leadership was nevertheless, as Grierson 
observed, essentially distrustful of 'information services other than 
its very'own'. (123) Paul Rotha, broadening the argument, has commented 
somewhat bitterly that 
in the 1930's the unions and the cooperatives, let alone the. 
Labour Party, had an antiquated attitude to their public image. 
Lack of money was a threadbare alibi.... The wealthy Cooperative 
movement squandered its money on having advertising pictures 
made by companies tainted by Conservative views .... it was the 
Conservative mind that first caught on to the inspiration of 
the documentary idea. Labour had no ear for such an imagina- 
tive approach to public service and public education. Labour 
did not even have an aesthetic approach, let alone a social 
one. (124) 
These charges are only partially accurate, failing to take into account 
the broader needs and priorities of the organisations for which Botha 
in particular-wished to make films. Labour generally was conceptually 
preoccupied with the printed and the direct spoken word. Papers, pamphlets, 
books, classes, public meetings, conferences and mass rallies were the 
principal channels of publicity for the Labour movement. With the develop- 
ment of talks on 'controversial' subjects radio broadcasting became 
increasingly important as a means for the mass communication of Labour 
views on current issues, and assumed increasing priority for the Party 
as a channel for publicity. Had. radio not existed, film may have been 
regarded more favourably. But where radio was considered to be performing 
122. B. Wright, The Long View o . cit., pp. 109-10. See also J. Grierson's 
Preface to P. Rotha et al, Documentary Film op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
123. In a letter to The Times, 19 April 1966. 
124. P. Rotha, Documentary Diary op. cit., pp. 280-1. 
431 
a democratising function, film was regarded as a tainted medivm. As 
Patrick Gordon Walker explained, Labour Party and trade union leaders 
had'some doubts about the use of film as propaganda' because of 'the 
crudity of capitalist propaganda filmst-and because the medirim was a 
principal tool of fascist dictatorships. (125) As has been shown in 
Chapter Three, the cinema industry was regarded with profound suspicion 
by-Labour leaders. They regarded it as being implicated in a political 
conspiracy; giving support to Labour's political opponents. The industry's 
products were largely held in contempt, amid fears that the cinema, in 
exercising a vulgarising and stupefying influence, was undermining the 
democratic process. Since the foundations of Labour Socialism were a 
belief in thgiiltimate rationality of the individual and the inevitable 
evolution of society towards social democracy, Labour leaders were unlikely 
to view with approval anything which, in its effects, exercised a retro- 
gressive influence. Given their developmental conception of an emerging 
social democracy, these leaders probably intuitively reacted against 
the idea of using film, and therefore approached the whole question of 
film propaganda and publicity with misgivings. 
Indisposed-to look favourably upon the cinema, Labour leaders 
appear, as Walker put it, to have 'not quite understood the use of the 
medium'. (126) They certainly lacked any aesthetic feel for film, and 
the range of suggestions made regarding possible productions for the 
movement, it would seem that, as Rotha has claimed, they lacked an 
imaginative approach. Some Labour leaders had-an unsophisticated and 
very literal view. Walter Citrine for example, would appear to have 
had no film sense. In February-1933 he contacted the newsreel companies 
to obtain footage of their coverage of the National Demonstration on 
Unemployment which the National Joint Council had organised. His intention 
was to have an 'official record' of the event. (127) Such a request 
suggests that Citrine had no real understanding of the nature of film 
production - of the production values and organisational imperativem, and 
the conscious decisions and priorities, which are involved. 
125. P. Gordon Walker, 'Politics and Film', The FIFA Journal, July 1952, 
P. 18. 
126. Ibid. 
127. TUC GC, National Joint Council Minutes, 21 February 1933. 
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Apart from the nature of the medium, organisational factors 
also had some bearing on the response of the Labour Party and the TUC 
to the use of film. John Saville has argued that the style of activism 
characteristic of the early years of the Labour Party, based. on the 
street-corner meeting, had, by the mid-1930's, long since past. (128) 
Street corner meetings had not disappeared, they were simply not the 
main form of political communication. As a national Party attempting 
to re-establish itself as a viable alternative Party of Office, the 
" Party publicists appear to have been keen to move away from the image 
of a minority or sectional party conveyed by the street-corner meeting. 
The Party's appeal was national and aimed to attract middleclass as well 
as working class support. Panty propaganda and campaign work was 
organised centrally, but depended very heavily on local initiative. 
The organisational style of the Party was to devolve responsibility 
largely with local and area organisations. (129) Between 1935 and 1938 
the fundamental assumption of Citrine, Henderson, and other members of 
the Joint Film Committee was that responsibility for film exhibition and 
production rested almost wholly with local Labour Parties, Trades Councils, 
trade union branches, etc. (130) The Workers' Film Association was con- 
ceived in terms of providing a service for Labour organisations. It was 
not a department of the Party or the TUC. It was though intended to 
tailor its activities to the specific needs of these two bodies. But 
the balance of the relationship appears to have been such that the 
initiative for harnessing WFA activities to Labour Party/TUC requirements 
was rather more with the Association than with the National Joint Film 
Committee, its controlling body. Consequently, the two national organisa- 
tions of the Labour movement which wielded the greatest political influence 
did virtually nothing to initiate film activity once they had established 
the Association in Wardour Street. The work of the WFA fitted in with 
established practice: it became, in effect, a film service for local 
Labour groups, (notwithstanding the electoral arrangements which were 
drawn up, which of course were never implemented): it was not part of 
128. J. Saville, 'May Day 1937', in A. Briggs, J. Saville (eds. ), Essays_ 
in Labour History 1918 - 1939 (London, 1977), p. 273- 
129. G. D. S. Cole, A Plan For Democratic Action (London, 1939), PP-34-5- 
130. Election preparations apart, the only exception to this was the 
decision of the TUC's Organisation Committee to promote trade 
unionism by exhibiting films in cinemas. A total of ¬10 was 
allocated for theproduction of four thirty feet films, and £500 
for their exhibition in cinemas. A pilot scheme was devised in 
the north of bland and these loop films were shown in 80 cinemas 
for two months. Difficulties in arranging these exhibitions led 
to the abandonment of the scheme. TUC GC. Organisation Committee 
Minutes, 16 November 1937,18 February 1938,14 June 1938. 
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the Labour Party's political style to send daylight cinema vans across 
the country showing films to crowds gathered on street corners. 
If it was the organisational practice of the Labour Party 
NEC and the TUC to devolve responsibility for propaganda work. then there 
was little point in funding a service if there was insufficient interest 
amongst local bodies in using the medium: scarce resources could be 
used more effectively in proven, and less expensive, methods of publicity 
Until 1937the Labour Film Committee was not entirely convinced that there 
was enough interest to justify-the launching of such a scheme. Individual 
unions were largely indifferent. They gave priority to tried and tested 
methods of publicity, preferring to leave political work to the Party 
and the TUC. (131) Only two constituency Iabour. Parties appear to 
have been prepared to sponsor film production prior to 1937, Kensington 
Labour Party and Nottingham Labour Party, one film was concerned with 
infant mortality, North Kensington Sursery School, the other was a 
fictional propaganda film about the'conversion to socialism'. (132) Even 
the Film Exhibition arranged'at the Party's Annual Conference in 1936 
was a failure, eliciting little response from delegates; and few local 
parties had the means to show films. 
Other factors had some bearing on the decisions of the Film 
Committee. The scarcity of suitable projectors within the movement was 
of considerable importance in delaying the launching of the film service, 
as was the wrangle with the Cooperative Union and the Cooperative Whole- 
sale Society-over the financing of the scheme. The success of the NACEC's 
Film Department eventually convinced the Committee that there were 
sufficient means for showing films non-theatrically, and that sufficient 
interest existed to suggest that a film service was likely to have 
enough support to justify the funding involved. Eiren so, other problems 
interceded. The parlous state of the NEC's finances ensured that the 
Party leadership continued to view film propaganda as a desirable but 
largely impractical means of promoting the Party. 
confirmed 131. G. Elvin, in a letter to the author, 1 September 1977, 
this opinion. (After Reeves, Elvin was probably the most influen- 
tial in securing the establishment of the WFA. ) Before 1938 only two 
films were sponsored by trade unions: Construction (see above, p. 335) 
and The Union of Post Office Workers, which was made in 1927. For 
details of this film see Kinematograph Weekly, 17 February 1927, 
p"35. A copy survives in the National Film Archive. 
132. See Kino News n. d., May 1936; Left Review, May 1936, p. 415; 
Labour Organiser, December 1934, p. 219. 
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The Labour Party's National Executive had to raise a loan in 
early 1938 to meet the daily expenses of the Office, incurring a deficit 
on the yearts account of over £6000. In 1939 the situation had deterior- 
ated further, and another loan had to be negotiated. This over-spending 
was due in large part to 'the practice of running special campaigns' 
and tthe growing demands made by the Movement on Headquarters'. (133) 
The Party was clearly in some difficulty, but only because, as W. W. Hend- 
erson, Head of the Publicity Department, put it in 1936, 
Phases of effort which hitherto have generally been regarded: 
as 'special efforts' must now be regarded as part of the 
normal activities of the Party. (134) 
The Party was on a semi permanent election footing during the 1938-9 
period, regularly drawing up plans, launching massive campaign drives, 
for an election which never came. Demands on resources were consider- 
able and priority was given to traditional methods of publicity - methods 
which were proven to be reliable, and suited the style of the Party 
and its mode of operation. Leaflets, posters, etc., were as equally 
rapidly obsolete as film in the Party's electorally-determined view. 
But whereas leaflets, or the Daily Herald, could be produced overnight 
and issued to millions within a few days, film publicity required months 
of planning and production, with no guarantee that anyone would see it, 
or that it would be topical. 
It was the poor financial position of the TUC which led to the 
deferment of the implementation of Citrine's scheme in 1935; and it is 
important to note that it was envisaged that the central offices of the 
TUC would run the film service had they been able to afford to launch 
the project. But here again, it was a question of priorities. The 
following year, its financial position not markedly improved, the Council 
agreed to provide ¬2000 to finance a ten-week tour of Britain by a 
professional theatre troupe, which was to perform a play on the Tolpuddle 
Martyrs, 'Six Men of Dorset'. (135) 
133. LPNEC, National Executive Committee, 'The Financial Position of 
the Party', March 1939. 
134. Ibid., Press and Publicity-Department, 'Labour Party Literature 
Campaign', 20 May 1936. 
135. TUC GC, Organisation Committee, 'The Theatre and Trade Union 
Propaganda', 16 October 1936. The tour was not a success, with 
net losses of over ¬1800. 
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Most individual trade unions, largely uninterested in film 
publicity, could not be considered wealthy in the sense of having access 
to relatively large sums of disposable money. But for the larger unions 
the situation was quite different. The Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
the National Union of Railwaymen and the National Union of Distributive 
and Allied Workers could each provide ¬500 to finance the Party's 
'Victory for Socialism' campaign in 1934, with total trade union 
contributions amounting to over ¬3000 before the campaign commenced. (136) 
In 1937 the Transport and General Workers' Union and the National Union $ 
of General and Municipal Workers gave ¬1000 and ¬650 respectively to fund 
the London Labour-Party's LCC election campaign, organised by Herbert 
Morrison. (137) In the 1938-9 financial year the following unions 
donated considerable sums to the TUC 's International Solidarity Fund 
and the Labour Party's Spain Fund: National Union of Railwaymen (¬1000), 
National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers (¬2750 ¬500), Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain (¬5000 ¬30,000), and the Transport and 
General Workers' Union (¬2000). The Amalgamated. Union of Building Trade 
Workers paid ¬1000 to thOCLC'to sponsor education work; the TGWff loaned 
the Workers' Travel Association ¬25,000; and NUDAW gave the Labour 
Party ¬1000 simply to help its finances and pay routine expenses. (138) 
136. LPNEC. National Executive Committee, '"Victory for Socialism" 
Campaign. Financial Statment', 22 March 1934; 'General Fund. 
Financial Statement', 2 May 1934. 
137. B. Donoughne, G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison op. cits, p. 210; National 
Union of General and Municipal Workers, Report of the Biennial 
Congress 1938, P. 41. 
138. TIiC Library, National Union of Railwaymen, Proceedings and Reports, 
1938, p. 21; National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers, 
Annual Report 1939, p. 26; 1940, p. 11; Amalgamated Union of Building 
Trade Workers, Annual Report 1938, p. 26; National Union of Minework- 
ers Library, Miners' Federation of Great Britain, Annual Volume 
of Proceedings 1938-9, Minutes of the Executive Committee, 11 August 
1938,16 February 1939; Transport and General Workers' Union 
Archive, TGWU, Minutes of the General Executive Council and Finance 
and General Purposes Committee, 12 August 1938,27 October 1938. 
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There was clearly a considerable amount of money available 
from one source or another, yet those with the most readily disposable 
funds were the least interested in investing it in film publicity-. Had 
prominent individuals within the Party shown more enthusiasm for the 
medium the Party as a whole may have been more receptive to the suggest- 
ions of Calder and Rotha, but this is unlikely. Unfortunately the 
private papers of these people, where they exist, reveal nothing of 
their attitude towards film publicity. There is no indication in 
Attlee's papers, for example, that the Leader of the Party was in an3r 
way attracted to the medium, either for his own projection or that of 
the Party. (139) Herbert Morrison, considered by many contemporaries to 
be the Party's leading publicist, and very keen to use the most modern 
techniques of publicity, displayed, according to Rotha, little interest 
in film. (140) Sir Stafford Cripps, the only senior Labour politician 
after the war to argue the need for utilising the film as part of the 
public relations work of the Labour Government, was the only one before 
the war responsive to the appeal of the documentarists. He apparently 
gave much encouragement to Rotha and other documentary film-makers, 
and raised funds for the production of the film Peace of Britain. (141) 
The papers of those involved in the work of the Film Committee either 
no longer survive, as in the case of Joseph Reeves, Lord Ritchie Calder 
and W. W. Henderson, or contain nothing of relevance, as in the case of 
Lord Citrine, J. S. Aiiddleton and George Elvin. 
Contemporary evidence already cited, and opinions expressed 
in letters to the author by George Elvin, Sir Vincent Tewson, Lord Ritchie 
Calder, and interviews with Ralph Bond. and Paul Rotha suggest that it 
was the enthusiasm of Elvin, Botha, Calder and Reeves which succeeded 
in persuading the Party and TUC leaders to invest in a film service for 
the movement. But for their persistence it is probable that despite 
a good deal of theoretical interest within those leaderships nothing 
would have actually been achieved.. 
139. For Attlee's views on the press, and public relations generally, 
see J. Margach, The Abuse of Power (London, 1979), pp. 86-91. 
140. B. Donoughue, G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison op. cit., pp. 207-18; 
P. Rotha, in an interview with the author. Lord Morrison's 
papers have not survived. 
141. See B. Wright, interview, in E. Orbanz, Journey to a Legend and Back 
op-cit., p. 139; P. Rotha, interview, in E. Sussex, The Rise and Fall 
of British Documentary op. cit., p. 161; P. Rotha, Documentary Diary } 
op. cit., pp. 164-5. Sir Stafford Cripps' papers are unrewarding 
on this subject. 
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There. were: other reasons for this apparent lack of interest. 
Apart from one or two individuals on the periphery of the documentary 
movment, documentary film-makers were anxious to avoid being aligned 
officially with any political party. This was not merely to avoid 
diffiuultiesgarding future industrial or government sponsorship, but 
also to avoid being obliged to produce material tailored specifically 
to the particular line of a party. Being creative individuals they 
wished to retain their independence. This may have been an inhibiting 
factor in negotiations between documentarists and the Labour Party's 
Publicity Department. For example, while Paul Rotha and Donald Taylor, 
of Strand Films, wrote a scenario for a film intended to contribute to 
the Panty's 'Agricultural Campaign' in 1937-8 they were not prepared 
to edit-it to Party requirements, and the project was abandonde4142) 
Unable ultimately to control the content of any film which it mag have 
sponsored, the Publicity Department was perhaps reluctant to commission 
either Strand Films or the Realist. Film Unit to produce documentary 
publicity material. Such doubts as there may have been were perhaps 
justified from the Party's point of view bearing in mind the case of 
Realist Film Unit's Advance Democracy which, commissioned by the four 
London Cooperative Societies, advocated a political strategy firmly 
rejected by both its sponsors and the Party. An additional effect of 
this problem may have been to lead the Party's publicists towards the 
view that trade unions were more appropriate for the sponsorship of 
documentary films: only films about unions, their benefits to the 
community and the work of their members, could avoid or minimise problems 
of editorial control - leaving documentarists with more freedom to 
manoeuvre as independent creative publicists. 
The Party and the TUC failed to learn from the success of the 
Party-directed work of the Conservative and Unionist Pilms Association, 
and persisted in the tactical error of allowing Labour film activities 
to remain uncooidi. nated with Party/TUC campaign and propaganda work 
(despite plans being drawn up, nothing was actually done). Had. Labour 
Partyfilm units toured the country with a repertoire of am terial for 
142. P. Rotha, in an interview with the author, 25 January 1978. Pressure 
appears to have been put on documentary film-makers by 'unofficial 
censorship' to confine their work to subjects with less political 
topicality. Given their vulnerability to the withdrawal of govern- 
ment or industrial sponsorship documentarists may therefore have 
been doubly reluctant to make films putting the Labour Party point 
of view in an overt-propagandistic manner. See J. Grierson 'Battle 
for Authenticity', World Film News, Noivember 1938, p. 305; G. Elvin, 
'This Freedom - An Inquiry into Film Censorship', The Cine Tech- 
nician. January-February 1939, p. 145. 
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social, cultural and political meetings, produced specifically for Party 
purposes and integrated with the normal activities of local Parties, 
in conjunction with national campaigns, then audiences, interest and 
support for the Workers' Film Association may have been considerably 
greater. But this presupposes a close coordination of activities 
between Head Office and local organisations which did not generally 
exist. 
I 
The Labour Party and the TUC were curiously ambivalent about 
using film. They wanted to do so, and were aware of the need to do 
so. for political reasons. Yet ultimately their interest was not 
sufficient to warrant a high priority being placed on using the medium. 
Indeed, one of the most conspicuous aspects of Labour's response to 
film was on the one hand the willingness of trade unions and local Party 
organisations to leave responsibility-almost entirely with the two 
national leaderships; and on the other, the assumptions of these leader- 
ships that firstly, in providing the initial funds to launch the film 
service they had discharged their responsibilities, and secondly, that 
it was the duty of unions and constituency parties to sponsor the 
production and arrange the exhibition of films provided by this service. 
Unlike the Conservative Party, the Iabour Party was unwilling to coord- 
inate film exhibition with the routine publicity work of its Party Agents, 
and made no attempt to organise national or regional tours with mobile 
cinema units. Consequently the Workers' Film Association failed to 
conduct its operations on a scale remotely comparable with that of 
the Conservative Party and the National Government which, according to 
one estimate, exhibited their films to an audience of over one-and-a-halt 
million people in 1935, (143) making the work of the WFA appear woefully 
inadequate and amateur.. 
Bat to draw upon the comments of the documentary film-makers, 
who had an interest in securing Party sponsorship and therefore were 
no. entirely impartial, and to use the comparison of the Conservative 
Party, casts the film work of the Labour Party and the TUC in completely 
negative terms, of thorouggoing failure. What these two organisations 
did was not very much; and there were, as suggested above, several 
reasons why this was so. But there was perhaps an equally compelling 
2 
143. World Film News, December 1936, P. 9. 
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reason which had little to do with film. The fundamental change in the 
relationship between politicians and voters which had taken place since 
the end of the Great War had altered the conception of the political 
process which informed the strategies of Labour politicians. In the age 
of the mass electorate the use of film for cadre work was far less 
important than mass propaganda. Labour leaders recognised that 
ultimately, the cinema was, for good or ill, not open as a channel of 
communication to the masses for the Labour movement - whereas radio 
was. At best film could perform a cadre function, but the circumstances- 
obtaining in the late 1930's, of limited projection facilities, financial 
constraints, lack of suitable films, etc., would ensure that. such a 
role was never very satisfactory. It was to newspapers and radio that 
hopes of Labour's resurrection were pinned, and given the enormous 
power of radio, its broad democratising function, and the fast that the 
technology-was already there, the focus of interest amongst labour"Party 
politicians was Broadcasting House, not the WFA offices in Wardour 
Street. This perspective has been well s»mmarised by G. D. H. Cole: 
the tremendous enlargement of the electorate has made both 
the conditions of political propaganda and. the relations 
between the voter and representative utterly unlike what 
they used to be. Political meetings can reach today only 
a small fraction of those who have the right to vote. 
Canvassing is very difficult among so many: the newspaper 
and the wireless talk become the only effective means of 
appealing to the less politically conscious electors; and 
they are open very little to the general run of candidates. 
Consequently, though elections remain local in form, the 
basis of electoral appeals becomes increasingly national, 
and the individual candidate counts for a good deal less 
than he did. (144) 
144. G. D. H. Cole, A Plan for Democratic Action (London, 1939), P. 235" 
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Chapter Ten: POLITICAL BROADCASTING: LABOUR'S ATTIZIPTS TQ GAIN 
ACCESS TO RADIO 
Radio broadcasting offered to the Labour Party the tantalising 
prospect of a medium of mass communioation. under public control and 
imbued with an ethos of public service. Where the cinema was very much 
the medium of the masses, the radio appeared as the medium for the 
masses - one which would enrich and inform the lives of ordinary people, 
and encourage participation in the civic culture, rather than serve to 
stupefy thought and inhibit political involvement in the democratic 
process. The BBC's democratising potential was fully appreciated, and 
despite strong criticism of certain aspects of BBC policy, Labour leaders 
never lost sight of the fundamentally positive contribution which the 
Corporation was making to the social, cultural and political develop- 
ment of the population. But, by definition, this process of democratic 
development, in the view of such leaders, involved the further growth 
of the Labour Party and the wider acceptance of Labour Socialism, the 
Party's ideology. MacDonald and his colleagues had, by 1928-29, begun 
to see in the BBC the means by which they could counter the machinations 
of their political opponents, and in particular neutralise and eventually 
overcome the handicap of near-universal press hostility. If one of 
Labour's difficulties in the age of mass communication was reaching the 
masses, then the BBC offered an immensely powerful medium for the 
exposition of Labour policies and views, and the political education 
of the electorate. The problem however was one of access to the tech- 
nology; and, once access had been gained, equality of access with 
Labour's political opponents. 
This Chapter examines the attempts by the Labour Party to gain 
equality of access to radio broadcasting for political purposes. As 
suggested in Chapter Pour, the vast bulk of surviving evidence connected 
with attempts by Labour organisations to use the medium relate to the 
Labour Party. Other Labour organisations did of course gain access to 
the airwaves, principally the Trades Union Congress General Council. 
Hut their contribution to the broadcasting of the period was almost 
wholly of a broad educational character. Some Labour personalities 
appeared quite regularly before the microphone; but they did so largely 
as individuals recruited for their expertise on particular subjects, and 
not as representatives of the organisations to which they belonged. 
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Moreover, while there is an abundance of source material concerning the 
planning and execution of particular programmes or series to which they 
contributed, there is insuffioient surviving material to provide an 
overall view of the development of general political broadcasting 
involving such individuals, from the point of view of Labour's attempts 
to use the medium for political purposes. Consequently the focus of 
this Chapter is the Labour Party, and the surviving sources concentrate 
almost exclusively on the question of party political broadcasting 
rather than general brca dcast talks in connection with subjects of a 
political nature. Again, the Archive of the BBC has been the principal 
source of documentation. Its files are by no means complete, with sets 
of correspondence missing for the Labour Party for the period 1933 - 1937, 
and a paucity of material on particular negotiations in 1935 and. 1938-9- 
But there is a mass-of material available, in contrast to the u=ewarding. 
administrative records of Labour organisations. 
1. 
The original Licence: granted by the Postmaster General to-the 33BC: 
in January 1923. contained no reference to 'controversial broadcasting'. 
It simply required the Company to transmit 'a programme of broadcast: 
matter to the reasonable satisfaction of the Postmaster General'. (1) 
The intention of the monopoly granted to the Company was to pre-empt 
any-problems which might arise, if there was more than one broadcasting 
agency, regarding the allocation of wavelengths, financial arrangements 
and the issue of licences to listeners. The approach of the Post Office 
to the BBC was essentially one of civil service administration. As the 
Licence granted was to last for a period of two years, the performance 
of the Company as a monopoly was under close scrutiny; and Post Office 
dissatisfaction with programme policy could have led to its withdrawal. 
In so far as the Company was run for commercial purposes, to promote the 
sale of receiving sets, the public response to broadcast programmes 
could have had a critical effect on the life of the Compare. In conse- 
quence Reith specifically ruled out the broadcasting of controversial 
matters: 'we avoided them of our own volition from the start'. (2) The 
1. Cmd. 1822 (1923) Wireless Broadcasting Licence. 
2. BBC, Broadcasting Advisory Board Minutes, 8eith to F. W. Phillips, 
20 May 1924. 
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dispute in the House of Commons which broke out in early 1923 over the 
Company's monopoly, led directly to an official inquiry to look (among 
other matters), at the future organisation of the BBC in relation to 
the question of monopoly control. During the inquiry Reith insisted 
that, regarding the possibility of broadcasting 'anything controversial', 
the BBC would 'obviously not do W. (3) Such reassurances appear to. 
have failed to impress the Sykes. Committee. Although it. accepted the 
continuation of the monopoly it also recommended tighter Government 
regulation. A Supplementary Agreement. to the Licence was duly introduced, 
by Clause 8 of which the PMG reserved the right to issue Licences to 
other broadcasting organisations should the BBC nat provide a satisfactorT 
service. (4) As the Licence was to be extended to 31 December 1926 the 
Company's trial period had also in effect been extended. 
Keith was highly conscious therefore of the need to avoid 
pursuing a programme policy which would incur the wrath either of the 
listeners or the Postmaster General, an extraordinarily difficult task. 
The pitfalls soon became apparent-on the day the Sykes Committee was 
appointed. On 24 April 1923 the PMG stated that 
I think it is undesirable that the broadcasting service 
should be used for the dissemination of speeches on 
controversial matters, and I have had the attention of 
the British Broadcasting Company called to the incident... (5), 
The incident to which Joynson-Hicks referred was a broadcast speech by 
B. S. Tonnroe, editor of The Building News and a former Conservative 
candidate. Tounroe, had offered to make a broadcast following the threat 
of a. building workers' strike. In what, in retrospect, appears to be 
an error of judgment on 8eith's part, Tounroe's request was granted, 
and his talk on the 12 April contained an appeal to both sides of the 
dispute to accept arbitration and avoid a strike. The general tone of 
his argument however was to place the responsibility for ending the 
dispute with the workers; and he warned of the consequences should they 
3. BBC, Sykes Committee Minutes, second meeting. 
4. Cmd. 1976 (1923. ) Supplementary Agreement (to) the. Licence. 
5. B nsard, vol. 163, cols. 300-1,24 April 1923" 
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decide to take strike action. (6) The Labour Whip, C. G. Ammon, protested, 
and the controversy which the talk aroused in the House of Commons 
precipitated Joynson-Sacks' statement. As Reith revealed. in his 
evidence to the Sykes Committee, he interpreted the 'influence' which 
the PMG exercised over the BBC as effectively an 'instruction'. (7) 
The PMG's statement obliged Reith to take a more careful line 
over matters of controversy, and, it would appear, question his own' 
assumptions about what was legitimate and what was likely to provoke 
criticism. Thereafter the Company developed the practice of asking the 
Poet Office for permission and advice regarding anything which could 
be considered controversial; and a Broadcasting Advisory Board was 
established to advise on such matters. Within a, year the Board could 
report the Company had been 'very successful' in avoiding controversy. (8) 
By this time Reith had clarified his view of controversial 
broadcasting, and tried on several, occasions to secure permission for 
the transmission of political speeches by the three main parties. 
Similarly, he had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the PM to approve 
party-political speeches being broadcast in connection with the General 
Election in December 1923. (9) The Sykes. Report had recommended that 
some latitude be given in respect of 'controversy#, but. it was only 
under the first Labour Government that-such latitude was granted. In 
June 1924 the Broadcasting Advisory Board advised against too strict a 
policy-, and suggested that while political speeches should be avoided, 
some discussion of subjects which were otherwise controversial should 
be allowed. (10) This was accepted by Vernon Hartshorn, the PMG, as the 
most sensible way forward. (11) Ignoring this, Reith suggested a debate 
between the Leaders of the three Parties on some subject of current 
political interest. Hartshorn replied in August. 
6. The draft of Tounroe's talk survives. See BBC, Policy. Strikes. 
7. BBC, Sykes Committee Minutes, second meeting. 
8. Ibid., Broadcasting Advisory Board Minutes, 14 May 1924. 
9. Ibid., Policy. Political Broadcasting. General Elections., 
F. W. Phillips to Reith, 17 November 1923. (Hereafter, this file will 
be referred to as 'P. GE. ') 
10. Ibid., Broadcasting-Advisory Board Minutes, 18 June 1924. 
11. Ibid., 8 July 1924. 
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if one such debate were allowed, it would no doubt lead to 
proposals for others of a similar character and.... it would 
be extremely difficult to draw the line between what should 
and should not be permitted. 
As the Company no doubt realise, a considerable section 
of the public would probably strongly protest against 
doctrines, which are repugnant to them, being issued broad- 
cast by an agency; controlled by the Government in power, 
even though the other side of the arguments were presented 
at the same time in the form of a debate. Such protest might 
even take the form of deliberate oscillation, as recent 
experience in similar circumstances has proved in America. (12) 
ffartshorn considered that he would have to consult the Cabinet before 
agreeing to such a proposal. By this time the position of the minority 
Labour administration was becoming tenuous, as political opinion within 
the House was highly critical of the treaties recently signed with the 
Soviet Union. Preoccupied with this deteriorating situation Hartshorn 
considered it inadvisable, given the uncertain political future of the 
Government, to allow. a debate on some current issue of political 
controversy. On 8 October the fate of the Government was decided, and 
the following day MacDonald asked the King for a dissolution of Parliament. 
The same day Reith asked the P14G for permission to broadcast a speech 
by the three Party Leaders before the Election; and after consultation 
with the Prime Minister Hartshorn agreed two days later. (13) 3%tween 
the 13 - 17 October 1924 the first uncensored political broadcasts in 
Britain took place, the direct result of Reith's persistence and powers 
of persuasion. But due also to the foresight of Labour leaders, who 
were under no obligation to grant such permission. Perhaps they saw. some 
possible advantage in doing so, as an outgoing Government. Certainly, 
as Chris Cook has shown, the Labour Party faced the Election in a stronger 
position than in any previous campaign. (14) The reasons for the 
decision are unclear in the absence of sufficient evidence. Nevertheless, 
not only were Labour leaders the first Party leaders to accept political 
broadcasting as a legitimate part of electioneering, but they set a 
precedent, following which it proved difficult for subsequent Conservative 
PMGs to resist further encroachments of broadcasting into the arena of 
politics. 
12. BBC, Policy. Political Broadcasting. General., W. E. Euston (for 
Hartshorn) to Reith, 19 August 1924. (Hereafter, 'P. G. ') 
13. Ibid., P. GE., Correspondence between Hartshorn and Reith, October 
1924. 
14. C. Cook, The Age of Alignment (London, 1975), pp. 279-82. 
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As for the Election broadcast of MacDonald, given on 13 October, 
it was a disaster. MacDonald was, as Marquand put it, 'Labour's chief- 
answer' to the Conservative campaign, which focussed on the Campbell 
case and the Russian Treaties. (15) The Labour Party based its campaign 
partly on MacDonald's achievements in office, which were meagre, but 
mainly-on the reputation, sincerity and popularity of their Leader, 
whose charismatic appeal was given great weight in the Election. 
MacDonald's standing has been well described by Egon Wertheimer, his 
contemporary and friend: 
In the imagination and consciousness of thousands his position 
is beyond party politics..... he has become a legendary being - 
the personification of all that thousands of downtrodden men 
and women dream and desire ...... he is the focus of the mute hopes of a whole class. (16) 
Wertheimer, who produced an incisive examination of the Labour Party, 
was not given to blind eulogy, and while this assessment of MacDonald 
needs qualifying it nevertheless captures the essence of the Labour 
Leader's support within the ranks of the Party faithful. With this 
in view, MacDonald's opportunity to reach millions of people simul- 
taneously probably appeared particularly attractive, although it is 
likely that the majority of people who were able to listen were not 
the people to whom Wertheimer referred. Even so, MacDonald's broadcast 
speech in Glasgow had been preceded by a lengthy journey from London 
that day, during which he gave three long addresses. His evening speech, 
the main one of the day, drove his live audience, according to one 
observer, M. A. Hamilton, to a 'white heatlof excitement. But he was tired, 
his voice was faltering, and he moved restlessly about the platform. (17) 
MacDonald was accustomed to speaking before large public meetings, 
and ignored Reith's advice to broadcast from a studio. (18) His platform 
oratory, received as a disembodied voice, appeared to listeners as 
'irresponsible ranting'. (19) Whereas Baldwin, who took the troabla to 
15. D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald. (London, 1977), P-378- 
16. E. Wertheimer, Portrait of the Labour Party 2nd. ed. (London, 1930), 
PP. 176-7. 
17. M. A. Hamilton, ('Iconoclast'), J. Ramsay MacDonald (1923-1925) 
(London, n. d., 1925), p. 123. 
18. J. C. W. Reith, Into the Wind (London, 1949). P. 96. 
19. A. J. Salter, Personality in Politics (London, 1947), P-58. 
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visit Savoy Hill, clearly benefitted from Reith's advice and gave a 
studio speech which was calm and persuasive. 
With the return of the Conservatives to power came the return 
of the veto on controversial broadcasting, and the matter was left in 
abeyance pending the outcome of the Crawford Committee's inquiry into 
the future organisation and structure of broadcasting. (20) The Craw- 
ford Report recommended *a moderate amount of controversial matter' 
in the programmes of the BBC, provided that the material 'is of high 
quality and distributed with scrupulous fairness'. (21) Following the 
General Strike the recommendations of the Report were implemented, and 
the new Charter and Licence gave the PMG specific powers to prohibit. 
anT matter from being broadcast. Within eleven days of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation coming into being Sir William Mitchell-Thomson, 
the Postmaster General, indicated that the Licence required the 
Corporation to refrain from broadcasting statements expressing the 
opinions of the Corporation on matters of public policy, and 'speeches. 
or lectures containing statements on topics of political, religious or 
industrial. controversy'. (22) 
For the first time the position of the BBC concerning political 
broadcasting had been clearly defined. Persistent lobbying by Reith, 
with the backing of the newly established Board of Governors, eventually 
persuaded the P! 1G to reverse his decision, and the ban on controversial 
matter was lifted on 5 March 1928. The decision was based on the satis- 
factory-way in which the BBC had. conformed to the restrictions imposed. 
But the discretionary powers entrusted to the Corporation were experimental 
and the Government retained the right. to reverse the decision in the light; 
of further experience. Responsibility for ensuring that the Corporation 
interpreted this new freedom strictly in the spirit of the recommendations 
of the Crawford Report lay, with the Board of Governors. (23) Not surpris- 
ingly therefore, the era in broadcasting which this decision inaugurated 
did not start with a sudden explosion of controversial talks and debates. 
The Board of Governors quickly agreed that there should be a gradual and 
20. BC, P. G., Mitchell-Thomson to Reith, 28 May 1925. 
21. Cmd. 2599 (1926) Report of the Broadcasting Committee, p. 15. ' 
22. BBC, P. G., Mitchell-Thomson to Reith, 11 January 1927. 
23. Ibid., Mitchell-Thomson to Reith, 5 March 1928. 
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experimental introduction of political and economic controversy, 
focussing on. clearly defined occasions, such as pieces of legislation 
presented to Parliament. There was to be no insertion of controversial 
talks into, existing series of talks, no single talk on a controversial 
matter, and no inclusion of talks in the Programme just because they 
were controversial. (24) As Roger Eckersley, the Assistant Controller 
(Programmes) put it: 
We want to aim in time at being able to introduce controversial 
matter as a normal thing: in other words, it should be less 
treated as an event than as normal programme practice. (25) 
To ensure that this happened, a Controversy Committee, eonsisting of 
! 
departmental heads and Control staff, was established in March 1928. 
2. 
Ey the time the ban on controversy had been lifted the Corpora- 
tion's Talks Department had almost exhausted the supply of non-contro- 
versial subjects from which it was possible to generate debate of a 
level consistent with the high standards to which the Department 
aspired. More seriously, it had exhausted the supply of high calibre 
speakers who were willing to take part in such talks. (26) Following 
the PMG's announcement in March however there was little hesitation 
amongst Labour leaders. Arthur Henderson almost immediately requested 
broadcasting facilities for Ramsay MacDonald, who was to make a major 
political speech on 2 April in connection with the forthcoming general 
election, the first such request from the main political Parties. (27) 
Made at too. short_notice for programming and inclusion in the Radio 
Times, the request could not be granted. Nor could it have been given 
without prior consultation with the other main Parties and a series of 
talks arranged. Nevertheless, the incident, together with encourage- 
ment from the Liberals and Conservatives, led Eckersley to draw-up a 
24. BBC, Board of Governors I'Iinutes, 14 March 1928. 
25. Ibid., Talks. Debates and Discussions., R. Eckersley to Reith, 
21 September 1928. 
26. Ibid., H. Ma. theson to R. Eckersley, 21 February 1928. 
27. Ibid., Policy. Political Broadcasting. Party Political Broadcasting., $ 
A. Henderson to Keith, 13 March 1928. (Hereafter, 'P. PPB. ') 
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plan for political broadcasting, again the first of its kind, based on 
two fundamental principles. Firstly, as Beith was obliged to explain 
to Albert Inkpin of the Communist Party of Great Britain, who had also 
requested broadcasting facilities, 
Arrangements are now being considered for broadcasts of a 
politically controversial nature with the three political 
parties who represent at the present time the three chief 
groups into which the House of Commons is divided, and which' 
may be assumed to reflect the opinion of the large majority 
of the electorate. (28) 
The regular broadcasting of politically controversial talks was 
envisaged primarily in terms of party political broadcasting based 
on party lines and party' definitions of issues (even though the BBC 
eventually took some part in the selection of these issues). Other forms 
of political broadcasting were vaguely defined by current practice: 
the enunciation of the Budget, speeches at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, 
and Departmental talks explaining official Government policy. But 
these had not been long established, were not precisely categorised, 
and were regarded, at least by the Corporation, as essentially 'non- 
controversial'. The central focus of political broadcasting was not 
'politicst or issues of current controversy, but the political process 
as defined by Reith, his senior colleagues and the Board of Governors: 
the party system in the House of Commons. 
The second fundamental principle was that of complete equality 
in the allocation of opportunity and time to each party. (29) Before 
this could be discussed by Party Leaders however Churchill, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, appears to have persuaded Reith that there 
should be no absolute equality between the. Government of the day and 
Opposition Parties; rather it should have the right of replT to each. (30) 
The experimental scheme to which Reith subsequently invited Party Leaders 
to agree was based on this modified principle, and presented in terms 
of the 'scope of privileges to which they will be entitled'. (31) The 
style of approach anticipated the central problem which was to arise. 
Party Leaders wrangled with each other of course, but they also took 
28. BBC, P. PPB., Reith to Inkpin, 10 May 1928. 
29. ibid., B. Eckersley to Reith, 4 April 1928. 
30. Ibid., Reith to Lord Clarendon, 13 April 1928. 
31. Ibid., Reith to Henderson, 19 April 1928. 
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issue with the BBC, the Labour Party in particular taking the view that 
the Corporation should merely-provide the technical. and programming 
facilities: it was the responsibility of the Parties to decide upon how 
those facilities should be used. But this was to materialise later. 
For the present the scheme which Reith outlined provided. the first 
attempt to define political broadcasting for practical application. 
In the first instance each main Party would have at its disposal 
half an hour (one broadcast per week) for the enunciation of Party policy 
in general. After three weeks, succeeding speeches would take place 
every-fortnight while Parliament was in session, and would continue 
until dissolution, expected at the latest in June 1929. The rota was 
to take the form of one Government spokesman to each Opposition spokesman, 
using the formula AB, AC where B represented the Labour Party and C the 
Liberals. With the dissolution of Parliament the former procedure of 
absolute equality of opportunity (ABC) would be adopted. Reith intended 
to continue the broadcasting of Government beeches at the Lord Mayor's 
Banquet, on the Budget, and non-controversial statements explaining 
Government policy or legislation passing through Parliament. Such 
speeches were not regarded as controversial occasions requiring Opposition 
speeches in reply. (32) 
While J. C. C. Davidson for the Conservative Party accepted this 
scheme in its entirety, Samuel for the Liberals took strong objection 
to mart' points and proposed a joint conference of the Parties and the 
Corporation to, resolve them. Henderson approved of the scheme in 
principle, but also proposed a conference to refine certain details. (33) 
The record of that conference, held on 21 May 1928, conveys something of 
the intensity of political feeling, between the three Parties. While 
agreement was reached on the preliminary three talks enunciating general 
policy, Samuel objected to the BBC's definition of set piece, non-partisan, 
Government speeches as 'non-controversial', and., regarding the scheme of 
regular broadcasts, rejected the Government's claim of right of reply 
to each Opposition Party. Henderson, though agreeing in principle to 
the scheme, would not commit himself to the exact proposals made. He 
was prepared to accept that the Government of the day should have 'some 
preponderance of opportunity over either Opposition Party', but this 
32. BBC. P. PPB., Reith to Henderson, 19 April 1928. 
33. Ibid., Henderson to Beith, 4 May 1928. 
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advantage should not be equal to the total number of broadcasts for 
both. (34) Samuel concurred in this view, and proposed a new formula 
in the ratio 7A 53 5C. Henderson agreed, but Davidson refused to consider 
any modification of the original scheme; at which point Henderson took 
the view-that Davidson's intransigence had created a new situation: if 
the*Government. was. not prepared to negotiate he (Henderson) could not 
now accept the original scheme. Deadlock ensued, forcing Reith to 
reconsider the whole idea of political broadcasting. 
Lindsay, the Labour Party-Secretary, subsequently explained 
the Party's position: it had agreed to the BBC's proposals in principle 
in order 'to obtain accommodation' - to ensure that party political 
broadcasting became a reality, and that the Labour Party participated. 
It had agreed to the principle of the Government of the day, having-the 
right of replyto each Opposition Party on the assumption that these 
broadcasts would consist, on the one hand, in criticism of Government 
policy, and, on the other, defence of that policy. 
It is realised now, however, that if the scheme is to be. 
carried out successfully and without bringing broadcasting 
generally into disrepute, the speeches must only be of an 
expository and constructive character, and not of the 
nature of attack and reply in the narrow party sense; 
that they should, in fact, be of an educational char- 
acter in the wide popular view. (35) 
Accordingly, the Party took the view that there should be a strictly 
equal allocation of time and opportunity to each of the three main 
Parties. Lindsay's letter reveals an astute appeal to Reith's broad- 
casting values of impartiality and high moral purpose. How far-the 
change of view within the Party leadership was merely a tactical 
manoeuvre rather than a quite different conception of party political 
broadcasting is difficult to judge. Certainly it was consistent with 
later statements on the value of political broadcasting; and the failure 
of the partisan oratory of MacDonald in the disastrous election of 1924 
was unlikely to have been forgotten. But it would appear that, from 
34. BBC, P. PPB., Minutes of the Political Broadcasting Conference, 
21 May 1928. 
35. Ibid., Lindsay to Reith, 24 May 1928. 
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what slim. evidence there is, that. the change of attitude to 8eith's. 
scheme, explained by Lindsay, was both:: a tactical. move in responsa 
to, Davidsonts aggressive, uncompromising stance, and an accurate 
reflection of what the Party believed political-broadcasting-should. 
become. The persistent theme throughout. Labour. commentary'in the 
inter-war period was the problem of persuading a largely- mis-informed. 
electorate of the 'facts'. If party political broadcasting was to 
consist in a mere exchange of partisan jibes, vitriolic criticism, and 
the rhetoric and complex manoeuvring of the debates in the House of 
Commons, then this electorate would remain confused, and the specific 
advantage which Labour could. gain from using. the medium would. be 
lost - or rather, the specific. disadvantage. of having littler press 
support; could not be neutralised. 
Lindsay*'s appeal to Reith however overlooked a vital factor: 
in the situation. The Party, assumed that the BBC had a completeir free 
hand, which was not the case. The whole question of political broad. - 
casting haä been placed in doubt by Sane 1928, as Davidson refused to 
accept anything but the original BBC scheme. The larger issue was- 
made- very clear to the Director General. bg Davidson, as Reit8 reveale& 
to Clarendon, the Chairman of the Hoard of Governors: 
He: has, of course, also. privately confirmed. what I lmew- 
before, and what you heard. yesterday, namely, that, if we. 
da not. maintain our original proposals, the Government 
would withdraw the controversial liberty. The alternative, 
of course, is the abandoning of the idea of political 
speeches altogether, at. any rate until the General Election. (36) 
Meanwhile l the Bbard. of Governors. had decided. that. even if agreement. on 
regular party-political talks was not possible, the initial three 
party broadcasts, unanimously agreed, should go ahead. (37) However, 
Heith subsequently, had to writer to the three Parties that in view of 
their inability to reach agreement with respect to the rotm. of political 
speeches, the Governors had reluctantly concluded that "for the present' 
js 
no political speeches of this type could be made. (38) This act. of 
36. BBC, P. PPB., Beith to Clarendon, 8 June: 1928. 
37. Ibid., Control Board Minutes, 5 June 1928. 
38. Ibid., P. PPB.., Heith to. Henderson, 28 June 1928. 
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denial was probably also an act of self-preservation, the putative 
powers of the PMG being sufficient, given Davidson's intimation that 
the veto on controversy could be restored, to induce Reith and the 
Governors to shelve the project for the time-being. 
Whatever the private source of this retreat, the ostensible 
reason was the inability, of the Parties to reach agreement, an 
explanation which was initially accepted by the labour"Party. Dy 
December 1928 the Liberals were complaining that the DBC was complicit. 
in a Government policy of suppressing the legitimate use of broadcast- 
ing by the political parties. (39) Gladstone Murray, Assistant 
Controller (Information) sought Davidson's help to try and head off 
the likely storm. of criticism. Davidson gave little encouragement, 
taking the view that the benefits which would accrue from the regular- 
broadcasting of politics would be outweighed by the detriment to the 
public interest which would arise from the loss of a good broadcasting 
tradition, that by which the Corporation remained outside the arena 
of party political controversy. He did not indicate any, strong 
objection to the question being resurrected, but insisted that if it 
was, then the formula must be AB AC, or AB, or nothing. (40) Implicitly- 
this was a sign that the Corporation could try again, and immediately 
Carpendale wrote to the Party Leaders, offering air-time for the 
broadcasting of political speeches provided that they could agree on 
a scheme, (41) Dy-this time Director of Talks Hilda Matheson had 
clarified her ideas on the whole question of political broadcasting, 
and put forward various strategies to circumvent any future inter- 
party deadlock. (42) Moreover, the General Election was by now little 
more than six months distant, and if, regardless of any series of 
regular political talks, special political broadcasts were to be 
arranged in connection with the Election, then plans had to be drawn 
up well in advance. As Matheson revealed, there was a general feeling 
within the Corporation at least, that to broadcast merely one talk 
each by the three Party Leaders, as in 1924, would be 'very inadequate. 
She proposed that two talks each should be offered, the advantage 
additionally being that by doing the same thing twice over (ABC, ABC) 
ej 
39" BBC, P. PPE., Murray to Davidson, 18 December 1928. 
40. Ibid., Murray to Carpendale, 21 December 1928. (Sir Charles 
Carpendale was Controller (Programmes). ) 
41. Ibid., P. GE., Carpendale to Samuel, 22 December 1928. 
42. Ibid., Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 December 1928. 
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this would not involve the Corporation in any argument about a rota. (43) 
Carpendale's offer of regular party political talks elicited 
a new-proposal from the Labour Party. In his reply-Henderson revealed 
the lack of precision in the Party's grasp of the concept of political 
broadcasting, considering political talks and debates as more or less 
the same thing - an error of understanding for which Labour leaders 
could be forgiven, since the BBC itself had not clarified its own 
working definitions until December 1928, and the process was not fully 
complete until October the following year. (44) Dismissing 'time- 
consuming' debates in which speakers of opposing views followed 
each other, he proposed a new scheme in which an hourly slot in the 
programme every fortnight would be available for political broadcasting: 
teach party in turn [would] have the right to occupy, this time as it 
thinks fit'. (45) As for the approaching Election, Henderson suggested 
that these hourly slots could be made available weekly. 
Reith took these proposals seriously. enough to warrant meeting 
MacDonald to discuss them; and the Liberals gave their support. But 
the Conservatives were unimpressed, and the Corporation reverted to J. 
its original position of basing political. broadcasting in the forthcoming- 
elections on the previous one, with the possibility-of offering two, 
broadcasts to each Party rather than one. As na agreement on regular 
party political talks had emerged, these were in effect written off 
by the Director General - prompting MacDonald to demand a meeting with 
Reith and Clarendon. The record of their conversation. is highly 
illuminating. MacDonald accused the Corporation of having denied the 
Labour. Party facilities to put across its point of view; and insisted 
that the breakdown in negotiations was not Labour's responsibility- 
since 'he was willing to agree to practically anything'. 
(46) MacDonald 
believed that 
they were the Party that had most to gain by the microphone 
in that they possessed only one small newspaper ... 
(47) 
43. DBC.. P. GE. ', Matheson to R. Eckeraley, 7 February 1929. 
44. Ibid., Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 December 1928; ibid., P. G., 
Reith to Lees-Smith, 30 October 1929. 
45. Wit, P. GE., Henderson to Reith, EL February 1929. 
46. Ibid., Record of an interview between Lord Clarendon, Ramsay 
MacDonald and Sir John Reith, 26 February 1929. 
47. bid 
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Given almost unanimous press hostility, the denial of access to 
broadcasting would, he argued, close off the only avenue (apart from 
the Daily Herald) for the Party to express itself before a mass public 
audience. Significantly MacDonald was convinced that the Conservatives 
did not want any political broadcasting for this reason. Yet he asked 
Keith if he would resurrect his original plans for party political 
broadcasting if Labour and the Conservatives could agree on them, 
disregarding-the Liberal view. Reith and Clarendon indicated that 
they would accept a majority decision while holding out hope for all- 
party agreement. Later, MacDonald repeated. his willingness to accept 
almost anything to get on the air and urged that unless the BBC 
accepted a majority decision 'nothing at all will be done', adding 
that 'we are... most anxious to use the wireless'. (48) 
Against his original intention Reith found himself assuming 
the thankless role of mediator, though with some success: both Labour 
and Liberal Parties accepted the Corporation's original scheme as a 
basis for election broadcasting during the 1929 General Election, under 
'very decided protest'. (49) But the path to the microphone was still 
strewn with pitfalls. MacDonald, during his interview with Reith and 
Clarendon, had persuaded them to arrange broadcasts on the AB AC basis, 
in the two months remaining before the dissolution of Parliament. 
But he insisted that a single broadcast talk for Labour was insufficient, 
and proposed three sets of speeches on the All AC basis; this was later 
reduced to two sets, for the pre-dissolution period, on condition that 
there were two sets on the ABC basis for the period of the Election 
itself. By the last week of March agreement had been reached, (50) 
only to disintegrate again as each Party tried to secure the most 
favourable sequence within the agreed formula. MacDonald for example 
wanted the sequence to reflect the status of the labour Party as the 
Official Opposition: he wanted the Party's speakers to be able to close 
both the pre-dissolution talks (making the sequence AB AC, AC AB) and 
those during the Election (making the sequence ABC, ACB). (51) With 
48. PRO MacDonald Papers 30/69/5/40, MacDonald to Reith 9,111arch 1929. 
49. Ibid.; BBC, P. O., Samuel. to Reith, 22 March 1929. 
50. , P. GE., Beith to MacDonald, 25 March 1929. 
51. Ibid., MacDonald to Reith, 2 April 1929. 
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Samuel's acceptance came Davidson's refusal, on the basis that two 
sets of speeches during the election period gave the combined Oppo- 
sition Parties a total of four speeches to the Government's two. (52) 
Forewarned of this, Reith had publicly announced the previous day the 
BBC's scheme for party political broadcasting before and during the 
Election, pre-empting any further objections by MacDonald and Samuel 
which would cause further delay: the scheme included only one set of 
talks for the period of the Election, in the sequence CBA, following 
the precedent of 1924. (53) For MacDonald this was thoroughly un- 
satisfactory. He had already revealed to Reith that the Labour 
Party suspected the BBC was 'wangling so as to handicap us'. (54) 
He was also already convinced that Labour had been put in an impossible 
position by Davidson, whose uncompromising stance he interpreted as 
calculated to prevent the Party from ever using the microphone. He 
had appealed to Reith to accept a majority decision otherwise nothing 
would be done; and now a scheme had been publicised, without consult- 
ation, which accorded with all the demands made by Davidson as a 
condition of his (Davidson's) agreement to the scheme at all. (55) 
MacDonald apparently threatened to drop out of the scheme 'if they are 
going to try to manipulate things', (56) but this was almost certainly 
a public gesture of defiance, a hollow bluff which Reith would probably 
not have taken seriously. Nevertheless, MacDonald had his suspicions: 
The whole thing has a most unpleasant savour in my nostrils. 
It may all have been perfectly innocent, but I really must 
say. that an innocent creature has never been cursed with a 
more sinister countenance. (57) 
He then used this point to add weight to his claim, made originally in 
March, that in view of the importance of the newly enfranchised women 
voters an address should be made by representatives of the women's section 
52. BBC, P. GE., Davidson to Reith, 5 April 1929. 
53" The Times, 5 April 1929; BBC9 P. GE., Reith to MacDonald, 4 April 
1929. 
54. , P. GE., MacDonald to Reith, 2 April 1929. 
55. Ibid., MacDonald to Reith, 9 March 1929; Reith to MacDonald, 4 
April 1929; PRO MacDonald Papers 30/69/5/40, MacDonald to Reith, 
8 April 1929. 
56. Sunday Graphic, 7 April 1929, cited in A. Briggs, The Golden Age 
of Wireless op. cit., p. 133. 
57. PRO MacDonald Papers 30/69/5/40, MacDonald to Reith, 8 April 1929. 
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of each Party, during the period of the Election itself. There 
followed a new round. of negotiations on this issue and the sequence 
for each set of talks, with Davidson insisting that the Government 
should have the final date for both the pre- and post-dissolution 
series; and again threatening that if this condition was not accepted. 
the Government would withdraw its support for the additional series 
of post-dissolution talks by women representatives. (58) 
An agreement was finally achieved, over a year after Henderson's 
original request for facilities to be made available for MacDonald to 
make a statement in respect of the next election; only six weeks before 
the poll; and in the middle of the pre-dissolution talks. The final 
arrangement was accepted by, each Party under protest and with no 
prejudice to negotiations over future elections. As Reith put it, 
'the equal discontent of all three parties ... was the only criterion of 
impartiality in the circumstances'. (59) For the pre-dissolution talks 
(S April -3 May) the sequence was AB AC, AC AB; and for the Election 
period (13 - 29 May), CBA, CBA. Henderson, Snowden, Margaret Bondfield 
and MacDonald gave Labour's broadcasts. As a matter of BBC policy all 
talks were given in the studio, and speakers were invited to the studio 
for rehearsals, voice tests and general advice on presentation. Again 
it appears that only Baldwin showed any interest. in the composition 
of his likely audience and the context in which it would be listening. (60) 
MacDonald's broadcast was dismissed by Reith as 'ineffective'; Snoirden's 
he regarded as the 'best of all'. (61) 
Labour's attempts to gain access to the medium of radio for party 
political purposes unearthed the complexities contingent upon the 
principle of 'fairness' to which the Crawford Report committed the BBC 
in recommending that a moderate amount of controversy should be broad- 
cast. The suspicions which the negotiations between the Parties fuelled 
in the minds of Labour leaders were hardened by the role which Reith 
58. BBC. 0 P. GE., Davidson to Reith, 18 April 1929. 
59" J. C. W. Reith, Into the Wind o . cit., p. 131. 
60. BBC, Lord Peith Papers, Baldwin to Reith, 13 April 1929. 
61. J. C. W. Reith, Into the Wind, op. cit., p. 131. For a different view 
of Snowden's talk, see S. Hibberd, 'This - Is London..... ' 
(London, 
1950), P"45. For comments on Henderson's talk from the point of 
view of local opinion, see M. Pegg, Broadcasting and Society 
1918-1939 (London, 1983), P"187. 
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was perceived to be performing. This suspicion was not diminished by 
Labour's experience in seeking to secure opportunities for broadcasting 
on political subjects generally. 
The delicacy of the negotiations with the Labour Party can be 
inferred from the lengths to which the Corporation was prepared to go 
to avoid giving Labour leaders. any grounds for criticism during the 
period in which such negotiations over party political broadcasting 
took place. Instructions were sent to all stations that. Head Office 
should see manuscripts in advance of all talks or discussions of a 
controversial or provocative nature; and where such talks or discussions 
were taken up they were to be handled by Head Office. (62) In the 
case of the North Regional Director's plan to broadcast a series on 
'Trade Tendencies in the Industrial North' specific instructions were 
issued to 
ensure that the speakers should keep clear of any references 
which might be construed as controversial on labour lines. (63) 
Similarly, the complexity of the BBC's position in negotiations with 
the Labour Party is revealed in the Controversy Committee's discussions 
concerning Ministerial statements. Under existing practice Ministers 
were granted. opportunities for explaining in a non-partisan way pieces 
of legislation passing through the House which were not the subject of 
acute controversy. The Minister of Agriculture, W. Guinness, had asked 
to. give a talk on the question of marking eggs, an issue the controversy 
surrounding which had only recently subsided. The usual practice would 
have been automatic approval for such a talk. But with an election in 
eight the very fact of a Minister dealing in person with such an issue 
would appear, in the view of the Controversy Committee, doubl3r 
controversial - in rekindling the old controversy, and, in giving the 
Government of the day a public platform for explaining policy,, granting 
a publicity advantage, as under existing practice no right of reply was 
available. What concerned the Controversy Committee was not simply 
that permission for the talk. would offend Labour sensitivities. It 
would set a precedent of which 'a future government which might be with- 
out a powerful press' (that is, a Labour Government) would justly try 
to take advantage. (64) The Director of Talks Hilda Natheson conjured 
62. BBC, Controversy Committee Minutes, 25 January 1929,1 Narch 1929. 
63. Ibid., 1 Febrmry 1929. 
64. Ibid. 
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up the prospect of a beleagured Labour Government resorting to this 
precedent to explain its policies on a regular basis, and such a 
reliance could be compromising for the Corporation. The Committee 
agreed that no Ninisterial. statement should be made under present 
circumstances, but that a permanent official of the Department con- 
cerned could give a talk. 
No matter what precautions were taken to avoid offending Labour 
it was likely that over the question of general political talks prob- 
lems would arise. In fact very few opportunities arose for Labour 
leaders to broadcast between March 1928, when the veto on controversial 
broadcasting was lifted, and May 1929, when the General Elention took 
place. Using the categories of political broadcasting defined by the 
Corporation's Director of Talks, the limited scope of Labour's use 
of the medium can be clearly demonstrated. (65) Only one Party Political 
Studio Talk or Discussion (Category I) was arranged in this period, at 
the request of Neville Chamberlain. As already indicated, attempts 
were made by 8eith to organise regular talks involving party political 
discussions, on issues of current controversy. With the three Parties 
unable to agree on a scheme Reith invited the Party Leaders to discuss, 
in succession on the same evening, a matter of acute controversy which 
had an importance over and above any consideration of the state of 
negotiations regarding a general scheme for party political broadcast- 
. 
(66) The result was a discussion on the 22 January 1929 on the 
De Rating Bill, in which Sir Kingsley Wood, Arthur Greenwood and Ramsay 
Muir took part. Each speaker had twenty minutes, with Wood, representing, 
the Government point of view, being given a further ten minutes to reply 
in view of the 'extra burden of responsibility on the Government of the 
day'. (67) 
Due to. Party disagreement no other discussion in this category 
was arranged-before the second Labour Government took office. No Labour 
representative took part in Speeches by Ministers and other Political 
Leaders on Special. Non Party Political Occasions (Outside Broadcasts), 
(Category Iv), which included the Lord Mayor's Banquet and the Dinner 
65. For full definitions of these categories, see BBC, P. G., 'Political 
Broadcasting', 6 November 1930, written by Matheson. 
66. Ibid., Reith to Samuel, 30 January-1929" 
67. Ibid., Policy. Political. Broadcasting. Accusations of Party Bias., 
Carpendale to Davidson, 12 October 198. (Hereafter, 'P. APB. ') 
Unfortunately the Talks file on the De-Rating Bill discussion is 
missing. 
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of the Royal Institute of. International Affairs. Labour leaders did 
occasionally take part in Studio Talks by Ministers and other Political 
Leaders on Non-Political Subjects (Category III). Snowden, for example, 
gave a talk on 'The Preservation of Rural England'. Bat the only real. 
opportunities for Labour politicians or trade union leaders to use 
the medium to discuss political issues came in the. form of Discussions 
and Symposiums which may involve Political Opinions (Category' VII). 
James Maxton took issue with Sir Ernest Benn on the subject of 'Riches 
and Poverty', the first political discussion of any kind ever broad- 
cast in Britain, on the 18 May 1928. Ellen Wilkinson discussed the 
issue of 'Equal Pay' with W. H. Thoday; J. H. Thomas argued the merits of 
'Road v. Rail' with Colonel. Moore Brabazon; and Dr. Marion Phillips 
examined the need for 'Protective Legislation for Women Workers' with 
Nirs. Abbott. In all, eight such discussions in this period gave Labour 
politicians opportunities to use the medium. But only-one trade union 
leader, Walter Citrine, used the radio in this way, in a symposium on 
'Tendencies in Modern Industry'. The only other category of political 
broadcasting in which Labour could take part was Single Talks or Series 
of Talks (not by Ministers or Politicians) dealing with or incidentally- 
referring-to Political Events or Theories (Categgory. VI). Harold Laski 
for example gave a series of six talks on 'Social Purpose'. Remaiaing 
categories were Studio Talks by Ministers and Officials on the Work of 
Public Departments or some aspect of National Policy (%n Party) 
(Category II. ), which included the Budget and legislation passing through 
Parliament, providing it was not the subject of acute controversy; and 
Speeches by Ministers on Non-Political Occasions (Category V), such 
as the Civil Service Dinner, the Royal Academy Banquet and the Dickens 
Fellowship. 
Unsurprisingly, Labour leaders were not au fait with these categories, 
and the frequency with which Government Ministers gave talks (under 
Category II), the regularity with which Labour requests for facilities 
appear to have been turned down, and the treatment received at the hands 
of the Corporation when permission was granted, gave rise to much resent- 
ment. Before the veto on controversy had been lifted Labour had already- 
gained an insight into the rigorous censorship exercised by the BBC. 
The General Council of the TUC intended to hold a meeting at a TUC- 
sponsored college in grounds owned by Lady Warwick. J. R. Clynes invited 
the BBC to broadcast speeches by Lady Warwick and Arthur Pugh of the 
General. Council. The talks were described. by Clynes as 'non political' 
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to which neither the Post Office nor the public could take exception. (68) 
Gladstone Murratiy- (Assistant Controller (Information)) regarded the 
talks as 'dangerously-near the partisan' and sought the guidance of 
F. W. Phillips at the Post Office. (69) Clynes subsequently submitted 
scripts for inspection, and Phillips returned them to Murray with 
excisions. The original text of Pugh's talk included the following, 
with the excisions underlined: 
The fundamental aim of all these educational activities is 
to enable the workers to develop their capacity for effective 
service within the organised working class movement, and the 
means whereby those taking up responsible leadership in Trade 
Union, Cooperative and other working-class organisations, or 
as representatives on public bodies, can be better equipped 
for the duties thus undertaken. (70) 
Clynes had to. give assurances that the speaker would adhere to the 
amended draft, and the talk was given on the 24 February 1926. To a 
large degree Labour speakers acquiesced in this treatment, knowing that 
otherwise they would never get the opportunity to broadcast. But 
when the veto on controversy was lifted in March 1928 it appears that 
expectations had changed. Snowden for example took exception to having 
to submit his script for his talk on 'The Preservation of Rural 
England'. (71) Moreover, requests for facilities were frequentlsr' 
turned down. A proposed debate between the Cooperative Wholesale Society 
and the National Traders' Defence League was considered too risky, as 
it 'would stir up feeling rather-than reach any useful conclusion', 
especially as the Cooperative movement 'was now definitely political'-(72) 
A. J. Cook, who was considered an 'unsuitable speaker' by the Corporation, 
was refused permission to broadcast a talk on the subject of clay Day. (73) 
The National Union of Railwaymen unsuccessfully requested to be able 
to broadcast. speeches from their Annual Conference; and a request bg 
the Chemical Workers' Union for facilities, based on complaints that 
Walter Citrine of the TUC did not represent the views of one particular 
68. BBC, Talks. Trades Union Congress., J. R. Clynes to Murray, 15 Feb- 
ruary 1926. 
69. Ibid., Murray to Stobart, 15 February 1926. 
70. Ibid., Phillips to Murray, 19 February 1926, to which is appended 
the amended draft. The word 'similar' was substituted for the 
second set of excised words. 
71. Ibid., Controversy Committee Minutes, 28 March 1928. 
72. Ibid., 12 July 1928,13 December 1928. 
73. jbid., 25 October 1928,22 Harch 1929. Cook was allowed to broad- 
cast an appeal on behalf of the Lord. Mayor's Fund. for Distressed tvt4 nPra _ 
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section of the trade union movement during the symposium on 'Tendencies 
in Modern Industry', was rejected by Charles Siepmann on the grounds 
that Citrine represented the 'official. Trade Union point of view'. (74) 
Snowden was unable to broadcast, on the question of the rating of land 
values, and MacDonald was denied the opportunity to broadcast on the 
occasion of the opening of Transport House. (75) There were of course 
good reasons for the Corporation to refuse facilities: in the case of 
Snowden for example plans were already underway for a full-scale 
political. debate on this issue. But what appeared at first to be 
nothing particularly unreasonable gradually, began to appear less than 
fair. A test-case arose with the Budget. Speech delivered by Churchill 
on 25 April 1928. The terms under which the speech was given were 
specifically non-partisan. The Corporation had already acknowledged 
privately that it was 'not always easy to draw the line between partisan 
opinion and statement: of fact', (76) and this proved to be the case with 
the Chancellor. MacDonald complained that Churchill's statement was 
in fact a party statement: 'you really cannot draw aline between a 
factual speech and a Party one - especially when Churchill. delivers it. ', 
and requested that Snowden be allowed to 'give a similar factual state- 
ment'. (77) The Corporation's refusal to grant such facilities was 
justified on grounds that the Government of the day should be allowed 
to explain its Budget, and that no complaint. had been made when the 
Labour Party agreed to the original scheme for political broadcasting, 
wherein opportunities would be given for the Government to explain its- 
policies generally. (78) 
The Labour Party was further frustrated at plans by the Corporation 
to allow Walter Elliott, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Scotland, to talk on the subject of the Western Highlands and Islands 
Transport Services Bill, which Lindsay, the Party Secretary, regarded 
as an infringement of the rule of scrupulous fairness. Reith replied 
74. BBC., Controversy Committee Minutes, 17 May 1929,8 November 1928. 
75" Ibid., 4 June 1928,25 April 1928. 
76. Ibid., P. APB., Beith to P. W. Phillips, 12 June 1925; ibid.,. P. GE., 
Matheson to B. Eckersley, 20 December. 1928. 
77. Ibid., Policy. Political Broadcasting. Budget., MacDonald to 
Reith, 1 May 1928. (Hereafter, 'P. B. ') 
78. Ibid., Controversy Committee Minutes, '2 May 1928. 
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that. Major Elliott 'was speaking as a Minister and not as a member of 
the Conservative Party' and, his talk would be a non-party explanation 
of the Bill. (79) Lindsay did not accept Reith's explanation, and 
inquired. as to the likely BBC response if MacDonald requested facilities 
to broadcast on the Bill, not. as a member of the Labour Party, but. aa 
Leader of His Majesty's Official Opposition. (80) 
The distinction between non-party Ministerial statements and 
partisan political broadcasts was a fine one which easily became lost 
as Labour politiciansi grew increasingly, exasperated at the apparent 
ease with which the Government was able to broadcast to the nation. 
The mere fact of explaining an Act was an attempt to gain some credit 
for it, and gave an opportunity for publicity which was denied other 
parties. It was however a developing field, in which the ground. ru]. ee 
were crystallising, but had not taken permanent. form, and one which 
offered a future Labour administration unprecedented opportunities. 
, Indeed the second Labour Government lost little time in exercising 
the right of access for the Government of the day, provided both by 
precedent and continuing practice. There was no change of policy 
within the Corporation regarding Ministerial speeches, and Labour 
Ministers took every opportunity to use the microphone after MacDonald 
had broadcast to the nation as Prime Minister on 8 June. For the period 
June to December 1929 the Government. used the BBC for Ministerial: 
statements on fourteen occasions, equalling the previous administration's 
Ministerial use of radio for the whole of 1928, and prompting Conservative 
criticism that there were too many- Government broadcasts. (81) During 
the following year there were also fourteen Ministerial broadcasts. 
Thereafter a new agreement was reached on political broadcasting. The 
same opportunities were available for such statements, but, dependent 
upon Liberal. support, the momentum of the Government slumped. Its 
legis]a tive programme was effectively destroyed by the mauling which 
Bills received in the House of Lords, and by Liberal amendments at 
79. B$4, P. NB., Lindsay to Reith, 15 November 1928; Reith to Lindsay, 
16 November 1928. 
80. Ibid., Lindsay to Reith, 20 November 1928. 
81. Ibid., P. APB., Davidson to Reith, 9 October 1929. 
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committee stage. There were therefore few occasions during 1931 
when Ministers could legitimately-broadcast on the work of their 
departments and on new legislation. Indeed, the only Ministerial 
statements broadcast between January and August 1931 were MacDonald's 
speech on the India Round Table Conference (20 January) and Snowden's 
Budget talk. While there is no evidence to suggest that Labour 
leaders regarded this as symptomatic of the BBC's jaundiced treatment 
of the Party, there was nevertheless a degree of cynicism in Snowden's 
response to Reith's suggestion in February 1931 that the Budget speech 
should be part of a series of party political talks. The rationale 
of Reith's proposal was that every year the impartiality of the Budget 
speech had been questioned, and that he now found it difficult to see 
how such a talk could be strictly non-partisan. (82) Replying for the 
Chancellor, Kennedy insisted that the Budget. statement must stand br 
itself: TTo include it in the list of political talks would deprive 
the Government of one broadcast opportunity'. (83) 
Meanwhile, renewed attempts were made to draw up a scheme for 
political broadcasting satisfactory to all three main parties. The 
BBC's Controversy Committee had already placed on record prior to the 
1929 General Election that 
the political broadcasts upto date had been lacking in interest, 
were not fulfilling the functions for which they were intended, 
and were not good programme value.... these broadcasts tended to 
discredit politics and entirely failed to fulfil the expectations 
from a broadcasting point of view which the Corporation had in 
mind when it: initiated proposals regarding them. (84) 
The inability of the three parties to agree a scheme for political. 
broadcasting was not merely a source of exasperation for the Corporation; 
it further encouraged. Eeith and his colleagues to move away from the 
original concept of party political talks under normal conditions as 
the centrepiece of political broadcasting. Public demand for such 
broadcasts was, Hilda Matheson argued, limited, and the demand for space 
82. BBC., P. B., Reith to Kennedy, 18 March 1931. Kennedy was the Labour 
Chief Whip. 
83. Ibid., Kennedy to Reith, 17 March 1931. 
84. Ibid., Controversy Committee Iiinutes, 19 April 1929. 
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in the weekly schedule from other 'equally important' services such as 
entertainment, information and education was so great. that 
The BBC would not feel justified in setting aside regular 
weekly periods for party political. broadcasts, since this 
would inevitably - entail, the cancellation of other services 
of wider and more general appeal. (85) 
Moreover, where issues of national importance were to. be examined, 
Matheson identified a keen desire amongst listeners to hear not just 
the views of the Party Leaders but of independent experts. She 
recommended that. at election times, and moments of national emergency, 
the initiative for political broadcasting should be largely with the 
political parties. But ordinarily the treatment of questions of current 
controversy should be decided by-the Corporation; the form of treatment 
should be the symposium. or discussion; and the contributors should be 
drawn from both political parties and independent experts. She also 
reaffirmed the importance of allowing Ministers of the Crown opportuni- 
ties to broadcast on legislation, the work of Public Departments, and 
items of national interest such as the Budget. (86) 
Political broadcasting then, held in prospect in March 1928 as 
an exciting new departure, had become by June 1929 a wearisome and 
frustrating exercise in patience for Reith and his colleagaesras- 
repeated attempts to secure agreement with the three main parties failed. 
Following the formation of the Labour Government no new initiatives were 
made by 8eith or Matheson, as they tried to re-think their approach to 
the question of political broadcasting, and the negotiations with the 
parties were allowed to subside. Political subjects were certainly 
given air-time. Ethel Snowden for example gave a talk on 'Why Women 
want Peace', Sir John Simon examined 'The Future of Indian Goverament', 
Beatrice Webb discussed the question of 'The Reform of British 
Parliamentary-Government', and Sir Josiah Stamp and J. H. Keynes discussed 
'Unemployment'. But Ministerial broadcasts apart, there was no party 
political broadcasting from the inception of the Labour Government 
until a new arrangement was drawn up in November 1930. The issue, 
shelved in June 1929, was resurrected. with the discovery that the BBC 
was apparently acting on its own initiative to arrange ad hoc talks of 
85. BBC, P. PPB., H. Matheson, Memorandum on Political Broadcasting, 
31 July 1930. 
86. Ibid. 
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a party political nature, without seeking any general agreement from 
or involvement of the Party Leaders. 
Lord Beaverbrook had applied to the Corporation in November 1929 
for permission to broadcast on nnpire Free Trade. The BBC agreed, on 
condition that a reply was given by a prominent opponent: 8L-ith did 
not regard it as a party issue, and therefore the Party Whips were 
not consit1ted. (87) With the formation of the United. Empire Party in 
February 1930 the planned broadcasts assumed. a party political character, 
as Beaver-brook's views would be taken to be an exposition of the 
policies of that. Party. The Corporation's position was that since the 
commitment to allow Beaverbrook. to broadcast could not be relinquished, 
then the example of the De-Rating Bill discussion should be applied, 
giving each of the three Parties a single broadcast talk. (88) The 
Prime Minister was informed of this in March, and expressed 'amazement'- 
at the scheme, since it was a breach of the precedent of that debate, 
whereby the Government was granted equalitT of opportunity, with the sum 
of the other-Parties. MacDonald assumed that the agreement of 1929. 
still applied, and once again believed that the BBC had been less than 
fair towards the Labour Party. -a Party which now expected to enjoy the 
advantages of office which the Corporation had bestowed on the Conserva- 
tives prioz to June 1929. (89) The Prime Minister's displeasure was 
sufficient to elicit from Reith an indication that he would cancel the 
talk, if MacDonald wished, without associating the Government with it, 
and this was done. (90) 
The affair prompted. MacDonald to re-open the question of party 
political. broadcasting, since it was clear that the BBC's decision to 
act without prior consultation with the Parties loosened their control 
not only of the issues which were to be debated, but also of the 
people who were to gain access to the airwaves. Moreover, from Labour's 
point of view, the precedent set by the De-Rating Bill debate, of the 
Government's right of reply to each Opposition Party, was a principle 
to be defended at a time when even the Corporation was willing to 
87. BBC., P. PPB., Bsith to G. Pry (Conservative Central Office), 
17 February 1930- 
88. Ibid., Memorandum on Lord Beaverbrook, 19 February 1930. There 
is no clear indication as to who wrote this memorandum. 
89. Ibid., C. P. Duff to Reith, 4 March 1930. Duff was 11acDonald's 
Private Secretary. 
90. Ibid., Reith to Duff, 4 March 1930. 
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ignore it. Consequently inter-party negotiations resumed within days 
of Beaverbrook's talk being jettisoned. But nothing had been agreed 
by June and Reith proposed a symposium, to be opened by Beaverbrook, 
on the question of 33ipire Free Trade, adding that it was 'desirable' 
to secure 'the concurrence and cooperation of the Whips as to pro- 
cedurer. (91) Owing to pressure of work little progress was made by 
the three Whips, and Reith, forcing the issue, proposed a detailed 
plan for the symposium. Again, MacDonald was 'amazed' that the BBC 
should take upon itself responsibility for arranging a series of 
party political broadcasts contrary to the understanding that no such 
talks could be decided upon without the prior agreement of the three 
Parties. The 'serious breach' of this understanding was 'one to which 
the Government could not remain indifferent'. (92) So strongly did 
MacDonald feel that the Corporation was abusing its position, to 
Labour. 's detriment, that he-issued a warning: 
The Government has na desire to interfere with BBC programmes, 
but it cannot be disinterested regarding the political use 
made by it of its opportunities ..... 'The only way the BBC 
can protect itself is by planning its political broadcasting 
in close cooperation with the Parties. (93) 
MacDonald believed that, unfortunate though it was that the Whips had 
not come to agreement, this could not justify faith's independent 
action. Moreover, as Kennedy, later explained to Lord Gainford, the 
Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors, any extension of broadcast 
discussion beyond the confines of the three main political Parties 
created difficulties which did not arise in connection with party 
political. talks. The implication was that Reith's action had 
immeasurably complicated an already problematic-situation, and in 
effect put in jeopardy the three-Party negotiations. (94) This view 
was reiterated at an all Party meeting with Reith and Gainford in the 
Souse of Commons following the BBC's decision to-allow Beaverbrook to 
91. HBiC., P. PPB., Reith to T. Kenned7,25 June 1930- 
92. Ibid., N. Butler to J. H. Whitley, 7 August 1930. Butler was 
MacDonald's Political Secretary. 
93. , H. G. Vincent to Whitley, 16 August 1930. Vincent was MacDonald's Private Secretary. 
94. Ibid., Kenned3r to Gainford, 31 October 1930. 
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broadcast on the 27 November. The three Parties protested against this 
recognition of the United. Enpire Party, and refused to participate in 
the series, suggesting an independent expert should be asked to reply 
to. Beaverbrook. Nevertheless a basis of agreement for future political 
broadcasting was achieved. (95) The scheme consisted of five sections. 
Under Section A. Party Political Speeches, the Corporation would 
allocate two or three months each year during which period the micro- 
phone would be available one night every week to the Parties in a 
rota along the lines of the formula Labour 9, Conservative 8, Liberal 5. 
Both subjects arid. speakers would be decided by the Parties. During a 
General Election there would be a rota for the pre-dissolution period, 
and equal opportunity during the post-dissolution period. 
Under Section 34 Discussions, there would be an hour's 
discussion periodically on party political. issues of current interest. 
There would be-one speaker for each Party; but if the issue arose from 
a Government measure, then the Government would have the right of reply. 
Subjects would be chosen by the BBC. In addition other politically 
controversial subjects which did not necessarily fall along party, 
lines would be discussed periodically. Symposiums (Section C) included 
party political issues as well as issues which did not fall on party 
lines; and independent experts would be invited to contribute. Finally, 
there were Section D, Factual Expositions, by Ministers or independent. 
commentators who would explain measures passed by Parliament; Section E. 
Broadcasts by Ministers on national occasions; and Section F. Information 
and Non-Controversial Talks on political, economic and social questions 
by Public Departments. (96) 
At a subsequent conference on the 18 November the procedure 
for implementing this scheme was clarified. The Parties noted the 
claim of the BBC that the Corporation could not be bound in every case 
to secure their agreement as a preliminary- to proceeding with a political 
broadcast. However, 
95. BBC, P'. PPB'., Record of the. Meeting in the House of Commons, 
4 November 1930- 
96. Ibid., Draft Memorandum on Political Broadcasting, 5 November 1930. 
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it was held that if the BBC proceeded in face of failure 
to secure such an agreement, the question of the proper 
use of the Corporation's discretionary -power might be 
re-opened.... (97) 
The scheme, it was proposed, would last until the end of 1931 or the 
calling of a General Election, whichever was sooner. Within three weeks 
agreement was reached. on a symposium on 'Unemployment', to be broad- 
cast during January and February 1931 - the first party political 
debate since January 1929 (excluding the General Election), but also 
the first in which independent experts took part and the Government 
speakers neither had the right of reply nor the opportunity to go last. 
In order of broadcast, the speakers were Professor Henry Clay, J. N. Keynes, 
B. Seebohm Rowntree (Liberal), Herbert Morrison (Labour), Stanley 
Baldwin (Conservative). The evident success of this form of broadcast 
encouraged Reith to propose a debate on 'The Effects of Tariffs on 
Ehnployment', and the talks, given in May-, were confined to the three 
Parties,, with the Conservatives again enjoying the advantage which was 
believed to accrue from speaking last. Other talks were planned bat. 
jettisoned following the publication of the May Report on 31 July and 
the financial. crisis which it"precipitated. 
With the political crisis which followed in August, the demise 
of the second Labour Government, and the manner in which it fell, 
created a complex situation which nullified the agreement on political 
broadcasting of November 1930 and made previous precedents regarding 
General Election broadcasting equally inapplicable. The problem 
stemmed from the splits in both Labour and Liberal Parties, and the 
formation of a National Government representing Conservative, National 
Labour, and Samuelite Liberal. The decision to hold an election was 
taken on 5 October, and each constituent Party of the coalition was to 
issue its own election programme. Parliament was dissolved two days 
later. Yet the BBC only started to consider the question of election 
broadcasting on the 2 October. In drawing up plans Matheson assumed 
that there would be 'two main bodies of opinion to be placed before the 
country'. (98) $y which she meant that body of opinion which supported 
97. BBC, P. PPB., Amended Draft rlemorandum on Political Broadcasting, 
in Kennedy to Reith, 4 December 1930. 
98. Ibid., P. M., Matheson to Reith, 2 October 1931. 
the National. Government, and that which opposed it. But she accepted 
that it may be necessary to find space to. accommodate minority views, 
such as Sir Oswald Mosley's New Party. Arthur Henderson, now Labour 
Leader, insisted that there should be as many speakers against the 
Government as for it, and that the Labour Opposition wanted as many- 
broadcasts as all the other opponents of the Government put together. (99) 
A provisional list of Labour 3, Conservative 2, National Labour 2, 
Liberal 2, National Liberal 1, and New Party 1, provoked Henderson to. 
demand 4" broadcasts. (100) The allocations had been devised by Reith 
and Major Glyn, MacDonald's Parliamentary Private Secretary, apparently 
without full consultation of the Parties. The documentation for these 
negotiations is scant, the urgency of the situation presumably leading 
to much of the bargaining being done by telephone or without any formal 
record of discussion being made. Certainly, the laborious procedure 
which occasioned the 1929 Election was not repeated; and the BBC appears 
to have conferred upon Glyn considerable authority for the purpose of 
reaching a quick decision. (101) The programme of election broadcasts 
was issued on 12 October, the day-before it was to commence. The basic 
pattern appears to conform to the 1929 arrangement, of equal allocation 
to the main Parties, with slight. modifications, presumably to 
accommodate Lloyd George and disarm Labour criticism. 
Ten broadcasts were made between 13 - 24 October, six by 
representatives of the National Government (two Conservative, two 
National Labour and two Liberal - one Samuelite, one Simonite), three 
by the Labour Party, and one by Lloyd George. (102) J. R. Clynes, William 
Graham and Arthur Henderson spoke for Labour, while MacDonald and 
Snowden spoke for National Labour, on behalf of the National Government. 
Not standing for re-election, Snowden had no need of restraint, and his 
'Bolshevism run mad'- speech had an electrifying effect. J. H. Thomas, 
who followed MacDonald and Snowden in joining the National Government, 
later described the Election as 'the cruellest and most brutal election 
I have ever seen'. (103) Snowden felt little remorse over his venomous 
99. Reith, Diary, 8 October 1931, cited in A. Briggs, The Golden Age of 
Wireless op. cit., PP-138-9- 
100. BBC, P. GE., Reith to Samuel, 8 October 1931- 
101. See for example, ibid., Reith to R. G. C. Glyn, 12 October 1931. 
102. Baldwin was the only Conservative speaker, broadcasting twice. 
103. Cited by G. Blaxland, J'. H. Thomas: A Life for Unity (London, 1964), 
p. 255. 
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criticism-of his former colleagues and believed that his broadcast 
influenced the outcome of the Election. (104) Be that as it mag, the 
broadcasts by Clynes, Graham and Henderson were regarded as poor and 
damaging to the Labour case. (105) It was perhaps partly an awareness 
of this poor technique, and the consummate skill of Baldwin and to a 
lesser extent 17acDonald, which prompted recriminations. Clynes com- 
plained that 'the wireless was overweighted against us'; (106) and the 
TUC and the Labour Party NEC issued a joint statement protesting against 
the 'preferential treatment accorded by the BBC to the National Govern- 
ment in political broadcasts'. (107) There had already-been some ill- 
feeling over the way in which the National Government had used the 
radio prior to the dissolution of Parliament to appeal for support and 
justify its policies. (108) Still reeling from the shock of the Election 
disaster the Labour Party's NEC tried to restore something from the 
wreckage, and resolved to complain to the Postmaster General about 
'the grave injustice suffered by the Labour Party'. (109) The Official 
Opposition, as the National Joint Council's statement to Reith main- 
tained, was given . 
'no single opportunity of broadcasting their case to 
the public' prior to 7 October, 'whereas there were several broadcasts by 
Ministers and supporters of the National Government'. (110) The Govern- 
ment did. in fact have five broadcasts between 25 August and 7 October, 
and other. speakers such as Henry, Clay of the Bank of England were also 
104. P. Snowden, An Autobiography vol. 2 (London, 1934), P"995. The text 
of his speech is reproduced, pp. 1059 - 1064. Leo Amery has 
described Snowden's talk as 'horribly, effective', in his 
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considered to have broadcast in support of National Government 
policies. (111) The imbalance in the allocation of talks, and the 
'partisan advice' given by the announcer during news bulletins on the 
eve of the poll, lied the TJJC to regard the BBC's role during the Election 
period as a definite breach of its functions and powers, 'as a public 
corporation divorced from politics'. (112) The experience was a bitter 
one, intensified byythe resentment and recrimination which were 
inevitable given the circumstances in which Labour fell from power and 
had to face an election not only opposed by its own leaders of long- 
standing, but also. presented to the electorate by labour's opponents 
as supporting sectional rather than national. interests. 
3. 
In 1931 the" political shocle-waves generated. by the Corpor- 
ation's contribution to the Genera]. Election subsided only after the. 
1935 General Election. Convinced that there was a political bias 
against the Labour Party, Labour leaders were primed. to take issue 
with the BBC on: any aspect of its- policy and programme output which ° 
could be construed as disadvantageous to the movement. The basis-of 
these complaints was that the BBC was in breach of its obligations, 
as indicated by the Postmaster General in 1928, to ensure fair and, 
equitable treatment as between the main Parties in the question of 
political broadcasting. Their central theme was that the Corporation, 
while granting access to facilities, was denying equality of access 
with the Government. 
It was not long before. the BBC, in an untypical moment of 
bad-timing, provoked the TUG into vigorous protest. On. 14 May, ' 1932 
the Corporation broadcast a retrospective of the first ten years of 
broadcasting in Britain, included in which was a survey of the 
General Strike. Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC General 
Council, complained to Whitley, Chairman of the Board of Governors, 
of the'one-sided. and biased' nature of the programme, pointing out 
that na attempt had been made to give the Trade Union point of view. (113) 
Citrine demanded an explanation of BBC policy, in the event of further 
111. LPNEC, National Executive Committee Minutes, A. Henderson, 
Report. on 'The General Election', 10 November 1931. 
112. B BC. P. GE., National Joint Council to Beith, 10 November 1931. 
113. TUC 1932, p. 225. 
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industrial. disputes. At the subsequent meeting of Whitley and a 
deputation. of the General Council, on 7 June, Citrine asked whether, 
in the event. of such disputes, the BBC became an instrument of the 
Government. (114) 
In. itself. the 'Retrospective' was a minor issue which gave 
Labour leaders an opportunity. -to express their dissatisfaction with 
the BBC and suggest that the Corporation ought to take more notice of 
Labour sensitivities in programme design. But it served as yet one 
more instance of bias, fuelling the resentment which was simmering 
at Transport Souse. After the experience of 1931 it took little to 
cause offence there, but in September the following year a curious 
combination of circumstances created an intensely bitter. atmosphere. 
Apart from. a series of three talks on the War Loan Conversion Scheme, 
in which Lansbury, now- Labour Leader, participated. in July, there were 
no' political. broadcasts on issues of party political controversy 
until the autumn of 1932. The. Talks Department had abandoned the idea 
of reserving the majoritr of political talks for politicians as both 
unworkable and undesirable, preferring a much broader spectrum of 
opinion to be represented, and one which did not become distorted 
by, -party political needs. (115) At the instigation of the Prime Minister 
in September 1932 the BBC dispensed with the agreement concerning, 
political broadcasting negotiated in November 1930, and established a 
small inter-Party consultative committee to advise the Corporation on 
political talks. The Parliamentary Advisory Panel was unofficial, and 
the Party representatives were chosen, without prior consultation with 
their Leaders, by-the BBC. Plans were immediately drawn up, by the 
Talks Department: for a series of talks on major political issues, 
such as 'Unemployment' and 'The Means Test'; and Arthur Greenwood and 
Sir Stafford Crippe of the Labour Party's NEC were invited to take part. 
The manner in which this was done was interpreted by- ansbury as 
contrary to. the 1930 agreement, according to which the Party Leaders 
were to be contacted by the-BBC in advance-of any series of talks on 
party political issues. being drawn up. Lansbury saw in this.. unilateral 
action by the BBC a dangerous precedent: 
114. TUC 1932, p. 225. 
115. BBC, P. G., C. Siepmann to Reith, 21 June 1932. 
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the selection of the issue is a matter of vital importance. 
It would be quite possible to have a programme of dis- 
cussions dealing with political questions which would 
focus the public attention on certain aspects of public 
affairs without giving the Opposition the opportunity 
of bringing into relief the particular matters upon which 
they think the general public should be enlightened. (116) 
In view of the BBC's apparent disregard of the 1930 agreement, he argued, 
new discussions between the Parties concerning the arrangements and 
procedures for political broadcasting were needed; and the right of 
Party Leaders to choose speakers should be reaffirmed. 
It was atfprecisely this moment that circumstances beyond the 
Corporation's control pitched the BBC into, a political minefield. 
Snowden and Samuel. resigned from the Cabinet on the 28 September. As 
Free Traders they could not accept. the protectionist terms of the 
Ottawa Agreements; and their departure not only raised an issue of 
national importance, but placed in doubt the 'national' character of 
the National Government. With MacDonald's approval the BBC agree& to 
the request of Snowden and Samuel to explain their views to the nation, 
and Baldwin and Simon were to reply for the Government. On hearing of 
this series of talks Lansbury immediately. requested facilities for the 
Official Opposition to put forward its view on the issues 'which brought 
about: the break-up of the Government'. (117) Whitley in reply explained 
how the talks came about, and insisted that it would have been 'improper' 
to introduce other speakers into this series, since the broadcasts were 
not concerned with the issues which caused the resignation, but with 
the issue of Ministerial resignations, which was not a subject of Party 
controversy. (118) Lansbur7 rejected this explanation and called into 
question the consistency of the Corporation's policy. With reference 
to the differences within the second Labour. Government. over. the problem 
of haw to, reduce unemployment, he doubted that the BBC would have. 
allowed four broadcasts by. members of the Government to explain their 
views and refusecthe Conservative Opposition opportunities to broad- 
cast on the subject. By preventing Labour from putting forward its 
views in reply to the resignation broadcasts the BBC, Ia, nsbury argued, 
was indicating to the public that only the Liberals had objections to 
the Ottawa Agreements. Moreover, the BBC was treating the matter as if 
116. British Library of Political and Economic Science, Lanabury Papers, 
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it was internal to the Government, providing facilities to sections 
within the National Goverment- a policy which had been specifically 
rejected by-the three Parties in their agreement of November 1930. 
rn effect, the BBC was denying the Official Opposition the right of 
reply in a situation in which the Government had four broadcasts on 
an issue of national importance. What made the matter even worse, 
Lansbury insisted, was that both Snowden and Samuel attacked Labour 
policy-during their talks. (119) 
Whitley offered Lansbury the opportunity to broadcast, in, 
the form of a discussion of the issues which prompted the resignations 
with a Government representative. Bat Lansbury was not prepared to 
acquiesce in face-saving arrangements which, by removing any cause 
for complaint, obscured the fundamental principle at stake. "Whitley's 
patronising attitude can only have exacerbated the situation. On 
learning of Lansbury's rejection of his offer, and. of the Labour 
Leaderts intention to make a statement concerning the matter to the 
delegates at. the Party's Annual Conference, Whitley foolishly suggested 
the form which this statement should take. (120) At the Conference' 
an emergency resolution was passed which pinpointed the two central 
issues raised by-the affair: 
The Conference protests against the deliberate exclusion 
of they Official Opposition from participating in the dis- 
cussion and the failure to take the Opposition into con- 
sultation on a matter of political broadcasting. (121) 
At a subsequent meeting of the Party's NEC Labour leaders were 'emphatic 
.... that the party had not been fairly 
treated' in connection with the 
resignation broadcasts, and a further resolution was passed stating 
that 
naapolitical broadcast. should be made on behalf of the 
Government without the Opposition being given an oppor- 
tunity to broadcast. (122) 
119. BBC, P. G., Lansbury to Whitley, 2 October 1932. 
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Two meetings between. Iansbury and the Director General on 9 and 18 
October did little to quell Lansbury's anger, and. a Party deputation 
went to see Whitley on 25'October to reiterate their claim for full 
equality-of treatment. (123) Whitley maintained that as the decision 
to confine the 'resignation series' to members of the Government was 
based on Parliamentary precedent, the question of inequality-of 
treatment did not arise, since no such opportunity would be granted 
to the Opposition in. the House of Commons on such an occasion. (124) 
For the Party however this was irrelevant. The Ministerial resig- 
nations were not a matter of significance only to the Government, 
as the broadcasts themselves indicated: 
the reconstruction of a Government arising out of differences 
between Ministers on questions of high policy raises issues 
of national importance on which the Official Opposition has 
a legitimate claim to express its views. (125) 
The BBC was not forthcoming however, and the National Joint Council of 
the TUC and the Labour Party established a Broadcasting Sub-Committee 
to draft a report on broadcasting policy, and resolved to put forward 
a motion for debate in the House of Commons on this matter. (126) 
During this debate, which took place on 22 February 1933, Cripps spoke 
forcefully on the subject of 'resignation' speeches, disputing the 
BBCts view that their policy was based on Parliamentary precedent. 
When a member of the Government resigns, he argued, he/she-is allowed 
to explain their views, and no. reply is made. If the Government is 
allowed by the BBC to reply to-a resignation speech, then the principle 
of' Parliamentary precedent does not apply. In which case, the principle 
of equality of treatment should apply, and the Official Opposition 
should be given the chance to broadcast in reply to Government state- 
ment. (127) Privately the Director of Talks had some sympathy with 
Crippst view, and conceded that the resignation speeches were in effect 
Ministerial statements which not only attacked the Labour Party but 
gave the ea-Ministers concerned personal publicity. (128) The BBC was 
123. TUC GC, National Joint Council Minutes, 25 October 1932. 
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not prepared to concede so much in public however, and the rather 
fruitless negotiations in which the Parliamentary Labour-Party bad 
become engaged were broadened to encompass the whole question of 
Ministerial statements. 
The issue was first raised in negotiations on the 25 October 
by the Labour-deputation to Whitley. Lansbury stated that the Par- 
liamentary Labour-Party would insist: upon claiming their right as the 
Official Opposition 'to broadcast in reply to whatever statements 
were put forward on behalf of the Government'. (129) In effect the 
failure of the BBC to consult Lansbury over the resignation speeches 
had created. a new situation in which the 1930 agreement was no longer 
applicable. This had drawbacks for the Party, but it could also be 
used to the Party's advantage; and Iansbnry was quick to exploit 
the opening which had been created. He demanded that Labour should 
be given the opportunity to reply. to all Ministerial statements, 
including those which were supposed to be non-partisan and of an 
expository character, and especially the Budget and the Prime Minister's 
speech at the Lord Mayor's'Banquet. (130) There had been fifteen such 
'detached' speeches between 1 January and 25 October 1932, and on one 
occasion only had the Labour Party been given the opportunity to reply,. 
(the War-Loan Conversion Scheme, on 14 July). While in many cases no 
political controversy arose from such detached statements, there were 
numerous important occasions, lansbury argued, where partisan views 
were expressed. There was an issue of principle at stake. But in 
Iansbury's view the Corporation was guilty of 'deliberate biast, which 
had damaging political consequences for the Party, especially, where 
Ministerial broadcasts on such controversial subjects as Disarmament 
and India were allowed without reply-from the Official Opposition. (131) 
The Corporation conceded nothing, and the negotiations ground to a 
halt. 
By this time the National Joint Council bad assumed responsi- 
bilitq~for broadcasting matters on behalf of the TUC General Council 
129. TUC GC, National Joint. Council Minutes, 25 October 1932. 
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and the Parliamentary Labour Party. It proceeded to initiate fresh 
negotiations on the allocation of talks during the next General- 
Election, and drew up a statement of the Labour movement's broadcasting 
policy. -(132) In June the NJC produced a memorandum on broadcasting 
which was discussed by-a deputation to the Board of Governors on 11 July. 
The document reiterated Labour's views on Ministerial broadcasts and 
reaffirmed its demand for absolute equality of treatment. But it also 
included some additional points. Firstly, that no Government spokesman 
should be allowed to broadcast without adequate opportunity being given 
by- the BBC for the presentation of the Official. Opposition point-of' 
view. Secondly, that equality-of opportunity should be extended to 
the trade union movement, in order that it can present its views on 
questions of economic, industrial or social interest. 
The National Joint Council claims that where broadcast 
speeches are made by, politicians, economists and employers 
on any topic; affecting Trade Unionism, the spokesmen 
of this Movement should be entitled to. submit its own 
point-of view over the wireless. (133) 
Thirdly, the NJC insisted. that reasonable provision should be made for 
'responsible working-class organisations': to initiate discvssiozi when, 
in their view, matters of importance needed to be brought to the 
attention of the public. The: immediate source of these fresh demands 
was the belief' that the Government 'should not be allowed to use the 
BBQ for propaganda'. (134) The deputation, in the words of the BBC's 
record of the meeting, believed the 'Goverment thought the wireless 
belonged to them' and that 'the Government were controlling us+'-. (135) 
Following Whitley's assurances as to the Corporation's 
independence Whitley tried to end any further discussion of Ministerial 
statements by-indicating that the BBC had. no intention of granting the 
Official Opposition the right of reply, - on such occasions as the Lord 
Mayor's Banquet, the explanation of new Acts of Parliament, and 
expository talks concerning Government policy-(136) Nor could he accept 
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the right of Labour organisations to 'initiate on working-class 
problems' since the BBC could not'hand over responsibility to any- 
Party or group'. In response to A. G. Walkden's inquiry 'Would the 
BBC recognise the fifty-fifty principle on industrial questions? '', 
the BBC Chairman replied that the past practice of the BBC showed 
that what they were asking-was already being carried out. Lansbury 
did not agree, but could elicit no concessions from the Board. (137) 
There. remained the question of equality of treatment for 
Labour in regard to general series of party political talks. Between 
the 1931 General Election and July 1933 there had been one series of 
three talks between Lord Lloyd and Lord Cecil on the League of Ration. 
and Collective Security, and one series of three talks on the War Loan 
Conversion Scheme, involving Baldwin, MacDonald and Iansbury. But there 
were only, two proper party political talks series in this period. The 
first took place between October and December 1932, involving debates 
on Disarmament, National Taxation, Tariffs, and the Means Test. The- 
second series took place between January and March 1933, involving 
debates on State Subsidies to Industry, the Abolition of Death Duties, 
Wage Rates in the Building Industry, Housing the Lower-Paid Worker, 
and Fascism. In the original agreement of November 193Q the allocation 
of such talks had been devised on the basis of electoral support, giving 
a ratio of Labour 9, Conservatives 8, and Liberals 5. But the formation 
of the National Government and the various Party splits made this 
method of allocating talks unworkable. The Corporation had little. 
faith in the rota system anyway, and took the inability of the Party 
Whips to devise a satisfactory allocation of talks as justification 
for assuming responsibility-for organising talks series without formal. 
Party involvement. (138) Indeed, it was at the moment when the controversy 
over the resignation speeches erupted that the BBC invited Arthur 
Greenwood to participate in the first series of political talks for over 
a year, in a debate with B. S. Hudson on the Paeans Test. (139) The series 
was greeted: with little enthusiasm by the Labour Party since it had been 
organised without the prior consultation of Labour leaders. (140) Biet 
it nevertheless gave the Party full equality of opportunity with the 
Government, which would not have been possible under the previous 
137. BBC9 P. G., 'Notes, 11 July 1933'. 
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arrangements based. on numbers of MPs in the House of Commons, given 
the diminutive size of the Labour. Party in 1932. BT mid-1933 how- 
ever plans for a series of autumn talks were being drawn up by the 
Corporation which were not sar advantageous to the Party. The Director 
of Talks, Siepmann, was told by Cripps that 
the Official Opposition would not cooperate in an r series 
other than on the basis of a right of reply by the Official 
Opposition to any of the other speakers put up by the 
Goverzment side. (141) 
Cripps eventually conceded that the NEC would probably agree to a 
ratio of 4: 3, or 5: 4 if the ILP was included. But in his official 
reply to 8eith Lansbury insisted on full equality, either in the 
ratio 5: 5 or-4: 4. (142) The following day -the deputation from the 
National Joint Council was told that the BBC had decided. on a ratio 
of 5: 3: 1 for respectively the Government, the Labour Party and the 
Samuelite Liberals. Despite protests Whitley remained unmoved, and 
after reporting back the NTC accepted this arrangement 'under strong 
protest'. (143) 
It is clear therefore that after almost a year of corres- 
pondence and intermittent-negotiations the leaders of the Labour 
movement had failed to gain mang of'their objectives. In particular, 
no general principle of equality of access was established. Despite 
the absence of the BBC corespondence files concerning general political 
broadcasting during the period July 1933 - July 1937 it is evident from 
other BBC records and other sources that by the time of the 1935 General 
Election little had changed. Iansbury for example felt obliged to 
write to-Reith in March 1935 fit, in view of the recent practice of 
the Goverment in using the radio to broadcast statements on foreign 
policT, the Labour Party, as the Official Opposition, should be invited 
to broadcast its views on any such statement. (144) 8eith's reply was 
that. the issue of Ministerial statements had been dealt with in 1932 
141. BBC, P. PPB., Siepmann to Reith, 23 June 1933. 
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and 1933; that such statements were factual and non-controversial; 
that Labour bad. no cause for complaint; and that the matter was 
closed. (145) Again, following the retirement of the Prime Minister 
from the Premiership on T June 1935, Baldwin's broadcast on Ministerial 
changes was regarded by Lansbury as nothing but political propaganda; 
and the Labour Leader complained that the Corporation had once again 
failed to invite the Official Opposition to reply. (146) Beith's line 
of defence was-unchanged: -the BBC retained the right to invite any 
Minister to broadcast on an occasion of particular national interest, 
without thereby incurring an obligation to provide facilities for the 
Official Opposition. (147) 
Similarly, over the question of series of general political 
talks, full equality of treatment was still a live issue in 1935. In 
the case of the troublesome series on India for example, one which was. 
not party political, including the views of independent experts, and 
one which took the form of a symposium, the allocation of talks to 
Party speakers was as follows: National Government 2, Conservatives 
opposed to Government policy 2, Liberals 2, Labour 1. There were, 
in addition, two specialists who had worked in the Indian Civil 
Service, and one 'independent'. On hearing of the distribution of the 
talks in this series Lansbury wrote to faith that it was 'an impossible 
allocation', and requested an additional talk for Labour. (148) faith 
replied that the series was not a party political one, but one which 
provided for Parties to express their views alongside those of others 
not identified with Party Policies-(149) For Labour the allocation 
of four talks to the Conservatives and two to the Liberals was bizarre. 
As Attlee put it in a letter to Lansbury: 
The allocation of places between rival groups within the 
Capitalist Government does not concern us. They are all 
our enemies. (150) 
In this light Reith's suggestion that the Labour Party's view was just 
one of several different views on the subject had dangerous implications, 
since the focus of the debate would be the internal divisions of the 
BBC. 
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The India series was a source of great frustration for the 
Labour Party. From the specific complaint made by the deputation to 
Whitley in. 1933, that as the BBC regarded the Government as a coalition 
of Parties, though it was, in fact, one Party, it followed that there 
would always be a gross injustice in the allocation of talks, unless 
Labour had an equal number of talks to all Government speakers in 
combination. The complaint is evident in 1934 over the India series; 
and again in 1935. In its evidence to the Ullswater Committee in July 
1935 the National Council of Labour (formerly the National Joint Council) 
felt compelled to insist that the 'Government should be considered as 
a single entity'. (152) The NCL took the view that the Official. 
Opposition should be treated in line with Parliamentary procedure, 
whereby-it had rights and privileges not accorded to other opposition 
Parties, in the Hause. Following Parliamentary procedure the Govern- 
ment should be entitled to have the final word in a series of political 
talks, by way of a brief rejoinder. But it was vital, the NCL maintained, 
that the Official. Opposition had the opportunity to-put forward its. 
case in reply to any Government broadcast, including factual, non- 
partisan, Ministerial talks. This was essential as 
The public cannot come to a considered judgment on a complex 
and perhaps vital national issue unless it hears both sides 
of the case. (153) 
Furthermore, in recognising that the initiative for Ministerial broad- 
casts resided with the Government, the NCL fully appreciated that the 
Labour Party's access to broadcasting was to some degree dependent upon 
Ministers themselves. It was conceivable that, in the event of the 
general principle of right of reply being accepted, Ministers might 
choose not to broach a particular issue with the public. The NCL 
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therefore suggested. to the üllswater Committee that if the Official 
Opposition had 
reasonable grounds for desiring the equivalent of a Vote 
of Censure on the Government of the day-or to bring before 
the listening public some important aspect of the Govern- 
ment's policy-.... a certain provision of time should be 
made to meet cases of this kind. (154) 
Overall therefore it is evident that by 1935 Labour objectives 
in regard to the principle of equality of access for purposes of pol- 
itical broadcasting had not been achieved. Nevertheless some important 
gains were made, due to the persistence of Labour pressure, the validity 
of their arguments, and the flexibility of the BBC on specific cases. 
In relation to Ministerial statements the BBC responded to Labour 
criticism by trying to minimise the likelihood of a repetition of the 
unpleasant situation which had arisen in October 1932. From early 
1933 the Talks Department appears to have discouraged Ministers from 
broadcasting such statements, preferring permanent officials in the 
departments concerned to make them. (155) In regard to the specific 
request by I. 3nsbury for the opportunity to participate in the 
'resignation series', Whitley offered Lansbury a broadcast discussion 
with a Government representative on the issue which caused the resig- 
nation. (156) This was not quite what Lansbury wanted, and the offer 
was rejected. But this is clear evidence that concessions of a sort 
could be wrought from the Corporation. Similarly, when ? ansbury 
complained that the Labour Party had not been invited to reply to the 
Prime Minister's talk on 'The Nation and the Unemployed' in December 
1932, Reith initially was unsympathetic. But on being pressed further 
by Lansbury an invitation was extended, in the event that he found 
MacDonaldts speech controversial. (157) In the case of Baldwin's 
broadcast on changes in his Cabinet in June 1935 Reith conceded 
afterwards that. the new Prime Minister's talk justified a rejoinder 
from the Official Opposition, and an invitation was extended to 
Lansbury"to participate in a series of three talks on the issue in 
question. (158) An additional Labour talk was granted in the Indian 
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series after several. representations to Reith. (159) Finally, agree- 
ment was reached in 1934 over the Budget. The detached Ministerial 
statement enjoyed by all Chancellors since Churchill in 1928 was 
replaced by a series of political talks in which replies to the 
Chancellor's talk were made by both Labour and Liberal Opposition 
Parties. Proposals along these lines had been-rejected by-Neville 
Chamberlain in 1933, just as Snowden had done in 1930, and on the 
same grounds. But in the case of Chamberlain's veto Lansbury was 
convinced that the decision was simply a manoeuvre to deny the Labour- 
Party the chance to comment on the Budget. (160) 
These were small gains compared. with the larger issues which 
remained unresolved for Labour, and they were evidently appreciated 
by frustrated Iabour. politicians. But Lansbury and his colleagues 
insisted, in virtually every case where some concession had been made, 
that acceptance of the modified arrangements did not prejudice, by 
setting a precedent, future negotiations on the general principle of 
equality of access. (161) Moreover, acceptance did. not imply gratitude; 
and Labour's fundamental sense of grievance remained undiminished. 
Indeed, it was constantly-fuelled by the BBC's attitude, and in, 
particular by the Corporation's attempts to assume greater control 
over political broadcasting. 
As already indicated, the Corporation decided in September 
1932 to take matters into its own hands regarding political talks in 
view of the inability, of the three Parties to arrange them. A. Par- 
liamentary Advisory Panel was established to advise the Corporation 
on the question of political broadcasting and liaise with the Parties. 
Its members were present in an unofficial capacity, but with the 
approval of the Conservative and Liberal Parties. Labour's objection 
to the PAP was conditioned by several factors. Whitley's attitude 
towards Lansbury did not ease the situation. But it was the unfortunate 
coincidence of the launching of the Panel with the controversy over 
the resignation of Snowden and Samuel which predisposed Labour 
politicians to regard it unfavourably. In drawing up proposals for the 
159. BLPES, Lansbury Papers, vol. 15, f137, Green (for Siepmann) to 
Iansbury, 15 November 1934. 
160. Hansard, vol. 280, col. 2299,24 JulY 1933. 
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Corporation's first series of party political talks in over a year, 
the 'resignation' talks were automatically identified with the PAP. 
Ton bury expressed surprise to Whitley that the BBC had not consulted 
the Party'Leaders before proceeding with the proposals, and that the 
BBC 'has apparently itself selected the subjects for discussion and 
the speakers'. (162) The selection of the issues put before the 
public was, Iansbury argued, a matter of vital importance, and there 
was a danger that in exercising this power of selection the authority 
responsible could overlook those questions to which the Official 
Opposition wished. to draw the attention of the public. It was essential 
therefore that political broadcasting should be under the broad control 
of the Parties; and that the BBC should consult with the Party Leaders 
concerning. speakers for such talks. Whitley tried to reassure Lansbury 
that strict propriety in the selection of both issues and speakers 
would be maintained by recourse to the Panel. (163) 7ansbury had 
initially approved of the PAP, and James Milner's membership of it 
as Labour representative. But it appears that Lansbury was given to 
believe that the BBC was not planning any-political series before 
April 1933. On hearing, without prior consultation, that a series 
was being arranged for the autumn, and that Arthur Greenwood had been 
invited to participate, Iansbury was furious. Arising as it did when 
Lansbury was in dispute with Whitley over the'resignation series' 
it appeared as yet more evidence of the BBC's shoddy treatment of the 
Labour Party. (164) Whitley's justification for the course of action 
taken, 'the Corporation's greater knowledge of the suitability of subjects 
and speakers ', (165) was patronising and inept, and provoked Lansbury: 
I an astonished that the BBC should-consider that it has a 
greater knowledge of the suitability of subjects and 
speakers than the Leaders of the Parliamentary Parties. 
This is an extraordinary claim. It implies that the BBC, 
controlling the greatest publicity service in the country, 
is to judge what ought to be the political issues dis- 
cussed and is further to select what politicians it pleases 
to represent organised political opinion.... I regret that 
I cannot share your view that listeners can trust the BBC 
to hold the balance fairly. (166) 
162. BLPES, Lansbury Papers, vol. 10, f277-9. Lansbury to Whitley, 
27 September 1932. 
163. BBC, P. G., Whitley to Iansbury, 30 September 1932. 
164. Ibid., Lansbury to Whitley, 2 October 1932. 
165. Ibid., Whitley to Lansbury, 30 September 1932. 
166. Ibid., Lansbury to Whitley, 2 October 1932. 
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Arthur Greenwood immediately declined the offer, Milner was advised-by 
the Party's NEC not to serve on the PAP, and the NEC formally expressed 
their hostility to the idea of 'unofficial political broadcasts under 
the auspices of an unofficial advisory"committee'. (167) The deputation 
to Whitley on the 25 October, fearing that the SBC might distance 
itself further from the political Parties and invite independent 
commentators to talk on Party issues, insisted that the views of the 
Labour Party should only be broadcast by its official representatives. 
The following day the NEC resolved that prior to any broadcast bya 
member of the Parliamentary Labour Party on matters of Party policy, 
approval was required from the Policy. -Sub-Committee, effectively 
preventing any Labour politician from participating in series of political 
broadcasts arranged through the PAP. (168) 
The to 1n issue of course was the responsibility for deciding 
upon which subjects political talks were to be broadcast. Whitley 
vigorouslg advocated the Corporation's ultimate control; (169) and 
Lansbury and the National Joint Council equally forcefully insisted 
that 
the choice of subjects by the BBC without prior consult- 
ation with the Leaders of the political Parties places in 
the hands of the Corporation the power to determine the 
electoral issues on which the public are to be invited 
to make up"their minds. Such a power is one which no 
medium for disseminating news and opinions ought to 
" enjoy. (170) 
The existence of the Advisory Panel, far-from alleviating the suspicions 
and ill-feeling amongst Labour politicians, served to exacerbate the 
situation. The Party decided to ignore it completely since it 'would 
be responsible to no-one'; but also-because in participating in the 
BBC's arrangements for political talks it implicitly accepted the BBC's 
narrow conception of legitimate political subjects. (171) 8eith had 
167. LPNEC, National Executive Committee Minutes, 30 September 1932; } 
BBC. Policy. Political Broadcasting. Parliamentary Advisory 
Panel., Milner to Reith, 6 December 1932; ibid., P. G., Lansbury 
to Reith, 18 October 1932. (Hereafter, 'P. AP'. ) 
168. TUC GC, National Joint Council Minutes, 25 October-1932; LPNEC, 
National Executive Committee Minutes, 26 October 1932. 
169. BBC, P. G., Whitley to Lansbury, 14 November 1932. 
170. Ibid., National Joint Council to Whitley, 22 November 1932. 
171. Ibid., Lansbury to Reith, 22 December 1932. 
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proposed a non-political series of talks on 'Housing' and the PAP was 
in the process of drawing up plans for it when Lansbury discovered 
what was intended. He argued that the Corporation regarded many subjects 
as. 'non political' which, from the Party's point of view, had political 
facets which ought not to be overlooked. He suggested that in accept- 
ing the BBC's definition of 'political' the Panel was not merely 
consolidating the Corporation's control over the range of political. 
issues brought before the public, but contributing to the narrowing 
of politics within certain limits, and thereby denying Labour the 
opportunity to express its views on issues which it considered to be 
politically important. (172) 
In practice the Panel proved to be of little value. It rarely 
met due to pressure of parliamentary business, and, as Roger Eckersley, 
Controller (Programmes) admitted in late 1934, it was not representative 
since there was no Labour member. (173) By June 1935 it was virtually 
moribund, and attempts byr Reith to reconstitute it and give the Panel 
greater status vis-&vis the Parties failed. (174) The collapse of 
the Panel was due in no small measure to the persistent lobbying of 
Lansbury and Attlee. Keith had been persuaded to allow the Parties to 
choose their own subjects and speakers in the autumn series of political 
talks in 1933 following Lansbury's insistence. (175) The precedent set 
here rendered the PAP redundant, and thereafter its role was insig- 
nificant. 
This then was a major success for the Party. But the question 
of ultimate responsibility for deciding the subjects upon which political 
broadcasts were to be made remained. It was a question for which there 
appeared to be no obvious solution, since the positions of the BBC and 
the Labour Party were mutually exclusive. As-the BBC had the advantage, 
this particular issue remained a source of resentment within the Labour 
leadership. In their evidence to the Ullswater Committee Sir Walter 
Citrine and Arthur Greenwood raised the question of the machinery needed. 
for arranging political. broadcasts. The problems, they argued, were 
to satisfy the needs of the Parties and avoid placing the i3C in the 
embarrassing position of determining either issues or speakers. If 
there was to be political broadcasting, it had to be the responsibility 
172. MQ, P. G., Iansbury to Reith, 22 December 1932. The 'Housing' 
series eventually became 'political'. 
173. Ibid., P. PAP., Eckersley to Reith, 19 November 1934- 
174. Ibid., Eckersley to Weston (Post Office), 18 June 1935. 
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of the Party Leaders and their advisers to arrange it, otherwise the 
BBC could become 'the arbiter of political fortunes'-(176) 
The resentment and frustration arising from these develop- 
ments were not eased by the occasional access to the microphone 
granted to Labour leaders in connection with political or 'semi- 
political'talks of a non-party character concerning broad subjects of 
topical interest. Sir Walter Citrine fog example took part in a 
debate with Professor John Hilton on the subject of 'Are Trade Union 
Restrictions Justifiable? '. Attlee gave three talks on 'Departments 
of State at Work'; and Herbert Morrison contributed to a series on 
'Freedom', and a short talk on 'The LCC Town Planning Schemel. But 
such talks were infrequent; and it is difficult to judge from the 
surviving BBC" files and the R dio Times the degree of balance in such 
talks and debates since on many occasions Labour or Conservative 
speakers were not present in their capacity as Labour or Conservative 
MPs, but as specialists in their chosen fields. It is however evident 
that-such general political broadcasting evoked little criticism from 
Labour ranks; and correspondence from contributors in these files 
conveys nothing of the bitterness apparent in Lansbury's exchanges 
with Whitley and Reith. Nor does it suggest great concern with any 
possible imbalance or advantage conferred upon Labour's political 
opponents (although there is occasionally some disappointment expressed 
that the discussion proposed did not cover certain aspects of the 
subject). 
In one particular aspect of general political broadcasting 
Labour enjoyed regular and equitable access: the weekly series 'The 
Week in Westminster'. The objective of the series was to give an 
impartial account by an eye-witness of proceedings in the House of 
Commons, conveying both the substance of the debates and the atmosphere 
of party politics. Labour politicians and prominent labour person- 
alities regularly broadcast on a rota basis with representatives of 
the other Parties, enjoying an unproblematic parity with Government 
speakers. Attlee was regarded as a particular success and bore the 
175. BBC, P. a., Lansbury to Reith, 10 July 1933. 
176. 'Broadcasting Policy', LPAB 1935, P"306. 
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burden of the majority-of Labour talks in the series in the ear] 
1930's. The experience was invaluable, but the exercise was regarded 
as-unsatisfactory and senior Labour politicians gradually-became 
disinclined to take part. (177) In their evidence to IIllswater Citrine 
and Greenwood suggested that it was not possible to be strictly 
impartial in these talks and it would be better to abandon them: 
if proper provision were made for the Party Leaders to appear before 
the microphone then such talks would be unnecessar5r. (178) 
As the General Election of 1935 approached, and nothing of 
significance had been achieved on the question of equal access, the 
Party began to pin its hopes on the official inquiry into broadcasting, 
and the outcome of the Election itself. For with a rejuvenated 
Official Opposition numerically restored to its pre-1931 size, the 
case for fairer treatment would be more difficult to resist on the 
basis of the BBC's previous policy in allocating broadcasts. The 
distribution of talks for the General Election therefore acquire& an. 
additional significance. 
Wishing to avoid becoming involved in the wrangling over the 
allocation of talks for the General. Election, Alan Dawnay, Controller 
(Programmes), had alreadyr informed the Government Chief Whip Margesson 
in June 1935 that the responsibility of the Corporation in connection 
with the Election consisted solely- in providing time in the programme { 
schedule for Election speeches. The question of allocating this time 
between the Parties was one which was best dealt with by a. committee 
of the three Whips, chaired by the Speaker. (179) The time to be made 
available was a 20-minute slot at 9-40 p. m. each evening for four 
days, for each of the three weeks covering the Election period - 
twelve broadcasts in all. The BBC's Control Board suggested that an 
allocation in the ratio of 7: 5 in favour of the Government as against 
both Opposition Parties could be the basis for negotiations; and it 
reluctantly accepted that minority political Parties such as the 
Independent Labour Party and the Communist Party might have to be 
177. BBC, Talks. Current Affairs. Week in Westminster., Wace to 
Siepmann, 11 July 1934. 
178. 'Broadcasting Policy', LEAR 1935, p"307. 
179. BBC, P. GE., 'Record of an interview between Dawnay and Captain 
Nargesson', 28 June 1935. 
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included in the axrangements. (180) In view of the Speakerts reluctance 
to assume responsibility for making these arrangements Margesson 
suggested to Graves, Dawnay's successor, that the Government would 
accept a ratio of Government 5, Labour 4, and Liberal 3. Only those 
Parties with a realistic chance of forming a Government should be 
included in the main Election broadcast series. Minority Parties, if 
granted access, should broadcast at some other, less favourable time, 
such as 6=00 p. m., and for a shorter period. (181) Margesson agreed to 
consult the other Whips on this basis, and on hearing that arrangements 
were being made Attlee immediately put forward his own proposals to 
Reith. Instead of the 5: 4: 3 ratio he suggested 5:. 5: 2 would be more 
appropriate since the Conservatives and the Labour Party were the only 
two real contestants for power. Moreover, as there was already a 
large number of Liberals in the Government, and the Samuelite Liberals 
had been elected as supporters of the present Government, Liberal 
opinion would be adequately' represented by two speeches; and as the 
total number of candidates mustered by all the Liberal. groups would 
not exceed 100, three broadcasts would be disproportionate to their 
size and influence. (182) With regard to minority- Parties Attlee had, 
k 
s 
as Deputy Leader, demonstrated his willingness to dismiss their claims. 
to use the microphone, contrary to official Party policy--(183) As 
Leader of the Party he was unwilling to take responsibility for denying 
their claims, probably because the political damage which the III' 
could inflict was considerable at a point when Party unity, above all, 
was critical, bearing in mind the catastrophic consequences of disunity 
prior-to the last: election. He therefore left it to the discretion of 
the Corporation to resolve this minor but sticky question. 1 
In addition, Attlee suggested that all Election broadcasts 
should cease. three days before the poll to prevent the Government, 
which would make the final speech, from gaining an unfair advantage by 
introducing a surprise issue into the contest to which Labour would 
have no opportunity of reply. Derived from the bitter experience of 
180, BBC, P. GE., Control Board, 'Notes on the Allocation of Election 
Broadcasting', 15 October 1935- 
181. Ibid.. -Record of an interview between C. Graves, Sir Stephen Tallents and Captain Margesson, 15 October 1935,16 October 1935. 
182. Ibid., Attlee to Reith, 17 October 1935- 
183. Daily Herald, 14 November 1933. 
490 
1931, when. Walter Runciman precipitated a Post Office Savings Bank 
'scare' three days before polling day, this was a precaution against 
'stunt tactics', fear-of which loomed large in Attlee's thinking. (184) 
Again, with reference to the events of the previous Election campaign, 
Attlee urged in-his letter to Reith that during the period of the 
General. Election all other.. talks which had anT degree of political 
content should be avoided. Furthermore, he requested that on the final 
night of the broadcast series, both the Official Opposition and the 
Government should speak, with neither Party seeing the script of their 
opponent. Lastly, he urged 'close scrutiny-of news bulletins" to avoid 
arg "tendenciousness* on the part of BBC announcers. (185) 
The Corporation complied with Attlee's requests regarding 
the scrutiny of news bulletins and the avoidance of any other political' 
talks during the Erection period. (186) With regard to the minority 
Parties the BBC decided to grant access to air Party which fielded. 
a certain number of candidates, the criterion of 20. not being made 
public: until after nomination day. (187) As none of these Parties 
put forward 20 candidates they were denied the opportunity to broad- 
cast. Attlee's suggestion that Election broadcasting should cease a 
few days before the poll, was. accepted; although the request for 
Labour and Conservative speakers to broadcast on the final evening of 
the series was rejected as impractical. On the central question of 
the allocation of talks, Graves indicated that the Liberals wanted. an 
additional talk but had accepted the original. proposal of three, and 
that Marg+esson had. threatened to demand at least-one more talk if 
Labour was granted an additional one. (188) Attlee accepted the 
5: 4: 3 arrangement 'under protests, but was presumably grateful. that 
the ILP had not. been included in the calculations, since the Liberals 
had in effect only two talks, Margesson having insisted that if Lloyd 
George was to-broadcast; which he did, he must take one of the Liberal 
allocation. (149) Finally, Attlee, mindful of the tendency of the 
184. Daily Herald, 2 November 1935- 
185- BBC, P. GE., Attlee to Reith, 17 October 3.935- 
186. Ibid., G. Murray to Chief News Editor, 21 October 19351 Mnrraa, to. 
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Corporation to omit the proper title of the Labour Party, reminded Graves 
that-the Party was not to be designated the 'Labour. Oppositions but the 
'Official Opposition'. (190) 
Before the negotiations over General Election broadcasting 
began the National Council of Labour issued a circular to Trades 
Councils and Divisional Labour Parties emphasising the importance of 
the Daily Eerald in the approaching Election. It reveals the Party's 
expectations regarding the likely allocation of talks: 
The use of the wireless will be a potent element in the 
contest whenever it may come, and, while the Labour Party- 
will claim a full opportunity to broadcast its policy, 
it is more than likely that the Government, on the strength 
of its claim to represent several Parties, will again secure 
a preponderat' proportion of the facilities afforded by 
the BBC. (1917 
In this context the final arrangements for the Election were a significant, 
advance for the labour Party. Similarly, in its evidence to the Ulls- 
water Committee, the NCL was 
emphatically of the opinion that during the election 
campaign the proportion of speakers allocated to each 
Party should broadly represent their strength in the 
country... (192) 
This submission signified a considerable shift in the Party's thin 
since 1932 and helps explain the remarkable ease and speed with which 
an arrangement was made in October 1935. It also demonstrates the 
confidence of the Party's leadership that in the event of an Election 
it would be largely-restored to its pre-1931 size in the House of 
Commons. But it further suggests the degree of success for Labour 
leaders in so far as the 1935 Election broadcast allocation did not 
'broadly represent' the Party's strength in the country. On the day 
prior to the dissolution of Parliament the Parliamentary Labour Party 
189. BBC, P. GE., Attlee to Graves, 23 October 1935; Record of an 
interview between C. Graves, Sir Stephen Tallents and Captain 
Margesson, 15 October 1935,16 October 1935. Lord Snowden 
eventually secured a similar arrangement, reducing the Liberal 
quota of talks to one. 
190. Ibid., Attlee to Graves, 23 October 1935. 
191. LPNEC, National Council of labour circular, 'The General. Election 
and the Daily Herald', February 1935. 
192.1M 1935, p"306. 
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consisted of 57 MPs; the National Government had 506, of which 449. were 
Conservatives. If the size of the vote rather than the number of MPs 
is taken as the measure of the Party's strength in the country, then 
in 1931 the Labour vote of 6.65 million was less than half that for the 
National Government (14.5 million), and only just over half that"for 
the Conservatives (11.95 million). There is no fully satisfactory 
way of indicating the strength of the Labour Party in the country, 
bye-elections providing at best a guide to the likely degree of change 
in political fortunes at the next election if the voting population votes 
along similar lines. As the NCL did not specify the means by, which 
this strength was to be gauged, it could suggest that the practice 
adopted by the Whips in 1930, of allocating talks according to numbers 
in the House of Commons, was the method to be used, (accepting that 
in 1931 an extraordinary set of circumstances emerged which could not 
be used as a precedent under normal political conditions). If that was 
sa, then the allocation agreed upon in October 1935 bore no relation 
to the relative strength of the three Parties, and marks a substantial 
advance in the Labour Party's quest for fair treatment in regard to 
political broadcasting. Even if the method to be used was based on 
the size of the vote in the previous election, the 2: 1 advantage for 
the National Government did not materialise in the allocations agreed 
in 1935, which would again represent a notable improvement in the 
position of the Labour Party. 
As before, Labour speakers during the Election were uninspiring, 
their microphone technique, with the notable exception of Herbert. 
Morrison, rather primitive compared with their political opponents. 
For-Harold Laski the Party's use of the radio was 'incomparably inferior' 
to that of the Conservatives. (193) Morrison however, with the assistance 
of Mary Hamilton, had arranged for the BBC Talks Department to coach 
him in the techniques of broadcasting. (194) The result prompted Thomas 
Jones to refer to 'the excellence' of riorrison's. talk. (195) 
193. H. Laski, 'The General Election of 1935', Political Quarterly, 
January-March 1936, P"7. 
194. M. A. Hamilton, Remembering My-Good Friends (London, 1944), p. 168. 
195. T. Jones to Abraham Flexner, 17 November 1935, in T. Jones, 
A Diary with Letters 1931 - 1950 (London, 1950), p. 156. See 
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Improvements there may have been, and they were not, from 
Labour's point of view, inconsiderable; but the scars of earlier disputes 
with the BBC remained and continued to colour the Party's conception 
of the Corporation. While in general terms Party leaders were prepared 
to give Reith and'his colleagues the benefit of the doubt, there were 
occasions where an institutional bias in favour of the Government of 
the day was the most generous construction which could be placed upon 
Corporation policy. Writing in January 1936, shortly after relinquish- 
ing the Leadership of the Party, Lansbury expressed with some bitterness 
a view which was representative of the state of opinion within the 
Partys 
the BBC under your guidance, or at least with your 
acquiescence has never, from the first days when the 
Labour. Party was driven from Office in 1931, received 
fair play from the BBC (sic). Since I gave up the. 
leadership my friend Major Attlee has been subject to 
the same kind of treatment. 
.... The BBC... has been, and apparently still is to be, 
grossly partisan .... It is the political outlook of the department Z am calling in question. (196) 
4. 
Between 1936 and 1939 there were few developments in political 
broadcasting in connection with party political talks. Talks policy 
in general became more adventurous. Talks programmes were wider in 
scope, more imaginative in style-, and much more accessible to what 
Nigel Luker of the Talks Department described as 'The not. so intelli- 
gent. and mostly uninformed', - the largest section of the Corporation's 
potential audience. (197) Bat political broadcasting languished, a 
casualty of the fundamental commitment of the BBC to the principle 
of 'balance', and of its dependence upon agreement amongst the three 
main political Parties before any partisan political broadcast. talks, 
discussions or debates were arranged. The wrangling of which the 
196. BLPES, Lansb Pa ers, vol. 16, f3-5. Lansbury to Reith, 
8 January 1936. That such an opinion was typical is clear from 
the views expressed on the BBC by Labour MPs during the three 
debates on the Corporation in the House of Commons in 1936 
following the publication of the Ullewater Report. 
197. BBC, Talks. Talks Policy., N. Luker to Assistant Director of 
Talks, 25 November 1938. (Hereafter, 'T. TP. ') 
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Parties had proved themselves eminently capable prior to 1936 disinclined 
Reith and his colleagues to become involved in further futile negotiations. 
But the Ullswater Report had recommended that on the major political' 
issues of the day there should be 'close cooperation and consultation' 
with the three main Parties. (198) It was with a discernible lack of 
enthusiasm that. a fresh approach was made in mid-1936; and by the end 
of 1938 no progress had been made. 
There were therefore surprisingly few political broadcasts 
falling along Party lines after the 1935 General Election. There were 
many debates and discussions on controversial subjects, but the part- 
icipants were recruited for their expertise on the matters in question 
and not their membership of a particular Party or organisation. (199) 
Yet even here there appears to have been, up to the end of 1937 at 
least, a decline in this type of programme, as Herbert Morrison's 
complaint suggests: 
I think it is unfortunate that there has been a tendency in 
recent years for the proportion of controversial broadcasts 
to decrease. I hope nobody has got cold feet. (200) 
In fact, there was a marked absence from the airwaves of politicians 
for any type of broadcast, np to 1938. As Sir Cecil Graves, Controller 
(Programmes) revealed, apart from the weekly, series 'The Week in West- 
minstert, fbro3dcasts by MPs are entirely sporadic'. (201) The only live 
political occasions regularly involving MPs as representatives of their 
Parties were the General Election and the Budget. Occasionally 
Ministers broadcast short factual statements about Acts of Parliament 
for which they were responsible, usually after the 10-00 p. m. News 
Bulletin. Otherwise, ITs appeared only as specialists rather than as 
Ids, and did not represent a Party or a partisan point of view. (202) 
This method of presenting controversial discussion was to enable 
'recognised authorities' to supply the listening public 'with as adequate 
198. Cmd. 5091 (1936) Report of the Broadcasting Committee, para. 92. 
199. BBC. P. G., Graves to Miss Stanley, 29 June 1937" 
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material as possible for forming their own opinion'. (203) This method, 
which, between the General Election of 1935 and February 1939 was the 
principal method of presenting political discussion over the airwaves 
(the Budget apart), was intended to provide an impartial presentation, 
to inform rather than persuade. It was essentially a form of broad- 
casting designed to satisfy the philosophical commitment to a broad 
educational function, and the obligations of the Corporation following 
the recommendations of the Crawford and Ullswater Reports, rather than 
to meet the political needs of the parliamentary Parties. Attempts 
to devise new approaches to political broadcasting had very mixed 
results, partly due to the difficulties involved in getting the Parties 
to agree, and partly due to the curious circumstances arising at the 
time. On making a decision in April l938 to take the initiative and 
not leave it to the Parties to agree before taking further action, (204) 
the Corporation found itself with no issues of domestic political 
controversy worthy of treatment: the most attractive issue was the 
Milk Bill. (205) Searching for a 'live political issue' the Director 
of Talks, Sir Richard Moonachie, eventually suggested a political 
discussion on the 'freedom of the press'; (206) but within a few weeks 
this question became the focus of heated argument in the House of Commons. 
The issue was very much 'live'; in fact it was 'too hot' for Maconachie 
to risk, and the idea had to be abandoned. (207) In consequence, despite 
their good intentions, BBC staff were helpless, waiting 'until some 
controversial measure comes before the House'. (208) The irony was that 
issues of foreign policy were drawing great public interest, but the 
Corporation felt unable to cover them in any way other than its standard 
method of impartial experts giving an authoritative exposition: 
foreign affairs were not to be the subject of broadcast partisan discussion, 
as the BBC had found to its cost over the planned series, the'Citizen 
and His Government'. (209) The Corporation was in the invidious position 
203. BBC, P.. G., Memorandum to the Talks Advisory Committee, 'Live 
Political Issues', 7 July 1938. 
204. Ibid., Nicolls to Maconachie, 6 April 1938. Nicolls replaced 
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of having to deny requests for facilities to talk on Anthony 
Men's resignation, and issues such as rearmament, yet offering the 
Parties the opportunity to get their teeth into the Bacon Industry 
Bill. 
BY April 1939 therefore only two broadcast debates had taken 
place involving all three Parties on subjects of current controversy, 
'Old Age Pensions" and 'Municipal Trading'. This was, as R. C. Norman, 
Chairman of the Board of Governors, put it in a letter to the Postmaster 
General, 'after years of effort on our part'. (210) Conveying a strong 
note of resentment he complained that 
the vast audience.... are deprived of the opportunity-of 
getting, through the unrivalled instrument which we control, 
such an education in the most vital controversial 
questions... (211) 
Lt was not through lack of effort on the part of the Corpor- 
ation that this state of affairs had arisen. The original Parliamentary 
Advisory Panel set up in 1933 had. by 1935 lost any usefulness it may- 
have had, and was finally dissolved in October of that year, at the time 
of the General Election. In May 1936, acting in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Ullswater Report, Rsith revived the idea of a 
Parliamentary Advisory Committee 'to advise us on all political broad- 
casts'. (212) Following previous procedure the Speaker was approached to 
nominate a Committee. The Speaker agreed on condition that all three 
Party Leaders made a formal request for him to do so. However, the 
Speaker was not prepared to act until the reassembly of Parliament in 
the autumn, by which time the Corporation had decided to wait anyway 
until February 1937, when the new Charter and Licence had come into 
effect. The subsequent preoccupation of the House with preparations 
for the Coronation made the Speaker reluctant to go ahead, since no 
request from the Party Leaders was forthcoming. In frustration Norman 
appealed to the PMG to suggest a way forward. (213) No reply was received 
to abandon its plans. See BBC, Talks. The Citizen and His 
Government, 1935-6. For a brief account, see A. Briggs, 
Governing the BBC, (London, l979), pp. 198-201. 
210. BBC, P. G., Norman to G. C. Tryon, 5 April 1939- 
211. Ibid. 
212. Ibid., Policy. Parliamentary Advisory Committee., Reith to 
? Carpendale, 18 May 1936. (Hereafter, 'P. PAC. ') 
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until almost twelve months later, when Tryon suggested there was 
nothing which he could do to overcome the problem. (214) 
Maconachie, the Director of Talks, drew the obvious conclusion: 
there was not going to be a Parliamentary Advisory Committee, and the 
BBC would have to work out its own scheme for political broadcasting, 
taking special precautions to pre-empt criticism of unfair treatment 
from the Parties. (215) Plans were eventually drawn up based on the 
principles that there should be an increase in the amount of political 
broadcasting within the Programme Schedule, and that it should focus on 
'live political issues' - that is, subjects of current interest in the 
House of Commons. (216) The scheme involved a series of talks along 
the lines of the Budget talks, in which each Party would make a state- 
ment, the talks to run consecutively for 10 minutes each, (Category A). 
It was assumed that Front Bench politicians would participate. 
Secondly, there would be the more usual method of treatment, discussion 
by recognised authorities in an impartial manner, where no Party 
considerations arose. Category Btalks would take place on a monthly 
basis. Thirdly, the practice of News Talks would continue. These were 
usually-Ministerial statements, or factual descriptions, and were not 
connected with subjects of controversy, (Category C). The possibility 
of providing a slot each week in the Schedule to be used as the Parties 
saw fit was rejected on grounds of bad programming practice. (217) 
The scheme was approved by the Board of Governors, and a 
fresh approach to the Party Whips was authorised in order to arrange 
a series of Category A talks. (218) Negotiations went slowly however, 
and in October 1938 Margesson contacted Nicolls suggesting that the 
Government would prefer to postpone further discussion until the new 
year, by which time the international situation might have improved. (219) 
It was only during the first week of 1939 therefore that agreement 
between Attlee and Margesson was reached; and plans were immediately 
214. BEC, P. PAC., Tryon to"Norman, 18 February 1938. 
215. Ibid., P. G., Maconachie to Graves, 7 March. 1938. See also ibid., 
Tallents to Reith, 15 March 1936. 
216. Ibid., Nicolls to. Maconachie, 6 April 1938. 
217'. Ibid., Nicolls to Graves, 30 May 1938. 
218. Ibid., Miss Stanley to Tallents., 9 June 1938; ibid., T. TP., 
Assistant- Director. of. Tallos . to. Maconachie9 15 June 1938. 
219. Ibid., P. G., Nargesson.. to Nicolls, 28 October 1938. 
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put into effect to begin a Category A series the following month. (220) 
Apart from providing a regular time in the Schedule, no other control 
over the series was exercised by the BBC. Scripts were not seen in 
advance, the subjects were decided by the Parties on a rota basis 
and were on live political issues, and each Party chose its own speakers, 
who were backbenchers. There was however a promise that. the scheme 
would not include foreign affairs or 'personal subjects' (that is, 
differences of opinion between members of the same Party) in the 
House of Commons. (221) The format was for each Party to broadcast 
for 14 minutes in succession, each from a different studio. They were 
therefore unable to gain an advantage because there was no way of 
replying directly to specific points made in the previous broadcast. 
The result was apparently less-of a discussion and more a succession 
of speakers reading prepared statements in a rather heavy style. (222) 
Attlee suggested that some life could be given to the talks if, at the 
end, an informal discussion between the speakers was introduced, allowing 
for the direct exchange of argument and counter-argument. But the 
Party Whips could not agree on this proposal and the original format, 
was retained. (223) Between February and the end of the Parliamentary 
Session there were six monthly broadcasts. The subjects were: 'Old Age 
Pensions' (chosen by the labour Party), 'Municipal Trading' (the Govern- 
ment), 'Unemployment' (the Liberals), 'Palestine? (the Government), 
'An Emergency Tax on Wealth' (Labour), and 'Agriculture'(the Government). 
One of the reasons for the 'success' in securing further 
political. broadcasts. for the Parties was the constant pressure of Megan 
Lloyd George on the Talks Advisory Committee. But it was the demands 
220. BBC. P. G., Nicolls to Maconachie, 9 January 1939. Unfortunately 
no details of the negotiations between Attlee and Margesson 
have survived in BBC records. 
221. Ibid., Ogilvie to the Labour Party, 9 February 1939. These two 
conditions were probably at the insistence of the Government, 
not the BBC. 
222. 'Debates that lack debate', Cooperative News, 27 May 1939. 
223. BBC. Talks. Political Broadcasting. Political Debates, 1939", 
Attlee to Nicolls, 4 May 1939; C. Edwards (Labour Chief Whip) 
to Nicolls, 11 May 1939. 
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of the Labour Party for opportunities to broadcast on issues of national 
importance which finally persuaded the Board of Governors that the 
Corporation must take the initiative and devise its own schemes. With 
the PMG's long awaited reply in February 1938 that he could do nothing 
to help the Corporation, the initial reaction within the BBC to the 
idea of assuming responsibility for organising political broadcasts 
was lukewarm. Maconachie for example thought it would be more trouble 
than it was worth. (224) But a deputation of the Labour Party to the 
BBC on the 30 March convinced the Board that it was both desirable and. 
necessary that there should be more (i. e., some) political broadcasts. (225) 
The Labour Party had already put forward its views on political 
broadcasting in its submission to the Uliswater Committee. Citrine 
and Greenwood had argued that political debates should be a normal 
feature of broadcast programmes. They accepted that such debates should 
not be the sole preserve of the Parties, but that neither should they 
be the sole preserve of the impartial specialists. In addition, there 
should be frequent broadcast talks on political questions, in which the 
Government would be entitled to explain and defend its policies, the 
Official Opposition's view would be entitled to be heard, and the Govern- 
ment would be entitled to a brief rejoinder at the end of the series. 
Moreover, machinery should be set up for the Parties to make the necessary 
arrangements. The role of the BBC should simply be to provide the 
programme time and the technical facilities: it was not within the 
province of the Corporation to determine the subjects of such broadcasts, 
or the speakers. (226) 
With negotiations over the Parliamentary Advisory Committee 
postponed between May 1936 and February 1937, and then held in abeyance 
until February 1938, it is not surprising that the labour Party-grew 
increasingly impatient.. The Government could use Ministerial statements 
to promote its policies and gain publicity, while labour had no opportunity 
224. BBC. P. G., Maconachie to Graves, 7 March 1938. 
225. Ibid.., Nicolls, 'Political Broadcasts', Memorandum, 3 June 1938, 
p. l. 
226. 'Broadcasting Policy', LPAR 1935, P"306. 
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to put its views across: it had not appeared before the microphone 
since the General Election of 1935, with the exception of the Budget 
talks. Herbert Morrison believed that the Corporation's reliance on the 
impartial expert as a way of fulfilling its obligations to provide 
political broadcasts was misguided: 
a pair of talks by two effective party speakers (whoever 
they may be) are likely to do the job much better than an 
educational lecture. (227) 
Eventually the Party's NEC resolved to see the Director General 
with a view to an equitable apportionment between the 
Government and the Official Opposition being arranged. (228) 
In order to give a sharper edge to Labour's claims to fairer treatment 
J. S. Middleton, the Party- Secretary, made a request for Labour to be 
given facilities to broadcast on the international situation, in view 
of the new development in Government policy. (229) The request was in 
effect an intimation thatlhe Labour Party wished to give its views on 
the events which had precipitated Fden's resignation as Foreign 
Secretary. But it appears to have been more specifically a device to 
bring the whole question of access to broadcasting facilities into the 
open; and in this respect the tactic was successful. Following the 
deputation to the Board of Governors on 30 March the Corporation was 
in no doubt that the Labour. Party wanted party political broadcasting 
to be established on a regular basis. (230) In the absence of any further 
progress, and following Ogilvie's decision to suspend negotiations until 
the internationa)ituation improved, Attlee felt the matter sufficiently 
urgent to request a meeting with the new Director General. At the 
meeting Greenwood argued that, accepting that the Government of the 
day was 'bound to get a larger showing', Labour should have had some 
opportunities for broadcasting its views. (231) The deputation agreed. 
to see Margesson, the Government Chief Whip, in order to revive 
negotiations and speed things up. (232) Within five weeks agreement was 
reached, and a new departure in British broadcasting was initiated, due 
in no small measure to the attempts by the Labour Party to gain access 
to the airwaves. 
227. BBC, C. HM., Morrison to Reith, 15 October 1937. 
228. LPNEC, National. Executive Committee Minutes, 15 February 1938. 
229. BBC9 P. G., Middleton to Reith, 24 February 1938- 
230. Ibid., Nicolls to Reith, 30 May 1938. 
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The new series of Category A talks did not however diminish 
the overall advantage enjoyed by the Government through its far treater- 
access to the radio. The issue had become sufficiently sensitive by 
early 1937 for the Corporation to circulate instructions that no 
Cabinet Minister or holder of high office should be approached to give, 
a talk or make a Ministerial statement without the prior approval of 
the Controller (Programmes). (233) As Graves explained: 
the point is that we have to keep a check here on the amount 
of broadcasting done by Cabinet Ministers. They are, of 
course, given opportunities for speaking factually about 
Bills and such like matters which have passed through 
the House, but we need to watch and see that this is not, 
overdone, otherwise we might find ourselves in the position 
of having the Opposition trying to make out that the 
Government was being given too big a showing. (234) 
But the justice of Labour's complaint was believed to be given 
greater poignancy by the episode relating to Eden's resignation. 
Middleton, as we have seen, immediately-requested facilities to put 
forward, Labour's views in the issues arising from Eden's departure 
from the Cabinet. On receiving a refusal, Middleton then discovered 
that Eden was to be given the chance to broadcast. The occasion was 
the Annual. Banquet of the Royal Society of St. George. But this was 
immaterial to Labour politicians, since a leading Conservative, who 
had resigned from the Cabinet on a major point of policy, was now being 
given the opportunity to broadcast. As he was no longer a Minister it 
was difficult for Middleton to understand why Eden should be granted 
an opportunity to put forward his views, since this was not in accord- 
ance with established Corporation practice - unless it was now the 
policy of the BBC to invite leading politicians who were not Ministers 
to speak. The Party interpreted BBC action as evidence of duplicity 
and further justification of Labour's case for facilities to put across 
its own views. (235) 
231. BBC, P. G., Record of an interview between Ogilvie, Graves, Attlee 
and Greenwood, 1 December 1938. 
232. Interestingly, Ogilvie was received warmly in the Labour Press 
on becoming the new Director General; and Harold Laski was quoted 
as saying of him 'By nature he won't. hanker after any "power" or 
dictatorship of the BBC. '. Daily Herald, 20 July 1938, P"7, 
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The point was reiterated by Attlee during the meeting of the 
Labour deputation with the BBC three weeks later. He accepted that the 
Government, sin the nature of things', had greater opportunities to 
broadcast. What concerned him was the distinct lack of opportunities 
for the Official Opposition. He urged that 'now and then' the Official 
Opposition should be given the chance to state its policy, and accepted 
that the other Parties'should be offered facilities to reply, in the 
manner of the Budget talks. (236) 
This was not what the BBC had initially envisaged. Before 
the deputation's visit the Corporation was thinking in testes of avoiding 
exhausting wrangles with the Parties by concentrating any expansion of 
political broadcasting, if any was to take place, on talks and debates 
by recognised authorities: 
Political broadcasts in the wider social sense of broadcasts 
which serve to educate the electorate on issues which are not 
necessarily very-controversial, or, at least, are not treated 
controversially, or actively before the public or Parliament. (231) 
The impact of the meeting was considerable. As Nicolls put it: 
the Labour Party is not likely to be satisfied with anything 
less than the most controversial Party political subjects. (238) 
There would be no advantage to the BBC in trying to avoid Party wrangling 
by sidestepping the question of party political broadcasting, since the 
Labour Party felt so strongly about the matter that the Corporation 
would be drawn in to a publicly embarrassing dispute if party broad- 
casting was denied. A scheme for Category A broadcasts was approved 
by the Board of Governors shortly afterwards. 
Again, therefore, a measure of success had been achieved by 
Labour. But other problems remained, not least of which was the 
236. BBC, P. G., Record of a Meeting between a Deputation. from the 
labour Party and a Committee of the Board of Governors and 
the Director General, 30 March 1938. 
237. Ibid., Nicolls, 'Political Broadcasts', 3 June 1938; Tallents to 
8eith, 15 March 1938. 
238. Ibid., Nicolls, 'Political Broadcasts', 3 June 1938. 
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prominence of Ministers in News Talks to the exclusion of Labour 
representatives. In the first three months of 1938, for example, 
eleven Ministers gave such talks, but no members of the Official 
Opposition were invited to do so. (239) Unfortunately there is little 
information available concerning such talks and the frequency or other- 
wise of Ministers and Opposition speakers, so no clear picture can 
be drawn of the general pattern of such talks over a period of a 
year or more. Ewen so it would seem that with the deteriorating 
international situation the number-of Ministerial appearances in 
News Talks steadily increased, with regular announcements on A. B. P., 
recruitment to various domestic services, and other preparations for 
war. The Labour Party complained that Ministers were using these 
occasions to gain publicity for themselves. (240) 
In addition accusations of a biased treatment in favour of the 
Government were made in connection with outside broadcasts. (241) The 
occasion which prompted this charge by Emmanuel Shinwell was the broad- 
cast of a speech by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir John Anderson, at a function 
presided over by the Lord Mayor. But the principal speaker in this 
instance was Herbert Morrison, whose speech was not broadcast, and who 
apparently knew nothing about the intention to broadcast until shortly 
before it took place. The incident prompted 'some score letters.... and 
... fifty telephone calls'- 
to the BBC complaining of this unfair exclusion 
of Morrison. (242) What also annoyed Morrison was that 
the Prime Minister was using your organisation on the 
Monday, the Lord Privy Seal on the Tuesday, and the Prime 
Minister again in a political speech in which he was 
critical of the labour Party, on the Saturday. 
It seems to me that Ministers are getting a share 
of broadcasting out of proportion to that of the 
Opposition. (243) 
This was more than a case of pique on Morrison's part. The regularity 
of Ministerial appearances was widely noticed, and in some quarters 
resented as conferring upon the Conservative Party an unfair electoral 
239. BBC, ]?. APB*., Nicolls to Tallents, 4 May 1938- 
240. Ibid., P. G., Ilicolls to Maconachie, 16 December 1938. 
241. Hansard, vol. 343, cols. 635-6,6 February 1939. 
242. BBC, P. NB., M. Farquharson to Nicolls, 30 January 1939. 
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advantage. Writing in the weekly Cooperative News, 'Michael', for 
example, complained of the 'number of times the Prime Minister tries 
to get on the air', adding: 
Jewellers' dinners, National Service appeals, and every sort 
of pretext is used to bring him to the microphone. As a 
result, his somewhat acidulated personality is made familiar 
to-listeners, and he is able to repeat over and over again 
his apologia for his foreign policy,, and to attack critics 
as irresponsible wreckers. 
With a general election not many months off, this is 
bound to give the Government a most unfair advantage if 
it is allowed to go on, for no Opposition broadcast has 
been heard since the Budget. (244) 
The cumulative effect of these developments was to encourage Labour 
leaders to believe that the BBC was not. being fair to the Party. This 
feeling was not dispelled by a well-intentioned invitation by Ogilvie 
to Attlee to explain to the listening public the issue between him 
and Sir Stafford Cripps concerning the tactic. of the popular front. (245) 
Attlee considered this quite unprecedented, since it was an attempt to 
initiate public discussion on internal differences between members of 
the same political Party, or rather between him and an ex-member, Cripps 
having been expelled on the 25 January. As he noted rather tartly 
No such suggestion has been made, as far as I know, in the 
case of Mr. Eden or Mr. Duff Cooper... (246) 
Attlee suggested that political broadcasting should be confined to 
discussion of matters between Parties rather than within them. Ogilvie's 
proposal was probably an innocent one, but Attlee appears to have 
regarded it as mischievous. 
But the main source of concern was a growing conviction that 
the Government was exercising control over the broadcast talks on foreign 
affairs. On the day Middleton made a request to the Corporation for 
the Party to broadcast on the international situation, following Eden's 
resignation, the BBC banned a broadcast by Colonel Wedgwood, a Labour 
Imo. His talk was part of a major series, IThe Way of Peace', examining 
244. 'BBC Gives Way to Political Pressure', Cooperative News, 11 Feb- 
ruary 1939, p. 8. Emphasis in original. Labour claims of unfair 
treatment. appeared to be- confirmed when. details of the number of 
talks made by Government speakers and members of the Opposition 
Parties were later revealed.. by the. Assistant PMG to the House. 
See Hansard, vol. 343, col. 2065,17 February 1939. 
245. BBC, P. G., Ogilvie to Attlee, 14 March 1939. 
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recent internationaltdevelopments, using impartial specialists. 
Wedgwoodts talk was banned because it contained critical references 
to Hitler and Mussolini, and he refused to remove these comments from. 
his script. (247) On the day the news broke of this matter, Sir Cecil 
Graves, Controller. (Programmes) wrote to Middleton explaining that no 
talk of the kind which he had proposed could be granted unless it 
was part of a balanced series: 
i 
Should we be officially infomed that it was the wish of 
the Government as well as of the Official Opposition that, 
there should be a broadcast discussion upon the present 
issue we might be prepared to make arrangements for such 
a broadcast. (248) 
Middleton explained however that the BBC had missed the point. The object 
of the request was for the Labour Party, to make a statement of its policy' 
on the issues arising from the new development in Government foreign 
policy. On such an issue of national importance the BBC should not 
abuse its discretionary, power. (249) The public, he argued, were being 
denied the opportunity to hear a balanced discussion on a matter of 
"supreme and international importance'. (250) The urgency of such a 
discussion was sufficient to persuade the Party to send the deputation 
which had such an impact on the Corporation on 30 March. By the time 
of this meeting the labour-position had however changed. Arthur Green- 
wood opened the discussion by saying that 'if the Government refused 
to allow this broadcast it would be a pity'. (251) This was not an 
accusatory statement, but one which accepted that behind the decisions 
of the Corporation was probably the hand of the Government. Attlee 
said they appreciated 'the statutory position' of the BBC -a reference 
to Clause 4 of the Licence - and Middleton urged the Board to take 
the initiative by inviting bath Government and Opposition to make a 
statement on the international situation. 
246. BBC9 P. G., Attlee to Ogilvie, 16 March 1939- 
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The record of this discussion is not sufficiently detailed to 
enable. firm. conclusions to be drawn, but it would appear that the 
deputation accepted that the Corporation's freedom of action may be 
restricted by the Government, but that. if it wasn't, then the Board 
of Governors should. offer programme time to both Government and 
Opposition, and it would be up to each side to use it. It should not 
be a question of there being a discussion if the Government agreed to 
take part: the Government would take part if the Opposition had already 
broadcast. The caution of the BBC was of course deliberate policy. 
As Tallents explained, 
the BBC has lately, of its own initiative and not at 
Foreign Office suggestion, felt obliged to exercise a 
special reserve in the arrangement and handling of 
broadcast-debates on live international political 
issues. If broadcast debates had no significance outside 
this country, any such discretion would be undesirable. (252) 
Nicolls concurred in this view: 'foreign politics must be entirely 
ruled out' of political discussion. (253) Furthermore, the Government 
made it conditional upon participation in any political debates (and 
therefore a condition of any political debate taking place) that 
foreign affairs be excluded. (254) By late 1938 the BBC was so uncertain 
as to how far it could go that Maconachie felt it necessary to contact 
the Prime Minister's Office for approval for a non-party discussion 
of National Service. (255) 
Labour claims that 'broadcasting was being used to bolster up 
the Government' began to suggest, in'the words of one Labour observer, 
that 'the responsibility for this state of affairs does not rest with 
the BBC*. (256) An accusation by Richard: Acland. (Liberal) in the House 
of Commons that it was the Prime Minister who decided whether or not 
the Opposition Parties should be allowed to broadcast their views on 
252. BBC, P. G., Tallents to Reith, 15 March 1938. 
253. Ibid., Nicolls to Graves, 30 May 1938. 
254. Ibid., Record of a telephone conversation between Tallents and 
Margesson, 20 July 1938. 
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foreign affairs reflected a widespread belief. (257) It was a charge 
that the Chairman of the Board of Governors found difficult to refute: 
it is uncomfortably near the truth to say that the decision 
who should speak is in the hands of the Prime Minister. (258) 
Indeed, the TUC and the Labour Party became very keenly aware of the 
influence which the Government was exerting in the Corporation when 
the National Council of Labour attempted to broadcast to the German 
people on the 25 August 1939. The Prime: Minister's Secretary tele- 
phoned the Assistant Controller (Programmes) to say that he did not 
want the message to be broadcast. A summary of the message was broad- 
cast in the Home News Bulletin, and Hugh Dalton and Citrine were 
'apoplectic with fury at our refusal to broadcast the whole message '. (259) 
The Foreign Office eventually withdrew their objections, and the full 
message was broadcast, in German. But the damage had been done, and 
the incident revealed to the NCL the overt control by the Government 
over the BBC. Despite reassurances by Sir Samuel Hoare in July 1939. 
that the Government had no intention of taking the BBC over, (260) the 
NCL saw things quite differently. The whole atmosphere of inhibition 
which had had such an effect ca the film industry could not but affect, 
in their view, the Corporation, and this latest incident confirmed 
their suspicions. For the first few months of the war the Labour Party 
and the TUC had. little to do with the BBC. 'The TOC', complained 
Citrine, 'had been deliberately flouted and ignored' by the BBC from 
the beginning of the war. (261) 
There were of course other occasions when Labour politicians 
gained access to the airwaves, namely the general political broadcast 
talks, debates and discussions which featured regularly in the Programme 
257. Hansard, vol. 345, cols. 1843-6,27 March 1939. 
258. BBC, P. G., Norman to Tryon, 5 April 1939. 
259. Ibid., Talks. Trades Union Congress., 'Record of Telephone 
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Schedule. As. the Ullswater Report recognised, such talks tended {to 
devote more time to the expression of new ideas and. the advocacy of 
change', (262) and for this reason proved most attractive to Labour 
speakers. Herbert Morrison made-frequent appearances, talking on such 
subjects as 'London's Green Belt' (8 December 1936), 'The Work of the 
LCC' (21 May 1937),. and 'London's Part in the Air Raid Precautions' 
(21. March 1938). Ellen Wilkinson gave a News Talk on her Hire Purchase 
Bill on the night it received its third reading in the House of Lords, 
14 July. 1938. Margaret Bondfield took part in a round table discussion 
on 'Trade Unionism and Industry' (11 January 1938). George Dallas made 
regular appearances to discuss, for example, 'The Farm Worker and the 
Pature' (25 March 1938), 'Family Allowances' (26 May 1938) and 'Private 
Enterprise and Public Ownership in Electricity. ' (25 Ocotber 1938). 
Similarly, Labour intellectuals such as Harold. Laski and. Richard 
Grossman became regular contributors to this type of programme, taking 
part in debates such as 'A Second Chamber is Neither Necessary nor 
Desirable' (18 January. 1936) and. 'A Penny on the Rates' (20 January 1939). 
These talks were not party political, and were highly regarded 
by the BBC staff, not. just for their good programme value, but because 
they were an effective means of ensuring that the BBC's contribution to 
the political education of the listening public was not subordinated to 
the narrow interests of party politics. There were limits however to 
what was possible in such general political broadcasting. The absence 
of a news collecting department within the BBC prevented the development; 
of up-to-the-minute analysis of political. affairs. This was also 
difficult for other reasons. The majority of programmes were scripted, 
and a programme series took both a considerable time to prepare and often 
a few weeks to transmit. In the India series for example, it took six 
weeks for the twelve talks to be broadcast. Nor was the modern technique 
of using a professional broadcaster to provide a summary argument used: 
the chosen representatives or recognised authorities had to speak for 
themselves, making debates cumbersome and unduly long. In addition, the 
commitment of the BBC to the principle of 'balance' in practice made it 
difficult for the late inclusion of a debate or talk on an issue which 
had suddenly, become the subject of controversy, since the Programme 
262. Cmd. 5091 (1936) Report of the Broadcasting Committee, para. 89. 
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Schedule had to be planned well in advance, and there was usually 
little time available (at late notice) within the Schedule for the 
insertion both of an initial talk on a subject and the necessary- 
reply. (263) Moreover, it. was usual prac. ticein general political broad- 
cast talks and discussions for the brief given to each contributor to 
exclude direct reference to party policies. Strict conditions were 
set for prospective speakers to ensure that their talks did not become 
too polemical or stray, too far from the specific subject of the series; 
and it appears that generally even speakers regarded by the Corporation 
as very controversial, such as D. N. Pritt and Harold Laski, accepted 
these-term s and stuck faithfully to their contractual obligations. (264) 
Only on rare occasions did serious problems arise, most notably in the 
case of William Fe=ie, a member-of the Communist. Party and an official 
of the National Union of Vehicle Workers. His talk, part of a series 
on 'The National Character', was cut off after he strayed from the 
script which had been re-written for him by the producer of the series 
Mazy Adams . 
(265) 
Consequently, while Attlee and his colleagues may have wished 
to be able to walk into a studio at short notice and air their views 
in an impromptu manner. on a subject of great topicality, it was 
virtually impossible for them to do so; and only very occasionallg 
could an unscripted debate on a highly political issue take place. One 
such debate, on 'Planning', was possible only because the speakers, 
Harold Macmillan, John Strachey and Arnold Plant, 'understood the 
necessity of balancing each other's opinions'. (266) 
There were programme formats which allowed. greater latitude. 
The Midland Region's Midland Parliament, (and later, Northern Region's 
Northern. Cockpit), provided an attractive forum of debate. Each speaker 
was able to make an uninterrupted statement, which was followed by an 
impromptu discussion. Subjects covered in the monthly debates included 
'Should Employers be Licenced? ', 'The Five Day Week', 'What are Fair 
263. BBC, Talks. Discussions and Debates. J. M. Rose-Troup to R. Wilson, 
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Wages? ' and 'Strikes or Conciliation? '; and contributors ranged from 
MPs to industrialists and trade union officials, as well as ordinary 
working people. Gradually, by 1938, most talks series of a general 
political character employed. the 'interlocutor technique' as a means 
of sidestepping the problems which had arisen from the commitment to 
the principle of balance. By this method an expert (usually a pro- 
fessional broadcaster, but. if not, usually a recognised authority 
with a good broadcasting technique) adopted the role of the ordinary 
listener, but. using his/her knowledge of the subject of a talk to ask 
the speaker penetrating questions from a broadly critical standpoint. 
By this means a new form of balance, it was hoped, would be established. 
One of the attractions of general political broadcast talks 
for the BBC was that it enabled the Corporation to retain virtually 
complete control over the programme, from conception to transmission. 
Occasionally-talks arose following suggestions from prominent individ- 
uals who were regular contributors - Herbert Morrison and Harold Laski 
for example, Morrison even massaging to persuade Reith to allow a party 
political broadcast series in connection with the LCC elections in 
1937. (267) But the overwhelming majority of such talks, regarded 
essentially- by the BBC as educational in charaoter, (268) arose at the 
initiative of the Corporation, which recruited its speakers from highly 
selective lists regularly compiled by the Talks- Department. Consequently 
access to the airwaves for this type of broadcast was of a fundamentally 
different kind from that for party political broadcasting: Labour 
politicians could not request facilities in their capacity as members 
of a political Party, only as individuals with a particular field of 
expertise; and anyone who exceeded the terms of reference of their 
talk, as defined by the Corporation, would probably never be given 
the chance to broadcast again. Even so, from a reading of the Radio 
Times and an examination of the material in the administrative and 
contributors' files in the BBC Archive, there seems to be little evidence 
either that Labour was treated. unfairly in the opportunities arising for 
this category of broadcast programme, or that Labour leaders regarded 
themselves as being treated unfairly. (269) 
267. See the correspondence with Reith, December 1936 - February 1937, 
in BBC, Contributors. Herbert Morrison. 
268. Ibid., P. GE., Record of an interview between Margesson, Ogilvie 
and Graves, 24 January 1939. 
269. Although in 1933 Kingsley Martin was convinced that he had. been 
blacklisted by the BBC. C. H. Rolph, Kingsley op. cit., p. 297. 
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As for the procedure for General. Election broadcasting, Attlee 
and Greenwood. believed that the arrangements made in 1935 'were the 
best that had yet been achieved'. (270) They-accepted that it was the 
responsibility of the BBC merely to provide time within the Programme 
Schedule for speeches, and not to determine the allocation of those 
periods between the different Parties. The Labour Party's view was 
that when Parliament had been dissolved there was in effect no Govern- 
went, and that it was therefore unfair that the late Government should 
be allotted more broadcasts than the Opposition. Attlee and Greenwood 
maintained that time should be allocated equally between the Govern- 
went and Opposition Parties on the lines of one Government speech for 
each Opposition speech. There was a rider however that only Opposition 
Parties 'with strong backing' should be allowed to participate. (271) 
Shortly after the I, abour Party's meeting with the Director 
General in December 1938 Ogilvie had conversations with Margesson 
to elicit the Government view. T4argesson accepted the validity of the 
argument that 'the existing Government and the apparent alternative 
Government should be treated on a 50/50 basis'. (272) Minority Parties 
should be considered after nomination day, and any fielding more than 
twenty candidates should be given an opportunity to broadcast, for a 
shorter period at a less important time of day. Attlee, on hearing 
of these suggestions was "much pleased and satisfiedt, regarding them 
'a fair solution of this difficult question'. (273) The subsequent 
agreement arrived at between the Parties allowed for twelve broadcast 
talks of twenty minutes each, allocated in proportion 5: 5: 2 for the 
Government, the Labour Opposition and the Liberal Opposition. The 
Government was to speak first and last, with three days clear of talks 
before polling day. The claims of minority Parties would be considered 
after nomination day, and a criterion of twenty-candidates was to be 
applied. Any-Parties meeting that criterion would be entitled to a 
single broadcast which would be separate from the main series. Lastly, 
no other talks of a political nature, or with political implications, 
270. BBC, P. G., Record of an interview between Attlee, Greenwood, 
Ogilvie and Graves, 1 December 1938- 
271. Ibid. 
272. Ibid., P. GE., Record of an interview between Margesson, Ogilvie 
and Graves, 24 January-1939- 
273. Ibid., Margesson to Ogilvie, 3 February 1939; Attlee to Ogilvie, 
6 February, 1939" 
U- 
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were to be given during the election period. (274) The Election of 
course never came. But the arrangements represent a major step 
forward for the Labour Party from the 1935 agreement. Given the 
importance of the likely election issues, and the consequences which 
such an election could have for the future of the Labour Party, the 
gain was more than theoretical, since Labour leaders worked on the 
assumption, up to early 1939 at least, that an election was close at 
hand. 
5. 
The Independent Labour Party's attempts to gain access to 
broadcasting facilities were almost wholly unsuccessful. Apart from 
one or two talks, such as James Maxton's discussion with Sir Ernest 
Benn on the question 'Should Death Duties be Abolished? ', on 21 January 
1933, the Party was virtually excluded from the airwaves for the entire 
decade. It was trapped in a situation which had no satisfactory 
solution, since, before it disaffiliated from the Labour Party, it 
was regarded as a minority-grouping within a major Party, and as such. 
could not be given special treatment over and above that afforded to 
the Labour Party as a whole; and following disaffiliation it became a 
minority Party with so few MPs that it did not meet the criteria by 
which broadcasting facilities were allocated. 
In May 1931 for example the IL? requested an opportunity-for. 
the Party to put forward its views in the series of talks on 'Export 
ti Trade-Policy'. The BBC replied, that party political broadcasts were 
arranged by the Whips of the three main Parties in the House of Commons 
recognised by the Speaker; and that the question of allowing minority 
views to be broadcast from within a major Party was one with which. 
Whips should deal. (275) Similarly, prior to the General Election 
of 1931 John Paton made requests for the Party to be included in the 
series of Election broadcasts, since the other. Parties were allowed 
to, the ILP was running independently of the Labour Party, and it would 
field twenty-five candidates. The reply from the BBC was simply that 
274. BBC, P. GE., Siepmann to Wellington (Assistant Controller (Pro- 
grammes)), 19 July 1939- 
275. Ibid., Policy. Political Broadcasting. Inde endent Labour Party., 
G. Murray (Assistant Controller (Information)) to J. Paton 
(Secretary of the IIP), 27 May 1931. (Hereafter, 'P. ILP. ') 
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the Party-Whips had made arrangements, implying that they could not now 
be altered. (276) When Penner Brockway-tried to persuade the Corporation 
to include I"Taxton in a series of talks on 'The Causes of War', the 
BBC'was again able to plead innocence: the arrangements had already 
been completed and it was impossible to extend the series. (277) 
Brockway accepted this in good faith, but hoped that in any future 
series on economic or political questions the Corporation would consider 
the Party. 
The problem of making arrangements which satisfied the three 
main Parties and included minority views was one which the BBC never 
satisfactorily resolved, largely because of the power conferred upon 
the three largest-Parties by the Corporation in the desire to avoid. 
becoming too involved- in the wearisome negotiations. Consequently, 
where party political broadcasting was concerned the BBC was disinclined 
to press for the inclusion of other views which could only jeopardise 
the delicate equilibri= which had been achieved at various times 
between Conservative, Labour and Liberal Parties. To a large degree 
therefore the ILP was crowded out of this type of broadcasting, not: 
by, the BBC, but by the other Parties. In the matter of general 
political broadcasting the control which the BBC retained enabled it 
to determine which organisations and individuals spoke, and on which 
subjects. But even here the logistics of large series served to 
preclude the ILP's involvement. In the case of the India series for 
example the twelve talks presenting a balance of authoritative statements 
and Party views, including minority views within the Conservative Party; 
were designed to explore particular themes, providing coherence to the 
series. The ILP's views on India simply did not, it would appear, 
fit in with the broad conception of the series, and the request had 
to be refused. (278) Again, in regard to the ill-fated series 'The 
Citizen and His Government', the ILP's request had to be refused 
because, as Graves explained, 
276. BBC, P. G., Paton to Reith, 10 October 1931; R. Eckersley to 
Paton, 12 October 1931. The criterion for inolueion in the 
series was 40 candidates. 
277. Ibid., P. ILP., Siepmann to Brockway, 22 October 1934; Brockway 
to Siepmann, 23 October 1934. 
278. New Leader, 25 January 1935, P"5. 
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There is no question of including in this series more than 
the main trends of opinion on the subject. It would not 
be possible, without entirely unbalancing the series, to 
add other-points of view. (279) 
Ever optimistic, Brockway again tried to get his Party's views broadcast, 
in the series of election talks-in 1935, justifying the ILP's inclusion 
by indicating that it intended to field twenty candidates. The BBC 
had decided to wait until nomination day before allocating time in 
the Programme for minority Parties, and the delay convinced Manton 
that the II. P was simply being ignored, the victim of a conspiracy of 
the three main Parties in collusion with the Corporation. (280) Reith 
tried to reassure him that if the ILP put forward twenty candidates 
then it was likely that the Party would be given the chance. to broad- 
cast. In the event, the ILP had only seventeen candidates, and no 
facilities were granted. Thereafter, the absence of material from 
the correspondence files of the BBC, and the steady decline in items 
in the New-Leader"on broadcasting, suggest that the dwindling Party 
gave up trying to overcome the ruthless logic of the two-party system. 
Where the 112 did occasionally succeed in gaining access 
to the airwaves the Communist Party was totally excluded from political 
broadcasting between 1928 and 1939" On at least three occasions, and 
there were unlikely to be many more, individual members of the CPGB 
took part in broadcast discussions, but as recognised authorities 
rather than as representatives of the Party expounding its policy or 
views. The individuals concerned were John Strachey and Arthur Horner. 
Horner for example took part in a discussion in the series 'Class - An 
Inquiry Into Social Distinction' on 15 November 1938, explaining the 
marxist approach to 'class'. Attempts were made at various. times 
to obtain facilities, but; in every case the Party's request was flatly 
refused, and usually with no explanation being given. 
279. , P. 112., Graves to Brockway, 25 September 1935- 
280. Ibid., P. GE., Brockway to Reith 24 October 1935; Eton to 
8eith, 28 October 1935. 
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On hearing of the Postmaster General's decision to permit 
some controversial broadcasting in March 1928, the CPGB contacted 
the Corporation requesting inclusion in any arrangements. Reath 
replied that the new scheme for political broadcasting was being 
arranged solely with the three main political Parties in the House of 
Commons-, 'which may be presumed to reflect the opinion of the large 
majority of the electorate'. (281) Undeterred, Shapurji Saklatvala, 
the first Communist 1a', asked unsuccessfully, for 'an opportunity 
to broadcast on "The Perils of Bogus Socialism"', in connection with 
the Labour-Party Annual Conference. With the approach of the Genera3. 
Election of 1929 J. R. Campbell wrote to Reith that he was 'amazed' 
that the BBC should make arrangements for election broadcasts without 
taking the CPGB into account; and he claimed the right to the same 
facilities as those granted to the three main Parties. (282) Reith 
simply replied that the Corporation was unable to provide the 
Communist Party with any broadcasting facilities in connection with 
the General Election. Saklatvala regarded this as unfair since the 
BBC was a public body 'which claims to hold the ring for all Parties'. 
What was particularly damaging in his view, was that many people 
believed that only those political Parties allowed to broadcast were 
entitled, legally, to field candidates, and therefore any refusal on 
the part of the BBC to allow the CPGB to broadcast could be very 
damaging. (283) Albert Inkpin put the Party's case more aggressively: 
The exclusion of our Party from broadcasting means that 
the Board of your Company, composed as it is of represent- 
atives of various capitalist interests and of members of 
the-three capitalist parties, is utilising the funds 
provided in large measure by working class tax payers 
to convey only capitalist propaganda to wireless list- 
eners. We protest against this open and arrogant 
class control of broadcasting and demand that you should 
immediately review your decision and admit us to the 
same facilities as the other parties. (284) 
In 1931 the Party again requested similar facilities to those 
granted to the three main Parties. On this occasion the reply was that: 
281. BDC, P. PPB., Reith to Inkpin, 10 May 1928. 
282. Ibid., P. GE., Campbell to the BBC, 10 April 1929. 
283. Ibid., Saklatvala to the BBC, 2May 1929. 
284. Ibid., Inkpin to the BBC, 3 May 1929. Reith was unmoved. 
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the arrangements had. already been made and could not be altered. In 
1935 however Pollitt's request received. a surprise reply: the BBC would 
consider his request. Since the CPGB was not contesting many seats, 
its policy- being to support the Labour Party candidate where possible, 
this was a rather empty gesture, made in the almost certain knowledge 
that the Party would not field more than twenty candidates. The 
calculated risk worked, and Pollitt was denied access to the micro- 
phone. (285) Thereafter, the Party appears to have abandoned any hope 
of broadcasting to the nation, until May 1939, when a misleading 
article in the Daily Herald suggested that the BBC was willing to 
give any political. Party air-time provided that it was represented in 
the House of Commons. (286) Pollitt immediately wrote to the BBC 
requesting that the Party's sole NP,. William Gallacher, be given the 
opportunity to take part in the monthly party political broadcasts 
recently axranged. (287) Tallents, the BBC's Controller (Public Relations), 
replied that the series to which Pollitt referred was agreed only on 
the basis that it was limited to the Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Parties. 
While the Party therefore was completely excluded from the 
airwaves, it should be noted that Harry Pollitt. was invited to take 
part in a major series, 'The Citizen and His Government', to put 
forward the Communist Party's view of the democratic system of govern- 
ment, and its proposals for improving it. That. the series was cancelled, 
largely because Pollitt and Sir Oswald Mosley were to take part, was 
further confirmation for the CPGB, if any was needed, of the fundamental 
bias of the BBC against the Party. (288) It should also be noted that the 
reasons for inviting Pollitt to take part in the talks were firstly- 
to add. appeal to the series, and secondly to provide an opportunity 
for communist (and fascist) views to be roundly attacked and 
discredited. (289) 
285. For the brief correspondence, see BBC, P. GE. 
286. Daily Herald, 3 May 1939. 
287. BBC, P. PPB., Pollitt to Nicolls, 10 May 1939. 
288. See for example, Daily Worker, 18 March 1936, p. 3. 
289. BBC, Talks. The Citizen and His Government., Record of an 
interview between Graves (Controller (Programmes)) and Sir 
Robert Vansittart. (Forei t Office), 27 September 1935" 
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To conclude this Chapter, it is evident that the high hopes and 
somewhat naive ambitions which Labour politicians had for the BBC in the 
years immediately following the inauguration of political broadcasting 
remained, by 1939, largely unfulfilled. While access Der se was, 
from 1928 onwards, no longer a fundamental problem, it was nevertheless 
a problem which was never fully satisfactorily resolved. This was in 
part due to chance circumstances: for most of the pre-war decade. 
Labour was not in power, and it was the Government of the day which 
enjoyed the privileges of general access to the airwaves. But it was 
also due to an aversion amongst the Party Leaders to allowing the 
BBC to deal freely with party politics. By-passing the main burden 
of responsibility for party political broadcasting to the three 
political Parties in the House of Commons Reith and Ogilvie had, in 
effect, created a situation in which this particular form of political 
broadcasting would feature only minimally in the Programme Schedule 
under normal circumstances, since the inability of these Parties to 
reach agreement ensured that few party political talks series took 
place for most of the decade. This was not, of course, intended by 
Reith or his successor, and they and their senior staff were fully 
aware of the inadequacy of the BBC's coverage of party political affairs. 
Nor was it intended by the Parties, although there were suspicions 
amongst Labour leaders that the high-handed and aggressive negotiating 
style of the Conservatives was calculated either to prevent any agree- 
ment being reached, or to achieve terms which conferred upon them an 
unequivocal advantage. In both cases Labour would lose out, since, in 
the first instance the Party needed. to use the radio to overcome the 
disadvantages of little press support and inadequate funds for sustained 
mass propaganda; and in the second: any-disproportionate advantage which 
the Conservatives may secure could effectively neutralise any benefit 
which Labour might derive from using the medium. Party political 
broadcasting, in general terms therefore, never materialised on the 
scale which the Labour Party expected. 
Similarly, the essential reluctance of senior BBC staff to 
relinquish responsibility, completely for all political broadcasting 
ensured that general access to other forms of political broadcasting 
was not possible. Adherence to a strictly non-partisan conception of 
general political broadcasting, one which relied heavily on the use of 
recognised experts rather than Party polemicists, and one which was 
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based on the principle of balance, ensured that no political Party 
was able to use this particular form of broadcasting to publicise its 
views and policies, except in the most oblique and attenuated manner. 
Access then, was possible, but it was either subject to very strict 
regulation and only vaguely corresponded to the needs of the Labour. 
-Party, or was largely theoretical, pending agreement amongst the 
Parties. The only opportunities for party political broadcasting 
which the Labour Party could rely on as certainties were on the occasion 
of a General Election and, after 1933, the Budget. 
As Labour quickly discovered however, access in itself 
was of only limited value: the second essential problem was equality 
of access to broadcasting facilities with Labour's chief political 
opponents, the Conservatives. It soon became apparent. to MacDonald 
and Lansbury that the BBC, at the very least, was both insensitive to 
the Party's position and exasperatingly unfair in its treatment of 
Labour in comparison with the Conservatives. At times specific 
circumstances generated deep resentment amongst Labour politicians as 
the quest for equitable treatment proved as elusive as ever. In 
particular, the use of the radio by the National Government to make 
Ministerial statements was a constant source of bitterness. 
It was the fundamental faith amongst Labour politicians 
in the public value of the BBC which accounts in some measure for the 
intensity of feeling generated by these frictions, since at times the 
Corporation appeared to be acting in effect, if not intentionally, as 
a channel for Conservative publicity rather than as a strictly impartial 
public service. It was also this faith, and the strategic importance 
of the BBC in the continuing democratic development of Britain, that 
encouraged the Party's leaders to persist in their claim for fair 
treatment. Such persistence gradually produced rewards. In 1929 
J. C. C. Davidson refused to accept the principle of equality of treat- 
ment in a General. Election in a three party system. Ten years later 
Nargesson accepted parity in a General Election in what was virtually 
a two party system. There were of course a number of points on which 
the Party made no progress. Most notable was the refusal of the BBC 
to allow Labour to use, at its own request, the microphone to broad- 
cast on issues of national importance without first having secured the 
agreement of the National Government to a balanced series. In this 
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way-the Labour Party found it impossible to attack key Government 
policies on the air. Consequently, while the gains made by the Party 
between 1928 and 1939 in connection with political broadcasting should 
not be underestimated, the central. issues of general. access to broad. - 
casting facilities, and equality of access with Labour's political 
opponents, remained highly contentious. 
CONCLUSION 
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The development of. the use of film by the Labour movement 
in Britain originated largely within the context of the activities of 
the Communist Party and its auxiliary organisations. The production, 
distribution and exhibition of films by Labour organisations in 
Britain arose from a combination of circumstances, including the need 
to generate support-for the Soviet Union, the growing political and 
aesthetic interest in Soviet films, and the censorship. of those films 
by the British Boarcl of Film Censors and local. Licensing Authorities. 
Films were used essentially to perform a cadre function, generating 
political. consciousness and contributing to the development of a 
'workers' culture". Of particular importance in this respect was the 
conception of the commercial cinema which prevailed within the cadre 
levels of the movement. Profound exception was taken to the soporific, 
influence exercised by_ the cinema and the mass psychology which, it 
was believed, the cinema was creating. Given the ultimately rationalist 
character of Labour ideology the pervasiveness of the cinema and its 
somewhat mysterious ability tt. influence people's attitudes and 
behaviour provided a new and compelling means of accounting for the 
inability of the mass population to act in accordance with their imputed 
objective interests and vote into power Labour's political representatives. 
On this view the cinema did not simply, induce a politically dangerous 
lethargy by chance, but was an instrument of direct manipulation. Far 
Labour observers the cinema industry was in conscious collusion with 
the movement's political opponents. But even trenchant theorists of 
conspiracy, accepted that there was never a complete correspondence of 
interests between the Conservative-dominated National Government and a 
cinema industry dominated by American distributors. They recognised. the 
determination of the Government to prevent-the showing of films, 
especially newsreels, which could cause political embarrassment or 
provide a focal point for criticism of major Government policies. It 
was within this context that attempts were made to use film by sections. 
of the Labour movement. Its purpose was to cultivate an alternative 
conception of film, one which emphasised the medium's value as a source 
of information-and political education rather than merely as a source 
of entertainment. 
Labour film work. was a political response to the political 
and ideological, character of the commercial cinema. Its most important 
phase occurred between 1936 and 1939, coinciding with. the Spanish Civil 
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rar and. the growing-threat of fascist aggression in other parts of 
grope. Rro film. agencies in particular, Kino and the Progressive Film 
; ýa. stitute; drew upon these developments, producing and distributing 
Aims which contributed to the growth of a broad cultural and political 
klignment across the country, one which overcame class barriers and 
Political differences. As the principal non-commercial sources of 
411sual news of events in Spain and elsewhere, and. of anti-fascist films 
generally, these groups helped to nourish the growth of anti-fascist 
. nd anti National Government politics on a considerable scale, and need. 
"to be seen as part of a much broader left-wing cultural and political 
'"thrust in the latter part: of the 19301's,, of an importance comparable 
to that. of the Left Book Club. 
The main organisations of the Labour movement, the Labour 
'arty and the TUC, were interested in the possibility-. of using films, 
ýöut 
were essentially unwilling to provide the funds necessary to sponsor 
Aroduction. This was. partly due to poor financial circumstances, but 
f3lso due to their attachment. to more traditional methods of publicity. 
2ere was, in addition, a confusion of purpose in regard to the manner 
In which such Labour films could be used; and the organisational practice 
of leaving responsibility for publicity and propaganda largely in the 
bands of local organisations ensured that little would be achieved. 
'Where the Conservatives were most effective waa in establishing a film 
I)ublioity organisation under central control. Such an arrangement 
was alien to Labour Party and TUC practice, and doubts as to the 
ability of constituency Parties and Trades Councils to show, through 
lack of projection facilities, any films which the National Council of 
Labour may sponsor, discouraged the NCL from taking any practical steps 
in the direction of film propaganda until late in the decade. That the 
Workers' Film Association was finally established was due more to the 
efforts of a few individuals, notably Joseph Reeves, than to ay 
strong commitment, on the Bart of the National_ Executive Committee or 
the General. Council as a whole. But it was also due to the achievements 
Of the London Cooperative Societies, whose film Advance DemocraoY 
demonstrated what-could be done to promote the movement and the degree 
Of interest amongst local bodies in using film. 
While the leaders of the Labour Party and the TUC lacked. 
any-real appreciation and understanding of the medium of film, they 
recognised in radio broadcasting a medium of immense potential for the 
0 
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movement. As a public service under monopoly control, it provided 
a successful model of the practical application of socialist principles. 
There were aspects of'its organisation which caused concern, notably 
the extensive powers of the Director General and the formal relation- 
ship of the Corporation with the State. Criticism of the style of 
management of Reith was counter-balanced to some degree by gratitude 
for the ethos of public service with which he had imbued the BBC. 
The social and cultural value of radio programmes was never in doubt 
for most Labour observers. But the political sympathies of the 
Corporation,, and of Reith in particular, were regarded as highly suspect. 
Given the impressive public status of the BBC and the sanction of 
approval which access to the radio automatically conferred, the use 
of the medium by the Labour movement was especially attractive. Yet. 
the fundamental character of radio broadcasting as a public service 
was seen to be. placed in jeopardy by the Director Generals whose 
political outlook and autocratic managerial style threatened to 
compromise the Corporation's independence. and impartiality. The NCL 
never succeeded in. bringing Reith and the BBC under greater public 
control. Nor did the Council manage to strengthen the constitutional 
position of the Corporation to provide greater protection against 
abuses by the Government of the day. Labour leaders accepted that such 
a powerful channel of communication should be brought under direct 
State control during a national emergency. But they took the view 
that in normal circumstances the Government should have neither the 
power to prevent anything from being broadcast, nor the power to have 
broadcast any material which-it desired. While protection against. 
such manipulation was based on trust and an all-Party-agreement which 
typified the inner workings of liberal democracy, there were, in the 
Labour view, occasions where the putative power of the Government of 
the day had in effect been 'e rcised, by intimation rather than by 
formal instruction. These problems had major political implications 
since the real value of the medium for Labour resided. in the general 
contribution which the BBC could make to the further democratic 
development of the country. According to this perspective however, 
by definition such development could only arise through the wider 
acceptance of the ideas and principles embodied in Labour Socialism, 
the dominant. ideology of the Labour movement. In an age of mass 
political communication, in which the dramatic growth of the electorate 
created entirely new political circumstances from those which existed 
prior to 1918, the relationship between politicians and voters was 
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fundamentally different. Despite the decline of the Liberal Party 
there was no guarantee that the rise of Labour would continue unabated; 
and Baldwin had demonstrated, through his 'new conservatism', that the 
Conservative Party was able to adjust to these new conditions and 
capture the middle ground. of British politics. With a mass electorate 
whose political loyalties were uncertain, and whose susceptibility. 
to press manipulation was widely accepted, traditional methods of 
publicity and propaganda were still necessary, but neither adequate 
nor fully appropriate. Radio broadcasting, by virtue of being a public 
service imbued with a high moral purpose and an educational impulse, 
appeared to Labour leaders to be ideally suited to Labour's predicament. 
Faced by near universal press hostility, unable to reach large sections 
of the population with its message, and finding its legitimacy as the 
alternative Party of office tenuous and uncertain, the Labour Party- 
looked to the medium of radio as a means of overcoming these problems. 
In practice the Labour Party gained only limited access 
to the airwaves, since party political broadcasting was only possible 
on the basis of balanced series of talks, and the three Parties found 
it difficult to reach agreement on how this balance was to be drawn. 
There was no free access to the technology of broadcasting, nor could 
there be as political broadcasting was only a minor part of the total 
output of the BBC, and in any case it was not a service intended to 
satisfy-the needs of politicians. But the central issue here for Labour 
was that under normal political conditions the Party was deprived of the 
opportunity of being able to broadcast its views on matters of national 
importance unless the Government consented to a series of party pol- 
itical talks on the subject in question. As the Government of the day 
enjoyed far greater general access to the microphone, Labour nurtured 
a strong sense of grievance at the apparent duplicity of the Corporation. 
Where the Labour Party did succeed in using the microphone it was 
largely under unfavourable conditions. The claim for full equality of 
treatment was persistently made and the logic of the Party's case proved 
increasingly difficult to resist. But any improvements in the Party's 
position vis-a-vis the question of equality of access were limited 
and mainly concessionary, and the general principle was never fully 
recognised by the BBC, much to the exasperation and anger of the 
Party's leaders. 
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Finally, during the late 1920s and.. 1930s the cinema and 
radio. opened. up new, possibilities in the political and ideological 
struggle being waged between the Labour movement and its political 
opponents. The Conservative Party' responded to these possibilities 
far more quickly-and effectively than Labour, taking advantage of their 
control of the institutions of the State for most of these years. 
These new media of mass political communication offered the opposing 
sides new-means of mass persuasion, involving techniques which were 
potentially, far more effective than more traditional methods. But 
film and radio also became the site of this struggle. The use of these 
media for political purposes became in itself a political issue, of 
direct importance, it was believed by, Labour leaders and activists, 
to the outcome of this contest; and one in which the advantage, and 
the initiative, tended to-reside'with the Party-in power. 
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Introduction 
The Filmography is arranged in four sections: A. British Films, 
B. Soviet Films, C. Spanish Films and D. Other Foreign Films. IIitries 
are listed alphabetically rather than by producer or distributor, to 
provide easier access to the production and distribution details of 
individual films. An overall picture of the scope of production and 
distribution for each labour film agency is provided by Tables XI and 
XII which follow these listings. 
Section At British Films, includes all films of a political 
character produced by or for the Labour movement between 1929 and 1939" 
It also includes films made by non-commercial or independent film 
organisations which were bought by Labour film groups for their 
libraries. The commercial publicity films of the Cooperative movement, 
have not been included, since the principal concern of the study is 
with the political use of film rather than the use of film for purposes 
of general education and commercial. publicity. Similarly, commercial 
films shown by organisations such as the Workers' Film Association have 
been omitted. from the list, even though the WFA acted in effect as an 
agent for commercial distributors, providing complete programmes of 
films for Labour Parties and trade union branches. Entries include 
films which were made but not released; and the symbol (+) is used to 
indicate that a film may not have been completed. An (*) is used to 
indicate the existence of copies of films in the National Film Archive, 
although not all such copies are in a viewable condition. Copies of 
many of those so denoted are also in the possession of Stanley Forman 
of Educational and Television Films Ltd. 
Section. B, Soviet Films, provides a list of all Soviet prod- 
uctions made available in this country between 1924 and 1939 which 
were distributed by Labour film agencies. It also includes films 
distributed by other groups such as Friends of the Soviet. Union and 
Unity Films, which either identified with the movement or whose 
personnel were Labour activists participating in the activities of 
Labour film agencies (Basil Barton for examples of Unity Films, was a 
key member of Kino). Section C provides a list of Spanish films made. 
available in Britain between 1936 and 1939, in connection with the 
Civil War. Section D. Other Foreign Films, includes all other foreign 
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material obtained by Labour. film agencies for their libraries between 
1929 and. 1939. 
The listings provide details for each film of the country- 
of origin, production company- (or, in some cases, individual. producers), 
the gange (9.5mm, 16mm or 35mm), whether or. not the film was silent (sl) 
or sound. (sd), it length in. minutes, its distribution company, date 
of release in this country, and any alternative titles by-which the film 
was ]mown. In a number of cases not all this information is available. 
The absence of documentary evidence for individual film agencies has. 
proved a major problem in the compilation of this filmography. There 
are no single primary sources to which reference can be made for a full 
list of films which any particular agency produced or distributed. 
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that any such sources ever existed. 
Consequently, these listings can not be considered complete. Never- 
theless, from the sources available it has been possible to compile 
lists which are virtually complete. 
Film titles azd. the associated production and distribution 
details have been derived from various sources. Me administrative 
records of the Film and Photo League in the Hugh Cuthbertson Papers 
provide accurate and reliable information for FPL and some Lino films. 
Similarly, the Herbert Marshall Collection, which contains a large 
number-of Lino publicity slips and advertising material, provides 
accurate information concerning films in Kino's library. Correspondence 
in the files of the National Council for Civil. Liberties and the 
Acquisition Files in the National Film. Archive provide reliable 
information concerning the films held by the Progressive-Film 
Institute. The Catalogues of the National Film Archive, the and o 
Trade Journal, the Slade. Film History Register, V. Wegg-Prosser's 
unpublished 'Notes: on the Films of the Film and Photo League', and 
extensive viewing have provided. cross-checks and additional, information. 
(A list of films viewed is provided in the Bibliography. ) For films 
which have not survived. the principal sources of information have been 
the various journals and newspapers referred to in the main body of 
the thesis, and in particular advertisements in the Daily Worker; and 
the sources already mentioned above. Further information has also been 
derived from. the various catalogues published by the Workers' Film 
Association between 1939 and 1943, the BFIts publication Some British 
and Foreign Documentary and other Short Films (1938), and the onthl 
Film Bulletin. Jay Leyda's Kino (1973) provided a basic reference for- 
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Soviet. films. Other reference works on Soviet cinema were consulted, 
but little infozmation could be found concerning rather obscure film 
titles such as Jewish Colonisation in the USSR. 
In a few cases little information is available regarding the 
origins or format of British films. Advertisements in the Daily Worker 
or Reynolds News may refer to a title and nothing more; but the frequency- 
of such advertisementsrestablishes the existence of a film and its use. 
Reliance on contemporary journals has its pitfalls, and where possible" 
cross-checks have been made to minimise errors. The Film and Photo 
League for example publicised widelya series of films intended to 
cultivate a popular front; yet from the surviving records of the League 
it is evident that only one such film, People's Front Newsreel, was 
ever made. In advertising film exhibitions, it was common for the 
people conoerne& to show little regard for accuracy in regard to the 
details of the films to be shown. A number of films became known bg 
several titles, and a few films, confusingly, had similar titles. More- 
over, running times vary-considerably-from one advertisement to another. 
Crime Against Madrid for example was advertised as being 30 minutes and 
45 minutes in length. Where possible such details have been checked 
with surviving films. Many films listed no longer survive. In order 
to minimise confusion and errors the date when a particular film was 
made available in this country has been pinpointed, where possible, 
to a. specific month in any one year. Where some films share similar 
titles the date of release and running time are reasonably accurate. 
for material of British origin; but foreign material has been difficult 
to cross-check in certain cases, and the entries can only-be taken as 
a guide. The date of release, in most cases, refers to the date when 
the film was first available in this country. There are a few exceptions 
to this. The Film Society for example imported a few Soviet films in 
the late 1920x,. which were subsequently made available for hire bg the 
Progressive Film Institute several years later. There was also 
occasionally- a delay between the 16mm and 35mm release of a film. Where 
this occurred release dates for both gauges have been given. 
Lastly, in a few cases in Section A entries refer to 'films' 
which were not intended for release on their own, but as part of news- 
reels. ILP Summer School, May Day 1935, Tom Mann at Pioneers' Camp and 
Soviet Polk Dancers were items in Workers' Newsreel No. 4. Some surviving 
films are without titles or are incomplete, and may-not have been 
released. Altermtively, they may have been used as newsreel items and, 
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on losing their topicality, were cut up again for future use in 
compilations as stock shots, or shown separately. Busmen's Holiday 
was shown as a self-contained film and then re-used as part of New 
Review 1937. There is no general pattern, but where it appears that 
newsreel material was re-used, the specific items of which the newsreel 
was made have also been listed individually. 
Abbreviations Used in the Listings 
BWSL. British Workers' Sports Association 
CFEFC Chinese Par Eastern Film Corporation 
CGT Confederation Generale du Travail 
CA1PC China Motion Picture Corporation 
CNT Conf4ddration National des Travailleurs 
CP Communist Party 
CWS Cooperative Wholesale Society 
FAI Iberian Anarchist Federation 
FOSR Friends of Soviet Russia 
FPL Film and Photo League 
FSII Friends of the Soviet Union 
IF International Films 
ISF International Sound Films 
LBC Left Book Club 
LCS London Cooperative Society- 
MWFS MerseyeideeWorkers I Film Society 
NACEC National Association of Cooperative Education Committees 
NATSOPA National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 
NJCSR National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief 
NIÜ North Kensington Labour Party 
PCF Patti Communist Francais 
PFI Progressive Film Institute 
PJIM Polish Jewish Labour Movement 
PN People 's. Newsreel. 
SACS Royal Arsenal Cooperative Society 
RCVGF Relief Committee for the Victims of German. Fascism 
SFC Socialist Film Council 
SMPI Spanish Ministry of Public-Instruction 
SPFA Scottish People's Film Association 
WEA Workers' Education Association 
WPA Workers' Film Association 
WFPL Workers' Film and Photo League 
UPOW Union of Post Office Workers 
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British Films 
TITT. R PRMUCTION DIST. n_Tr 
ACROSS THE BORDER Workers' Travel Ass. WFA 1939 
16/sd/10 
*ACTION AGAINST TEE MEANS Film and Photo League Kino 1935 
TEST 16/s1/10 
*ADVANCE DEMOCRACT Realist Film Unit Kino/PPI Oct 1938 
16/. 35/sd/18 WFA 
*AGAINST FASCISM Kino London Prod. Gp. Kino 1934 
16/s 1/5 
*AGAINST IMPERIAT WAR, ? Atlas ? FSÜ 1932 
MAY DAY 1932 16/sl/15 
*AHTI-FASCIST DEMON- Kino Kino Nov 1937 
STRATIONS, 1937 16/sl/2: 
+A. R. P. British Film Unit Kino 1939- 
16/sd/? 
THE AWAKE ING OF MR. COLE London Cooperative Soc CWS/WFA May 1939 
16/sd/20 
BANANAS Darting'ton Film Unit Kino 1936 
16/ßi/10 
*BEHIND THE SPANISH LINES Progressive Film Inst. Kino/PPI Jun 1938 
16/35/sd/20 
*BLOOD BANK SERVICE IN Kino/NJCSR Kino/ 1938 
SPAIN 16/sl/5 NJCSR 
BLOW, BIIGLFS, BLOW! R. Messel/Socialist PFI Apr. 1936 
Film Council 35/sd/75 
*BREAD Kino London Prod. Gp. Kino May 1934 
16/s1/12 
BRITAIN EXI? C+$ Progressive Film Inst. Kino/PFI Dec 1938 
16/35/sd/20 
THE BUILDERS Workers' Film Ass. WPA 1940 
16/sd/35 
*BUSMENIS HOLIDAT Kino/H. A. Green, 8. (ren Kino Nov 1937 
16/sl/7 
CAMBERWELL IS PREPARED Workers-' Film Ass. WFA Jun 1939 
16/sd/30 
*TIM CHALLENGE OF YOUTE Film and Photo League FPL Dec. 1937 
(IOU MARCHES ON) 16/sl/20 
*CHALLENGE TO FASCISM: Glasgow Kino Glasgow Jun 1938 
GLASGOW'S MAY' DAS' 1938 16/sl/17 Kino 
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TITLE PRODUCTION DIST. DATM 
THE CHILDREN'S REPUBLIC Workers Film. Ass. WFA 1939 
16/sl/10 
*CONSTRUCTION Workers" Film &. Photo Kino/FPL Dec 1935 
League 16/sl/l0 
CORNWALL THE WESTLAND Worksrs. t Travel Ass. WFA 1939 
16/sd/10 
*CORONATION MAY DAY Film and Photo League FPL Jul 1937 
(THE. xEmff MONTD: OF MAT) 161; s1/20 
*CP DEMONSTRATIONS MAT Kino Kino Jun 1937 
DAY 1937 16/sl/9 
*CP 15th CONGRESS Progressive Film Inst. Kino Oct 1938 
( CONGRESS - 16, (sl, sa/lo ýý 
ý 1938) 
CRIME AGAINST MADRID CNT/PEI Kino Jul 1937 
16/sd/30 
*THE DAILY WORTTB FILM Kino Kino/PN Dee 1937 
9.5/16/si/3 
DEFENCE OF BRITAIN Workers' Film & Photo Kino/FFL Dec 1935 
League 16/si/l0 
*DEFENCE OF MADRID Progressive Film Inst. Kino INoa-1936 
16/sl/45 
*DOCKWORKERS Film and Photo League FPL Nov 1937 
16/sl/10 
EACK FOR ALL London Cooperative Soc LCS/CWS May 1939 
16/sd/20 
FIGHT Workers' Film & Photo FPL Dec 1935 
League 16/si/io 
GAIETY OF NATIONS G. H. Sewell FPL Oct 1935 
16/el/10? 
+GENEROUS SOIL Film and Photo League FPL Oct 1937 
16/sl/10? 
*GLIMPSES OF MODERN RUSSIA Atlas Atlas Oct 1930 
35/si/l0 
*EM L IINLTD. Glasgow School of Art Kino Aug 1936 
16/sl/20 
HELP SPAIN PFI/NJCSR Kino/ Sep 1938 
16/sd/40 NJCSR 
HOLIDAY FROM UNFIPLOYZENT WM/Oxford Trades Kino/FPL Sep 1935 
Council 16/sl/15 
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TITLE PRODUCTION DIST. I 
HOMELAND HOLIDAY Workers' Travel. Ass. WFA. 
__ 
1939 
16/sd/10. 
I110 Workers' Ed. Ass. WEA 1938 
16/sd/10 
*ILP STJ ER SCHOOL, 1935 Kino Kino/FPL Sep 1935 
16/sl/3 
IN THE COUNTRY OF LEN 321 Friends of Soviet. FOSR Oct 1928 
EY TO SOVIET (A JO Russia 35/W? " , 
RUSSI 
INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE Progressive Film Inst. Kino May 1938 
16/sd/10 
*fl TIONAL BRIGADE PFI/Vera Elkan Kino Jul 1938 
16/91/10 
*INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE Ass. Cinematograph not (Dec. 
ENPRESS'HALL SALLY Technicians 16/sl/? released 1938 (RETIIES OF. THE 
INTERNATIONAL_BRIGADE) 
11W 1 pe IONAL COLUMN Progressive Film Inst. Kino Ma 193T 
16/sl/30 
IT'S UP TO US! Progressive Film Inst. Kino/ Feb 193T 
16/35/sd/5 Left 
Review 
*JUBILE7 1935 North London Film Soo. Kino/FPL Oct 1935 
(BRITAIN 1935: ýI WPL 16/sl/8 
LANCASHIRE PEACE Manchester FPL ? Manch. 1936 
DEMONS'T'RATION 16/81/? FPL 
LEFT BOOK CLUB' Progressive Film Inst. Kino/PFI Jan 193T 
16/35/0l/3: LBC 
LET'S HAVE A HOLIDAY Workers' Travel Ass. WFA 1939' 
LA4ESTONE Dartingtozn Film Unit Kino Mar 1936 
16/al/10 
LIVERPOOL: GATEWAY TO Merseyside Workers' MWFS/ Apr 1934 
EMIRE Film Soc. 16/sl/12 Kino Feb 1936 
LONDON MAT DLY 1933" ? I. Seruya not (Hay 
? E. Silver 16/sl/7 released 1933 
*LONDON WORKERS' OUTING Workers' Film & Photo Kino/FPL Sep 1935 
EASTER 1935 League 16/sl/3 
LONDON'S LABOUR DAY Kino Kino Jun 1938. 
16/? sd/5 
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TITLPý PRODUCTION DIST. DATA 
*MADRID TODAY SMP6 Kino/PFI Ma 193T. 3 Isd/8 
MANCHESTER AT WORK Manchester FPL Manch. Oct 1937 
16/sl/? FPL 
*MARCH AGAINST STARVATION Film and Photo League FPL Apr 1937 
16/81/30 
MA1TIRED TOWNS International. Peace. Kino Sep 1938 
Campaiga 16/sd/10 
*MAY DAY 1935 Workers" Film & Photo Kino/FPL Sep 1935 
League. 16/sl/2 
*MAY FIRST 193T Film and Photo League FPL Dec. 1937 
16/61/15 
rEDITERRANEAN JQUBEt Workers' Travel Ass. WFA 1939 
16/sd/10 
MR. ATTLEE. IN SPAIN ? Kino Kino/PFI Mar 1938 
16/35/s1/5 
MR. STRAUSS IN SPAIN ? Ki Kino/PFI Apr 1938 n35/sd/5 
16 
*MODERN ORPHANS OF THE Realist Film Unit/ Kino/PPI 1931 
STORM V. Saville/NJCSR NJCSR 
(BASQUE CHILDREN) 16/35/sci/l0 
*NATIONAL HUNGER MARCH Kino London Prod. Gp. Kino Apr 1934 
16/sl/15 
NATSOPA'S JUBILEE Workers' Film Ass. WFA ? 19391 
16/sd/20 
NATSOPA SPORTS DAY NATSOPA ? Kino 1938 
16/sl/? 
A. NEW RECRUIT London Cooperative Soo LCS/CWS/ Mar 1939 
16/sd/4o WFA 
*NEWS FROM SPAIN SMPI/PFI Kino/P Apr 1937 
16/35/sd/40 NACEC 
NEWS REVIEW 193T FPL/Kino Kino Dee 193T 
16/sl/30 
1931 Atlas Atlas Map 1931 
(TEE CHAR'S FILMT) 35/8l/20 
*NON-INTERVENTION Progressive Film Inst. PFI Jul 1938 
35/sd/10 
NORTE KENSINGTON M. Nathan/North Kensing, ? NKII' Feb 1937 
NURSERY SCHOOL ton Labour Party 
16/äl/10 
. 
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TITLE PRODUCTION DIST. DAT 
PASSPORT TO EUROPE Realist Film Unit WFA 
_ 
1939 
16/sd/10 
*PEACE AND PLENTY Progressive B'ilm Inst. Kino Mar 1939 
16/sd/20 
*PEACE. OF BRITAfl Freenat Films Kino/ Apr 1936 
16/35/sd/4 Preenat 
THE PEACE PARADE Pellt' & Healey/LCS LCS/CWS/ Oct 1937 
16fsd/12 ISF 
+A PENN TO SPEND Film and Photo League FPL ? 1937 
16/s1l? 10 
*PEOPLE WHO COUNT Pelly & Healey/LCS LCS/CWS/ Oct 193T 
16/sd%20 ISF 
PEOPLE WITH A PURPOSE Realist Film Unit RACS/ Oct 1939' 
16/35/sd/26 WFA. 
PEOPLE'S FRONT NEWSREEL Film and Photo. League FPS Dec 1937 
9.5/16/sl/10 
PEOPLE'S SCRAPBOOK 1938 People's Newsreel PN Jan 1939 
9.5/äl/6 
+"POPULAR FRONT FILM No. 3" British Film Unit not Feb=1939 
16%sd/? 40 released 
POTTER'S CLAY London Cooperative Soo LCS/CWS/ Ma3r 1939 
16/s&/20 WFA 
*PRISONERS PROVE INTER- Progressive Film Inst. Kino/PFI Apr 1938 
MENTION IN SPAIN 16/35/sd/5,10 
*RED, RIGRT AND BLOO FPL/LEF]! BOOK CLUB FPL/LBC Nov 1937 
16/s1/35 
*REVOLT OF TEIE FISHERMEN Workers' Film & Photo FPL Dec 1935 
League 16/sl/15 
*RHONDDA ? Cardiff Kino Kino Apr 1936 
(RHONDDA DEPRESSION YEARS) 16/sl/12 
*THE ROAD TO HELL Socialist Film Council SFC Aug 1933 
16/sl/40 
+RUSSIAN JOURNEY Film and Photo League FPL ? 1938 
9.5/sl/? 
*SAVE SPANISH CHILDREN Kino/NJCSR Kino/ Max 1938 
16/sl/5 NJCSR 
*SCHOOLS IN CATALONIA Kino/NJCSR Kino/ Feb 1938 
16/äl/5 NJCSR 
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TITLE PRODUCTION DIST. DATR 
SCOTLAND SPEAKS Scottish Peopleis Film SPFA/ Sep 1938 
Ass. 161sl/? Kino 
SH1+E DIP Dartington Film Unit Kino Mar 1936 
16/s1/10 
SHOTS OF 2E CLASS WAR Atlas Atlas 1932 
35/sl/? 
SOCIALIST SMIMR SCHOOL Kino London Prod. Gp. Kino Sep 1934 
16/sl/5 
SOVIET FOLK'DANCE'BS Film and Photo League ITL/Kino Oct 1935 
16/sl/5 
*SOVIET RUSSIA PAST AND ? R. Bond/"? I. Montagu FSU Jul 1933 
PRESENT 9.5/16/35/sl/75 
SPAIN 1936-3T. Film and Photo League FPL/Kino Oct 193? 
16/s1/15 
*SPANISH ABC Progressive Film Inst. Kino/PFI Jun 1938 
16/35/scj/20 
+SPANISE TRAVAIL Film and Photo League FPL Jan 1938 
(SPANISK DANCE) 16/sl/20 
*SPIRIT OF MAI DAY Film and Photo League FPL Jul 193T 
9.5/s1/12 
SPORT Workers' Film Ass. / WFA 1939 
BWSA. 161s1/10 
*STOP FASCISM Kino Kino Apr 1936 
16/sd/3 
THE STORE OF London Cooperative Soo LCS/WFA Oct 1939 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 16/sd/20 
*STRM Film and Photo League FPL Sep 1937 
16/al/22 
*SUSSIDC 1939 People's Newsreel PN Feb 1939 
(PEOPLE'S SCRAPBOOK 1939) 9.5/8l/10 
TENANTS IN REVOLT British Film Unit Kino Jun 1939 
16/sd/20 
*TESTIl-IONY ON NON- 
Progressive Film Inst. 
16/35/sd/33 
Kino/P May' 1938 
INTERVENTION 
TOM 14ANN AT PIONEERS' Workers' Film & Photo Kin#L Sep 1935 
CAMP League 16/sl/5 I 
TRANSPORT Workers' Film & Photo Kino/FP Nay 1935 
League 16/sl/15 . 
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TITLE PRODUCTION DIST. DATE; 
A TRIP TO RUSSIA Manchester. WFPL Kino/FPL Sep 1934 
16/sl/10,25 
A TRIP TO RUSSIA Friends of the Soviet Kino/nu 1936 
Unioa 16/sl/3Q 
*THE UNION OF POST OFFICE Union of P. O. Workers UPOW Mar 1927 
WORTES 35181/40 
USSR Friends of the Soviet Kino/PFI Apr 1936 
Union 16/35/s1/25 
? UTOPIA London Cooperative Soc LCS/CWS' Mar 1938 
(TROUBLE IN UTOPIA) 16/sd/22 
*VITAMINS Cambridge-Film Prods. Kino/PFI 1937' 
16/35/sd/20 
*VOICE OF THE PEOPLE Realist Film Unit Kino/WFA Oct 1939 
(ACHIEVEMEý]T) 16/35/sd/20 
*WE ARE THE ENGLISH Kino/London District Kino/ISF Nov'1936 
Communist Party 
16/sl/11 
! hMBLEI PAGEANT London Cooperative Soc LCS/CWS Sep 1938 
TOWARDS TOMORROW) 16/sd/42 
*WHAT THE NEWSREEL DOES Socialist Film Council SFC Aug 1933 
NOT SHOW. 16/sl/30 
*WINTER. Film and Photo League Kino/FPL Jan 1936 
16/sl/13 
WOHL' EDUCATION Royal Arsenal Coop. Soc SACS 193T 
16/al/10 
WORHERSI EDUCATION Royal Arsenal Coop. Soc RACS/WFA Max 1939 
(EDUCATE AND LIBERATE) 16/id/lo 
WORI I FILM ASSOCIATION Workers' Film Ass. WFA 1939 
NEWSREEL No. 1 16/sl/10 
*WORpt NEWSREEL No. 1 Kino London Prod. Gp. Kino/FP Aug 1934 
16/sl/10 
*WORKERSI NEWSREEL No. 2 Kino London Prod. Gp. Kino/FP Oct 1934 
16/sl/15 
*WOE I NEWSREEL No. 3 Workers' Film & Photo Kino/FP Mar 1935 
(II; T s T C I ON League 16/sl/15 ý 
H R ý ý 19 
H) 
UAB; THE 
*WORppq$ NEWSREEL No. 4 WFPL/Kino Kino/FPJ Sep 1935 
16/x1/1.5 
*"WORý TOPICAL NEWS No. 1 Atlas Atlas Mar 1930 
35/s1/5 
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TITI. ý PRODIICTION DIST. DATA 
*WOB= I TOPICAL NEWS No. 2 Atlas. Atlas Na 1930 
35/. 81/12 
wo1i is' TOPICAL NEWS No. 3 Atlas. Atlas Mar 1931 
35/x1/? 15 
*YOUTH PEACE PILGRIMAGE ? British Pilm Unit ? Kino Mar 1939 
16 sl 
B. Soviet Films 
TITLR PRODUCTION DIST. DATE 
ABYSSINIA soyuzkinochronika PFI/ISF Dec 1937 
16/35/sd/45 
ALO1M o Soy Sinn/PFI Feb 193T 
0 
zý8 
ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, MRMAL Soyuzkinochronikn Kino Feb 1939 
16/sd/10 
BASQUE CHILDREN -- Kino/WFA Jul 1937 
16/sl/10 
BATTLESHIP POTE! V1I Goskino Atlas Jan 1930 
9.5/16/35/sl/55 Kino Dec 1933 
PFI Mar 1936 
BED AND SOFA Sovkino PFI Jan 1936 
35/sl/70 
THE BLUE EXPRESS Sovkino Atlas Dec 1931 
35/sd/60 
THE BROTEMMOOD OF DEATH Sovkino Atlas Dec 1930 
35/x1/65 
BUILDING THE WHITE SEA Vostok-Kino Kino/P Sep 1935 
CANAL 16/35/sl/30 
(PORT OF FIFE SEAS) 
C. B. D. Sovkino Atlas Feb 1930 
(S. V. D.; THE CLUB OF THE 35/x1/80 
BIG DEED) 
CEAPATEQ Lenfilm PFI Jan 1938 
35/sd/95 
TEE CIRCUS Mosfilm PFI May 1938 
sd 0 
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TITI. F PRODUCTION D. IST. DATM 
CRIMEA Intourist Kino/PFI Apr 1936 
16/35/sl/12 
DANCES OF THE PEOPLE OF Soyuzkinochronika PFI May 1939 
TM USSR 35/sd/is 
DEFENCE OF LIBERTY -- Kino 1937 
16/sl/10 
THE DESERTER Mezhrabpomfilm Kino/PFI Feb-1931 
16%35/sd/95 
EARTH vu u Atlas May 1931 35/sl/60 
THE END OF ST. PETERSBURG Mezhrabpm-Russ Atlas Apr 1930 
16/35/sl/85 Kino/PFI Apr 1936 
FIRST TIME IN HISTORY --- Atlas 1930 
35/31/? 
FIVE YEAR PLAN --- Atlas Mar 1930 
35/81/2 
THE FREAS ONS Mezhrabpom-Russ: WIR 1924 
35/81/? 
FOR THE YOUNG Soyazkinochronika Kino/PFI Oct 1938 
16/35/sd/10 
THE FUNERAL OF --- PFI 1938 
STANISLAVSKK 35/sd/2 
THE GENERAL. LINE Sovkino Atlas, Mar 1931 
(OLD AND NEW) 9.5/16/35/31/95 Xino Jan 1934 
PFI 1935 
THE GHOST THAT NEVER Sovkino Atlas 1931 
RETURNS 9.5/16/35/sl/75. Kino/PFI Sep 1935 
GIANT HARVEST - Atlas Jul 1930 
35/si/2 
THE GIRL WITH THE HAT BOX Mezhrabpom-Russ Atlas. May 1931 
()I O+l) THAT LAUGHS ARD 
WEEPS 
35/s1/60 
GROWING UP Soyuzkinochronika giro Feb 1939 
16/sd/l0 
HARVEST FESTIVAL Soyuzkinochronika Kino Oct 1937 
16/sd/40 
HEROES OF THE ARCTIC Soyuzkino Kino/PFI May 1935 
16/35/sl/90 
IF WAR SHOULD COME Mosfilm Kino/PFI Nov 1938 
16/35/sd/50 
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TITLF P80DIICTION DIST. DATIZ 
IN T LAND OF THE SOVIETS International Friends Kino/PFI Feb 1936 
of the Soviet Union FSU 
16fs1/35/sd/60 
ISOTOV THE BOLSEEYI& Soyvzkinochronika Kino Jan 1935 
16/s1/15 
IVAN Mezhrabpom-Russ WIR 1924 
35/sit? 
JAZZ COMID' Soyuzfilm Kino/PPI Apr 1936 
16/35/sl/80 
JEWISH : COLONISATION IN Atlas 1931 
THE USSR 35/s1/l0 
JUBILANT MARCIE kinochhron11m So Kino/PFI Nov 193T ý3 
THE LAST NIGHT Mosfflm PFI May 1938 
35/sd/95 
LENIN IN OCTOBER Mosfilm PFI Dec 1938 
35/sd/97 
LENINGRAD Intourls Kino/PPI Apr 1936 
s1/12 
THE LITTLE SCR Sovkina Kino Sep 1934 
16/sl/10 
LOE° WHITE SAIL Soyuzdetfilm PFI Jun 1939 
35/sd/85 
MARIONETTES Mezhrabpomfilm Kino/PFI Oct 1937 
16/35/sd/80 
MAN OF THE WOODS VUFKÜ Atlas Jul 1930 
35/s1/2 
MEN AND JOBS Soynzkino Zino/P Apr 1935 
16/35/sd/70 
MIRACLE OF THE SOLDIER Mezhrabpom-Russ WIR 1924 
35fs1/? 
MoSCoW Intourist Kino/PFI Apr, 1936 
16/35/s1/15 
MOTHER Mezhrabpom-Russ Atlas Feb 1930 
16/35/sl/80 Kino Mar 1935 
NEW BABIIAN Sovkino Atlas Jul 1930 
16/35/31/80 Kino Jan 1935 
NEW MOSCOW Soyuzkinochronika Kino/P Feb 1939 
16/35/sd/1o 
OCTOBER Sovkino Kino/PFI Oct 1935 
(TE& DAYS THAT SHOOK 9.5/16/35/31/120 
THE WORLD 
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TITLE' PRODUCTION DIST. DATE; 
OIL SYM HONT Azerbaidjan Films Kino Apr 1935 
9.5/. 16/s1/15 
PALACE OF WONDERS Soyuzkinochronika Kino Feb 1939 
16/sd/12 
PATRIOTS Mezhrabpomfilm Kino/PFI Nový1937 
(OUTSKIRTS) 16/sd/80 
PIANO PRODIGIES Soyuzkinochronika PFI Deo 1937 
35/. sdff8 
PLACES AND PEOPLE Soyuzkinochronika Kino Feb 1939' 
16/sd/10 
POLIKUSHKA Russ WIR 1924 
35/x1150 PFI 1936 
PRISONERS Mosfilm Kino Apr 1937 
16/sd/? 
PROFESSOR MAMLOCK Lenfilm Unity Apr 1939 
35/sd/l00 Films 
THE PUPPET MASTER Soyuzkinochroni]ca PPI Dec 1937 
35/sl/8 
RETURN OF THE NORTH : POLE Soyuzkinochronika PPI 1937 
HEROES 35/ad/55 
REVOLT OF THE PISHEF T Mezhrabpomfilm Kino Oct 1937 
16/sd/90 
THE RICH BRIDE U1iainfilm Kino/PPI Aug 1939 
16/35/sd/80 
THE ROAD TO LIFE Mezhrabpomfilm Kino/ISF Dec 1936 
16/35/sd/105 
RUSSIA 1936 Soyuzkinocbronika Kino/FSU Apr 193? 
16/sl/10 
RUSSIA OA HOLIDAY Soyuzkinochronika Kino Nov 1938 
16/sd/? 
RUSSIA TODAY Soyuzkinochronikr, Kino/PFI Jan 1935 
(RUSSIAN NEWSREEL No. 1) 16/35/sl/10 FSU 
RUSSIAN NEWSEW. T. No. 2 Soyuzkinochronika Kino/PFI Mar 1936 
16/35/x1/? FSü 
SCENES IN SOVIET RUSSIA MM-zhrabpom-Russ WIR Aug 1924 
35/sl/? 
SHADOWS CF THE MACHINE 1 Atlas Jan 1930 
I- 
35/sl/? 
I 1- 1 
-1 
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TITLFý PRODUCTION DIET. DATE: 
SHANGHAI: DOCUMENT Soyuzkino/Prometheus Atlas Feb 1930 
16/35/01/30 Kino/PPI Nov 1935 
SON OF A SOLDIER Soyuzfilm Kino Nov 1934 
16/sl/80 
SON OF MONGOLIA Lenfilm PPI Sep 1938 
35/sd/70 
SOVIET 15th ANNIVERSARY. - Kino Apr 1934 
CELEBRATIONS 16/sl/?. 
SOVIET. PARLIANENT Soyuzkinochronika Kino Feb 1939 
16/sd/10 
SOVIET SPORTS Soyuzkinochronika Kino Feb 1939 
16/sd/15 
SOVIET- SPORTS PARADE Soyuzkinochronika PPI Sep 1937 
35/sd/? 
SOVIETS CONQUER THE Soyuzkinochronika Kino/FSU Jan 1935 
STRATOSPHERE 16/s1/15 
SPARTAKIADE - Atlas 1930 
35/sl/? 
STALIN'S REPORT Soyuzkinochronika Kino/FSU Apr 1937 
16/35/sd/? 
STORM OVER ASIA Mezhrabpom-Russ Atlas 1930 
9.5/. 16/35/sl/110 Kino/PFI Apr 1935 
THE THIRTEEN Mosfilm PFI Aug 1938 
35/sd/85 
TORN SHOES Mezhrabpomfilm Kino Mar-1937 
16/sd/75 
TOURING THROUGH THE - Atlas 1931 
CAUCASUS 35/sd/? 
TURSSIB Vostok-Kino Atlas Apr 1930 
16/35/sl/75 Kino Apr 1937 
USSR ON THE SCREEN nika. Soyuzkino Kino/PFI Dec 1937 
d 16/35/0/30 
VOLGA Intourist Kino/PFI Apr 1936 
16/35/sl/15 
VOROWSKY'S FUNERAL Mezhrabpom-Ruts WIR Aug 1934 
35/sl/5 
THE WAY TO PROSPERITY Soyuzkinochronika Kino Jan 1935 
16/sl/30 
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TITI, ý PRODUCTION DIST. NAT_S 
WORK AND PLAY IN THE USSR Soyuzkinochronika Kino/PFI 1938 
16/35/6d/1o 
YOUTH Soyuzkinochronika Kino/PFI Apr 1937 
16/35/. ed/25 
C. Spanish Films 
TITLE PRODUCTION DIST. DATE 
AIR BOI ING OF MADRID Kino/PFI 1937 
16/35/sl/9 
ALQUEZAR - Kino/PFI 1937 
16/sd/15 
BARCELONA NEWSREEL Laya Films Kino/PFI Jan 1937 
16/35/sd/10 
A CALL TO ARMS CN 6 Kino ffär 1937 
l d/20 
THE HEALTH OF SPAIN Film Popular PFI Jul 1938 
35/sd/15 
LAND WITHOUT BREAD L. Btinuel Kino/PFI Dec 1936 
16/35/sd/30 
LATEST NEWS APRIL-JUNE Iaya. Films PFI Jul 1938 
1938 35/sd/10 
MADRID 1936 SIIPI/PCF IsP Max 1938 
(LOYAL SPAIN, TAKE AR !; 16/35/sd/35 
NEW SPAIN) 
NEWS PROM SPAIN No. 1 Laya Films P11 1937 
35/sd/13 
NEWS FROM SPAIN No. 2 Laya Films PFt 1937 
35/sd/1o 
NEWS PROM SPAIN No. 3 Laya Films PFI 1937 
35/sd/1o 
NEWS PROM SPAIN No-4 Laya Films PFI 1937 
35/. sd/10 
REFUGEES IN CATALONIA Laya Films Kino/PFI 1938 
16/sd/10 NJCSR 
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PRODUCTION DIST. DATR 
SPAIN TODAY PFI Jan 1939 
35/sd/10 
SPANISH GAZETTE Iaya. Films ISP Mar-1938 
16/sd/? 
SUNSHINE IN SHADOW Film Popular Kino/PFI Jul 1938 
16/35/sd/12 
mist SHALL NOT PASS SHPI ISP Jun 1937 
16/35%ßd/32 
THE WAR IN SPAIN --- Kino 1938 
16/s1/15 
D. Other Foreign Films 
TITLE PRODUCTION (COUN=) DIST. DATE 
ABYSSINIA Praesens (Ger/Switz PFJ 1936 
35/sd/50 
BEYOND THE SUNSET (Canada) - WFA 1939 
16/sd/10 
THE BOMBING OF CANTON CEPC (China) PFI 1938 
35/sd/9 
BY SIINNr STREAMS --- (Czech) ISF Mar 1938 
35/sd/10 
CHILDREN MUST LAUGH (Poland) PJNII WFA 1939 
16/sd/60 
CHINA FIGHTS FOR FREEDOM Frontier (USA) Kino Dec 1937 
Films 
16/sd/40 
CHINA STRIKES BACK Frontier (USA) Kino/PFI Jan. 1938 
Films WFA 
16/35/sd/25 
CHINESE SOVIET ARMY ? Frontier (USA) Kino Oct 1937 
Film 
/sd/3Q 
CHINESE WAR SONG HITS No. 2 CFEFC . (China) PFI Nov 1938 
35/sd/10 
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TITI, iI PRODUCTION. (COUNTRY) DIST. HATES 
cam WITH us (Czech) ISP 1938 
(ouT SCOUTS) 16/35/sd/12 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1938 March of Time(USA) Kino/ISF Sep 1938 
(PRELUDE TO CONQUEST) 16/35%sd/15 
THE DAWN Hibernia (Eire) Kino/ISF Feb 1937 
be/35/sd/80 
FACES OF FRANCE P. Nizan (France) Kino Jan 1938 
16/sd/30 
FIGHT TO THE IA ST --- (China) Kino Oct 1938 
16/sd/55 
THE FIST'S SONG T. Chosheng (China) ISP Jun 1937 
16/351sd/? 
FREE TRAETMANN! RCYGF/ (USA/Ger) Kino/PFI Jul. 1935 
(ERNST TEEIMAN: New York FPL 
FIGHTER AGAINST FASCISM) 16/35/sl/20 
GARBAGE -- 
(France) Atlas Nov 1929 
35/sl/? 
l RUP! Messner-Pilm'(Czech) Kino/ISF Feb 1937 
16/35/sd/100 
INSIDE NAZI GERMANE March of Time(USA) Kino Mar 1939 
16/sd/15 
INVASION OF SHANGHAI Prometheus (Switz) ? Atlas 1932 
35/. sl/? 
JUVENILE CRII"IE March of Time(USA) Kino Feb 1939 
16/sd/10 
KAMERADSCHAFT . Nero-Films 
(Germany) Kino Sep 1937 
16/sd/80 
LAND OF PROMISE Urim (Palest. ) ISF/WFA 1937 
Palestine 
Film Co. 
16/35/6d/50 
MILLIONS OF US American (USA) Kino/PEI May-1937 
Labor Films 
16/35/sd/15 
NANKING CAPTURED (Ch) Kino Apr 1938 
16/sd/10,20 
NAZI. CONQUEST No. 1 March of Time(LISA) Kino Sep 1938 
16/sd/l0 
NEW SCHOOLS FOR OLD March of Time(USA) Kino Feb 1939 
16/sd/10 
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TITLE PRODUCTIM f (COUNTRY) DMT. TIATR 
NEWS PARADE: GERMAN! Castle Films(USA) FPL Äpr 1938 
INVADES AUSTRIA 16/äl/10. 
NEWS PARADE No. l: Castle Films(USA) FPL Oct 1937" 
WAR IN CHINA 16/sl/10 
NEWS PARADE OF THE YEAR Castle Films(USA) ITL Tan 1938 
16/a1/10 
SHADOW OF THE MINE Prometheus (Germany) Atlas Feb 1930 
(HUNGER IN WALDENBURG) 16/35/sl/40 Kino/PFI Jan 1935, 
S8MCRAPES SYMPHONr - (IISA) Atlas Nov 1930 
35/al/? 
SOAPBUBBLES Davis: Film (Ger/Fr) Kino Oct. 1937 
16/ad/45 
SPANISH EARTSr Contemporary(USA) Unitr Dec 193T 
Historians Films/ 
16/35/sd/50- Kino/ISF Jul 1938 
STAY IN STI? TR Cin6-Libert6(France) Kino Nov 193? 
(STR. IKES OF JUNE) /CGT 
16/sl/lo 
STOP JAPAN Garrison (USA) Kino/PFI Sep 1935 
Films 
STRADNA&IDS (France) --- PF1 1937 
35/ad/? _ 
TENANTS BENT STRIKE Frontier (USA) Kino/PFI 1938 
Films 
16/35/sd/20 
THREAT TO GIBRALTAR March of Time(USA) PFZ 1938 
35/sd/15 
LA VIE EST Ä NODS PCF (France) PFI Apr 1937 
35/sd/80 
WAR IN CHINA March of Time(USA) Kino Oct 1937 
16/sd/10 
WAR IS HELL Brescoe (Germany) Kino/ Apr 1936 
16/sd/75 NACEC 
WATER AND WAVES Prometheus (Germany) Atlas 1930 
35/al/? 
WESTFRONT"1918 Nero-Films (Germany) Kino Feb 1937 
16/sl/100 
W TLANDS (Canada) -- WFA 1939' 16/sd/15 
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TI__ PRODUC=-: (COUN Y) DIST. nATE: 
TEE WORLD BELANGS TO US (Czech) IsP 1938 
16/sd/9o 
ME WORLD TODAY: THE New York Kino(USA) PFI. Mar 1937 
BLACK LEGION 35/sd/12 
YOUTH WILL CHANGE TEE (Czech) ISP 1937 
WORLD 16/sd/80 
fb1e u. Summary of Labour Film Production 1929 - 1939 
Atlas Films 6 (1) 
Workers t' Film and Photo League* 27 (3) 
Kino** 22 (4) 
Progressive Film Institute 18 
Socialist Film Council 3. 
London Cooperative Society 9 
Royal Arsenal Cooperative Society 3 
Five London Cooperative Societies 2 
Workers' Film Association. 6 
Others 23 
Total u 
Elates: 
*Including the Film anti. Photo League. 
**Inolndiag the Kino, London Production Group and the British 
Film Unit. 
Refers to individuals and provincial groups such as Glasgow"Siaa 
and Manchester Film and Photo League. 
1. Pigurea in parentheses refer to films 'which may have been made. 'B: r 
these groups about which little information is available. 
2. The figure. Lou PFZ includes. 5 films made from footage of Spanish 
origin. 
_JV 
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Table %IT- Summary of Labour. Film Distribution 1924 - 1939 
British. Soviet. Spanish American Others Total. 
Atlas 6 ?Z - 1 4 33 
Kino 68 56 8 13 12 157 
WPPL 30 - - 3 - 35 
PIE 15 45 13 7 .6 86 
ISF 3 z 3- 2. 8 18 
Wgg 21. 1 - 1 4 27 
Others; 11 6 - - - 17 
Total. 127 91 18 20 28 284 
*. Vote: These figures represent the minim m+ totals of films distributed,. 
by each group. Some distributors handled the same films. 
'Other-t- distributors were not strictly distributors but Labour 
organisations which use& films as. part of their, work and 
occasionally issued films which they bad bought or made. 
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A. British Broadcasting Corporation, Written Archives Centre, 
Caversham Park, Reading. 
548 'E r 
y 
Many files have been consulted, but not all have been cited in 
the text. The index number of each file, where known, has been 
given. Where initials have been used in footnote references 
they also have been given. 
Adult Education: TUC General Council R14 
AR Audience Research: Special Reports: Winter 
Listening Habits R9/9/LB167 
AR Special. Reports: Summer 
Listening Habits R9/9/LR/71 
Broadcasting Advisory Board Minutes CO 65 
Contributors: Clement-Attlee 910 
R: Walter Citrine 
" William Ferrie 
Arthur Horner 
Harold Laski 
HM Herbert Morrison 
Ellen Wilkinson 
Control Board Minutes R3/3 
Lord Reithts Papers 
News: Accusations of Bias - Sunday-Political 
News B28/3 
N. GC. ": General Correspondence R28/79 
" Home News Policy- B28/88 
" Industrial News R28/94 
Labour Party B28/101 
" News Agreements R28/154 
" News Bulletins: General Correspondence R28/169 
N. PB. ": News Bulletins: Political Bias B28/170 
": News Division R28/177 
Policy: Controversial Broadcasts R34/317 
": Controversy Committee Minutes R34/318 
: India R34/428 
": Planning 834/315 
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Policy: Programme Analysis R34/597 
Programme. Planning R34/609 
P. APB. Political. Broadcasting: Accusations 
of Partr Bias 834/523 
P. B. ": Political Broadcasting: Budgets 334/527 
P. G. Political Broadcasting: General R34/534 
P. GE. ": Political. Broadcasting: General 
Election Broadcasting 1134/535 
P. ILP. ": Political. Broadcasting: Independent 
Labour Party R34/ 
P. MB. ": Political Broadcasting: Ministerial 
Broadcasts 834/553 
P. PAC : Political Broadcasting: Parliamentary 
Advisory Committee R34/558 
P. PAP. ": Political Broadcasting: Parliamentary, 
Advisory Panel 1134/559 
P. PR. ": Political Broadcasting: Parliamentary 
Reporting 1134/561 
P. PPH. ": Political Broadcasting: Party 
Political Broadcasting R34/563 
": Strikes R34/881 
K: Trade Unions R34/89T 
Sykes Committee Minutes 84/6/2 
Talks: The Causes of War R51/623 
": The Citizen and His Government 851/83 
": Class: An Inquiry R51/ 
": Current Affairs: The Week in 
Westminster 1151/ 
T. DD. Debates and Discussions 851/118 
": Midland Region 851/322 
North Region R51/ 
" Political Broadcasts;: London County 
Council 851/415 
": Political. Broadcasting: Political 
Debates, 1939 R51/417 
" Private' Enterprise and Public 
Ownership R51/ 
T. TP. ": Talks Policy R51/397 
": Trades Union Congress R51/ 
": The Way of Peace R51/ 
Ullswater Committee: Other Written Evidence 
Papers 1- 138 34/7/8 
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B. British Film Institute, Charing Cross Ed., London. 
1. British Board- of Film Censors. Verbatim Reports (1930 -, 1931)- 
2. British Board of Film Censors. Scenario Reports (1930 - 1939)" 
3. Hugh Cuthbertson Papers. 
4. London County Council. Verbatim. Reports (1929 - 1930)" 
C. British LibrarT of Political and Economic Science, Portugal St., 
London. 
1. George Lansbury Papers. 
2. Independent Labour. Party. Minutes of the National 
Advisory. Committee (1921 - 1939). 
D. British Movietone News Ltd., North Orbital Rd., Denham. 
1. British Movietone News Files. 
2. Minutes of the Council of the Newsreel Association of 
Great Britain and Ireland (1937 - 1939). 
E. British-Universities Film and Video Council, Dean St., London. 
1. Issue Sheets of the Five. Plain Newsreel Companies. 
2. Accession Ledgers, Gaumont Sound. News/Gaumont Mritish News. 
P. Cooperative-Union Library, Hanover St., Manchester. 
1. Minutes of the Central Executive Committee of the 
Cooperative Union (1929 - 1939). 
G. EMI/Pathe Library, Wardovr St., London. 
1. Pathe News Files. 
H. Brynmor Jones LibrarTT, Univeralty of Hull, Cottingham Rd., Hull. 
1. The Archive of the National Council for Civil Liberties 
DCL L- 86 (Selected Files on Film and Broadcasting). 
I. Labour Party Archive, London. 
1. Labour Party National Executive Committee Minutes (1918 - 1939). 
J. London Cooperative Society Library, Notting Hill Gate, London. 
1. Minutes of the Political Committee of the London 
Cooperative Society. 
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K. North. West Film Archive, Manchester Polytechnic, Hilton St., 
Manchester. 
1. Reg. Cordwell Papers. 
L. National Union of Mineworkers' Library, Euston 8d., London. 
1. Miners' Federation of Great Britain. Annual volume of 
Proceedings, Minutes of the EScecutive Committee (19310 - 1939) 
M. Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond. 
1. Home Office Papers 
HO 45 (Selected Files). 
2. Cabinet Office 
CAB: 23 (Cabinet Minutes) 
3. Ramsay MacDonald Papers 
30/69 
N. Trades Union Congress Library, Great Russell St., London. 
1. TUC General Council Minutes an .. Memoranda 
(1926 - 1940). 
2. National Joint Council Minutes and Memoranda (1926 - 1934). 
3. National Council of Labour Minutes and Memoranda (1934 - 1940). 
4. Workerst Pilm Association Papers 
(i) Annual Reports 1939 - 1943 
(ii) Cashbooks 1938. -' 1943 
(iii) Ledger of Transactions 
0. Transport and General Workers' Union Libra77, Smith Square, London. 
1. Minutes of the General Executive Council and Finance 
and General Purposes Committee (1935 - 1939) 
P. University of Southern Illinois at Carbondale, Ohio, USA. 
1. Personal papers of Herbert Marshall. 
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IT. PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES 
A. Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 
Eansard, Fifth Series, 1922 - 1939 
B. Command Papers 
Cmd. 1822 Wireless Broadcasting Licence (London, $N1SO, 192-3) 
Cmd. 1951 Report of the Broadcasting Committee (London, HMSO, 1923) 
Cmd. 1976 Supplementary eement to the Licence 
London, HMO, 1923 
Cmd. 2260 General Treaty Between Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Signed at London 
8th August 1924 London, BI O, 1924) 
and. 2.599 Report of the Broadcasting Committee 
Londoix, EMSO, 1926 
Cmd. 2756 Wireless 33toadcasting - Drafts of (1) Royal 
Charter .... and 2 Licence .... (London, HMSO, 192 
Cmd. 3418 Correspondence Regarding the Resumption 
of Relations-with the-Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist. Re ublics 
(London, ENSO, 1929 
Cmd. 5091 Report of the Broadcasting Committee 
London, ENSO, 193ß) 
Cmd. 5320 Report of a Committee Appointed by the 
and of Trade to Consider the Position 
of British Films London, EMSO, 1936 
C. Official Reports 
Report of the Committee Appointed to Advise the Home Office 
and the Scottish Office on Matters Connected With the 
Administration of the Cinematograph Act 1909, 
The Position of Slow Burning Films (London, HMSO, 1939) 
D. Annual Reports and Administrative Records 
Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers, Annual Report 1934-39 
Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the City of Leeds 
Labour Party 1937-1939 
Association of Cinematograph Technicians Annual Report 1935-1940 
British Shard of Film Censors Annual Report 19ZB-1936 
Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association Annual Report, 1930-1936 
Cooperative Union Congress Report 1929-1939' 
Independent Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1929-1932. 
Kino Films Annual Report 1936 
Labour Party Annual Report 1924-1939 H 
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Leeds and District Trades Council Annual Report 1930-1939 
London County Council Annual Report 1929-1939 
London County Council. Minutes of Proceedings 1928-1939 
Manchester and Salford Workers' Film Society Report and 
Financial Statement 1930-1933 
National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers 
Annual Report 1935-1939 
National Union of General and Municipal Workers Report 
of the Biennial Congress 1934-1940 
National Union of Railwaymen Proceedings and Reports 1936-1939 
Report of the Annual Conference of Trades Councils 1929-1939 
Report of the Annual Meeting of the National Council of 
Labour Colleires: 1929-1939 
Report of the Congress of the Communist Party of Great 
ýý 1927-1939 
Royal Arsenal Cooperative Society Annual Report and Balance 
Sheet 1930-1.939 
Trades Union Congress Report 1924-1939 
Transport and General Workers Union Report and Balance 
Sheet to the Biennial Conference 1932-1940 
Workers' Educational Association Annual Report 1927-1939 
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A. E. U. Monthly 
Amateur Cine World 
Bioscope 
Board. of Trade Journal 
BBC Annual 
BBC* Handbook 
BBC Yearbook 
Bulletin of the Leeds Film Institute Society 
Camerv, Forward 
Cinema Quarterly 
Cinema/Today's Cinema 
Close Up 
Communist Review 
Comradeship and the Wheatsheaf 
Cooperative Educator 
Cooperative News 
Daily. Herald 
Daily-Worker 
Erperimental Cinema 
The Eye 
u 
554, 
Caumont British. News 
Home Movies and Some Talkies 
International. Literature 
International Peace Campaign 
International Theatre 
International. WorkersI theatrical Olympiad. Bulletin 
Journal of the A. C. T. /Cine Technician 
Kinematograph Weekly 
Kinematograph. 7tear Book 
Kino News 
Labour 
Laboe Organiser 
Labour Press Service 
labour Research 
Labour Year Book 
Leftfilmfront 
Left News 
Left Review 
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Listener 
Literature of the World Revolution 
Manchester Guardian 
Millgate 
Monthly Film Bulletin 
NATSOPA Journal 
New Clarion 
New Leader 
New Masses 
New. Propellor 
New Statesman 
New Theatre 
News Chronicle 
Paramount Service 
Party-Organiser 
Peace Year Bbok 
People's Year Book 
Plebs 
Political Quarterly 
Popular Wireless 
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Radio Times 
Record. 
Red International. of Labour Unions/RILU Magazine 
Red Stage/New Red Stage 
Reynolds News 
Russia Today 
Searchlight. 
Socialist Review 
Soviet Russia Pictorial/WorkersI International Pictorial 
Spanish Relief 
Sunday Worker 
The Times 
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Voice of Spain. 
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H. Films Viewed 
Many of the Iabo= films listed below were either viewed at 
Metropolis Pictures or, at the time of viewing, were in the sole 
possession of Stanley-Porman of Educational and Television Films 
Ltd. The Metropolis material has now been deposited in the 
National Film Archive, and copies of the ETV collection have 
been made by-the NFA. 
1. National Film Archive 
(a) Films Used by the Labour Movement 
xj 
Action Against the Means Test 1935 rt 
Advance Democracy 1938 
Against Fascism 1934 
Against Imperialist war; May Day 1932 1932 `t. 
Anti-Fascist Demonstrations 1937 e 
Battleship Potemkin 1925 
Behind the Spanish Lines 1938 
Bread 1934 
The Busmen's Holiday 1937 
Challenge to Fascism: Glasgow's May Day 1 938'1938. 
Construction 1935 
Coronation May Day 1937 
CP 15th Congress 1938 
Crime Against Madrid 1937 
5TO 
Daily Worker Film 1937 
Defence of Madrid 1937 
Dockworkers 1937 
The End of St. Petersburg 1927 
Free T aelmann 1935 
The General Line 1929 
Glimpses of Modern Russia 1930 
The Health of Spain 1938 
all Unltd. 1936' 
ILP Saner School 1935 
In the Land of the Soviets 1936: 
International Brigade 1938 
Jubilee 1935 
London, Nay-T 1933 1933 
London Workers' Outing, Easter 1935 1935 
Madrid Today 1937 
March Against Starvation 193T 
May Day 1935 1935 
MW Day- 1937 1937 
May the First 1937 193T 
Modern Orphans of the Storm 1937 
National Hanger March 1934 1934: 
News 1 Spain 1937 
Passport to Europe 1938 
Peace and. Plenty- 1939 
Peace of Britain 1936 
People Who Count 1937 
People's Scrapbook, 1938 1939 
Prisoners Prove Intervention in Spain 1938 
Red, Right and Bloo 193T 
Revolt of the Fishermen 1935 
Rhondda Depression Years 1936 
The goad to Hell 1933 
Spanish ABC 1938 
Spanish Earth 1937 
Stop Fascism 1938 
Storm Over Asia 1928 
Strife 1937 
Sussex 1939 1939 
Turksib 1929 
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Voice of the People 1939 
We Are the English 1936 
What the Newsreel Does Not Show 1933 
Winter 1936 
Workers' Newsreel No. 1 1934 
Workers' Newsreel No. 2 1934 
Workers' Newsreel No. 3 1935 
Workers' Tapical News No. 1 1930 
Workers' Topical News No. 2 1930 
Youth Peace Pilgrimage 1939 
(b) Films Produced by or for the Conservative Party 
John Ball's Hearth 1926-7 
Red Tape Farn 1926-7 
Socialist Car-of State 1930 
The Right Spirit 1931 
Stanley Baldwin Election Speech 1931 
The Great Recovery 1934 
Britain Under the National Government 1935 
Sam Small at Westminster 1935 
Stanley-Baldwin Election Speech 1935 
(c) Other Documentary, Publicity and. Propaganda Films 
Britain Today 1936 
Eaough to Eat? 1936 
The Halth of the Nation 193T 
Housing Progress 1938 
Housing Problems 1935 
Kensal goose 1937' 
Kensington Calling 1935 
Men in Danger 1939 
New Worlds for Old 1938 
Silver-Lining 1935 
Today and Tomorrow 1937 
Today We Live 1937 
Workers and Jobs 1935 
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(d) Newsreel Specials 
Europe Today 
The Great Crusade 
(British Movietone News) 1934 
(Pathe) 1935 
2. Visnews Film Library 
(a) Ga=ont British News 
Issue No. Date 
14 15/2/34 
61 30/7/34 
126 14/3/35 
128 21/3/35 
193 4/11/35 
194 7/11/35 
298 5/11/36 
303 23/11/36 
349 3/5/37 
357 31/5/37 
440 17/3/38 
484 18/8/38 
497 3/10/38 
501 17/10/38 
517 12/12/38 
524 5/1/39 
Summary Title 
Turmoil in Europe 
Study in Politics 
MacDonald on Peace 
Sir John Simon on Rearmament 
General Election 
General Election 
Jarrow March 
Baldwin on the Achievements of 
the National Government 
London Bus Strike 
Bas Strike Ends 
Britain Rea=ms on Wartime Basis 
Lansbury on Peace 
Munich Agreement 
London Rail Strike 
International Brigade Returns 
Unemployed Demonstration 
(b) British Paramount News 
18' 30/4/3 Chamberlain on Snowden Budget 
52 27/8/31 Cabinet Resigns 
53 31/8/31 New Cabinet Policy 
54 3/9/31 Henderson on New Goverment Policy 
55 7/9/31 Baldwin on New Government Policy. 
65: 12/10/31 General Election 
66 15/10/31 General Election 
67 19/10/31 General Election 
68 22/10/31 General Election 
124 5/5/32 MayDay Demonstration 
172 20/10/32 James Matton on Unemployment 
173 23/10/32 Hunger March 
175 31/10/32 Hunger March Fads 
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230 11/5/33 May Day Rally. 
233 22/5/33 Lansbury Pleas for Peace 
291 11/12/33 Dole benefits rictended 
295 25/12/33 James Maxton Interview 
304 25/1/34 Hunger March 
345 18/6/34 Government Cinema Vans 
408 24/1/35 Miners Leader Speaks 
470 29/8/35 Lansbury Pleas for Peace 
482. 10/10/35 Lansbury Resigns 
484 17/10/35 Miners' Stay-Down Strike 
485 21/. 10/35 Mineral Strike 
488 1/11/35 Anti-Nazi Demonstration 
489 4/11/35 General Election 
588 14/10/36 Anti-Fascist Rally 
592 29/10/36 Fish Girlsº Strike 
593 2/11/36 Jarrow March 
645 3/5/37 London Bus Strike 
646 6/5/37 London Bus Strike 
653 31/5/37 Dis Strike Ends 
730 24/2/3£ Europe and the. Crisis 
790 22/9/38 Europe's Fateful Hour 
871 3/7/39 Tenants Rent Strike 
3. British Movietone News Li 
2 16/6/29 
36 10/2/30 
44L 10/4/30 
48 5/5/30 
51 26/5/3.0 
82L 1/1/31 
85L 22/1/31 
93 16/3/31 
105k 11/6/31 
1o9 6/T/31 
110 13/7/31 
116A 27/8/31 
118 7/9/31 
120L 24/9/31. 
123 12/10/31 
123A 15/10/31 
MacDonald and the Iabo= Cabinet 
Baldwin Interview 
Arthur Greenwood. on Housing- 
labour Day, Demonstration 
Mosley Interview. 
Mosley Interview 
India Bund. Table Conference 
Churchill Interview 
MacDonald on Peace 
MacDonald on Hoover Moratorium 
Party Leaders at Albert Hall 
Finergency Cabinet Holds Pirst 
Meeting 
Baldwin, Samuel and MacDonald 
Britain Abandons Gold Standard 
MacDonald Interview 
General Election 
e 
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124 19/10/31 General Election 
124.. 22/10/31 General Election 
125 26110/31 General Election 
126 2/11/31 Lansbury's New Job 
141 15/2/32 Chamberlain on Tariffs. 
152A 5/5/32 May Day in Hyde Park 
174 3/10/32 Snowden in Opposition 
192A 9/2/33 Zyde Park Labour Protest 
210A. 15/6/33 MacDonald at Economic Conference 
227A 12/10/33. Lord Lloyd on Air Defence 
228k. 19/10/33 1kcitain Shows Signs of Prosperity 
245A 14/2/34 8unciman Interview 
263 18/6/34 Government Talkie Vans 
300A 7/3/35 Is There To Be An Armaments Race? 
330k 3/10/35 Labour Party Conference 
331 7/10/35' Chamberlain at, Tory Conference 
332k 17/10/35 Miners' Stay-Down Strike 
333 21/10/35 End of Miners! Strike 
3341 31/10/35 General Election 
335 4/11/35 General Election 
336 11/11/35 General Election 
383 5110/36 Conservative Party Conference 
3831 8/10/36 Jarrow March 
387 2/11/36 Jarrow- March 
390 23/11/36 Prime Minister on Democracy 
402 15/2/3.7 Strike at P1int Factory 
413 2/5/37 The Bus Strike 
435A T/10/3T Labour Party-Conference 
436 11/10/3? Conservative Party Conference 
464k 28/4/38 The Budget. 
4651 5/5/30 May Day 
487 3/10/38 Munich Agreement 
501 9/1/39 Unemployed Demonstration 
4. IIWPathe Film Li 
31/5 15/1/31 
31/69 27/8/31 
31/72 7/9/31 
31/82 12/10/31 
i 
Herbert Morrison's Building Scheme 
Government Resigns 
Baldwin on the Crisis 
General Election 
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31/83 15/10/31 General Election 
31/84 19/10/31 General Election 
31/85 22/10/31 General Election 
31/87 29/10/31 National Goverment Victory 
33/38 11/5/33 Labour Demonstration 
34/49 18/6/34 Government Cinema Pans 
35/4 14/1/35 J. H. lhomas Interview 
35/80 7/10135 MacDonald on Peace 
35/87 31/10/35 General Election 
35/88 4/11/35 General Election 
36136 4/5/36 May- Day 
36/94 23/11/36 Baldwin Speaks to the Nation 
38/80. 6/10/38 The Man of the Hour- - Neville 
Chamberlain 
5. North West Film Archive 
The Magic Basket 1930 
Partners 1930 
Bound the Clock 1932 
Women's Cooperative Guild Congress, Hull 1939 1939 
f 
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